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Abstract 
 
North Korea is unlikely to willingly relinquish its nuclear program because of its importance 
to the political economy of the DPRK state and the perpetuation of the Kim Jong-il regime.  
It is clear that the nuclear program has great intrinsic value to Pyongyang, its role as a 
defensive deterrent and important element in Pyongyang‘s offensive asymmetric war 
strategy.  The nuclear program functions as a bargaining chip in international diplomacy to 
extract economic inputs for its moribund economy, in domestic politics as vehicle for 
bureaucratic interests, and as a rallying symbol of the country‘s hyper-nationalist ideology.  
At the same time, regional states lack a credible strategy for coaxing North Korea into 
nuclear relinquishment due to their lack of leverage over the Kim regime, the absence of 
unity in addressing the nuclear issue and the incongruence of their wider strategic goals vis-à-
vis North Korea.  Given this state of affairs, regional countries will have no choice but to 
accept North Korea as a nuclear power and manage regional relations through deterrence.  To 
increase the stability of this environment, regional states may consider unconditional 
normalisation of political and economic relations with North Korea. 
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Preface 
 
 
 
Analysis of a country like North Korea that imposes such severe restrictions on the flow of 
information across its borders is complicated by impediments to the development of a chain 
of evidence.  It is important at this juncture to acknowledge the limitations of the data sample 
used in this thesis and account for any potential bias that may lie herein.  There is not the 
wealth of primary data available that one could expect to access if studying another country.  
Much of this information is available in South Korea, in Korean, which is an obstacle for a 
researcher based in Adelaide, Australia, with minimal understanding of hangul.  Where 
possible and/or practical, this thesis has drawn on primary data, including government 
documents and official statistics obtained online and through direct observation on two trips 
to the region: a July 2008 research trip to South Korea, and a three-month stay in Dandong, 
China, during 2004, on the west bank of the Yalu River facing North Korea.  Where access to 
primary data is limited, the thesis draws heavily on secondary sources written in English.  
Peer reviewed books and articles are the most prized secondary sources, followed by non-
government organisation (NGO) reports and expert commentaries.  Where appropriate, 
attempts have been made to corroborate primary data and secondary written sources with 
interview testimony from academics, journalists and think-tank policy analysts, gathered 
during the aforementioned trip to South Korea in 2008.  Where interview testimony has been 
used, a description of the interviewee is provided in the footnotes to establish their credibility 
as a source of information.   
 
The reliance on English language sources may bias data collection toward predominantly 
American and Australian perspectives on the nuclear issue.  Every effort has been made to 
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 ix 
access work by South Korean, Chinese and Japanese scholars, however it is acknowledged 
that a larger and more extensive literature on this subject exists in the native languages of 
those countries.  In relation to the use of Korean words and names, the thesis uses the 
McCune-Reischauer system of transliteration (without breves). 
 
It is for these reasons that the scope of the thesis is limited to providing a fresh interpretation 
of the existing academic literature in order to address its research hypothesis, rather than a 
more ambitious project requiring sustained access to large amounts of primary data.  Despite 
these limitations, the thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of the North Korean nuclear 
issue and reaches conclusions that provide a substantive addition to the scholarly debate on 
this topic. 
 
Many people have contributed to the production of this thesis.  First, I would like to express 
my heartfelt gratitude to my wife Helen for supporting me through my candidature, as well as 
my son Kobe and my parents Peter and Olga.  The support of my family has been integral to 
the completion of this project.  I would also like to thank my supervisors, Prof Andrew 
O‘Neil and Dr Maryanne Kelton for their guidance and mentoring throughout my 
candidature.  I greatly appreciate the contribution of Higher Degree Administration and 
Scholarships Office and the Faculty of Social Sciences at Flinders University for awarding 
me a scholarship to undertake PhD studies, and for providing financial grants to undertake 
field research in South Korea.  My gratitude also goes out to Dr James Manicom, Dr Terry 
O‘Callaghan, Dr Deanne Gannaway, Dr Martin Burke (DSTO), Dr Holli Evans, Dr Salah 
Kuteileh, Dr Vlado Vivoda, Dr Peter Burns, Dr Pamela Wallace, Assoc Prof Nick Bisley, 
Robert Godfrey (ANSTO), Julie Rayner, Cathy Moloney, Mary Lyons, Colum Graham, Rob 
Manwaring, Julie Tonkin, Sonja Yates, Trisha Farmilo for their assistance throughout my 
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PhD journey.  I give thanks to the academics, journalists and policy analysts in South Korea, 
who kindly gave their time for interviews during my trip to South Korea in July 2008, as well 
as Kim Sa-ra and Hwang Seong-woo, who assisted with logistics during my stay.   Finally, I 
would like to thank the academic staff of the School of Politics and International Relations at 
Flinders University, whose collective wisdom helped enormously in the formative stages of 
this research project. 
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1. Introduction 
 
To the casual observer, North Korea must seem like a bastion of irrationality, ruled by a 
provocative, nuclear-armed regime that is constantly engaged in crises with neighbouring 
states and the international community.  Indeed, every time diplomacy heralds a new dawn 
for cooperation on the Korean peninsula, the regime of Kim Jong-il unleashes some new 
provocation that plunges the region back into uncertainty.  This pattern seems perplexing 
given the perilous condition of the North Korean state since the great famine of the 1990s.  
For many foreign policy makers and academic analysts, the obvious road to recovery for 
North Korea lies through economic reform and integration into the global trading system.  
Instead, the Kim regime has chosen to devote a large portion of its scant resources to the 
development of a nuclear weapons program, a choice that has exacerbated the deprivation of 
the North Korean people and deepened the country‘s economic and political isolation.  In the 
meantime, it has engaged in episodes of calculated escalation against over the United States 
and other regional countries.  This thesis will explore the reasoning behind North Korea‘s 
escalatory behaviour and the subsequent responses of regional states up to mid-2009. 
 
North Korea‘s nuclear development has occurred in the context of over half a century of 
antagonism between the North and the United States, as security guarantor of its southern 
neighbour the Republic of Korea (ROK).  Since the detection of plutonium reprocessing 
activities at the Yongbyon nuclear facility in the 1980s, Washington has been at the forefront 
of efforts to halt North Korea‘s nuclear program before Pyongyang could develop a 
functional nuclear deterrent. South Korea and Japan have also become involved, as have 
China and Russia.  Most disconcerting for regional countries has been their impotence in 
preventing North Korea from becoming a nuclear weapons state. 
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Denuclearisation means different things to different actors in this debate.  Removing the 
weapons component of the nuclear program is not the same thing as the complete elimination 
of the program itself.  The United States and Japan clearly desire the total dismantlement and 
removal of all North Korea‘s nuclear-related facilities and materials encompassing the entire 
nuclear fuel cycle, a position that reflects their geopolitical goals and threat perceptions.  
China, South Korea and Russia have adopted a more nuanced position on this question, 
advocating the removal of the North‘s nuclear weapons capability but not necessarily the 
entire nuclear program.  Under this interpretation of denuclearisation, removal of weaponised 
components of the North‘s nuclear program does not preclude the continued operation of 
peaceful energy-generating components of the nuclear fuel cycle under International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.  The North Koreans have argued they have a right, 
enshrined in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), to develop nuclear technology for 
peaceful application as a civilian energy source, a view that has a great deal of currency 
among developing nations.
1
  Pyongyang‘s demands for proliferation-resistant light-water 
nuclear reactors as compensation for relinquishing their nuclear program are a reflection of 
this argument.  However, one should treat this claim with caution because of the high 
probability that North Korea‘s nuclear development has long been pursued with military 
applications in mind.  Also, because the Korean nuclear crisis is a product of the US-DPRK 
antagonism, the American policy position on denuclearisation may be more pertinent to the 
discussion.  Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, denuclearisation will refer to the 
complete dismantlement of North Korea‘s nuclear program, inclusive of weapons systems 
and all components of the nuclear fuel cycle.   
 
                                                 
1 2003b. KCNA refutes U.S. sophism about DPRK's decision . Pyongyang: Korean Central News Agency, 
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200301/news01/15.htm [Accessed 23 July 2007]. 
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Literature Review 
The investigatory themes of this thesis relate to the full spectrum of imperatives driving 
Pyongyang‘s nuclear proliferation, and the substantial limitations in negotiating leverage that 
regional states suffer vis-à-vis North Korea.  To outline a research niche in which to explore 
these issues in an innovative manner, one must first appraise the existing literature on North 
Korea in order to define that niche.  Indeed, the scholarship on North Korea‘s nuclear 
proliferation is nested within a wider literature on North Korea‘s domestic politics and 
foreign relations.  This literature review will begin by perusing key works on the Kim regime 
leadership and the North Korean economy.  It then considers the literature focussing on low 
politics and various other facets of North Korean society.  Next, it identifies important studies 
comparing North and South Korea, before moving into high politics and North Korea‘s 
foreign policy.  Finally, it considers analyses of the Korean nuclear issue from North Korean 
and regional perspectives.  From this, the literature review will lead to the identification of 
the research niche of this study and provide the foundation for the thesis research questions 
and methodology. 
 
Primary Influence on Modern North Korea: Leadership or 
Economy?  
There is a vast literature devoted to the investigation of the political, ideological and domestic 
dimensions of the North Korean state.  Several scholars have devoted attention to Kim Il-
sung, as the founding charismatic leader of the one-Party North Korean state.  Suh Dae-
sook‘s Kim Il-sung: The North Korean Leader is a case in point, in which Suh indentifies the 
successes and failures of Kim‘s leadership as fundamental to comprehending the nature of his 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
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regime and more broadly the ideological competition between North and South Korea.
2
  This 
relationship arises because of the intense personality cult surrounding Kim and his personal 
control of the key institutions of state.  Adrian Buzo shares Suh‘s focus on Kim Il-sung as the 
central character in the story of North Korea.  In The Guerrilla Dynasty: Politics and 
Leadership in North Korea, Buzo argues that the origins and development of the North 
Korean state are inseperable from Kim Il-sung‘s persona as an anti-Japanese guerrilla fighter 
during the latter part of the Japanese occupation.
3
   While the Kim Il-sung personality cult has 
diminished since his death in 1994, the importance of the leader at the centre of a vast 
apparatus of control has not diminished under Kim‘s son, Kim Jong-il.  Former journalist 
Bradley Martin has documented the continuity and contrast of the two leaders of North Korea 
in his book Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and Kim Dynasty.
4
  
A key theme of this book is the manner in which the regime uses the Kim Il-sung personality 
cult as a vehicle for the exploitation of ordinary North Koreans to support a parasitic regime 
elite. 
 
However, as will be illustrated in chapter six, the Kim Il-sung personality cult has diminished 
in importance in contemporary North Korea.  Kim Jong-il is clearly less charismatic than his 
father and has adopted a more technocratic leadership style based on expanded linkages with 
the military.  This is not to say that the leadership cult has become irrelevant, because the 
dynastic line remains an important legitimator of Kim Jong-il‘s rule.  Rather, one must 
concede that the personality cult is no longer the fundamental feature of North Korean 
politics in the present institutional environment, but one of a number of important features.  
                                                 
2 SUH, D.-S. 1988. Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader, New York, Columbia University Press. p. 321. 
3 BUZO, A. 1999. The Guerrilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea, Sydney, Allen & Unwin. 
4 MARTIN, B. 2004. Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and Kim Dynasty, New York, St. Martin‘s Press. 
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The works of Suh, Buzo and Martin cited above therefore tend appear somewhat dated in the 
context of more recent institutional changes. 
 
Exclusive focus on the regime leadership tends to gloss over the fundamental structural 
underpinnings of the North Korean state.  The great famine of the mid-1990s was a defining 
event in recent North Korean history, with mortality estimates ranging from 100,000 to 2 
million deaths.  Daniel Goodkind and Loraine West have offered the most reliable mortality 
figures in their article The North Korean Famine and Its Demographic Impacts, suggesting a 
figure of approximately 600,000 fatalities.  Yet the numbers by themselves do not tell the full 
story.  Former Vice-President of World Vision Andrew Natsios claimed in his book The 
Great North Korean Famine that the regime ―triaged‖ the northeast section of the country, 
depriving it of food shipments in order to ensure that people in the politically more important 
cities had access to food.
5
    This view is disputed by Hazel Smith, who argues that it was 
industrial workers in the big cities who were worst affected by the famine.
6
 
 
The famine drew particular attention to the perilous state of the North Korean economy and 
thus the survivability of the Kim regime itself.  At this time Nicholas Eberstadt contended in 
his article Hastening North Korean Reunification and book The End of North Korea that the 
current order in the North could not last, given the deterioration trajectory of the economy.
7
  
Kim Kyung-won made a similar argument in his article No way out: North Korea’s 
impending collapse, warning that the economic fundamentals could not be ignored and that 
collapse was imminent.
8
  Many studies have made the assumption, explicitly or implicitly, 
                                                 
5 NATSIOS, A. 2001. The Great North Korean Famine, Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace Press. p. 106. 
6 SMITH, H. 2005. Disintegration and reconstitution in the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea. In: CHESTERMAN, S., IGNATIEFF, 
M. & THAKUR, R. (eds.) Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance. New York: United Nations University Press. 
7 EBERSTADT, N. 1999. The End of North Korea, Washington DC, American Enterprise Institute; EBERSTADT, N. 1997. Hastening 
Korean reunification. Foreign Affairs, 76, 77-92. 
8 KIM, K.-W. 1996. No way out: North Korea's impending collapse. Harvard International Review, 18, pp. 22-5, 71-2. 
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that if regime collapse was avoided, economic weakness would at some stage force North 
Korea to seek political accommodation with the United States and regional countries.  Not all 
analysts, however, agreed with the economic determinism inherent in the work of Eberstadt 
and Kim.  In his well-known article Why North Korea Will Muddle Through, Marcus Noland 
predicted that the Kim regime would neither collapse nor thrive, but would persist by making 
ad hoc adjustments to specific problems as they arose.
9
  This has turned out to be prescient, 
though it remains to be asked what other factors played a role is preserving the Kim regime 
as the very foundations of its rule began to crumble.  The subsequent book Famine in North 
Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform by Noland and Stephen Haggard suggested that the regime 
maintained itself through reliance on large inputs of foreign aid, which allowed Pyongyang 
avoid the kind systemic reform deemed necessary and unavoidable by the economic 
determinists.
10
 
 
Beyond Economics: A Broader Treatment of North Korean Society 
Further answers to these questions can be found in adaptable ideology and the power of the 
military, which provided the glue that kept the North Korean state together through the worst 
of the famine period.  In North Korea: The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom, Han S Park 
eschews emphasis on the regime leadership and instead pays primary attention to the 
ideational context within which North Korean politics and society operate.  Park believes that 
the ―state of mind‖ of the society determines the behavioural patterns of the people within it, 
an attitude which informs the book‘s analysis of political, institutional and economic facets of 
the North Korean state through the lens of Juche, the regime‘s official ideology.11  Park‘s 
                                                 
9 NOLAND, M. 1997. Why North Korea Will Muddle Through. Foreign Affairs, 76, pp. 105-118. 
10 HAGGARD, S. & NOLAND, M. 2007a. Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform, New York, Columbia University Press. p. 5. 
11 PARK, H. S. 2002. North Korea: The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom, Boulder, Lynne Rienner. pp. 8-9. 
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analysis of the North Korean state is instructive in its location of the Kim regime‘s political 
behaviour and decision making within the context of a rational system of ideas.  Its drawback 
is that it does not speak to power; in attempting to overcome the drawbacks of a leader-
centric framework it does not pay sufficient heed to the power relationships of state 
institutions. 
 
As later chapters of this thesis will show, the military has become the most important 
institution within the DPRK state  under the leadership of Kim Jong-il.  In The Armed Forces 
of North Korea, Joseph Bermudez provides a detailed account of the links between the 
regime and the forces, and then describes each wing: air, naval, ground forces, paramilitary, 
internal security, and intelligence.
12
  This text is detailed and informative, however its main 
drawback is that it is now somewhat dated.  Much is likely to have changed within the 
military in the decades since 2001, in parallel and because of the evolving internal dynamics 
of North Korea, as well as newfound power of the Korean People‘s Army (KPA) derived 
from the North‘s nuclear weapons capability and the possibility of growing internal power 
plays linked to the regime‘s dynastic succession.  The case piece entitled The North Korean 
People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics by James Minnich provides a more up to date 
examination of the KPA‘s doctrine and tactics.  Minnich identifies a distinct assymmetric 
warfighting strategy within KPA doctrine that could quite easily accommodate a nuclear 
weapons capability.
13
  Minnich‘s work does not examine, nor is it intended to, the intentions 
of the Kim regime in relation to the military capabilities identified.   
 
Several quality edited volumes have been published which pick up on the structural themes of 
the North Korean state. The North Korean System in the Post Cold War Era, edited by 
                                                 
12 BERMUDEZ, J. 2001. The Armed Forces of North Korea, London, I.B. Taurus. 
13 MINNICH, J. 2005. The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press. pp. 73-75. 
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Samuel Kim, examines the interactive processes between the various structural units of the 
North Korean state, using a systems theory approach.
14
  North Korea: The Politics of Regime 
Survival, edited by Kihl Young Whan and Kim Hong Nack, covers similar terrain to argue 
that North Korea has little option but to open to the outside world, because of the internal 
processes of change underway since the famine.
15
  Alternatively, The North Korean Nuclear 
Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia, edited by James Clay Moltz 
and Alexandre Mansourov, draws on the expertise and experience of Russian nationals who 
lived, worked and studied in North Korea during the Cold War, when the DPRK and Soviet 
Union were allies.  This book offers more nuanced alternative perspectives on North Korea‘s 
economy, political system and nuclear program that offer a finer resolution of detail than 
Western sources, because they are insider accounts.
16
 
 
Many authors have attempted to divine the regime‘s intentions regarding its nuclear program 
through general studies of the North Korean state, synthesising information from all the 
perspectives described above.  In North Korea: Through the Looking Glass, Kongdan Oh and 
Ralph Hassig paint a broad picture of North Korea‘s ideology, economy, leadership and 
military, before describing the nature of internal social controls and external foreign policy.  
In a theme echoed by Bertil Lintner in Great Leader, Dear Leader: Demystifying North 
Korea under the Kim Clan, Oh and Hassig caution against making standardised judgements 
of North Korea‘s economic trajectory and foreign policy decision making because the North 
is unique in comparison with other states; the regime and the people exist in a closed society, 
                                                 
14 KIM, Y.-G. 2001. Ideological Changes in North Korea since the 1990s. In:  Second Biennial Conference of Korean Studies Association of 
Australasia, 24-25 September 2001 2001 Melbourne, Australia. Monash University, pp. 384-392. 
15 KIHL, Y. 2006. Staying Power of the Socialist ‗Hermit Kingdom‘. In: KIHL, Y. & KIM, H. (eds.) North Korea: The Politics of Regime 
Survival. New York: East Gate Books. 
16 MOLTZ, J. C. & MANSOUROV, A. (eds.) 2000. The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from 
Russia. New York: Routledge. 
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an alternate reality that is not easily comprehensible to outsiders.
17
  Paul French offers a 
similar catch-all case study of North Korea in his book North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula 
- A Modern History.  For French, the key to understanding the alternate reality that is North 
Korean society lies in the regime‘s ―misguided‖ economic policies, stretching back to the 
beginnings of the North‘s command economy during the 1950s.18  Andrei Lankov also uses 
the regime‘s economic policies as a starting point in his book North of the DMZ: Essays on 
Daily Life in North Korea, but instead focusses on how these have shaped common life 
experiences of everyday North Koreans.  According to Lankov, many citizens under Kim 
Jong-il‘s reign have managed to transcend the tyranny of their oppressive environment, 
creating subtle but perceptible changes in the North Korean social fabric that will result in the 
transformation of Kim regime from Stalinism into something quite new.  For Lankov, this 
social change will be evolutionary rather than abrupt as the regime lurches between denial 
and acceptance of the emerging social reality.
19
 
 
Comparative Studies: North Korea versus South Korea 
The comparative approach is perhaps best exemplified by the epic The North and South 
Korean Political Systems: A Comparative Analysis by Yang Sung-chul, which offers a 
comprehensive comparative analysis of the political and economic systems of the two 
Korea‘s prior to the early 1990s.20  Yang goes into great detail describing the history and 
structure of North Korea‘s political system which he characterises as totalitarian, and the 
command economy, which he believes was typical of those existing in most socialist 
countries.  Yang argues that these characteristics, diametrically opposed to those existing in 
                                                 
17 OH, K. & HASSIG, R. 2000. North Korea: Through the Looking Glass, Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press. p. xiii; LINTNER, 
B. 2005. Great Leader, Dear Leader: Demystifying North Korea under the Kim Clan, Chang Mai Silkworm Books. 
18 FRENCH, P. 2005. North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula - A Modern History, London, Zed Books. 
19 LANKOV, A. 2007. North of the DMZ: Essays on Daily Life in North Korea, Jefferson, NC, McFarland & Company. 
20 YANG, S.-C. 1994. The North and South Korean Political Systems: A Comparative Analysis, Boulder, Westview Press. 
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the South, are what drive the political decision making of governments on both sides of the 
DMZ.  Don Oberdorfer makes largely the same point in The Two Koreas: A Contemporary 
History, though with much less finesse and authority.
21
 
 
Alternatively, American historian Bruce Cumings suggests that North Korea‘s internal 
politics and foreign policy decision making, as well as those of South Korea, have their 
genesis in a history and a political thought that extends well beyond the immediate concerns 
of the modern strategic environment on the peninsula.  In North Korea: Another Country, 
Cumings offers an alternative perspective to the common portrayal of North Korea, 
marvelling at how the North has survived since 1945 in spite of foreign invasions, natural 
disasters, and its own internal contradictions.  It is within this narrative of insecurity that 
Cumings locates Pyongyang‘s desire for nuclear weapons.22  In Korea’s Place in the Sun: A 
Modern History, Cumings provides a chronicle of modern Korea's turbulent twentieth-
century history, incorporating the demise of the Yi Dynasty and loss of independence to 
Japan in 1910, its years under Japanese occupation, and its division and the Korean War.
23
  It 
then becomes a comparative study contrasting the diverging fortunes of North and South 
Korea, particularly after the mid-1970s.   
 
High Politics: Nonproliferation and North Korean Foreign Policy 
Several studies offer historiographic accounts of the first nuclear crisis, culminating in the 
Agreed Framework.
24
 For example, in their seminal work Going Critical: The First North 
Korean Nuclear Crisis, Joel Wit, Daniel Poneman and Robert Gallucci offer an inside 
                                                 
21 OBERDORFER, D. 1999. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, London, Warner Books. 
22 CUMINGS, B. 2004b. North Korea: Another Country, Melbourne, Scribe. 
23 CUMINGS, B. 2005. Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History, New York, WW Norton & Company. 
24 1994. Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Korean Peninsula 
Energy Development Organization,  http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf. 
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account of the first nuclear crisis, in which all three were involved as high-ranking officials in 
the US State Department.
25
  Similar studies document the second nuclear crisis that began in 
2002.  Charles ―Jack‖ Pritchard and Yuichi Funabashi have published similar descriptive 
accounts of the second nuclear crisis, documenting the diplomatic activities that led to the 
establishment of the Six Party Talks and the pursuit of a denuclearisation deal in that forum.  
Pritchard‘s Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb is a US-
centric insider‘s account which documents his role as a special envoy in the Bush 
administration‘s negotiating team.26  In The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second 
Korean Nuclear Crisis, Funabashi, a journalist, uses a broader brush in illustrating the role 
played by other states in the Six Party Talks, along with the key role played by the US.
27
  
These works do an outstanding job of chronicling the diplomatic manoeuvring that has 
embodied denuclearisation negotiations since the late 1980s.  Yet it is precisely because they 
concentrate on the diplomatic angle that they miss the critical domestic drivers of North 
Korea‘s proliferation decision-making. 
 
Other authors are more prescriptive.  In Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North 
Korea, Leon Sigal chronicles the negotiating track during the first nuclear crisis, concluding 
that the United States would have to pursue more serious cooperative engagement with North 
Korea if it was going to accomplish its nonproliferation goals.
28
  Where Sigal has 
concentrated on the means of accomplishing nonproliferation objectives during the first 
nuclear crisis, Michael Mazarr has focussed on the nature of US nonproliferation objectives 
themselves.  In North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation, Mazarr 
                                                 
25 WIT, J., PONEMAN, D. & GALLUCCI, R. 2004. Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, Washington DC, Brookings 
Institution Press. 
26 PRITCHARD, C. 2007. Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb, Washington DC, Brookings Institution 
Press. 
27 FUNABASHI, Y. 2007. The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, Washington DC, Brookings 
Institution Press. 
28 SIGAL, L. 1998. Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea, Princeton Princeton University Press. 
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suggests that realistic criteria for successful nonproliferation should vary according to the 
degree to which a nuclear program is entrenched in the military and political economy of a 
proliferator state.
29
  In the North Korean case, Mazarr concludes that engagement should be 
the strategy of choice because the reasons behind Pyongyang‘s proliferation decisions are 
likely to have evolved from their original purposes as tool of hard power security.
30
   For 
Selig Harrison, engagement on its own was not enough to get the diplomatic track moving.  
In Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and US Disengagement, he argued for the 
gradual disengagement of US forces from Korea in order to reposition itself as an honest 
broker in denuclearisation negotiations.
31
 
 
The debate over engagement in the late-1990s and early-2000s centred on the ability of the 
US to deter would-be nuclear aggression by Pyongyang, as well as the willingness of the Kim 
regime to accept a grand bargain quid pro quo for dismantling its nuclear program.  In North 
Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies, Victor Cha and Daving Kang took up this 
debate.
32
  Cha argued in favour of ―hawk engagement,‖ whereby the US would negotiate with 
Pyongyang in order to secure an international mandate for more punitive action, while Kang 
argued in favour of a grand bargain.  Both agreed that the Kim regime was neither irrational 
nor undeterrable, and that engagement should be the default policy option, though for 
different ends.  In North Korea on the Brink: Struggle for Survival, Glyn Ford and Soyoung 
Kwon have investigated the history of the DPRK to analyse whether Pyongyang‘s nuclear 
threat is real, or exaggerated as a threat by Washington to garner international support for its 
                                                 
29 MAZARR, M. 1997. North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation, London, Macmillan Press. p. 203. 
30 Ibid. p. 183. 
31 HARRISON, S. 2002c. Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and US Disengagement, Princeton, Princeton University Press. p. 
xxiii. 
32 CHA, V. & KANG, D. 2003. North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies, New York, Columbia University Press. 
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national missile defence system.
33
  This forms the basis for their assessment of how the 
European Union (EU) should approach the Korean nuclear crisis.  They recommend that the 
EU provide North Korea with sufficient security guarantees to enable it to give up its nuclear 
weapons and enough assistance to facilitate the economic and social reforms that the country 
needs. 
 
Other writers have explored the nuclear question in the context of US relations with both 
North and South Korea.  Lee Chae-jin contends in A Troubled Peace: US Policy and the Two 
Koreas that Washington‘s policy of containment and deterrence since the Korean War has 
allowed South Korea to enjoy a prolonged period of peace, during which time the South has 
become an economic powerhouse and matured politically into a stable democratic state.  At 
the same time, its inability to successfully deal with the North Korean nuclear issue has 
ensured that the US will remain enmeshed in Korean peninsula affairs for some time to 
come.
34
  Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia, edited by Charles 
Armstrong et al, looks more broadly at the prospects for regional integration in Northeast 
Asia and concludes that though so far elusive, a comprehensive regionalism based on 
economic, political and security linkages is possible.
35
  By contrast, Samuel Kim‘s The Two 
Koreas and the Great Powers explores the two Korea‘s relationships with the four other 
regional powers: the United States, China, Russia and Japan.
36
  The persistent theme raised is 
the diverging geostrategic interests of the regional powers, which inhibits their capacity for 
coordinated action on the North Korean nuclear quesiton.  This theme will form the basis for 
the analysis of the Northeast Asian security environment in Part III of this thesis. 
                                                 
33 FORD, G. & KWON, S. 2008. North Korea on the Brink: Struggle for Survival, London, Pluto Press. 
34 LEE, C.-J. 2006. A Troubled Peace: US Policy and the Two Koreas, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
35 ARMSTRONG, C., ROZMAN, G., KIM, S. & KOTKIN, S. (eds.) 2006. Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia, 
Armonk: ME Sharpe. 
36 KIM, S. 2006d. The Two Koreas and the Great Powers, New York, Cambridge University Press. 
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The problem with studies focusing on the North Korean nuclear question as a dimension of 
US foreign policy is that they tend to overlook factors driving Pyongyang‘s proliferation 
decision making that extend beyond national security concerns.  While the foreign policy 
dimension is no doubt important, other analysts have offered greater focus on the domestic 
aspects of North Korea‘s nuclear development.  North Korea in a Regional and Global 
Context, edited by Robert Scalapino and Lee Hong-ku, provides an overview of the 
organisation and administration of North Korean foreign policy during the 1980s, with 
specific emphasis on the influence of Juche philosophy on North Korean foreign policy 
calculus.
37
  The question remains, however, as to why a self-reliant foreign policy orientation 
would be important to North Korea?  To address this question, it is not enough to focus on 
foreign policy considerations alone.  Particularly where nuclear proliferation is concerned, 
foreign policy variables must be combined with domestic drivers to arrive at some useful 
conclusions.  Indeed, the domestic political economy dimensions of the North‘s nuclear 
proliferation are among the most important to consider in coming to an understanding of the 
complexities of the North Korean proliferation problem.  It is clear from Pyongyang‘s long 
history of nuclear development and negotiating behaviour that the nuclear program has great 
intrinsic value to the Kim regime.  Alexandre Mansourov‘s article The Origins, Evolution, & 
Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program cites four key drivers of North 
Korea‘s nuclear development—US bombardment of Japan with atomic weapons, US nuclear 
threats against Pyongyang, the Cuban missile crisis, and the discovery of the South‘s 
clandestine nuclear weapons program.
38
  These justifications fall under the rubric of national 
security, yet states usually seek to develop and maintain nuclear weapons for a number of 
                                                 
37 SCALAPINO, R. & LEE, H.-K. (eds.) 1986. North Korea in a Regional and Global Context, Berkeley: Center for Korean Studies, 
University of California-Berkeley. 
38 MANSOUROV, A. 1995. The Origins, Evolution, & Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program. The Nonproliferation Review, 
2, pp. 28-29. 
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reasons.  In his article North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields, or 
Swords?, Victor Cha points to internal variables such as parochial bureaucratic interests, 
domestic political machinations, national identity and economic incentives as the drivers of 
nuclear proliferation, over and above national security.
39
  It is this line of reasoning, 
focussing on the links between the nuclear program and the political economy of the North 
Korean state, which forms the foundation for analysis in Part II of this thesis. 
 
Identifying a Research Niche 
This thesis presents a novel interpretation of the existing literature on the North Korean 
nuclear problem, integrating a number of different analytical perspectives in its 
conceptualisation of the issue as a two-level game.  Denuclearisation negotiations should be 
viewed as the site at which the two-level game takes place, where domestic politics and 
foreign policy objectives of North Korea and regional states intersect with regional strategic 
competition.  The thesis combines a detailed structural and theoretical analysis of the political 
economy of the North Korean state, identifying Pyongyang‘s core rationales for acquiring 
nuclear weapons, with a comprehensive summary of the Northeast Asian security 
environment and the commitment of regional states to nonproliferation on the Korean 
peninsula.  As the literature review suggests, there is a niche for studies that integrate these 
variables and explain how they interact to produce the stalemate we see today.  This is the 
research niche that this thesis aims to occupy. 
 
                                                 
39 CHA, V. 2002b. North Korea‘s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields, or Swords? Political Science Quarterly, 117, p. 211. 
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Research Questions 
Pyongyang has a documented commitment to developing nuclear technologies stretching 
back to the 1950s and the aftermath of the Korean War, and of nuclear weapons-related 
development from as early as 1970.
40
  It has shown a willingness to buy time for this task 
through provocations such as missile and nuclear tests, incursions into South Korean sea- and 
air-space, and inflammatory statements about its nuclear program.  The concurrent failure of 
regional states to counter North Korea‘s proliferation threat prompts a rather obvious 
question: can North Korea's nuclear weapons program be removed?  This answer to this 
problem is not the exclusive disjuncture that it may appear on face value.   
 
The literature review revealed two key concepts that will require further examination through 
the thesis.  First, the many studies focussing on low politics of North Korea‘s internal 
political economy all tend to arrive at the same discussion point: regime longevity.  One 
arrives at this conclusion because there appears to be a definitive trajectory of decline in each 
of the dimensions of state, which accelerated during the great famine.  This leads to related 
questions: is the North sincere about the denuclearisation process?  Pyongyang‘s loose 
observance of the 1994 Agreed Framework, withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty in 2002, and demands to renegotiate the terms of subsequent agreements reached in 
the Six Party Talks, as well as its possible clandestine uranium enrichment program, all point 
to a negative answer.  Again, this opens up a new line of inquiry: if North Korea is committed 
to nuclear development, what utility does the nuclear program have for the Kim regime?  The 
North‘s perseverance in advancing its nuclear weapons program in spite of dogged 
international pressure seems to indicate that the nuclear program is of some vital importance 
to the perpetuation of the Kim regime.  If this is the case, one must then probe the 
                                                 
40 For a detailed chronology of North Korea‘s nuclear development stretching back to the late-1940s, see: HABIB, B. & O'NEIL, A. 2009. 
North Korea's Emergence as a Nuclear Weapons State and the End of the Disarmament Paradigm. Global Change, Peace and Security, 21. 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
 19 
relationship of the nuclear program to the political economy of the North Korean state and 
ask how it assists in perpetuating the Kim regime.  The degree to which the nuclear program 
is entwined with the Kim regime may reveal much about the likelihood that Pyongyang will 
choose to relinquish its nuclear program. 
 
Second, the literature examining the high politics of the nuclear program in terms of North 
Korea‘s foreign policy and Northeast Asian relations also arrives at a singular discussion 
point: the poor record of denuclearisation negotiations.  Indeed, while diplomatic and 
economic engagement appears to be the most realistic options for addressing the nuclear 
problem, and taking into account the significance of the Agreed Framework in delaying 
North Korea‘s nuclear armament by a decade, tangible outomes in terms of permanent 
denuclearisation have been relatively limited.  Again, this poses a series of related sub-
questions: can military solutions bring about nuclear dismantlement?  Pyongyang‘s regular 
provocations, including a number of missile and nuclear tests, have not incited a military 
response from regional states.  Instead, each provocation has prompted further economic 
sanctions and a flurry of ineffectual diplomatic activity.  Why, then, have two decades of 
diplomatic efforts proven fruitless?  Despite a series of agreements since 1994 to forestall the 
North's nuclear development, by 2006, Pyongyang had tested a nuclear device, followed by a 
second test in May 2009.  If the goal of diplomatic engagement was to prevent North Korea 
from acquiring a nuclear capability, then by any measure these efforts have failed.  Since 
2003, diplomatic efforts have centred on the Six Party Talks, a multilateral forum involving 
North Korea, the United States, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia.  It was hoped in 
Washington that the six-Party forum would enable the US to pressure Pyongyang to make 
concessions on its nuclear program through the added leverage of demands for 
denuclearisation from regional states, leverage that has failed to materialise because regional 
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states find it difficult to present a united front.  Are then the goals and methods of regional 
states in addressing the North Korean nuclear threat mutually consistent?  These questions 
must be examined within the context of the broader strategic environment of Northeast Asia 
in order to delineate the place of each regional state within this system. 
 
These two key concepts point to an internal/external dichotomy to the North Korean nuclear 
question, both of which must be addressed.  They give rise to three primary research 
questions, which will form the basis for the methodology employed in this thesis: 
1. Will North Korea willingly relinquish its nuclear program (the internal 
dimension)? 
2. Can North Korea be compelled to relinquish its nuclear program by 
regional states (the external dimension)? 
3. What are the possible outcomes (integrating the two dimensions)? 
Clearly there must be some relationship between the longevity of the Kim regime, the nuclear 
program, and the persistent failure of denuclearisation negotiations.  The goal of this thesis is 
to pinpoint the exact nature of this relationship. 
 
Methodology 
International relations in practice incorporates a mixture of political, economic and social 
forces moulded together in complex interplay.  As an academic discipline, it is a multifarious 
amalgam of politics, history, economics, philosophy, psychology, sociology and other related 
fields, so it makes sense that any sound analysis of specific foreign policy problems should 
embrace insights from the breadth of the disciplinary spectrum.  The methodological 
framework utilised in this thesis is a reflection of the disciplinary heterogeneity inherent in 
both the international relations discipline and, as Lee Chae-jin rightly points out, the Korean 
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peninsula context as well.
41
  Despite this, the thesis is positivist in its epistemological 
foundation, because it is examining a series of hypotheses (the research questions) to 
establish causal explanations based on the evidence of material forces.  The methodology, 
and the analytical frameworks set up within it, is directed toward the satisfaction of these 
ends. 
 
The research questions point to an internal/external dichotomy inherent to the North Korea 
nuclear issue, which suggests analysis of the problem at the domestic and international levels.  
Robert Putnam describes international politics as a two-level game in which the internal 
machinations of domestic politics lead national governments to formulate foreign policies 
that seek to satisfy domestic interests, while minimising any adverse consequences these 
policies may generate in the international realm.
42
  Therefore, the domestic imperatives of 
state governments, as well as the preferences of the individuals that lead them, heavily 
influence interstate relations.  In the context of the North Korean nuclear issue, this applies to 
the proliferation calculus of the DPRK government as well as the commitment of regional 
states to nonproliferation strategies.  The two-level game is the premise that forms the 
methodological foundation for addressing the research questions of the thesis. 
 
Research Question #1: Will North Korea willingly relinquish its 
nuclear program? 
This question requires a probing of the Kim regime‘s motivations for nuclear proliferation.  
These motivations will revolve around preserving the security of the North Korean state and 
                                                 
41 Lee notes, ―the competing theoretical or philosophical paradigms such as realism and liberalism serve to characterize general tendencies, 
but they do not fully describe the varying nuances in the multi-faceted US policy toward Korea.  No American administration always and 
consistently applied a straightforward one-sided paradigm to the multitude of foreign policy issues.  Every president drew on a combination 
of different paradigms to address specific issues and presided over the shifting balance between and among different bureaucracies.‖  See: 
LEE, C.-J. 2006. A Troubled Peace: US Policy and the Two Koreas, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press. p. 278. 
42 PUTNAM, R. 1988. Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. International Organization, 42, pp. 427-460. 
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the perpetuation of the regime‘s rule.  The working hypothesis for this question is that the 
decay of the North Korean state, accelerated after 1991 but beginning much earlier, has 
forced the regime to use the nuclear program to address several different domestic problems 
which endanger regime perpetuation.  First, it must be established that the North Korean state 
has experienced significant decline between its establishment in 1945 and the present day.  
David Carment‘s three perspectives on state failure establish this case; they encompass long-
term (macro) systemic processes, intermediate mechanisms associated with institutional 
viability, and short-term (micro) shock events that accelerate state deterioration in the context 
of variables at the macro and intermediate levels.
43
  What we find in the North Korean case 
are decay vectors at each level: ecological constraints and resource limitations exists at the 
macro level; declining marginal returns on investment eating away at state institutions on the 
intermediate level; and two shock events—the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and natural 
disasters from 1995-98—at the micro level.  Second, having established a decline trajectory, 
the thesis makes a before and after comparison of the North Korean economy and political 
system on either side of the great famine, the period which encompasses the two shock events 
identified above.  The comparison helps to identify the weaknesses of the North Korean state 
today, using the command economy and totalitarianism as frames of reference for the 
economic and political systems respectively.  Third, the thesis examines how the nuclear 
program is used to address some of these weaknesses and prop up the Kim regime, using an 
analytical framework encompassing the national security, international diplomacy and 
domestic politics drivers of nuclear proliferation.  Examination of this research question 
constitutes Part II of the thesis. 
 
                                                 
43 CARMENT, D. 2003. Assessing state failure: implications for theory and policy. Third World Quarterly, 24, p. 410. 
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Research Question #2: Can North Korea be compelled to relinquish 
its nuclear program by regional states? 
This question stems from the lack of success regional states have enjoyed in pursuing 
nonproliferation objectives vis-à-vis North Korea.  The key issues here relate to the capacity 
of any one regional state, or regional states acting in concert, to successfully compel North 
Korea to relinquish its nuclear program.  First, this section examines international relations 
theory, comparing realism, liberalism and constructivism in the Northeast Asian context.  
Because neither theory paints a satisfactory picture of the regional security environment on 
its own, the section instead adopts the cooperation, competition and conflict framework 
devised by Muthiah Alagappa, which incorporates insights from each of the three leading 
international relations theories to construct a much more comprehensive picture of the 
Northeast Asian security environment.  Second, the  cooperation, competition and conflict 
framework is applied to the five regional states—the United States, Japan, South Korea, 
China and Russia—to ascertain their strategic goals and gauge the likelihood of their 
cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue, finding that strategic competition is the 
modus operandi of regional states.  Third, the cooperation, competition and conflict 
framework is used to categorise and assess the individual and collective nonproliferation 
strategies employed by regional states to address the North Korean nuclear issue since the 
first nuclear crisis began to escalate in 1992.  Examination of this research question 
constitutes Part III of the thesis. 
 
Research Question #3: What are the possible outcomes? 
This question requires the integration of the answers obtained to the other two research 
questions, a combination of domestic considerations driving North Korea‘s proliferation 
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decisions and the undercurrent of strategic competition that inhibits the ability of regional 
states to cooperate in addressing Pyongyang‘s nuclear gambit.  Scenario mapping within the 
rubric of cooperation, competition and conflict is the rubric of choice here, ascertaining what 
nonproliferation strategies may work given North Korea‘s intent to remain a nuclear power 
and the difficulty that regional states have in prosecuting a coordinated response.  This 
section will also identify some wildcard scenarios that may change the domestic and external 
variables of the issue.  Examination of this research question constitutes Part IV of the thesis. 
 
 
Figure 1: Structure of thesis methodology. 
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Thesis Argument 
The argument of this thesis derives directly from the research questions identified above.  
First, North Korea is highly unlikely to relinquish its nuclear capability because the nuclear 
program is deeply enmeshed in the political economy of the North Korean state and performs 
several functions that are integral to the perpetuation of the Kim regime.  The degree of this 
enmeshment and the specific functions it performs are the focus of Part II of the thesis.  
Second, regional states are poorly equipped to compel North Korea to relinquish its nuclear 
program.  This arises because no one regional state has the capacity to force Pyongyang‘s 
hand on its own.  Similarly, regional states lack a coherent strategy for collective action, 
stemming from the atmosphere of strategic competition within which their mutual relations 
take place.  Each state has its own unique set of strategic objectives that are often incongruent 
with those of the other players, making it difficult for all parties to agree on appropriate 
nonproliferation strategies.  These divisions will be explored in more detail in Part III of the 
thesis.  Third, given this state of affairs, regional countries themselves will be compelled to 
adapt to North Korea as a nuclear power.  How they manage to do this in a regional security 
environment characterised by competition is likely to become the new battleground for policy 
and academic debate.  Part IV of the thesis will explore this in greater detail, offering a 
number of future trajectories along which the nuclear issue may head, as well as some 
wildcard scenarios that could destabilise the situation and create a whole new dynamic in 
Korean peninsula affairs.  China‘s growing role as a centre of power is occurring as the 
United States begins to diminish as a global superpower.  The evolving foreign policy 
orientation of Japan, developing from the tension between its historic pacifist posture under 
US protection and pressure from the political right to return Japan to adopt a more active and 
‗normal‘ strategic posture.  Internationally, broader factors such as the global financial crisis, 
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energy insecurity and climate change are emerging as challenges to regional security, despite 
the difficulty in calibrating their precise long-term impacts. 
 
Chapter Outline 
Part I 
Following on from this introduction, chapter two analyses North Korea‘s motivations for 
pursuing its nuclear weapons program.  These motivations are clustered into three specific 
groups—national security, domestic politics, and international diplomacy—which illustrate a 
clear case for North Korea‘s acquisition and maintenance of a nuclear capability.  The multi-
faceted utility of the nuclear program to the Kim regime is indeed compelling.  Most 
importantly, given the country‘s anaemic economy and resource shortages, the nuclear 
capability gives the regime the bargaining leverage it needs to plug holes in its economy with 
inputs of aid from the international community.  The chapter then examines the technical 
aspects of the North‘s nuclear fuel cycle and the level of sophistication so far achieved by its 
nuclear weapons capability. 
 
Part II 
Chapter three examines the decline of the DPRK leading up to 1991 and its subsequent rapid 
economic collapse following the demise of the Soviet Union.  The thesis establishes the long-
term and intermediate timeframe trends of decay, and the immediate trigger events that led to 
the calamitous famine and the consequent reorganisation of North Korean society.  The 
process of declining marginal returns on investment in key areas of the economy, where 
ongoing reductions in output within key economic sectors plagued the North Korean 
economy before the famine, caused the long-term and intermediate timeframe degradation.  
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The regime‘s responded by priming the system with ever more inputs of resources and labour 
in an attempt to boost production.  Over time, the success of this strategy declined despite the 
increasing scale of inputs, a classic illustration of declining marginal returns.  The trigger 
events that sparked the famine and deindustrialisation of the command economy were a result 
of the over-reliance on foreign inputs at the very moment when this external support gave 
way.  North Korea‘s nuclear program is integral to the regime‘s efforts to postpone the onset 
of declining marginal returns and is used to preserve the status quo for as long as possible. 
 
North Korea‘s economic system post-famine is the focus in chapter four.  The moribund 
command system, increasingly reliant on imported energy supplies, agricultural inputs and 
manufactured goods from the Soviet Union and the wider communist bloc, was extremely 
vulnerable to disruptions in its input flow.   When the Soviet Union collapsed, this 
vulnerability was exposed and the weakened economy plunged into precipitous decline, 
splintering into a number of parallel economies through the 1990s, including the huge 
military economy, the entrepreneurial economy, the court economy, and the illicit economy, 
along with the remains of the old command system.  The military has become the backbone 
of regime perpetuation under this economic order.  In the absence of systemic economic 
reform, inputs of foreign aid have become crucial to the maintenance of the military-centred 
system. 
 
Having charted North Korea‘s economic history, Part II then focuses on the impact of 
economic decline on the country‘s political system.  Chapter five analyses North Korea‘s 
political structure during the Kim Il-sung era prior to 1991, which harboured the 
characteristics of a totalitarian state: absolute dictator and mass Party, transformational 
ideology, all-pervasive system of terror, and Party monopoly on communications 
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technologies.
44
  Reflecting the pre-famine economy, this political system also fell victim to 
the gradual decay of declining marginal returns, as a function of the great systemic 
maintenance costs inherent in such strict social control mechanisms.  The economic crisis 
triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union accelerated systemic decay already underway 
since the late-1960s, eroding with it the other dimensions of the totalitarian political order.   
 
Chapter six examines the degradation of the totalitarian architecture post-famine, concluding 
that North Korea is in the process of becoming a post-totalitarian state.  North Korea‘s 
political system today is no longer that of a full-blown totalitarian regime, though the 
foundations of the totalitarian order remain in place.  The economic transformation that has 
taken place has triggered a process of political change at the grass-roots level that is 
undercutting the institutions of the old order, a process that does not appear to have reached 
its conclusion.   
 
Part III 
Chapter seven outlines the strategic value of the DPRK to regional states, documenting their 
differing strategic priorities and incongruous goals vis-à-vis North Korea.  Northeast Asian 
countries co-exist in strategic competition, where each state‘s geopolitical imperatives and 
strategic goals conflict with those of its neighbours, creating a disharmony of purpose that 
impedes their collective effort to address the North Korean threat.  Northeast Asia is a 
complex strategic environment riven by historical animosities, competing alliance blocs and 
growing rivalries.  The region is a bipolar system dominated by the United States and China.  
Within this system, the Chinese control the continental mainland while the US, for the time 
                                                 
44 FRIEDRICH, C. & BRZEZINSKI, Z. 1966. Totalitarian Dictatorship & Autrocracy, New York, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers. 
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being, dominates the East Asian maritime environment.  Regional states align their positions 
more or less behind these two poles of power in denuclearisation negotiations, allowing 
Pyongyang to cultivate the divergence of positions to its own advantage.   
 
Chapter eight documents the strategies pursued by regional states to compel North Korea to 
denuclearise.  It considers four broad approaches to denuclearise North Korea: regime 
change, limited military action via air strikes, bilateral engagement, and multilateral 
engagement.  These strategies have encountered varying degrees of success.  Military options 
have proven to be unviable in the absence of a catalysing event such as a North Korean attack 
over the DMZ.  Efforts to extract concessions from Pyongyang by strangling the North 
Korean economy have not faired much better, owing to the disunity of purpose among 
regional states described in the preceding chapter.  Efforts to engage North Korea, to secure 
nuclear relinquishment in exchange for a raft of incentives, has achieved the most by way of 
constructive progress, but even this has proven unsuccessful as a denuclearisation strategy.  
In light of these failures, this chapter finds that regional states are unlikely to compel North 
Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons program. 
 
Part IV 
Chapter nine confronts the predicament that regional states will need to adapt to a North 
Korea, either through conflict, cooperation or competition.  The key question is how they 
manage the tension between their divergent strategic interests, their nonproliferation goals, 
and their desire for regional stability.  This chapter contrasts the likelihood of conflict 
(nuclear arms race) with cooperation (multilateral security institutionalism), before exploring 
several more likely scenarios reflecting the reality of regional strategic competition.  It also 
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considers wildcard scenarios that could alter North Korea‘s internal politics and the dynamics 
of regional relations. 
 
Chapter ten will integrate the findings of the preceding chapters to address the three primary 
research questions of the thesis.  Denuclearisation of North Korea has been a goal of regional 
states for two decades.  Despite the efforts of regional states and a seemingly weak hand, 
Pyongyang has attained nuclear power status and used it as a means to shore up the position 
of the leadership and strengthen the national security of the state.  Yet the regime's continued 
brandishing of the nuclear card is a recipe for further crises, a problem regional states will 
compound by clinging to a denuclearisation agenda that has been ineffective.  Regional 
countries will be forced to adapt to North Korea as a nuclear weapons power and manage 
competitive regional relations in a pragmatic way that accommodates this new reality.  
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2. North Korea’s Nuclear Program: Strategic 
Rationale and Technical Capabilities 
 
 
Understanding Pyongyang‘s motivations for acquiring a nuclear capability is integral to the 
comprehension of the Korean nuclear crisis.  If the motivation is purely one of national 
security then the conclusion of an agreement featuring mutual concessions and confidence-
building measures should be reasonably straightforward.  The fact that denuclearisation 
negotiations have been anything but straightforward should be a red flag to the international 
community that North Korea‘s motivations for proliferation are more complex.  The first 
section examines North Korea‘s motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons.  These 
motivations are clustered into three specific groups—national security, domestic politics, and 
international diplomacy—which clearly illustrate the degree to which the nuclear program is 
embedded in the political economy of the DPRK state.  Subsequent chapters will explain how 
these motivations spring from deficiencies in the political economy of the DPRK state, as 
evidence for the hypothesis that North Korea will not willingly relinquish its nuclear 
program.   
 
This task requires an understanding of the technical aspects of the nuclear program itself.  
Some actors in this story, including members of the former administration of George W Bush 
in the US, have called for nuclear dismantlement as if it were something the North could 
perform very rapidly.
1
  By examining the extent of the nuclear program, the sheer 
impracticality of such demands becomes clear.  In a very real way, the physical plant of the 
                                                 
1 The Bush administration had chosen to maintain its position that complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation (CVID) was necessary 
before North Korea could reap any benefits from negotiations.  Indeed, the Americans were adamant that talks on any forthcoming incentives 
would not begin until these demands were met.  This will be explored further in Chapter 8.  See also: ROZMAN, G. 2007. The North Korean 
Nuclear Crisis and US Strategy in Northeast Asia. Asian Survey, 47, p. 607. 
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program, the numerous complex industrial processes of the North‘s nuclear fuel cycle, are 
embedded in the national economy.  Through coming to understand the regime‘s motivations 
for nuclear proliferation and the technical aspects of its nuclear capability, one can 
successfully locate the program within the political economy of the DPRK state and evaluate 
its importance to the institutional maintenance of Kim regime rule.   
 
 
Strategic Aspects: North Korea’s Motivations for Nuclear 
Proliferation 
The Six Party Talks are based upon the assumption that North Korea can be persuaded to 
dismantle its nuclear capability with the right mix of incentives and pressure.  However, is it 
wise to assume that the conventional logic is appropriate in the case of North Korea?  In 
denuclearisation negotiations since 1994, the North has failed to make lasting concessions on 
its nuclear program, despite what appear to be compelling incentives in light of the country‘s 
economic weakness.  Instead, the regime has actively engineered crises as a means to extract 
international largesse in exchange for de-escalation, without making any real concessions that 
address the core issue.  This pattern suggests that the conventional logic is flawed.  North 
Korea‘s long history of nuclear development, the momentum of investment in the closed 
indigenous nuclear fuel cycle describe above, and the benefits Pyongyang accrues from 
nuclear-related blackmail, point toward the conclusion that Pyongyang has relinquishing 
strong interest in maintaining its nuclear program.   
 
In general, states seek to develop and maintain nuclear weapons for a number of reasons.  For 
Kurt Campbell, currently serving as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs in the Obama administration, the motivations for nuclear proliferation revolve 
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predominantly around external factors: a response to changes in US foreign policy; a 
breakdown of the global nonproliferation regime; erosion of regional security; domestic 
imperatives; and the increasing availability of nuclear technology.
2
  Campbell‘s is very much 
a security-based explanation, privileging external factors as integral to proliferation decision 
making.  His reference to domestic imperatives as one of five other factors downplays what 
on its own could include numerous separate justifications for nuclear development based on 
internal political, economic and ideological drivers.   
 
Other analysts recognise the importance of internal variables in addition to national security 
concerns.  Scott Sagan groups the drivers of nuclear proliferation into three categories: first, 
states build nuclear weapons to increase their security against foreign adversaries, particularly 
if their enemies also maintain a nuclear capability.  Second, nuclear weapons are useful as 
political tools to advance parochial domestic political and bureaucratic interests.  Finally, 
nuclear weapons acquisition, or restraint of nuclear weapons development, can provide a 
normative symbol of a state‘s identity.3  Victor Cha offers a similar typology specific to 
North Korea, dividing Pyongyang‘s nuclear motivations variously as ―shields,‖ ―swords‖ and 
―badges.‖  If the North‘s nuclear capability operates as a shield, it is a product of the Kim 
regime‘s feelings of chronic insecurity and as such is deployed as a deterrent.  If the nuclear 
capability is a sword, it functions for aggressive purposes and will comprise a key component 
of an offensive war plan with the goal of reuniting the Korean peninsula on Pyongyang‘s 
terms.  If it is a badge, the nuclear program is a symbol of international prestige that affords 
North Korea greater diplomatic weight in the international arena than what it otherwise 
                                                 
2 CAMPBELL, K. 2004. Reconsidering a Nuclear Future: Why Countries Might Cross Over to the Other Side. In: CAMPBELL, K., 
EINHORN, R. & REISS, M. (eds.) The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices. Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution. p. 20. 
3 SAGAN, S. 1996/1997. Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb. International Security, 21, p. 55. 
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would enjoy.
4
  What is missing from Sagan and Cha‘s frameworks is an explicit reference to 
the economic dimension of nuclear proliferation, which, as this thesis will show, is an 
important variable in Pyongyang‘s proliferation calculus.  This section will combine the 
frameworks offered by Sagan and Cha with an emphasis on the economic dimension to 
explore three different areas—national security, domestic political and economic purposes, 
and international diplomatic advantage—in which the nuclear program is valuable to the Kim 
regime. 
 
Nuclear Weapons for National Security 
North Korea‘s emergent nuclear doctrine yields clues about its national security motivations 
of nuclear proliferation.  Nuclear doctrine is a series of principles, rules and instructions 
about the utility of nuclear weapons to a given country encompassing how, when and why 
such weapons will be deployed and used.  Specifically, a nuclear doctrine will describe the 
extent of a country‘s nuclear capability, clarify the offensive or defensive intention of its 
deployment, outline whether the capability is strategic or tactical, define probable targets, and 
identify key weapon delivery systems.
5
  Most nuclear powers explicitly define their nuclear 
doctrines to prevent potentially devastating miscalculations on the part of other nuclear states.  
It is possible to deduce elements of a likely nuclear doctrine by piecing together strands of 
information from official statements, North Korean strategic culture, known troop 
deployments, and research on the North‘s war-fighting strategy. 
 
                                                 
4 CHA, V. 2002b. North Korea‘s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields, or Swords? Political Science Quarterly, 117, p. 211. 
5 SCOBELL, A. & SANFORD, J. 2007. North Korea's Military Threat: Pyongyang's Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
and Ballistic Missiles. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute,  http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/Display.Cfm?pubID=771 pp. 
87-88. 
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Pyongyang‘s official statements have consistently indicated that the regime‘s nuclear 
capability is defensive and exists for deterrence.  Even as early as 2001, regime officials were 
proclaiming the defensive nature of their nuclear program.  In the aftermath of 11 September 
2001, North Korean Foreign Minister Paik Nam-soon made clear that ―our nuclear program is 
solely for our self-defence.  We denounce al-Qaeda for the barbaric act of 9/11, which was a 
terrible tragedy and inflicted a great shock to America.‖6  The regime reiterated the defensive 
nature of their nuclear capability in a statement issued through KCNA on 3 October 2006 
announcing the imminent nuclear test: 
the DPRK will never use nuclear weapons first but strictly prohibit any threat of nuclear 
weapons and nuclear transfer.  A people without reliable war deterrent are bound to 
meet a tragic death and the sovereignty of their country is bound to be wantonly 
infringed upon. This is a bitter lesson taught by the bloodshed resulting from the law of 
the jungle in different parts of the world.  The DPRK's nuclear weapons will serve as 
reliable war deterrent for protecting the supreme interests of the state and the security of 
the Korean nation from the U.S. threat of aggression and averting a new war and firmly 
safeguarding peace and stability on the Korean peninsula under any circumstances.
7
 
This announcement set a precedent for no first-use of nuclear weapons, intentionally 
demonstrating the defensive nature of a nuclear capability by attempting to minimise an 
adversary‘s fear of surprise attack.8  Generally, pre-emptive first strikes are more likely to 
occur when both opposing sides believe that war is imminent.
9
  In the North Korean case, by 
announcing a doctrine of no-first use, the Kim regime has attempted to reduce the perception 
of imminent threat among regional states in order to lessen possibility of a pre-emptive attack 
against it.  Taken at face value, these assurances appear to be a sign of the North‘s intention 
to act as a responsible nuclear power.   
  
                                                 
6 Paik Nam-soon cited in CHEON, S.-W. 2005. North Korea Nuclear Crisis: Current Status and Past Lessons. Korea and World Affairs, 29, 
p. 346. 
7 2006c. DPRK Foreign Ministry Clarifies Stand on New Measure to Bolster War Deterrent . Korean Central News Agency, 
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2006/200610/news10/04.htm#1 [Accessed 9 October 2006]. 
8 SIGAL, L. 1983. No First Use and NATO‘s Nuclear Posture. In: STEINBRUNER, J. & SIGAL, L. (eds.) Alliance Security: NATO and the 
No-First-Use Question. Washington DC: Brookings Institution. p. 110. 
9 SNYDER, G. 1961. Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security, Princeton, Princeton University Press. pp. 107-08. 
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One element to consider in evaluating the credibility of this doctrine is the status of the 
North‘s nuclear capability.  Prior to the October 2006 test, the North‘s capability was 
ambiguous, resting on unverifiable statements of admission.  The regime made increasingly 
explicit assertions about its nuclear weapons capability from October 2003, culminating in an 
outright admission in February 2005.
10
  The October 2006 test seemingly confirmed the 
North‘s nuclear weapons capability, although the test did not emphatically demonstrate the 
existence of a working, deployable weapon.  The May 2009 nuclear test has gone some way 
toward resolving this issue, though observers do not know if these weapons are ready for 
deployment as a warhead on a missile.  Even if the North lacks a miniaturised weapon, an 
ambiguous nuclear posture can create some anxiety about undesirable consequences in the 
decision calculus of an adversary, without committing the deterring state whole heartedly to 
any specific threat.
11
  Because outsiders do not know the exact status of the threat, any power 
considering attacking the DPRK must factor in the risk of an operational nuclear deterrent 
into its decision.   
 
The second consideration is whether the North‘s nuclear posture is offensive or defensive in 
nature, or a combination of the two.  To answer this question it is necessary to identify North 
Korea‘s overall strategic goals, of which there appear to be two: regime survival and 
reunification of the peninsula on North Korean terms.
12
  The goal of regime survival requires 
as one of its prerequisites the deterrence of military penetration by South Korean and 
American forces and the compellence of other states to help it survive.
13
  Reunification of the 
peninsula on North Korean terms means ousting the US presence in South Korea and uniting 
                                                 
10 PRITCHARD, C. 2007. Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb, Washington DC, Brookings Institution 
Press. pp. 132-33. 
11 SNYDER, G. 1961. Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security, Princeton, Princeton University Press. p. 246. 
12 HODGE, H. 2003. North Korea‘s Military Strategy. Parameters, Spring 2003, pp. 69-70; BERMUDEZ, J. 2001. The Armed Forces of 
North Korea, London, I.B. Taurus. p. 9. 
13 For more on the utility of deterrence and compellence as dual strategies, see: MORGAN, P. 2006. Deterrence and System Management: The 
Case of North Korea. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 23, pp. 121–138. 
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the entire ‗fatherland‘ under North Korean control.  In this instance, North Korea‘s long-
standing reunification strategies may provide insights into how they might deploy nuclear 
weapons once they have achieved a fully weaponised capability.  How the North deploys its 
nuclear weapons depends on which of these broader goals enjoys operational primacy.    
 
Defensive Posture: Deterrence 
Should regime survival be the paramount objective of the state then the nuclear capability is 
likely to be mobilised for deterrence.  Neo-realist theories of deterrence posit that states must 
develop self-help strategies to protect their sovereignty and national security in an anarchical 
international system.  Therefore, any state with nuclear-capable rivals must develop its own 
nuclear deterrent to preserve its sovereignty.
14
  Deterrence is the discouragement of the 
initiation of military aggression through the threat of a retaliatory response.
15
  Cheon Seong-
whun argues that this holds true in the North Korean case, where the regime feels that a 
nuclear deterrent is necessary as a means of defence against nuclear intimidation or attack by 
the United States.
16
  This is the reason most often cited in North Korea‘s official statements, 
which maintain that proliferation is a necessity to deter the United States.  The US maintains 
the world‘s largest nuclear arsenal and has threatened to use nuclear weapons against the 
DPRK over the past half-century.  Deterrence has a different meaning in the North Korean 
context: small countries like North Korea do not deter aggression through the development of 
second-strike capabilities for mutually assured destruction (MAD), as in the superpower 
contest of the Cold War.  Rather, they maintain a nuclear threat just large enough to raise the 
uncertainty in the calculations of an adversary that a first strike would not be completely 
                                                 
14 CAMPBELL, K. 2004. Reconsidering a Nuclear Future: Why Countries Might Cross Over to the Other Side. In: CAMPBELL, K., 
EINHORN, R. & REISS, M. (eds.) The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices. Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution. p. 24; SAGAN, S. 1996/1997. Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb. International 
Security, 21, p. 57. 
15 SNYDER, G. 1961. Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security, Princeton, Princeton University Press. pp. 11-12. 
16 CHEON, S.-W. 2005. North Korea Nuclear Crisis: Current Status and Past Lessons. Korea and World Affairs, 29, p. 346. 
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successful.
17
  In terms of the North‘s national security, the nuclear capability provides a low-
cost strategic equaliser against the US/ROK forces across the DMZ and a deterrent against 
attack or invasion from the South.   
 
For Robert Jervis, a strong deterrent posture employs the threat or use of force to make it 
either impossible for an aggressor state to achieve their objectives, or unacceptably costly for 
it to do so.
18
  The intention is to frighten an enemy state from attacking, because the expected 
cost of retaliation is high enough as to be unpalatable.
19
  As a small state with a limited 
nuclear program, North Korea cannot develop and utilise complex second-strike capabilities 
to cement a mutually assured destruction relationship with the United States.  Instead, the 
North can create what Victor Cha has called ―first-strike uncertainty,‖ whereby it develops 
just enough of a nuclear inventory to plant seeds of doubt in the calculations of its enemies, 
creating uncertainty that an attack by the enemy would be sufficient to neutralise the North 
Korean deterrent.
20
  This doubt also raises the risk premium of attacking North Korea, owing 
to the threat of nuclear retaliation against targets in South Korea and Japan.
21
  Nuclear 
weapons in North Korea‘s hands raise the stakes considerably in this regard.  Deterrence, 
therefore, does not make a state impregnable from attack.  A strong defence posture 
incorporates deterrence but includes other facets of conventional military power that enable a 
nuclear state to defend itself in the event that deterrence fails.
22
   
 
                                                 
17 CHA, V. 2002b. North Korea‘s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields, or Swords? Political Science Quarterly, 117, pp. 216-17. 
18 JERVIS, R. 1987. Strategic Theory: What‘s New and What‘s True. In: KOLKOWICZ, R. (ed.) The Logic of Nuclear Terror. Boston: 
Allen and Unwin. p. 51. 
19 WALTZ, K. 2003. More May Be Better. In: SAGAN, S. & WALTZ, K. (eds.) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company. p. 5. 
20 CHA, V. 2002b. North Korea‘s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields, or Swords? Political Science Quarterly, 117, p. 216. 
21 MCLAUGHLIN, J. Year. Remarks by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, John E. McLaughlin. In:  North Korea: Engagement or 
Confrontation, 17 April 2001, Texas A&M Conference. Federation of American Scientists. 
22 SNYDER, G. 1961. Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security, Princeton, Princeton University Press. pp. 3-4. 
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Offensive Posture: Component of an Offensive War Plan 
It is possible the North‘s nuclear weapons program has a strategic role over and above 
creating a strong deterrence posture. Reunification of the peninsula on North Korean terms—
usually taken to mean ‗by force‘—has been a stated goal of the Kim dynasty since December 
1962, when Kim Il-sung fortified the garrison state in North Korea by introducing his policy 
of the ―Four Military Lines‖ during the Fifth Session of the Korean Workers‘ Party Central 
Committee.
23
  His intent was to strengthen the state against attack from the South and to 
prepare for another push to reunify the Fatherland.  Two years later Kim introduced the 
policy of the ―Three Revolutionary Forces,‖ which called for revolution at home, in South 
Korea and internationally.  These policies remain embedded in the 1998 constitution and are 
the foundation upon which the North‘s military strategy has been based.24   
 
The DPRK‘s war fighting strategy remains heavily predicated on reunifying Korea by force 
and utilises asymmetric capabilities to achieve its objectives.  In general, asymmetric military 
strategies allow a weaker state to deprive a stronger adversary of the advantages of their 
military superiority.
25
  In this case, North Korea has compensated for its conventional 
military inferiority by enhancing its ability to strike targets at longer range utilising ballistic 
missiles, self-propelled artillery and multiple rocket launchers.  This allows it to project force 
beyond the forward theatre without the need for wholesale movement of troops and military 
hardware.
26
   
 
                                                 
23 CHEON, S.-W. 2005. North Korea Nuclear Crisis: Current Status and Past Lessons. Korea and World Affairs, 29, p. 344. 
24 BERMUDEZ, J. 2001. The Armed Forces of North Korea, London, I.B. Taurus. p. 9. 
25 GOLDSTEIN, A. 2008. Parsing China‘s Rise: International Circumstances and National Attributes. In: ROSS, R. & FENG, Z. (eds.) 
China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. p. 62. 
26 POLLACK, J. 2005. The Strategic Futures and Military Capabilities of the Two Koreas. In: TELLIS, A. & WILLS, M. (eds.) Strategic 
Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty. Seattle & Washington DC: National Bureau of Asian Research. pp. 137-38; 
OBERDORFER, D. 1997. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, Reading, Addison-Wesley. p. 388; YANG, S.-C. 1994. The North and 
South Korean Political Systems: A Comparative Analysis, Boulder, Westview Press. p. 715. 
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The offensive war plan itself is purportedly based upon a two-front surprise attack.  The first 
front consists of a massive artillery bombardment followed by full-frontal attack across the 
DMZ, with the objective of rapidly capturing Seoul.  Chemical weapons are to be utilised in 
the forward operating area to disable ROK forward defences, while simultaneous ballistic 
missile attacks will target military bases, ports and command and control facilities in the 
ROK rear, and in Japan, in an attempt to disable reinforcement of the forward defences.  
Special forces teams will infiltrate by sea, air and tunnel to create a second front, turning all 
of South Korea into a battlefield by attacking important facilities in the rear area, setting fires 
in urban areas and engaging defending ROK and US troops from a second flank.
27
  The 
objective is to capture Seoul quickly and then overrun the peninsula before American 
reinforcements arrive from abroad, with the aim of forcing a political settlement in which the 
North Korean occupation is accepted as a fait accompli.
28
  The regime leadership may view 
this strategy as feasible while the US is distracted in other theatres, including Iraq and 
Afghanistan, during which time rapid reinforcement of units in South Korea will be difficult.  
Pyongyang may also have noted the aversion among US officials to involvements that 
produce heavy American casualties.  If the North can strike early and hard, producing heavy 
US casualties at the outset, they may surmise that Washington will come under intense 
domestic pressure to extricate their forces and sue for a diplomatic settlement.
29
 
 
Although it is logical for the North Korean military to position a large portion of its forces 
between the DMZ and Pyongyang to defend the capital, forward deployments of KPA 
personnel and hardware in close proximity to the DMZ may be a sign that this blitzkrieg war 
                                                 
27 YANG, S.-C. 1994. The North and South Korean Political Systems: A Comparative Analysis, Boulder, Westview Press. p. 716. 
28 SCOBELL, A. & SANFORD, J. 2007. North Korea's Military Threat: Pyongyang's Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
and Ballistic Missiles. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/Display.Cfm?pubID=771.p p. 
32-38; MINNICH, J. 2005. The North Korean People’s Army: Origins and Current Tactics, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press. pp. 73-75; 
BERMUDEZ, J. 2001. The Armed Forces of North Korea, London, I.B. Taurus. pp. 11-12. 
29 BRADNER, S. 2001. North Korea‘s Strategy. In: SOKOLSKI, H. (ed.) Planning for a Peaceful Korea. Carlisle, PA: US Army War 
College, Strategic Studies Institute. pp. 27-28. 
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strategy remains operational.  It is estimated that approximately 70 percent of the North‘s 
military units and almost 80 percent of its aggregate firepower lie within 100 kilometres of 
the DMZ.
30
  Since 1991, the DPRK has invested heavily in WMD programs—chemical and 
biological, as well nuclear and special forces capabilities—while de-emphasising 
conventional mechanised military assets.  Cessation of Soviet patronage and stark economic 
difficulties forced this choice upon the regime.  Asymmetric capabilities are a strategic 
leveller, providing the North with a degree of military parity in the face of the massive 
technological superiority of US and ROK forces.  
 
Nuclear weapons may have a role in this scenario, complementing the use of other 
asymmetric warfare capabilities such as chemical weapons and special forces commandos.   
Tactical use of nuclear weapons—as opposed to the more ambiguous definition of tactical 
nuclear devices as having short-range and low explosive yield—relates to the targeting of 
nuclear munitions of any size against military targets supporting the enemy‘s war effort, 
wherever they may be.
31
  In North Korea‘s offensive war plan, short-range Scud-C missiles 
carrying nuclear warheads could target military bases and logistical hubs in South Korea and 
Japan, such as port facilities in Seoul, Busan or Yokohama, or in artillery shells targeting 
frontline troops in the forward theatre.
32
  It is difficult to envisage, however, North Korea 
escaping massive nuclear retaliation from the United States should they employ nuclear 
munitions against South Korean or Japanese targets.  The objectives of the war plan could 
certainly be achieved without nuclear weapons; after all, North Korean missiles are more than 
                                                 
30 SCOBELL, A. & SANFORD, J. 2007. North Korea's Military Threat: Pyongyang's Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
and Ballistic Missiles. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/Display.Cfm?pubID=771. p. 
23. 
31 SNYDER, G. 1961. Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security, Princeton, Princeton University Press. p. 137; 
SOKLOV, N. 2002. Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) . Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_10a.html [Accessed 27 
February 2008]; HWANG, J. 1999. Testimonies of North Korean Defectors: Hwang Jang-yop Speaks . Global Security.org, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1999/hwang1.htm [Accessed 22 July 2006]. 
32 KANG, D. 1998. North Korea‘s Military and Security Policy. In: KIM, S. (ed.) North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War 
Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 181. 
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capable of destroying targets with conventional warheads.  If North Korea were to use 
nuclear weapons in a war scenario, they are likely to be the weapon of absolute last resort in a 
losing gambit.
33
   
 
Indeed, it is hard to envision a North Korean assault ultimately being successful.  What the 
war plan does, however, is add weight to Pyongyang‘s deterrent posture, because the threat of 
retaliation inherent in any deterrent posture must be credible.  It has the political effect of 
increasing the risk premium for any American and South Korean plans to use force against 
the DPRK with overwhelming retaliation against the South.
34
  It is likely that regime survival 
retains primacy in the current environment, given North Korea‘s fundamental weaknesses 
vis-à-vis South Korea and the United States.  Reunification by force may no longer be an end 
in itself, though its continued emphasis in regime propaganda reinforces the credibility of the 
deterrent posture and is thus a source of tremendous diplomatic leverage.  
 
Nuclear Weapons for International Diplomacy 
Possession of nuclear weapons can radically alter the diplomatic weight and prestige of a 
country.  Because of their power, nuclear weapons dramatically affect the thinking and 
behaviour of states-people; for the leaders of nuclear-armed states, possession gives them 
greater leverage in their relations with other countries and allows them to be bolder in pursuit 
of their national interests.  Non-nuclear states must either accommodate with the preferences 
of the new nuclear state or form a balancing alliance with an existing nuclear power, an 
                                                 
33 Victor Cha frames the choice in the following way: ―Like the gambler down on his luck, the more North Korea frames the current situation 
as a losing one, the more appealing the double-or-nothing option becomes.  Such a calculation would be based not on winning but on 
avoiding further loss.‖  See: CHA, V. 2002a. Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula. International Security, 
27, p. 65; KANG, D. 2003. International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War. International Studies Quarterly, 47, p. 313. 
34 LIM, W.-H. 2006. North Korea's Missile Tests: Malign Neglect Meets Brinkmanship . Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable 
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influence referred to as the ―nuclear shadow.‖35  North Korea‘s use of ambiguous nuclear 
blackmail and overt nuclear posturing through nuclear tests seems to confirm this theory and 
has been successful in extracting a more accommodating political attitude from the US and 
regional states. 
 
Nuclear weapon states may also deploy or threaten to deploy their nuclear capability in order 
to extract concessions, a tactic the Kim regime has utilised consistently in denuclearisation 
negotiations since the negotiation of the Agreed Framework in 1994.
36
  Pyongyang‘s strategy 
is known as ―coercive bargaining,‖ in which deliberate, directed provocations put pressure on 
the US and regional states to provide material inducements to persuade the regime to pull 
back from the brink.  As Victor Cha notes, these ―deliberate pinpricks‖ fall short of war but 
are serious enough to raise concerns about possible escalation.
37
  Once a crisis has been 
engineered, Pyongyang issues new demands or restates previous claims as conditions for de-
escalation and a return to negotiations.  For example, through its October 2006 nuclear test, 
Pyongyang was able to extract a significant shipment of oil, as well as the release of funds 
from suspected illicit operations frozen in Macau bank Banco Delta Asia, in exchange for its 
re-entry into the Six Party Talks.  Underpinning these instrumental goals was Pyongyang‘s 
broader objective of forcing a reticent United States to engage with it and ultimately alter 
Washington‘s DPRK policy.  This theme will be explored further in Chapter 8. 
 
                                                 
35 BECKMAN, P., CRUMLISH, P., DOBKOWSKI, M. & LEE, S. 2000. The Nuclear Predicament: Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First 
Century, New Jersey, Prentice Hall. p. 172.  See also: CHA, V. 2002b. North Korea‘s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields, or 
Swords? Political Science Quarterly, 117, p. 227.  
36 For the general theory of nuclear blackmail, see: BECKMAN, P., CRUMLISH, P., DOBKOWSKI, M. & LEE, S. 2000. The Nuclear 
Predicament: Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century, New Jersey, Prentice Hall. p. 188. For more on the North Korean case, see: 
ANDRIANOV, V. 2000. Economic Aspects of the North Korean Nuclear Program. In: MOLTZ, J. C. & MANSOUROV, A. (eds.) The 
North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia. New York: Routledge. p. 29. 
37 CHA, V. 2003b. Why We Must Pursue 'Hawk' Engagement. In: CHA, V. & KANG, D. (eds.) North Korea: A Debate on Engagement 
Strategies. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 72.  See also: LIM, W.-H. 2006. North Korea's Missile Tests: Malign Neglect Meets 
Brinkmanship . Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0653Lim.html [Accessed 
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Nuclear weapon states often brandish the nuclear card as a signal in international diplomacy 
that their vital interests are engaged, or that a particular policy position is absolute and 
immovable.
38
  One could argue that the North Korea‘s October 2006 nuclear test was 
intended not only as a demonstration of its nuclear weapons capability but also as a 
diplomatic signal to indicate that the unfreezing of North Korean assets in Banco Delta Asia 
was an important national interest that required immediate attention from the US and regional 
states.  This had the desired effect; as described above, US-DPRK bilateral meetings were 
held parallel to the Six Party talks to deal specifically with the frozen funds and by early 
February 2007, a deal had been reached to transfer the money back to Pyongyang. 
 
Pyongyang has also used its nuclear program to drive a wedge between regional states.  With 
each act of nuclear brinkmanship, North Korea has been able to widen the gap between the 
US and ROK on the one hand, and China and Japan on the other.  Following each 
provocation the US looks to Seoul to ratchet up the pressure on North Korea.  Until the 
inauguration of Lee Myung-bak as South Korean president, Seoul was careful to avoid full 
endorsement of US policy for fear of disrupting engagement efforts with the North.  The 
more pressure Washington placed on Seoul for action, the more the Pyongyang was able to 
entice the South into signing additional cooperation agreements to provide aid and assistance 
to the North.  In the second example, North Korean provocations drive support for 
conservative factions in Tokyo who wish to fully remilitarise the Japanese state and engage in 
pre-emptive military solutions to address the threat from the DPRK, which in turn provokes 
deep-seated animosities in China stemming from the Japanese occupation during the Second 
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World War.
39
  This allows Pyongyang to align with Beijing and Seoul in common 
apprehension of a remilitarised Japan and splinters the Six Party participants into two camps: 
China and South Korea (and often Russia) versus Japan and the United States.
40
  The latter 
camp has also been split in recent years as domestic pressure in Japan for progress on the 
abduction issue has often made Japan‘s response more hostile (in a rhetorical sense) than the 
US. 
 
Nuclear Weapons for Domestic Politics 
The domestic political justifications for North Korea‘s nuclear weapons proliferation 
encompass economic, bureaucratic, and ideological dimensions.  Generally, nuclear weapons 
present weak states with a relatively low-cost and technically achievable strategic equaliser in 
the face of the North‘s relative decline in conventional military capability.41  The initial up-
front cost of establishing a nuclear program are high, but after the initial outlay to bring 
nuclear weapon development to maturity, the maintenance costs of the nuclear deterrent 
become quite low in comparison with those of a conventional military force of commensurate 
strategic value.  The resultant savings dividend could then be redirected to other spending 
priorities.
42
  This argument has merit in the North Korean case, due to the vast technological 
gulf between the North Korean military and its opposing contingent of US and ROK forces, 
resulting from the growing disparity in economic power between the two Korean states.  
After all, conventional military build-up is costly, and therefore contingent on economic 
                                                 
39 Indeed, according to one author, ―if the cultish regime in North Korea had not existed, some Japanese strategists surely would have wished 
to invent it‖. See SAMUELS, R. 2007. Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press. p. 171.   
40 PARK, J. S. & LEE, D.-S. 2008. North Korea: Existential Deterrence and Diplomatic Leverage. In: ALAGAPPA, M. (ed.) The Long 
Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press. pp. 274-75.  
41 CAMPBELL, K. 2004. Reconsidering a Nuclear Future: Why Countries Might Cross Over to the Other Side. In: CAMPBELL, K., 
EINHORN, R. & REISS, M. (eds.) The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices. Washington DC: Brookings 
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42 SHEN, D. 2006. North Korea‘s Strategic Significance to China. China Security, Autumn 2006, p. 25. 
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capacity and technological prowess, areas in which North Korea is now at a terminal 
disadvantage.
43
 
 
In contemporary North Korea, the nuclear program also exists hand in glove with the 
regime‘s legitimising paradigm—Songun, or ―military-first‖ politics—that privilege the 
military as the power base behind Kim Jong-il‘s rule.44  The diversion of resources to service 
the nuclear program, and more widely the military itself, is justified in relation to the external 
threat posed by the United States.  The regime needs the US as an enemy figure upon which 
to focus the people‘s attention while the country remains under extreme hardship.45  North 
Korean propaganda positions the nuclear weapons program within this context.   
 
Nuclear weapons development also serves the narrow bureaucratic interests of institutions 
within the DPRK state.  Generally, in nuclear states, the institutional actors typically include 
the state‘s nuclear establishment, which maintains all facilities related to the nuclear fuel 
cycle, and important units within the military bureaucracy.
46
  These institutions have a 
powerful stake in self-perpetuation and are likely to be active acquiring more resources to 
expand their role.  For example, the fledgling bureaucracy established in the United States 
during the 1940s to run the Manhattan Project acquired a large pool of resources—including 
funding, personnel, and physical plant—which gave it a strong incentive to fulfil its mission 
to perfect a nuclear weapon.  The continued existence of this bureaucracy was contingent on 
                                                 
43 PARK, H. S. 2002. North Korea: The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom, Boulder, Lynne Rienner. p. 135. 
44 PINKSTON, D. 2003. Domestic Politics and Stakeholders in the North Korean Missile Development Program. The Nonproliferation 
Review, 10, p. 10. 
45 MYERS, B. 2006. Concerted Front: Why Seoul is soft on North Korea . New York: The Wall Street Journal, 
http://www.opinionjournal.com/forms/printThis.html?id=110009427 [Accessed 14 May 2008]. 
46 SAGAN, S. 1996/1997. Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb. International Security, 21, p. 64. 
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the use of the weapon it had created and the continued manufacture of further weapons to 
augment the existing stock.
47
   
 
Nuclear research began in North Korea in December 1952 when Kim Il-sung established the 
Atomic Energy Research Institute as a branch of the North Korean Academy of Sciences to 
commence research into the use of radioactive isotopes in agriculture, industry and 
medicine.
48
  In 1956, the USSR established the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research located at 
Dubna, outside of Moscow, to facilitate cooperation in nuclear science among countries 
within the communist bloc.  North Korea, a founding member of the institute, sent over 300 
nuclear specialists and more than 150 advanced specialists to Dubna during the period of 
Soviet-DPRK nuclear cooperation.
49
  At the same time, Pyongyang established indigenous 
nuclear physics departments at Kim Il-sung National University and Kim Ch‘aek Industrial 
College, which conducted basic nuclear research and were responsible for the refinement of 
new ideas in the field emanating from abroad.
50
  These efforts were accelerated during the 
1960s when the regime leadership made a conscious decision to ramp up development of a 
nuclear energy sector, then again in the 1970s when Kim Il-sung decided to begin work on 
nuclear weapons development as a hedge against abandonment by his major allies in the 
USSR and China in the shadow of the ongoing Sino-Soviet split.
51
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Today the Second Natural Science Institute is responsible for nuclear weapons research and 
development, in collaboration with the Academy of Sciences and the Second Economic 
Committee‘s Fifty Machine Industry Bureau.  The Nuclear Chemical Defence Bureau in the 
Ministry of People‘s Armed Forces manages the research and development of defensive 
measures against nuclear, chemical and biological attack.
52
  The Yongbyon complex employs 
approximately three thousand personnel, along with additional number associated with other 
nuclear facilities around the country.
53
  The Nuclear-Chemical Defence Bureau, an organ of 
the Ministry of People‘s Armed Forces reporting directly to Kim Jong-il, exercises command 
and control of the nuclear inventory.
54
  Dismantlement of these institutional structures would 
be extremely difficult because once established, institutions take on a life of their own. 
 
Technical Aspects: North Korea’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
These institutions oversee North Korea‘s nuclear fuel cycle, consisting of a number of 
complex industrial processes through eight specific stages.
55
  According to Russian scientists, 
North Korea possessed a complete nuclear fuel cycle by 2000, with the infrastructure to 
process weapons-grade plutonium.
56
  This analysis highlights the resource inputs, industrial 
hardware and technical expertise necessary to maintain the North Korea‘s nuclear fuel cycle, 
as well as the geographic dispersion of important nuclear sites.  While Yongbyon clearly is 
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the epicentre of the nuclear operation, other important nuclear-related facilities are located 
around the country.  As will be made clear, it is unrealistic to expect hasty dismantlement of 
such an extensive and well-developed infrastructure, regardless of any denuclearisation 
agreement.   
 
 
Figure 2: Location of facilities related to the nuclear program in North Korea. 
Source: “North Korea—Nuclear Weapons Program,” Global Security, 03 October 2006, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/other_nuke.htm 
 
 
Uranium Mining and Milling 
North Korea is endowed with extensive uranium ore deposits, which constitute the 
prerequisite feedstock of the nuclear fuel cycle.  Surveys conducted during the 1970s suggest 
that North Korea at that time possessed approximately 300,000 tons of uriniferous black shale 
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ore, at concentrations of around 0.2 percent uranium, located at depths of about 200 metres.
57
  
Today, large-scale uranium mine sites in North Korea include Sunchon in South Pyongan 
province, Kusong, in North Pyongan province, Unggi in North Hamgyong province, 
Pyongsan in North Hwanghae province, and Pakchon in South Hamgyong province.
58
  North 
Korean mines use two uranium ore extraction techniques; open cut mining is used when the 
ore body lies at a shallow depth, while underground mining techniques at employed when the 
ore deposit is greater than 120 metres deep.
59
   
 
Uranium milling facilities are generally located close to the ore body.  North Korea‘s 
uranium milling facilities are located at Sunchon, Pyongsan and Pakchon, close to uranium 
mines in those areas.
60
  The extracted ore must be milled to concentrate the uranium in a form 
more practical for industrial processing because of the low concentration of uranium in the 
ore body (as little as 0.2 percent).  The milling process crushes the ore into a powder, which 
is then filtered through a strong acid or alkaline solution to leach the uranium from the ore 
fragments.  The leached uranium is precipitated from the solution then dried and heated to 
produce a concentrate of uranium oxide, known as yellowcake, which contains approximately 
eighty percent uranium.  The remainder of the ore is waste tailings consisting of radioactive 
materials and toxic heavy metals that need to be stored in isolation from the wider 
environment.
61
  One ton of North Korean uranium ore contains approximately one kilogram 
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of uranium, which means that 50,000 tons of uranium ore had to be mined and milled to 
extract the fifty tons of uranium required for the initial fuel load for the 5 MW(e) reactor at 
Yongbyon.  At peak production in the early 1990s, before the 1994 freeze under the Agreed 
Framework, North Korea was able to produce about 300 tons of yellowcake annually, from 
approximately 30,000 tons of ore.
62
 
 
Uranium Conversion and Enrichment 
Conversion 
Ordinarily yellowcake must be processed into uranium hexafluoride and then fed into a 
uranium enrichment process to increase the proportion of the isotope uranium-235 (
235
U) in 
the final fuel load.
63
  Most reactors operating around the world today require enriched 
uranium for fuel.    However, the 5 MW(e) [MW(e) = megawatts of electric output] reactor at 
Yongbyon is a gas-cooled graphite-moderated model, based on the UK‘s Calder Hall 
plutonium production reactor, which is capable of using fuel fabricated directly from 
unenriched natural uranium.
64
  This was advantageous to the North Koreans because the 
materials, technology and equipment for uranium enrichment would have had to be imported 
from abroad.
65
  Skipping the enrichment step was not only cheaper and more practical, but 
also allowed the front end of the fuel cycle to remain an indigenous operation.   
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North Korea has mastered the processing of yellowcake to uranium dioxide and then into 
uranium tetrafluoride, which is the precursor step to conversion into uranium hexafluoride, 
the feedstock for uranium enrichment.
66
  A reported export of two tons of uranium to Libya 
from North Korea in 2004 raised concerns that a uranium hexafluoride conversion process 
had been mastered at Yongbyon, though it is unclear whether the export load was delivered 
as yellowcake or as uranium hexafluoride.  If it was the latter, it means the North has 
developed the expertise for full uranium conversion and has mastered the prerequisite step for 
uranium enrichment.
67
  However, IAEA inspections of the Yongbyon fuel fabrication plant 
prior to 2003 found no evidence of the equipment needed to produce uranium hexafluoride.
68
  
The existence of a full conversion process at Yongbyon, or elsewhere in North Korea, 
remains a matter of debate. 
 
Uranium Enrichment 
There are two enrichment processes currently in commercial use around the world: gaseous 
diffusion and gas centrifuge, which both use uranium hexafluoride as a feedstock and both 
use the different molecular weights of 
235
U and 
238
U to separate the isotopes.
69
  Gaseous 
diffusion requires a massive ―cascade‖ of at least 1,200 diffusion stages, where each stage 
enriches the uranium slightly more to produce three percent 
235
U reactor-grade uranium.  
Over four thousand stages are required to produce highly-enriched weapons-grade uranium 
using this technique.
70
  Gaseous diffusion facilities in the United States and Europe are 
enormous, requiring physical space, equipment and substantial energy inputs that are not 
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available in North Korea.  If the North did establish such a facility, its size and energy 
signature would make it easily detectable by surveillance satellites.  By contrast, gas 
centrifuge enrichment achieves isotopic separation by rotating the uranium hexafluoride at 
very high speed in rotating metal cylinders, where centrifugal acceleration causes the isotopes 
to separate out by weight.  A cascade of only ten centrifuges is all that is required to produce 
reactor-grade uranium, or about 35 centrifuges for highly-enriched weapons-grade uranium.  
However, as the capacity of each centrifuge is very small, thousands of centrifuges are 
required to produce highly enriched uranium on an industrial scale.
71
 
 
Natural uranium primarily consists of two isotopes: 
235
U and 
238
U.  Of the two, only 
235
U is 
fissile, though it constitutes only 0.7 percent of the natural uranium load.  Uranium must be 
enriched to approximately two to four percent 
235
U for use as fuel in light water reactors and 
to over ninety percent for use in nuclear weapons (highly-enriched uranium, or HEU).
72
  As 
North Korea does not have any operational light water nuclear reactors, any uranium 
enrichment activity is likely be devoted specifically to the production of fissile uranium for 
nuclear weapons. 
 
Until recently it remained unclear whether the North had developed a fully functional 
industrial-scale uranium enrichment operation.  In 1998, claims surfaced that there was a 
secret enrichment plant located in underground facilities at Kumgchang-ri, 160 kilometres 
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north of Pyongyang.
73
  Subsequent inspections of the site in 1999 and 2000 appeared to refute 
this, ascertaining that the facility in question had not housed any enrichment activities.
74
   
 
During a trilateral meeting held in Beijing in October 2002, the Americans accused the North 
of conducting a clandestine HEU program.  At a meeting on October 4, DPRK First Vice 
Minister Kang Sok-ju stated in reply that North Korea was forced to reinforce its ―military-
first‖ policy by modernising its military to the maximum extent possible.  Kang cited North 
Korea‘s inclusion in President Bush‘s ―axis of evil,‖ the preventive war doctrine outlined in 
the 2002 US National Security Strategy, and the targeting of North Korea by American 
nuclear weapons as mitigating factors.  Charles Pritchard, who was a member of the 
American negotiating team, recalled that Kang did not explicitly admit to a HEU program: 
While there was no precise, irrefutable statement—a smoking gun—many factors led all 
eight members of the US delegation to reach the conclusion that Kang had effectively 
and defiantly admitted to having an HEU program.  Kang acknowledged that we said that 
his country had begun a uranium enrichment program for the production of nuclear 
weapons.  Immediately following that statement, he declared that the DPRK was in fact 
prepared to manufacture even more developed weapons; he then said that the DPRK 
needed to be on equal footing with the United States if it was to discuss the issue of 
denuclearization.
75
   
According to Pritchard, the US team arrived at a consensus on the meaning of Kang‘s 
remarks through a cumbersome process in which the three Korean linguists in their group 
were isolated and asked to recreate Kang‘s statement from memory, or from any notes that 
they took during the meeting.  They then created a final text by consensus that they felt 
accurately re-created Kang‘s statement.76  Clearly the Kang ―admission‖ was far from 
unambiguous. 
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A CIA intelligence estimate circulated in the US Congress in November 2002 alleged that 
North Korea had been working on a uranium enrichment program for several years.  The 
estimate stated that the regime had been attempting to secure ―centrifuge-related materials in 
large quantities‖ and was constructing an enrichment plant at an undisclosed location.77  
According to Selig Harrison, the Bush administration extrapolated a worst-case scenario of a 
HEU program from ―sketchy data‖ that did not warrant such an extreme conclusion.  
Harrison made a distinction between high enrichment for weapons-grade uranium and lower 
levels of uranium enrichment, in which evidence of limited centrifuge acquisition by North 
Korea did not support the notion that the North obtained the thousands of centrifuges 
necessary to conduct an industrial-scale HEU process.
78
  It was more likely that the North 
was conducting a small-scale experimental low-enrichment program.   
 
Evidence gathered about the A.Q. Khan network and the Libyan uranium export case imply 
that North Korea does indeed have a complete uranium conversion process with the ability to 
fashion uranium hexafluoride.  In 2009, Sigfried Hecker and William Liou believed that the 
North has a fledgling HEU program that has yet to progress beyond the research and 
development stage, which would account for the lack of subsequent evidence of an 
operational industrial-scale effort.
79
  David Albright similarly doubts that the North has a 
large HEU centrifuge plant.  According to Albright, there is a significant difference between 
assembling a small-scale centrifuge program with a few dozen centrifuges and operating a 
large-scale production plant involving the manufacture of thousands of complete 
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centrifuges.
80
  The best estimate from the evidence at hand until recently was that the North 
had a small HEU effort that has not progressed beyond an embryonic phase.   
 
That changed in November 2010 with sensational revelations from Sigfried Hecker after his 
most recent visit to North Korea.  On November 12, Hecker, along with colleagues John 
Lewis and Robert Carlin were taken on a tour of an industrial-scale uranium enrichment 
facility at Yongbyon, where they saw 2,000 fully operational centrifuges in two cascade halls.  
The facility was technologically advanced, with an ―ultramodern control room‖ and advanced 
new generation centriguges.
81
   
 
One must then ask how North Korea was able to procure the necessary material for such an 
advanced program.  The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the US Department of 
Energy are believed to have documentary evidence including contracts, banking and shipping 
receipts documenting North Korea‘s overseas procurement of materials and components 
destined for the HEU program.
82
  North Korea reportedly bartered missile technology for 
centrifuge enrichment equipment with Pakistan in the late-1990s through the network of 
Abdul Qadeer Khan, the chief scientist behind Pakistan‘s nuclear program.  Khan reportedly 
visited Pyongyang at least thirteen times between 1997 and 2002, the alleged period in which 
the North Korean HEU program expanded.  The circumstantial evidence is damning, but 
beyond a log of high-level officials travelling between North Korea and Pakistan, there is no 
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direct proof in the public record that Pyongyang acquired centrifuge technology from this 
source.
83
   
 
 
Fuel Fabrication 
As noted above, the fuel fabrication facility at Yongbyon houses processes for the production 
of fabricated reactor fuel from yellowcake.  At the end of the conversion process, uranium 
tetrafluoride is furnace-moulded into metallic uranium ingots.  In the final stage of 
fabrication, the uranium tetrafluoride ingots are melted into an aluminium alloy.  The 
extruded mixture is then machined into fuel rods 50 centimetres long and three centimetres in 
diameter.  The rods are then clad in magnesium-zirconium alloy (magnox) cladding, after 
which they are ready for insertion into the reactor.
84
  The 5 MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon 
requires a full load of approximately 8,000 fuel rods.
85
  The North currently has around 2,000 
magnox-clad fuel rods in storage, which were fabricated for the 5 MW(e) reactor prior to 
1994 but remain ready for use, along with approximately 12,000 unclad fuel rods that were 
manufactured for use in the 50 MW(e) reactor.
86
 
 
During a visit to Yongbyon in December 2006, Sigfried Hecker was told by Yongbyon 
nuclear center Director Ri Hong-sop that a section of the fabrication facility had been under 
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repair but would be ready to resume operation sometime in 2007.
87
  IAEA inspectors verified 
on 17 July 2007 that the fuel fabrication facility had been disabled in accordance with the 
2007 nuclear freeze agreement.
88
  In fact, the facility was abandoned because the industrial 
equipment used to convert uranium oxide into uranium tetrafluoride has been excessively 
corroded and could not be used.
89
  According to Ri however, the reactor was being operated 
with the spare fuel rods from the previous inventory described above.  There was no hurry to 
recommence production as enough fuel rods had already been produced to service the 5 
MW(e) reactor, while no extra fuel was needed for the incomplete 50 MW(e) and 200 MW(e) 
reactors.  To manufacture new fuel rods the fabrication facility will need to undergo 
substantial repairs.   
 
The Reactors 
The 5 MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon is a gas-cooled, graphite-moderated design capable of 
producing up to 25 megawatts of thermal output.  The reactor core consists of three hundred 
tons of graphite blocks, vertically cut with between 801 and 812 fuel channels.  Each channel 
holds ten fuel rods stacked vertically on top of one another, giving the reactor capacity for 
about 8,000 fuel rods in total.
90
  A further three hundred tons of graphite encase the graphite 
blocks containing the fuel rod channels, which reflect neutrons back into the core.  A steel 
pressure vessel encloses the entire core structure to contain cooling gas and limit release of 
radioactive particles.  Pressurised carbon dioxide is blown through the core to keep it cool.  A 
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large machine located at the top of the core is used to load and remove fuel rods.  If operating 
at full power for three hundred days per year, the reactor could produce approximately 7.5 
kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium every year, reprocessed from the spent fuel.
91
   
 
IAEA inspectors verified on 17 July 2007 that the 5 MW(e) reactor had been shut down in 
accordance with the 2007 nuclear freeze agreement.
92
  On 27 June 2008, the reactor‘s cooling 
tower was demolished as a gesture of goodwill to indicate compliance with agreements 
reached in the Six Party talks and by early 2009, approximately 90 percent of disablement 
work under the agreement was complete.
93
  In response to international condemnation of its 
April 2009 rocket launch, the DPRK announced its intention to permanently withdraw from 
the Six Party talks, restore the Yongbyon facilities to full operation and recommence 
reprocessing plutonium from the stockpile of spent fuel rods at the site.
94
  For the reactor to 
resume production at optimal levels, a new cooling system would have to be built, which 
could take between six months to one year.  Alternatively, the reactor could run without a 
cooling system at very low power levels, though the rate of plutonium production would also 
be quite low.
95
 
 
North Korea has two other incomplete larger reactors that have been under construction for 
some time.  Construction at both sites ground to a halt under the Agreed Framework and 
following the hiatus both require significant extra repairs for construction to resume.  Work 
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on the 50 MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon is more advanced, though progress has been stalled for 
some time.  According to Ri Hong-sop, as of November 2006 a schedule for completing work 
on the reactor had not yet been finalised.
96
  Sigfried Hecker saw the 50 MW(e) reactor on his 
2004 visit and noted that the site looked in a state of disrepair, having been largely neglected 
to that point following the 1994 freeze.  Ri told Hecker that a new design study had approved 
recommencement of work at the site and that workers had been commissioned for 
construction, but were awaiting final approval.
97
  The delay relates to bottlenecks at factories 
supplying components for reactor construction and that delays are inevitable due to the 
difficulty of importing specific equipment.
98
  The reactor core and other important internal 
components were stored off-site.  Completion of the 50 MW(e) reactor would facilitate a 
tenfold increase in plutonium production, which would allow the North flexibility to rapidly 
increase the size of its nuclear arsenal and conduct further nuclear tests.
99
    
 
The site for the 200 MW(e) reactor is located at Taechon, about twenty kilometres from 
Yongbyon.  According to the IAEA, no work has been done at this site since 2002.
100
  Ri 
Hong-sop stated that the bureaucracy was still deciding what to do with the project, given that 
it would cost less to construct the reactor from scratch at a new location rather than 
rehabilitate the Taechon site.  According to Ri, completion of the 50 MW(e) reactor has been 
prioritised above work on the 200 MW(e) reactor.
101
  The Yongbyon site also houses North 
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Korea‘s first nuclear reactor, the IRT-2000 research reactor built in the 1960s.  The IRT-2000 
is fuelled by highly-enriched uranium, which was supplied in measured quantities by the 
Soviet Union until 1991.  This reactor was utilised for medical isotope production and other 
research projects but has been sparingly used since 1991 due to fuel supply constraints.
102
 
 
Spent Fuel Storage and Reprocessing 
Spent fuel freshly removed from a reactor emits a substantial amount of heat and radiation.  
Used fuel is thus unloaded into a storage pond where the water traps radiation and absorbs 
heat.  Fuel must remain in temporary water storage for periods ranging from six months to 
several years, allowing sufficient time for short-lived isotopes such as the volatile iodine-131 
to degrade.
103
  The Yongbyon facility contains a spent fuel storage pond located next to the 5 
MW(e) reactor.
104
  Prior to April 2009, over three-quarters of the 8,000 fuel rods had been 
removed from the reactor under the nuclear freeze agreement, though removal had slowed to 
only 15 fuel rods per week, dragging out the estimated date of full dismantlement to 2011.
105
   
 
Once the spent fuel has cooled and unstable fission products have decayed, it can be removed 
from storage and reprocessed.  Spent fuel contains a large proportion of its original uranium, 
depending on burn-up time in the reactor core and neutron flux, with a reduced content of 
235
U isotopes (less than one percent).  Waste products make up three percent of spent fuel, 
while the remaining one percent is plutonium.  Reprocessing separates the uranium and 
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plutonium from the waste products.  The separated uranium is recyclable at the conversion 
stage of the cycle, while separated plutonium can be used for nuclear weapon production.
106
 
 
The Purex method (plutonium-uranium extraction), employed extensively in the nuclear 
industry worldwide, is used to reprocess spent fuel at Yongbyon.  Spent fuel is transported by 
lorry in lined casks from the storage pond to the reprocessing facility, which has become 
known as the ―radiochemical laboratory,‖ where the fuel has its cladding removed 
mechanically.
107
  Next, the de-cladded rod is dissolved in nitric acid and then mixed with 
various organic liquids, before passing through a series of mixer-settler tanks where 
plutonium and uranium are selectively precipitated from the remaining fission products.  
Using a similar process, the plutonium-uranium mixture then passes through more mixer-
settler tanks to separate the plutonium from the uranium.  The separated plutonium is purified 
into plutonium oxide powder in a series of glove boxes, which are small radiation-insulated 
chambers in which radioactive materials can be handled safely.  Plutonium metal ingots are 
smelted from this powder, which can later be melted and cast into components for nuclear 
weapons.  A series of tanks are located adjacent to the radiochemical laboratory for storage of 
liquid and solid radioactive waste.
108
   
 
IAEA inspectors toured the radiochemical laboratory during their inspection regime between 
1992 and 1994.  The facility was operational at this time and had a peak capacity to reprocess 
approximately 220-250 tons of spent fuel per year, if operated continuously for three hundred 
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days, which was sufficient capacity to reprocess all the spent fuel from the 5 MW(e) and 50 
MW(e) reactors.  Operations at the facility were frozen under the Agreed Framework, but 
were recommenced in 2003 when reprocessing began on the 8,000 fuel rods stored in the 
temporary storage pond at Yongbyon.  A second reprocessing campaign extracted plutonium 
from fuel burned in the reactor between February 2003 and March 2005.
109
  IAEA inspectors 
verified on 17 July 2007 that the Radiochemical Laboratory had been shut down in 
accordance with the 2007 nuclear freeze agreement.
110
 
 
North Korea’s Plutonium Stockpile 
Calculations of the size of North Korea‘s plutonium stockpile are highly uncertain because of 
the lack of verifiable data concerning reprocessing efforts.  In theory the 5 MW(e) reactor is 
capable of producing 0.9 grams of plutonium per day.  If the reactor runs at an average 
capacity of 85 percent over a year, the amount of plutonium produced would range between 
5.5 and 8.5 kilograms.  A more realistic estimate assuming the reactor operates at 60 percent 
capacity over a year would yield between four and six kilograms of plutonium.
111
  
Reprocessing activities have yielded a total estimated plutonium stock of approximately 46-
54 kilograms, of which between 28-50 kilograms is processed and ready for use in nuclear 
weapons.
112
   
 
David Albright and Paul Brannan speculate that a plutonium stock of this size is sufficient to 
make between 5 and 12 nuclear weapons, based on the assumption that each bomb contains 
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4-5 kilograms of plutonium.  Albright and Brannan further surmise that North Korean 
engineers may use more plutonium per weapon, perhaps six kilograms or more, to reduce the 
size of their weapons to configure onto a ballistic missile, in which case the separated 
plutonium stock would only be sufficient for 4-8 weapons.
113
  Sigfried Hecker estimates the 
North‘s plutonium stockpile at between 40 and 50 kilograms, from 6-8 nuclear bombs could 
be fashioned of similar size to that exploded in the October 2006 nuclear test.
114
  Mary-Beth 
Nikitin arrives at the slightly lower figure of 4-7 nuclear weapons, based on a plutonium 
stockpile of 30-50 kilograms, assuming six kilograms per weapon and subtracting 5-6 
kilograms for the 2006 nuclear test.
115
 
 
As these estimates demonstrate, attempting to calculate the size of a nuclear arsenal from a 
poorly quantified stockpile of fissile material is a complicated exercise.  The precise amount 
of plutonium required to fashion a nuclear bomb depends on several variables:  the desired 
yield, the design of the bomb, and the sophistication of the technology and the process.
116
  
These variables are themselves dependent on the technical capabilities of the scientists and 
engineers involved.  Designers with advanced technical competencies could build a bomb 
with a one kiloton yield from approximately one kilogram of plutonium.  Less competent 
technicians might require three kilograms of plutonium to manufacture a bomb of the same 
yield.
117
  Assuming that the reactor and associated facilities can be brought back online, 
North Korea could be capable of separating approximately 8 kilograms of plutonium by 
October 2009 with existing stocks of reactor fuel and another six kilograms of plutonium per 
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year for the next four years.
118
  Significant future growth of its plutonium stockpile will only 
be possible if the 50 MW(e) and 200 MW(e) reactors are brought online, or if the HEU 
program can be developed to operate at an industrial scale.
119
  These figures indicate that 
North Korea does not have the capacity to rapidly expand its nuclear arsenal.   
 
Weaponisation 
October 2006 Nuclear Test 
The Kim regime announced via KCNA on 3 October 2006 that it intended to carry out a 
nuclear test.  The statement explained the test was necessary because ―the present U.S. 
administration scrapped the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework and seriously threatened the 
DPRK's sovereignty and right to existence.‖120  Six days later the Korea Institute of 
Geoscience and Mineral Resources in South Korea detected seismic activity equivalent to a 
4.2 magnitude earthquake emanating from Musudan-ri in North Korea‘s North Hamgyong 
province.
121
  The North announced shortly afterward that it had successfully tested a nuclear 
weapon, hailing it as ―a historic event as it greatly encouraged and pleased the KPA and 
people that have wished to have powerful self-reliant defence capability.‖122  An estimate 
released by John Negroponte, the then US Director of National Intelligence, confirmed that 
the October 9
th
 nuclear test had indeed taken place but that its yield was quite low, reported at 
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under one kiloton (kt), perhaps even as low as 0.2 kt.
123
  A test yield of less than one kiloton 
is considered to be a failure.  A successful test of a simple plutonium device should normally 
produce a blast in the realm of 5-20 kilotons.
124
   
 
One should remember that exploding a nuclear device is a complex technical undertaking, a 
multi-faceted process in which there is considerable scope for malfunction and error.  There 
are several possible reasons why the weapon achieved such a small yield.  The device itself 
may have suffered from poor machining of manufacturing defects; the explosive charges used 
to compress the plutonium and start the chain reaction may not have detonated 
simultaneously; the charges may have been incorrectly shaped; the amount of plutonium used 
may have been insufficient; or the neutron initiator or neutron reflector may have 
malfunctioned.
125
  The test was not a complete failure, despite the compromised yield caused 
by a malfunction in one particular part of the process.  The scientists involved would have 
learnt a great deal from the test, leading to technical improvements in weapon design.  The 
test was successful in that nuclear criticality was achieved, which by itself is a substantial 
technical achievement for a first-time test.  It should also be noted that a one-kiloton nuclear 
device could still kill people within an area of about one square mile and cause significant 
damage over a much wider area, which if miniaturised, still represents a significant threat to 
cities of such high population density as Seoul and Tokyo.
126
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May 2009 Nuclear Test 
Through April 2009, rumours grew that the DPRK would conduct a second nuclear test 
sometime in the second half of 2009.  As it happened, the test occurred on 25 May, well 
ahead of the expected timeframe.  This blast was much more powerful than the 2006 test, 
registering a magnitude of 4.52 on the Richter scale, with an estimated yield of approximately 
20 kilotons, putting it on a par with the American atomic bomb that levelled Nagasaki in 
1945.
127
  This test was necessary for the North to overcome the failure of the first test and 
unambiguously confirm its nuclear capability.  The second detonation created a significant 
explosion and left no doubt in the minds of foreign observers that the DPRK was now a 
nuclear power.   
 
The successful second test demonstrated clearly to the world that the North‘s nuclear 
program has made substantial technical progress since October 2006.  Miniaturisation is the 
next technological milestone for the North‘s nuclear scientists, in order to produce a nuclear 
warhead that is deliverable atop a missile.  This is a substantial technical challenge that is 
likely to require additional nuclear tests.  Such tests are likely to be smaller in magnitude, due 
to the reduced size of the weapon, as well as the need to use as little fissile material as 
possible to achieve the necessary scientific goals.  North Korea could extract enough 
plutonium from reprocessing spent fuel already in storage for two new nuclear devices, which 
would allow them to conduct a third test without any net loss from their plutonium 
stockpile.
128
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Delivery Systems 
Suitable delivery systems must exist to carry strategic nuclear warheads to high-cost targets 
where maximum damage and casualties can be inflicted.  North Korea possesses Scud-C, 
Nodong and Taepo-dong ballistic missile systems capable of delivering warheads to targets in 
South Korea and Japan.  The Scud-C is considered the best short-range missile available on 
the market to states not allied with the US, with a range of approximately 500 kilometres, 
more than enough to hit targets in South Korea.  The North is thought to have an inventory of 
around 600 Scud-C missiles.
129
  The Nodong is a medium-range ballistic missile with a range 
of 1,000 kilometres.  It is estimated that the North has an inventory of approximately one to 
two hundred Nodong missiles, many of which may be deployed at suspected sites at Shino-ri, 
Chongju and Pyong-pukto.
130
  Pyongyang has also unveiled a new short-range missile called 
the Toksa KN-02, which is a version of the Russian Tochka SS-21 Scarab missile.  It has a 
limited range of only 120 kilometres, but is far more accurate than other short-range missiles 
in its inventory.
131
   
 
The Taepo-dong I missile system has a longer range of up to 2,300 kilometres, consisting of a 
three-stage conglomeration of a Scud-C short-range missile mounted on a Nodong rocket, 
with a small third stage booster to deliver the final payload.
132
  The Taepo-dong I was first 
tested on 31 August 1998, when a prototype was launched from a test facility at Musudan-ri 
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with the stated intention of placing a small satellite into orbit.  The three rocket stages 
separated successfully but the final booster stage exploded, destroying the satellite.
133
   A 
Taepo-dong II three-stage rocket has also been developed, which uses a missile similar to the 
Chinese DF-3 or CSS-2 rockets as the base stage instead of a Nodong missile, increasing 
range to between 3,500 and 6,000 kilometres.
134
  It is clear from a number of failed tests that 
both the Taepo-dong I and II rockets are still under development and are not ready for 
deployment.  On 5 April 2009 the DPRK again launched a multi-stage rocket for the 
ostensible purpose of placing a satellite into orbit, which foreign observers believed to be a 
clandestine long-range rocket test.
135
  Though ultimately described as a failure, the final stage 
of the rocket did manage to fly 2,700 kilometres before splashing down in the Pacific Ocean, 
a more successful result than previous tests.
136
  These missiles also lack a reliable re-entry 
vehicle within which to house nuclear warheads and they re-enter the atmosphere en route to 
their target.
137
  Until these technical issues have been rectified, the Taepo-dong missiles 
cannot be considered as an operational delivery system for a strategic nuclear weapon.
138
 
 
Conclusion 
After examining the national security, domestic bureaucratic and international diplomatic 
rationales for North Korea‘s nuclear proliferation, it seems clear that the Kim regime values 
the nuclear program in diverse ways that extend beyond the realm of national security.  The 
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nuclear capability provides a low-cost strategic equaliser against the US/ROK forces across 
the DMZ, it provides a deterrent against attack or invasion from the South, and likely 
occupies an important role in the North‘s asymmetric war plan.  Domestically, the nuclear 
capability enhances the Kim regime‘s legitimacy as the guarantor of a ―strong and prosperous 
country,‖ fighting valiantly against the forces of American imperialism.  It also is captive to 
the institutional inertia and sunk costs of bureaucratic interests.  At the international level, the 
nuclear capability gives Pyongyang a level of prestige and diplomatic weight well above 
what it could otherwise expect to possess.  The multi-faceted utility of the nuclear program to 
the Kim regime is indeed compelling and most importantly, given the country‘s anaemic 
economy and resource shortages, the nuclear capability gives the regime the bargaining 
leverage it needs to plug holes in its economy with inputs of aid from the international 
community.  To trace why international largesse is so important to the political economy of 
the state one must first understand the reasons for the regime‘s near-collapse during the mid-
1990s.  The following chapters in Part II will expand on this in detail, showing that the 
political economy of the DPRK state and its constituent institutions are reliant on foreign 
inputs to subsidise the costs of systemic maintenance. 
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3. Conceptualising North Korea’s Decline 
 
 
The longevity of the Kim regime—consisting of a leadership core centred on Kim Jong-il—is 
a crucial variable in the debate over nonproliferation goals for the Korean peninsula.  The 
conventional logic is simple: a weak regime, on the verge of collapse, is by necessity more 
likely to make concessions in denuclearisation negotiations than it otherwise would.  
However, is it wise to assume that the conventional logic is correct?  In various diplomatic 
fora since 1994, the North has failed to make lasting concessions on its nuclear program, 
despite what appear to be compelling economic incentives in light of the country‘s obvious 
fragility.  Instead, the regime has actively engineered crises as a means to extract 
international aid in exchange for de-escalation, without making any real concessions that 
address the core issue.   
 
This pattern suggests that the conventional logic is flawed and implies that the regime values 
perpetuation of its rule above crisis recovery for the country.  The regime must see something 
inherently dangerous in acceding to the nonproliferation demands of the United States and its 
regional allies.  To assess the danger, it is necessary to understand the true nature of the 
institutional crisis of the famine period.  Three key questions require an answer if we are to 
arrive at a satisfactory explanation.  First, why did North Korea‘s economy collapse during 
the famine?  Second, why did economic collapse not lead to state collapse?  Third, has the 
regime‘s trajectory of decay come to a halt, or is further systemic degeneration possible?  
North Korea has changed much over the two decades 1991.  If this process of transformation 
is complete, the DPRK state has weathered the storm and will evolve over time.  If the 
process of decay is yet to run its course, further collapse is possible under certain conditions.  
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Because of its over-reliance on economic determinism as the primary driver of state failure, 
the North Korea collapse literature is an insufficient source for addressing these questions.  
 
This chapter will fill this void in the regime longevity literature using insights from the fields 
of ecology and organisational complexity.  First, the it provides an overview of regime 
longevity literature and settles on an organisational framework utilising Barry Buzan‘s 
conception of the state (physical, ideational and institutional bases) and David Carment‘s 
three levels of state decay (macro-, intermediate- & micro-level drivers).  At the macro level 
it demonstrates the importance of the physical base of the DPRK state to the function of its 
institutional and ideological components, with specific emphasis on the concept of carrying 
capacity.  At the intermediate level, it uses organisational complexity and theory of declining 
marginal returns on investment to show how limitations of North Korea‘s physical base lead 
to deterioration of the state‘s institutions and economy.  At the micro level, it reveals how 
trigger events—Soviet collapse and natural disasters—impacted on the physical base of the 
state and led to rapid implosion of the command economy and key state institutions.  Overall, 
the chapter finds that ecology, energy and resources—the physical base of the state—are the 
foundational variable that should be taken into consideration when discussing regime 
collapse in North Korea. 
  
Longevity of the Kim Regime: An Overview 
One can easily fall prey to the temptation of referring interchangeably to the collapse of the 
Kim regime and the collapse of the North Korean state.  The latter necessarily entails the 
former, though the demise of the leadership may not bring about major changes in the 
economic and political architecture.  Leadership change via coup d’état or even direct 
election are similar in that they do not necessarily alter the political and economic system—
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the norms, rules and procedures governing the state‘s political and economic activities.  
Collapse ensues when this architecture is disturbed beyond recovery and breaks down.
1
   
 
During the 1990s, many analysts believed North Korea was a failing state, careening toward 
collapse.  In some of his earlier work, Nicholas Eberstadt contended that the current order in 
the North could not last, with collapse becoming increasingly likely the longer its economy 
continued to degrade.
2
  Kim Kyung-won made a similar argument, claiming that the 
economic fundamentals could not be ignored and that collapse was imminent.
3
  However, 
subsequent events undermined the assumption that economic failure would naturally and 
inevitably lead to state collapse.  Few countries have collapsed simply because of the 
deprivation of people‘s basic needs, except when economic problems precipitate a legitimacy 
crisis accompanied by widespread public dissent that the leadership is incapable of silencing.
4
  
This convergence has not occurred in North Korea; the Kim regime continues to cling to 
power and the nuclear question remains unresolved.  Eberstadt has since retracted his early 
predictions and revised his position, to suggest that international aid, particularly from China 
and South Korea, has been decisive in propping up the regime.
5
 
 
Other analysts have sidestepped the rapid implosion thesis, to predict the inevitability of 
collapse over longer time horizons.  Commitment to a single outcome was rightly rejected in 
favour of broad scenario mapping.  For example, Young Soo-gil et al outlined four future 
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scenarios for North Korea, including systemic reform, non-violent dissolution of the regime, 
civil unrest and coup d’état, and regional war.6  Aidan Foster-Carter went even further, 
hypothesising that all future pathways will lead to collapse, either by rapid economic 
implosion, war, or the unwinding of state institutions as the unintended consequence of 
reforms.
7
  Scott Snyder concurred, suggesting that systemic breakdown would transpire from 
the coalescence of complex simultaneous challenges that would overwhelm the regime 
leadership.
8
   
 
With the benefit of a decade‘s hindsight, Andrew Scobell suggested three broad long-term 
possibilities for the future of the Kim regime: in the first scenario, the regime persists in a 
state of suspended animation without undertaking any significant policy revisions.  In the 
second scenario—soft landing—the regime undertakes significant reforms and moderates its 
security policies.  In the third scenario—crash landing—the regime collapses either with a 
whimper, as did the East European communist regimes in 1989, or with a bang, as did 
Romania in the same year.  Scobell states that in the mid- to long-term, a crash landing may 
be inevitable, as the North‘s inelastic institutional structure may snap if serious reforms are 
undertaken.
9
   
 
Not all analysts were as pessimistic about the North‘s chances of survival.  Marcus Noland 
wrote in 1997 that North Korea was likely to ―muddle through‖ as a weak state, making ad 
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hoc adjustments in response to specific circumstances.  Noland compared the North Korea of 
1997 with post-Ceauşescu Romania, pointing to Romania‘s piecemeal economic reform 
program as an example of the path North Korea was likely to follow in the absence of broad 
systemic reform.
10
  Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig offered a similar assessment, stating that 
North Korea was likely to persist for a considerable time, even in the face of deteriorating 
social and economic conditions.  Oh and Hassig identified band-aid measures such as the 
solicitation of foreign aid, concessions obtained from the international community using the 
nuclear program as a bargaining chip, and minimal adjustments made to the domestic 
economy as specific components of the muddle through policy.
11
  Events since the late-1990s 
have borne out the wisdom of this position.   
 
The attraction of the muddle through theory was its utility as a default explanation for the 
regime‘s persistence when all reasoned analysis seemingly pointed toward collapse.  
Noland‘s article was less clear on how the regime would achieve this miraculous feat.  In his 
more recent work, Noland has documented substantial grassroots transformation in the North 
Korean economy.  According to Noland, the inability of the regime to fulfil its obligations to 
the public under pre-existing institutional relationships during the famine—the failure of food 
distribution mechanisms—necessitated the development of unmanaged market-based coping 
responses by local-level Party bureaucrats and military units, as well as state-owned 
enterprises and individual households.
12
  These coping measures relieved some of the 
pressure on the regime and allowed it to devote resources to the one institution that could 
ensure its survival: the military. 
                                                 
10 NOLAND, M. 1997. Why North Korea Will Muddle Through. Foreign Affairs, 76, pp. 115-17. 
11 OH, K. & HASSIG, R. 1999. North Korea between Collapse and Reform. Asian Survey, 39, pp. 308-09. 
12 NOLAND, M. 2006b. How North Korea Funds Its Regime . Washington DC: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=629 [Accessed 18/03/2007].  See also: HAGGARD, S. & NOLAND, M. 
2007c. What Are N. Koreans Up To? . Seoul: The Korea Times, 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/nation_view.asp?newsIdx=10661&categoryCode=116 [Accessed 9 October 2007]. 
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As these private coping strategies gained momentum, numerous enterprises were removed 
from the state planning mechanism and many farms decollectivised, while private markets 
emerged selling consumer goods.  This process is visibly changing how the country looks and 
the manner in which its people think about economy and politics.  This has caught the regime 
in a bind: it no longer believes central planning is the best way to run the economy but neither 
does it believe it can exist without it.
13
  The regime thus faces a potentially paralyzing choice: 
to embrace the changes already taking place on the ground, or to roll back private coping 
strategies in order to fortify the old system.  Ignoring reform is likely to worsen economic 
instability and leave the state reliant on handouts from international donors.  However, as the 
Soviet experience shows, the reform path entails risks of the kind of run-away change that 
perestroika and glasnost wrought in the Soviet Union.  On the other hand, rolling back grass 
roots coping strategies risks weakening the country and miring it in continual economic 
crisis.  Further, to maintain centralized controls requires resource inputs that the country does 
not have.  To pursue this course of action the regime must source the inputs it needs from the 
international community, and the only way it can do this without economic liberalisation is 
by obtaining foreign aid.  This brings us to the fundamental issue of the regime longevity 
problem: the imbalance between the systemic maintenance costs and the resource endowment 
of the North Korean state. 
 
Escaping One-Dimensional Analysis of Regime Longevity 
North Korea‘s resource limitations contributed to intermediate and long-term degenerative 
trends that weakened the state, as well as the immediate systemic shocks that rocked the 
                                                 
13 BECK, P. & READER, N. 2005. Facilitating Reform in North Korea: The Role of Regional Actors and NGOs. Asian Perspective, 29, p. 
47. 
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country after 1991.  According to David Carment, the processes of state decay can be 
identified according to long, medium and short time horizons.  At the macro level are the 
long-term processes of systemic transformation that lead to the emergence of state weakness.  
At the intermediate level are mechanisms associated with the viability of state institutions.  
Finally, at the micro level, Carment points to short-term selection processes and mechanisms—
trigger events—that lead to rapid institutional degeneration and/or escalations of violence.14  
The decay trends identified at each level result directly from resource stock limitations, 
obstacles to which domestic institutions, government policies and capital investment are 
directed to overcome.  It is this overarching framework within which the concepts of ecology 
and organisational complexity can be used to comprehend state decay in North Korea. 
 
Macro Level: Carrying Capacity and the Physical Base of the State 
Resource stocks such as land, energy and water are integral to a state‘s ability to execute its 
institutional and ideological functions.  Barry Buzan divided the state conceptually into three 
primary interlinked components: the physical base, the idea of the state, and its institutions.
15
 
A state‘s physical base includes the population and resources within its defined territory. The 
idea of the state is the distinctive idea—the legitimising paradigm—that lies at the heart of 
the regime‘s political identity. The institutions of the state comprise the machinery of 
government, including the executive, legislative, administrative and judicial bodies.  State 
institutions maintain dominion over its population and territory, a control materially 
subsidised by the physical base and legitimised by an overarching ideational framework.
16
   
 
                                                 
14 CARMENT, D. 2003. Assessing state failure: implications for theory and policy. Third World Quarterly, 24, p. 410. 
15 BUZAN, B. 1991. People, States and Fear: An Agenda For International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Boulder, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers. p. 70. 
16 Ibid. pp. 82-83.  See also: HOLSTI, K. 1996. The state, war, and the state of war, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. p. 84. 
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Much of the North Korea regime longevity literature assumes economic weakness and 
political fragility as the causes of regime collapse, with good reason.  A weakness of these 
studies, however, is that they often fail to examine why, beyond the common criticisms of the 
command economy and rigid political controls, weaknesses in the political economy of the 
Kim regime are drivers of collapse in the North Korean context.  While not strictly about 
regime collapse per se, scholarly literature does exist exploring the ecological and 
climatological causes of the great famine that sheds some light on this discrepancy.  In her 
ground-breaking article focusing on the supply-side dimension of the North Korean famine, 
Meredith Woo-Cumings has noted that the famine occurred during a period of ―remarkable 
climatic aberration‖ caused by a strong El niño event.17  For Woo-Cumings, the distribution 
choices of the regime and the totalitarian system itself were not the critical factors driving the 
famine, as other scholars have argued, but rather were subordinate to food supply disruption 
caused consecutive years of flooding and then drought from 1995-98.  What this supply-side 
analysis inevitably highlights is the importance of the environment as the foundation upon 
which all political and economic systems are built.   
 
The North Korean case demonstrates that disruptions to the physical base of the state—as the 
foundation of political and economic activity—can have profound impacts on its institutional 
and ideological bases.  The challenge, therefore, is to demonstrate how the physical, 
institutional and ideational bases of the state interact.  The concept of carrying capacity is a 
useful place to start.  In his seminal book Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary 
Change, William Catton defined carrying capacity as the maximum persistently feasible 
human population load which a given environment can support indefinitely.
18
  The ceiling for 
                                                 
17 WOO-CUMINGS, M. 2002. The Political Ecology of Famine: The North Korean Catastrophe and Its Lessons. Tokyo: Asian Development 
Bank Institute, http://www.adbi.org/files/2002.01.rp31.ecology.famine.northkorea.pdf. p . 2.  Climatic change in North Korea will be 
explored further in chapter nine. 
18 CATTON, W. 1982. Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary Change, Chicago, University of Illinois Press. pp. 4-5. 
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carrying capacity is set by the stock per capita of the least abundantly available indispensable 
resource, such as water, food or energy.  When the population load is less than the carrying 
capacity of a particular environment, there is room for population expansion.  If the 
population load exceeds the carrying capacity, overuse of resources and excessive waste 
products create damage that unleashes forces, such as violent competition or disease, which 
reduce the population load to a sustainable level to match the decreased carrying capacity of 
that system.   
 
Underpinning the idea of carrying capacity is the observation that the Earth is a finite 
biophysical system.  Any micro-system (ecosystem, region, state) within the wider biosphere 
will be bounded in some way by limits to resource stocks and pollution sinks.  This idea was 
the central theme of the famous Limits to Growth study written by Donella Meadows et al, 
which found that there are limits to the rate at which human societies can extract resources 
and emit wastes without exceeding the productive and absorptive capacities of the 
environmental systems that support them.
19
  Carrying capacity is therefore the point 
immediately prior to the level at which throughputs of extraction and emission exceed these 
limits. 
 
Catton contends that human communities can get around the limitations of carrying capacity 
by establishing trade relationships with other communities.  People living in an environment 
where carrying capacity is limited by a shortage of one essential resource—such as food or 
oil—can develop exchange relationships with people living in other areas possessing a 
surplus of that resource, which can be bought or bartered for in exchange for some other 
resource that the trading partner lacks.  The outcome of this exchange is that the composite 
                                                 
19 MEADOWS, D., MEADOWS, D. & RANDERS, J. 1972. The Limits to growth: A report for the Club of Rome’s project on the 
predicament of mankind London, Potomac Associates.  See also: MEADOWS, D., RANDERS, J. & MEADOWS, D. 2004. Limits to 
Growth: The 30-Year Update, White River Junction, Chelsea Green Publishing Company. pp. 8-9;  
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carrying capacity of these two regions becomes greater than the sum of their separate 
carrying capacities, leading local populations to grow beyond what their local environments 
can support, unencumbered by local scarcities.  However, if these exchange relationships 
break down, both dependent regions are left with populations larger than what they can 
support, leading to a population crash.
20
  Echoing Catton, Jared Diamond contends that if a 
society‘s key trade partner is weakened for any reason and can no longer supply an essential 
import product, the dependent society is also likely to be destabilized as a result.
21
   
 
North Korea‘s food crisis is linked directly to resource constraints, due to limitations on its 
land base and energy supply.   The North has an extremely limited stock of arable land and a 
harsh climate, unfavourable to high agricultural output.
22
  North Korea also lacks indigenous 
petroleum reserves and is reliant on imports to service its transportation fleet, industrial 
facilities and mechanised agricultural system.  As suggested by Catton above, North Korea 
attempted to circumvent its resource limitations through linkages with other countries.  The 
country‘s integration into the greater Soviet economic system, which included heavily 
subsidised access to the oil upon which mechanised agricultural system and heavy industry-
based economy were so reliant, permitted growth of the population far beyond what the land 
could support.  Energy is the lifeblood of industrial civilisation and its relative availability is 
an important determinant of the success of a given industrialised society.  Energy shortages 
have long plagued the DPRK, which has a miniscule endowment of liquid fossil fuels.  
Restrictions on oil supply have seen the country become increasingly dependent on foreign 
sources, leaving it vulnerable to supply disruptions.  On top of that, the North is constrained 
                                                 
20 CATTON, W. 1982. Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary Change, Chicago, University of Illinois Press. pp. 96, 158-59. 
21 DIAMOND, J. 2005. Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive, Melbourne, Penguin. p. 14. 
22 About 80 percent of North Korea‘s land is mountainous.  Of the remaining 20 percent, approximately 1-8 percent is under permanent 
cropping.  See: 2007a. Country Profile: North Korea. Washington DC: US Library of Congress, 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/North_Korea.pdf 
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by limited oil refining facilities that are aged and in need of repair.
23
  When this symbiotic 
economic arrangement collapsed, the flow of imported oil and components for farm 
machinery and irrigation systems ceased abruptly.  North Korea could not produce enough 
food to feed its over-sized population and lacked the means and the will to obtain food on the 
international market, leading to a population crash as mortality rates spiked and large 
numbers of people fled the country as refugees.
24
   
 
Many scholars find fault with this hypothesis on the grounds that it is excessively Malthusian 
and does not account for the salience of class divisions and political decisions about food 
procurement and distribution, which can be decisive in limiting or perpetuating mass 
starvation.  In his seminal study of famines in Bengal, Ethiopia and Bangladesh, Armatya Sen 
observed that populations rarely experience shortages evenly, because access to food during a 
food shock is a function of ―entitlement,‖ meaning the ability of famine-affected people to 
procure food through avenues such as production, trade and state distribution.
25
  Stephen 
Haggard and Marcus Noland believed that Sen‘s thesis applied during the North Korean 
famine, showing that government decisions not to purchase food on the international market 
contributed to the severity of the famine.  For Haggard and Noland, large segments of the 
North Korean population were placed at-risk because of the regime‘s persistent and 
misguided pursuit of agricultural self-sufficiency.
26
  Yet the solution proposed by Haggard 
and Noland, among others, involves sourcing food and energy from the international 
community, through economic reform and integration into the global economy.  They stress 
                                                 
23 LEE, J. J.-A. 2009. To Fuel or Not to Fuel: China‘s Energy Assistance to North Korea. Asian Security, 5, 45-72. pp. 47-48. 
24 NATSIOS, A. 2001. The Great North Korean Famine, Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace Press. pp. 12-14. 
25 SEN, A. 1981. Poverty and Famine: An essay on entitlement and deprivation, Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
26 HAGGARD, S. & NOLAND, M. 2007a. Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform, New York, Columbia University Press. p. 9. 
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the centrality of solving North Korea‘s balance of payments problem as the key to solving the 
food crisis via access to the international market.
27
 
 
Whatever political decisions the Kim regime arrives at for sourcing food and energy from 
abroad, the fact remains that a supply-side deficit still exists within North Korea.  Resource 
shortages are North Korea‘s structural reality, which political decisions about allocation can 
worsen or improve, but not alleviate.  The ability to choose the right response depends on the 
economic resources at hand, access to appropriate technologies, existence of key 
infrastructure, and strong institutions capable of maintaining social stability.
28
  These 
attributes are fluid and can change over time; however when all are strongly negative they 
tend to mutually reinforce each other and dramatically narrow the crisis response options of 
leaders.
29
  It is now necessary to figure out how North Korea‘s economic and institutional 
capacities have changed over time so that the interaction between resource constraints and 
political variables can be made clearer. 
 
Intermediate Level: Organisational Complexity 
To ascertain how degradation of the physical base impacts on the ideational and institutional 
dimensions of the state—the intermediate level trends—we turn to organisational complexity.  
The maintenance of societal complexity is reliant on the constant input of energy.  As a 
system gets larger and more complex, increasing inputs of energy are required for its 
continued operation.  State collapse transpires when the resource, energy and manpower 
                                                 
27 Ibid. p. 9; BENNETT, J. 1999. North Korea: The Politics of Food Aid. London: Relief and Rehabilitation Network, 
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/96816/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/47C10A60-7F01-4206-BE46-
D3C93D88DB6B/en/networkpaper028.pdf. p . 8. 
28 DIAMOND, J. 2005. Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive, Melbourne, Penguin. pp. 11-14. 
29 MUNASINGHE, M. & SWART, R. 2005. Primer on Climate Change and Sustainable Development: Facts, Policy Analysis, and 
Applications, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. p. 187. 
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requirements of governing institutions fall below what is necessary for their continued 
operation.
30
  Institutions evolve specific capacities to fulfil certain needs, and each 
operational program requires nodes of institutional organisation for its execution and 
maintenance.  These complex webs cannot function without steady inputs of energy and 
provision of resources.  Institutions must be staffed with trained and salaried recruits, the 
military must be provisioned, rules must be policed and information recorded.  Consequently, 
increased socio-political complexity requires greater inputs of energy and resources, thus 
incurring growing maintenance costs.
31
  To maintain a complex socio-political system, its 
leadership must have access to an adequate energy, resource and manpower base.  
Institutional breakdown is likely where the resource base falls below the level required for 
systemic maintenance across the spectrum of government institutions.  Consequently, 
systemic collapse becomes more likely when the system cannot be maintained at the desired 
level of complexity.   
 
For Joseph Tainter, societal deterioration occurs because of declining marginal returns on 
capital, institutional and political investments.  A society experiencing declining marginal 
returns invests increasingly heavily in strategies that produce a progressively lower output.  
Institutions are problem-solving organisms that address new challenges by adding further 
nodes of organisational complexity in a process of continual accretion.  According to Tainter, 
in the problem-solving process, the easiest and highest-return solutions are exhausted first 
until only the more difficult and costly strategies remain to be adopted.  Over time, as the 
costs of solutions grow, further investment in complexity fails to yield a proportionate 
                                                 
30 HOMER-DIXON, T. 2006. The Upside of Down: Catastrophe, Creativity, and the Renewal of Civilization, Washington DC, Island Press. 
p. 41. 
31 Ibid. p. 41. 
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return.
32
  This diminishing return to complexity is akin to a car burning up fuel at an 
accelerating rate to continue travelling at the same speed. 
 
The North Korean economy prior to 1991 was characterised by long-term degenerative 
trends, driven by declining marginal returns on investment in the economic system.  The 
regime responded by attempting to boost production by priming the system with ever more 
inputs of resources and labour.  The decade following the Korean War was one of rapid 
growth and development.  The colonial feudalism of the Japanese occupation was replaced by 
nationalised industrial production and the command economy, which were successful in 
rebuilding a North Korea devastated by the Korean War.  Kim Il-sung‘s government 
promoted heavy industry, which saw the combined output of mining and manufacturing 
increase threefold between 1954 and 1958.
33
   
 
The Command Economy: Central Planning & the Long-term Decay Trend 
As in other socialist command economies, North Korea‘s state bureaucracy directed the 
national economy.  In practice, the North Korean state, via the Korean Workers‘ Party, 
owned all of the means of production, incorporating all natural resources, industrial 
facitilities, infrastructure and agriculture.
34
  This system was introduced piecemeal in North 
Korea from 1946 and implemented in full during the 1950s, at a time when the wider global 
debate among economists about the efficiency of centralised resource allocation was 
unresolved.  During this period, the Soviet Union was registering impressive economic 
growth rates that seemingly validated the command economy as a system of efficient 
economic organisation on par with market capitalism, because the technology of the time was 
                                                 
32 TAINTER, J. 2000. Problem Solving: Complexity, History, Sustainability. Population and Environment, 22, pp. 9-10; TAINTER, J. 1988. 
The Collapse of Complex Societies, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. pp. 205-09. 
33 MARTIN, B. 2004. Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and Kim Dynasty, New York, St. Martin‘s Press. p. 96. 
34 YANG, S.-C. 1994. The North and South Korean Political Systems: A Comparative Analysis, Boulder, Westview Press. p. 228. 
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suited to heavy industries and large production units.
35
   
 
In communist countries, central planning is a monumental process of bureaucratic 
coordination aimed at reconciling the vast and complicated processes of the national 
economy.  In a command economy the central bureaucracy in theory knows, or can discover, 
the necessary requirements for efficient economic production, for the overall health of the 
economy and benefit of the society.  The centre arrives at an approach for achieving these 
ends through the process of planning, culminating in a series of single, three, five, or seven-
year plans.
36
  Thousands of Party officials, state administrators, enterprise managers and mass 
organisations go through a complex process of calculation and bargaining to arrive at a plan 
containing millions of individual planning commands, including what is to be produced, the 
quantity, and the price.37  In North Korea, economic decision-making occurred under the 
rubric of the State Planning Commission, which fell under the political control of the KWP‘s 
Central Committee.38 
 
Each plan is a series of orders to subordinate units, which then create their own set of orders 
in a process of disaggregation.  It would be far too complex for the central bureaucracy to 
micro-manage the entire economy, so the minute details of plan orders were divided into 
smaller sub-plans.  This disaggregation of the planning process took place on the same 
number of levels as exist in the hierarchy of national economic control.  For example, if the 
economic hierarchy consists of four levels, first the planning office breaks down the national 
economic plan for the ministries.  Each ministry breaks it down for its own directorates, 
                                                 
35 FRENCH, P. 2005. North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula - A Modern History, London, Zed Books. p. 76.  See also: MAIER, C. 1997. 
Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany, Princeton, Princeton University Press. p. 97. 
36 NOVE, A. 1979. Political Economy and Soviet Socialism, London, George Allen & Unwin. p. 155. 
37 KORNAI, J. 1992. The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, Oxford, Clarendon Press. p. 114. 
38 SELIGER, B. 2004. The North Korean Economy: Nuclear Crisis and Decline, or Peace and Reform in the Last Asian Dynastic Regime? 
Korea’s Economy, p. 79. 
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which each control several firms in the same sector or sub-sector.  Finally, the directorate 
disaggregates its own plan for the individual state-owned enterprises under its jurisdiction, 
resulting in a compulsory annual plan for each firm that contains several thousand figures.
39
  
Each level of planning adds another layer of complexity to the plan calculations, and with 
increased complexity come greater opportunity for distortion and error in the final 
calculations. 
 
The inefficiency of the command economy was rooted in the state‘s ownership of the means 
of production.
40
  In a socialist command economy the central bureaucracy pools the total 
residual income from all state-owned enterprise, be it profit or loss, into the state budget.  The 
central bureaucracy decides upon the selling prices and wages for each individual state-
owned enterprise, as well as the prices of the materials the firm uses and the proportion of 
gross returns each firm had to deliver to the state budget.41  The expenditure returned to each 
state-owned enterprise was not dependent on the amount of residual income that each firm 
contributed into the central budget, as budget allocations were a function of the accounting 
cost of central planning, not of the profitability and efficiency of individual productive 
enterprises.
42
  Therefore, the motivation for individual firms to increase efficiency was 
disconnected from the profit motive and instead was based on ideological and other artificial 
incentives. 
 
                                                 
39 KANG, S.-R. 1987. North Korea's Pragmatism: A Turning Point? Asian Survey, 27, p. 894. 
40 The property owner has an inherent right to residual income generated by that property, along with the right to dispose of that income in 
any way seen fit.  Thus the figure remaining after the costs associated with utilising that property have been paid—i.e. profit or loss—
belongs to or is the responsibility of the owner.  See: KORNAI, J. 1992. The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press. p. 64. 
41 Ibid. p. 73. 
42 BAZHANOVA, N. 2000a. Economic Factors and the Stability of the North Korean Regime. In: MOLTZ, J. C. & MANSOUROV, A. 
(eds.) The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia. New York: Routledge. p. 65; YOON, S. 
B. 1986. Macroeconomic Interaction between Domestic and Foreign Sectors in the North Korean Economy: A Schematic Interpretation. In: 
SCALAPINO, R. & LEE, H. (eds.) North Korea in a Regional and Global Context. Berkeley: Center for Korean Studies, University of 
California-Berkeley. p. 56. 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
 88 
The central planning mechanism proved to be inherently dysfunctional.  According to Stathis 
Kalyvas, one-Party communist-style systems generally experienced a long period of 
economic degradation due massive and intractable inefficiencies in the central planning 
matrix.
43
  A stratified hierarchy of control was thus erected to ensure that employees carried 
out their assigned functions and to provide a career ladder as an incentive for compliance, 
with success based primarily on the ability of functionaries to carry out plan orders.
44
  This 
system was inefficient because every employee is involved in the management of productive 
enterprises, yet no one exercised final responsibility for them or received any tangible 
material benefit from their success. 
 
During the planning process, each directorate acquired information from the productive 
enterprises under its jurisdiction in order to calculate its plan for production and allocation of 
labour and materials, including the production capacity and the relations between inputs and 
outputs at each firm.  In a perfect environment, each enterprise would pass on accurate 
information to the directorate, on the basis of which realistic production targets would be set 
that minimised waste of labour and resources.  In reality, the bargaining process operated 
much differently, because information was distorted all the way up the planning chain.  
Fearing punishment for not fulfilling their allotted targets, firm managers would falsely report 
production statistics to maximise their resource allocation and minimise their production 
quota to reduce the chances of falling short of plan targets.
45
     
 
Planning bureaucrats understood this game and built corrections into their plan commands 
                                                 
43 KALYVAS, S. 1999. The Decay and Breakdown of Communist One-Party Systems. Annual Reviews in Political Science, 2, p. 329. 
44 BUZO, A. 1999. The Guerrilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea, Sydney, Allen & Unwin. p. 29.  See also: KORNAI, J. 
1992. The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, Oxford, Clarendon Press. p. 66; NOVE, A. 1979. Political Economy and 
Soviet Socialism, London, George Allen & Unwin. p. 155. 
45 HOLMES, L. 1993. The End of Communist Power: Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis, Melbourne, Melbourne 
University Press. p. 165. 
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through the ―ratchet effect.‖  For example, should an enterprise raise its production from 50 
to 60 units during the previous year, the new production target will be set with 60 units as its 
minimum benchmark.  In the North Korean context, plan commands tended only to increase, 
placing greater stress on each state-owned firm to meet production targets and giving 
managers a powerful incentive to produce well below capacity.
46
  Some state-owned 
enterprises would end up hoarding resource stockpiles well beyond their production 
requirements while others experienced shortages.    Distortions arose in the agricultural sector 
too, where the amount of food planned for distribution always exceeded the amount of food 
actually produced.
47
  Because planning commands often were unrealistic, or unfulfillable in 
light of supply bottlenecks throughout the system, lower-level functionaries tended to favour 
low output or expropriation of state goods when this outweighed the rewards on offer for 
compliance.
48
   
 
Over time, North Korean workers and low-level functionaries saw their material benefits 
erode: rations were short, shops were empty and prices for staple goods rose.  The incentive 
for increasing output, or even participating in the system at all, was increasingly devalued 
relative to the demands of the command system.
49
  Labour tended to migrate toward 
unofficial informal economic activities, including black market entrepreneurialism, 
expropriation of state goods, rent-seeking activities, or private agriculture.  As the informal 
                                                 
46 SELIGER, B. 2004. The North Korean Economy: Nuclear Crisis and Decline, or Peace and Reform in the Last Asian Dynastic Regime? 
Korea’s Economy, p. 80.  See also: FRENCH, P. 2005. North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula - A Modern History, London, Zed Books. pp. 
83-84. 
47 NAM, S.-W. 2007. Chronic Food Shortages and the Collective Farm System in North Korea. Journal of East Asian Studies, 7, p. 102; 
KIMURA, M. 1999. From Fascism to Communism: Continuity and Development of Collectivist Economic Policy in North Korea. The 
Economic History Review, 52, p. 74. 
48 HARRISON, M. 2002a. Coercion, Compliance, and the Collapse of the Soviet Command Economy. The Economic History Review, 55, 
pp. 403-24. 
49 FRENCH, P. 2005. North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula - A Modern History, London, Zed Books. p. 92. 
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sector began to proliferate, the central planning mechanism was further distorted by the 
diversion to the informal sector of resources allocated for the command system.
50
 
 
Quantifying Declining Marginal Returns 
The decade following the Korean War was one of rapid growth and development.  The 
colonial feudalism of the Japanese occupation was replaced by nationalised industrial 
production and the command economy, which were successful in rebuilding a North Korea 
devastated by the Korean War.  Kim Il-sung‘s government promoted heavy industry, which 
saw the combined output of mining and manufacturing increase threefold between 1954 and 
1958.
51
  This increase was due partially to the Chollima movement, launched in 1957 during 
the 1957-61 Five-year Plan, which was the first of many mass mobilisation campaigns 
designed to achieve high production targets.  Chollima was an intense ideological propaganda 
campaign that created an atmosphere of battlefield fervour in the workplace to motivate 
employees to toil more industriously.
52
  It initially succeeded during the post-Korea War 
reconstruction period, when the economy was rebuilt from a low base.  Per capita income 
increased 13.1 percent annually between 1947 and 1967, attributable to the relative ease of 
rehabilitation as opposed to ‗normal‘ economic development.  North Korea‘s gross industrial 
production grew at an average annual rate of 41.8 % during the 1954-56 three-year plan and 
by 36.6 % during the 1957-61 five-year plan, which was fulfilled a full year ahead of 
schedule.  These figures are undoubtedly exaggerated, but they do reflect the easy 
productivity gains made through easy-to-achieve post-war rehabilitation.
53
  Central planning 
was highly suitable for this kind of economic development, yet as industrialisation matured 
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and the complexity of the economy grew, the ideology and basic industrial techniques of a 
command system began to realise diminishing returns.
54
 
 
Growth estimates for the North Korean economy from 1954 to 1989 bear testament to the 
inefficiency of the system.  Annual growth rates consistently declined after the post-Korean 
War reconstruction period.
55
  North Korea‘s economic development was largely extensive, 
where production increases were achieved through the addition of further capital and labour 
inputs, rather than intensive, where production increases were achieved through rising 
efficiency.
56
  Indeed the only way to boost productivity in the command economy was to 
pump more resources and labour through the system.  Yet because of bottlenecks and 
systemic waste, the extensive development pathway grew increasingly ineffective over time, 
exhibiting the classic indicators of declining marginal returns.  Lee Hy-sang points out that 
that in the years leading up to 1984, North Korea‘s productivity growth actually averaged -
1.7 percent annually when labour productivity is taken into account, well below the GNP 
figure.
57
 
 
The command system also discouraged technological innovation.  With an incentive structure 
heavily biased against efficiency gains, the economic logic to boost productivity through 
technological innovation simply did not exist, resulting in stagnation in technological 
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development that contributed to the ceiling in productivity growth.
58
  Evidence for the 
widening technology gap is plain in the North‘s frantic importation of new industrial capital 
during the 1971-76 six-year plan.  New industrial capital was acquired to replace existing 
industrial facilities, which could not be upgraded indigenously.
59
  Misuse of these new 
acquisitions through technological naivety and ideology-driven mismanagement prevented 
the North from obtaining a return on its investment, leading directly to a debt crisis.
60
  With a 
technologically obsolete industrial infrastructure, resource bottlenecks, and major 
disincentives limiting labour productivity, by 1991 North Korea‘s economy had little scope 
for reversing its long trend of declining output. 
 
Collectivisation of Agriculture 
Geography and climate have always hampered food production in North Korea.  Only a few 
regions are suitable for large-scale agriculture due to mountainous topography and the large 
temperature variation between winter and summer, which limits the length of the growing 
season.
61
  In 2004, the proportion of cultivated land in North Korea was estimated at 17-18 
percent of the total land area, much of which was poorly productive due to inferior soil 
fertility.
62
  For these reasons, periodic famine has been a feature of life on the Korean 
peninsula for many centuries.
63
  During the Japanese colonial period, northern Korea had 
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become a base for mining and industry, depending for its food on agricultural regions in the 
south, which has traditionally been the food bowl of the peninsula.  The country‘s rapid 
industrialisation through the 1960s and 1970s exacerbated this problem, facilitating a 
population increase to levels well beyond what the land base could support.
64
 
 
During this same period, Kim Il-sung launched a program of agricultural collectivisation.  
Collectivisation transformed privately owned farms into a version of the state-owned factory, 
where farmers who previously produced food for themselves and a surplus for sale were 
turned into employees producing food for distribution by the state.
65
  Collectivisation was the 
second phase of wider agricultural reforms began in 1946, which redistributed land to peasant 
farmers, eliminated the landlords as a political class and rallied the peasantry to Kim Il-
sung‘s banner.66  Collectivisation itself began in 1954 when Kim‘s political position was 
more secure, with the forcible transfer of farmland from individuals to local cooperatives.  
Three primary reasons undergirded the push for collectivisation: (1) to increase productivity 
according to the principle of economies of scale, as part of the effort to reconstruct rural 
villages decimated by the Korean War; (2) to bolster the bureaucratic power of the state; and 
(3) to eliminate private property for ideological purposes.
67
  The communist regime needed to 
drastically increase food production as part of the post-Korean War reconstruction effort and 
it was believed that output would be greater from large collective farms than from 
assortments of small family plots.   
 
In terms of ideology, peasant farming based on private property was incompatible with 
totalitarian control because it represented an independent social, political, and economic 
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force.  Kim Jong-il feared the infection of individual peasant farmers with ―petty bourgeois‖ 
self-interest, thus the elimination of private agricultural land holdings had intrinsic 
ideological value to the fledgling regime as a means of neutering the opposition of the 
colonial landholder class and turning the peasantry into good proletarians.
68
  Large-scale 
cooperative management incorporated into the central bureaucracy more neatly 
complemented the totalitarian power structure and brought the peasantry into line with other 
sections of the population in their dependence on the state.69 
 
Despite the incorporation of 95.6 percent of peasants into agricultural cooperatives by 1957, 
collectivisation did not solve North Korea‘s food security dilemma.  Kim conceded that each 
family could cultivate a small kitchen plot to produce food for their own consumption, to 
supplement the output of the agricultural collectives.
70
  In 1958, as a component of Chollima, 
Kim decided to amalgamate these cooperatives into larger units similar to the Soviet Union‘s 
massive collective farms.   
 
Furthermore, Kim Il-sung attempted to address the arable land problem through an enormous 
land reclamation campaign to increase the stock of land under cultivation and bring the 
country into agricultural self-sufficiency.
71
  Mountainsides were terraced, land reclaimed 
from the sea, and over forty thousand kilometres of irrigation canals were cut to increase the 
stock of arable land for farming.  These grand agricultural schemes came at a cost that would 
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come back to haunt the regime.  Mountains were terraced too steeply, which along with 
deforestation has contributed to soil erosion of the denuded hills (see figure 3).  This has 
severely reduced their water catchment capacity and led to increased intensity of flooding 
events in the land below.  Land reclaimed from the sea suffered from high salinity and would 
not support food crops, despite the massive use of chemical fertilisers.
72
  Kim‘s industrial 
agriculture project was no match for the limitations imposed by the natural environment. 
 
 
Figure 3: Looking across the DMZ at the denuded landscape surrounding the Kijong-dong peace village 
in North Korea, as seen from the Dorasan Observatory, July 2008 (taken by the author). 
 
 
Chongsan-ri 
In February 1964, Kim Il-sung announced a new framework for industrialised agricultural 
development—the Chongsan-ri farming method—based on mechanisation, chemicals, and 
grand irrigation projects.
73
  It was so named after a small collective west of Pyongyang where 
Kim spent two weeks talking with farmers and making ideological Marxist-inspired 
corrections to the farmers‘ cultivation methods.74  On the back of massive fossil fuel inputs, 
this initiative initially produced steady growth in production on the agricultural collectives of 
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2.8 percent annually from 1961 to 1988, however in the subsequent decade from 1988 grain 
yields dropped precipitously at -5.6 percent per year.
75
  Building on prior agricultural 
reforms, Kim institutionalised mechanised agricultural practices to turn the country‘s farms 
into factories, staffed by a salaried proletariat with no property ties to the land and thus no 
bourgeois sympathies.  During the period from 1946 to 1973, agricultural output grew by 
over 100 times, underpinned by an eight-fold growth in consumption of chemical fertilisers, a 
five-times increase in mechanically-irrigated land, and a hundred-fold increase in the number 
of tractors utilised on collective farms.
76
 
 
The period from 1970-73 saw widespread food shortages as agricultural production declined.  
In response, the Kim regime intensified the centralisation of agricultural planning, featuring 
the same input-output controls to which the rest of the economy was subject.  Concurrently, it 
launched the Three Revolutionary Teams movement, in which young Party members were 
dispatched to rural areas to teach farmers the latest Juche-inspired cultivation methods 
through ideologically based cultural and technical education programs.  Rather than increase 
output, this mobilisation program led to the imposition of an extremely rigid agricultural 
model and the further erosion of traditional farming techniques.
77
  Working groups on the 
collective farms became inflexible and did not have the ability to respond to changing 
conditions by trying new methods, such as, for example, introducing new plant varieties or 
changing the mix of crops under cultivation.  Without the capacity for autonomous action, the 
output of individual working groups declined because they were unable to respond decisively 
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to shock events or growing trends in inefficiency.
78
  Over time the industrial scale 
mechanisation and use of chemicals succumbed to declining returns, as soils became 
exhausted and agricultural machinery fell into decrepitude, decreasing crop yields.  Being 
extraordinarily input-intensive, the farming system was vulnerable to fluctuations in input 
availability; declining energy supplies often resulted in power cuts that prevented the 
pumping of water for irrigation and curtailed the production of fertilisers, pesticides and 
herbicides, all of which are derived from fossil fuels.
79
   
 
The grain procurement practices of the command system also bred inefficiency in food 
production and distribution.  The agricultural system rested on an unwritten principle of 
exchange between the government and farmers.  The farmers would produce crops and 
surrender them to the government at prices well below what they could command in the 
underground market, in exchange for an allotment of food, consumer goods and agricultural 
inputs such as fertilisers.  However, as the supply of agricultural inputs evaporated after the 
collapse of their external suppliers in the USSR, the government became increasingly unable 
to fulfil their promised allotments to farmers.  The terms of the exchange became 
increasingly unfavourable to cultivators, degenerating into a form of confiscatory tax.   
Farmers thus had a strong incentive to protect themselves, utilising measures such as the pre-
harvesting of grain so that the crop would not be subject to government procurement at 
harvest time.
80
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Micro Level: The Soviet Collapse & Aberrant Natural Disasters 
The Kim regime has made minor economic adjustments since the establishment of the 
command economy after the Korean War.  Often the default strategy for boosting production 
within the prevailing ideological framework was to organise the workforce in a similar 
manner to the armed forces, of which the Chollima movement was a classic illustration.  By 
the late-1960s, the North had reached the limits of an economic growth paradigm based 
exclusively on heavy industry.  This was a phenomenon experienced worldwide at this time.  
Rising energy prices, stagflation pressures, and technological advances driving a global shift 
toward light manufacturing as the new growth area all spelt doom for economies structured 
around heavy industry.
81
  North Korea responded by importing production facilities from 
abroad to drive further growth in its stagnating industrial sector and reinvigorate its 
centralised economy.  The failure of this initiative pushed the DPRK into a debt crisis that 
curtailed its ability to trade with and access technology from the West, railroading it into 
dependence on the Communist bloc for external economic exchange.
82
  As most Communist 
bloc countries struggled with similar problems, they became trapped within an outdated 
economic paradigm from which they could not escape without risking the implosion of the 
communist systems themselves.  
 
Through the 1980s, North Korea had become dangerously reliant on imports, subsidies and 
direct aid from the Soviet Union.  Subsidised trade involved an exchange in which the Soviet 
Union would provide manufactured goods, fuel and transportation equipment in exchange for 
rolled ferrous metals and sub-standard North Korean value-added products.  The USSR also 
supplied North Korea with most of its refined oil and one-third of its steel.  In total, two-way 
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trade with the Soviet Union accounted for between 50 to 60 percent of North Korea‘s total 
trade volume.
83
  Much of this occurred on a concessional basis through Moscow‘s 
willingness to finance North Korea‘s ballooning trade deficit, which reached an estimated 
cumulative figure of US$4 billion in the period 1985-90 alone.  Pyongyang enjoyed further 
concessions through subsidised commodity prices, well below international market norms, 
which saved North Korea approximately US$400 million on oil and coal purchases between 
1980 and 1990.
84
 
 
The increase in inputs from the Soviet Union in the late-1980s could not disguise the growing 
food crisis enveloping the country.  Agricultural and industrial output declined from 1987 as 
subsidised Soviet imports of key mineral and fuel inputs dropped away.
85
  Initially the regime 
adapted to the loss of output by bartering rice in exchange for cheaper Soviet grain, while 
drawing heavily on the national food stockpile and advising the public to consume only ‗two 
meals a day‘ in a concerted propaganda campaign.  In 1990, as its own internal crisis took 
hold, Moscow rejected the barter system and requested that North Korea pay for goods in 
hard currency at international market prices.  The regime‘s responses remained trapped 
within the ideological confines of the command economy, as illustrated by regime 
propaganda urging North Korean citizens to eat only two meals a day.
86
  By 1991, two-way 
trade had collapsed; Soviet exports to North Korea had fallen by over seventy percent from 
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the previous year and by 1993 had collapsed to a tenth of the average import total between 
1987-90.
87
   
 
The declining North Korean economy, reliant on imported energy supplies, agricultural 
inputs and manufactured goods from the communist bloc, was extremely vulnerable to 
disruptions to its input flow.   The rapid drop in energy availability in 1991 was the trigger 
event that crippled an already weak system.  The economy could no longer operate at its 
former level of complexity without the enormous throughput of resources.  At this point of 
the decay process, Tainter predicts that productive units across the economic spectrum will 
increase their resistance to the demands of the hierarchy or overtly attempt to break away.
88
  
This resistance has occurred in North Korea, visible in the growth of entrepreneurialism and 
corruption.  The marketised military economy has arrested the trend to some degree, 
institutionalising a new organisational paradigm in which the North Korean economy has 
splintered into several parallel economies.  What remained of the command economy, the 
heavy industrial sector, was a hollowed-out shell, as network of factories brought offline or in 
severely curtailed production, its formerly privileged workers facing starvation as their 
incomes dried up.  Agricultural production, long based on mechanised farming and vast 
utilisation of chemical fertilisers, also deteriorated.   
 
The North lacked the foreign exchange needed to purchase imports at market prices because 
of its minimal export income, resulting in the steep decline of total Soviet-DPRK trade 
volume from US$3.2 billion in 1990 to US$360 million in 1991.
89
  Imports of Soviet crude 
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oil declined precipitously from 440,000 tons in 1990 to only 40,000 tons in 1991, which 
crippled the North‘s industrial sector.90  The cessation of machinery imports created a 
shortage in spare parts, while the fuel scarcity stalled production, incapacitating the decaying 
industrial infrastructure and thus limiting its ability to produce export goods, the income from 
which would help to pay for the required inputs on the international market.
91
  Consequently, 
the effect of the import halt on North Korea‘s industrial sector was proportionally far higher 
than just the value of the missing inputs themselves. 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was a hammer blow, bringing the country to its 
knees as aid and subsidised inputs that had long propped up the economy began to dry up.  
To compound the catastrophe, floods and then drought wreaked havoc on agricultural 
production and decimated the state‘s centralised food distribution apparatus.  Without a 
substantial export sector, the North could not trade for food on the international market, nor 
was the regime willing to undertake the economic reforms that would allow it to participate 
in international trade.
92
   By 1993, mortality rates began to climb, a sign that the growing 
food crisis had evolved into a fully fledged famine.  The floods that hit during the summer 
monsoon were the coup de grace, a trigger that accelerated the famine event already 
underway in which, according to the most authorative estimates produced by Daniel 
Goodkind and Lorraine West, approximately 600,000 to one million people perished between 
1995 and 2000.
93
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By 1995, the famine forced the regime to acknowledge that it required international 
assistance and by the opening months of that year had successfully negotiated aid agreements 
with South Korean and Japan.  However, as aid began to diffuse through the country it 
became clear that the regime was using it as a balance of payments support and not as a 
mechanism to increase the overall food supply.  Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland have 
argued that the food crisis could have been and still can be alleviated if the regime were 
willing to access commercial imports of grain, as do other countries with a comparative 
disadvantage in agriculture.
94
  The coping measures developed outside of government control 
were described above.  The government response, on the other hand, was far more measured.  
Not willing to make major systemic changes to address the food shortfall, the regime instead 
tinkered with small, ad hoc technical changes in a vain effort to boost food production.   
 
The Famine and the Collapse of the PDS 
The establishment of the Public Distribution System (PDS) in 1957 centralised the 
distribution of cereals through a rationing system, which later came to encompass a much 
wider variety of foods and consumables.
95
 This was necessary because the fixed prices of 
goods in North Korea distorted the balance of supply and demand, forcing the government to 
decide how to distribute scarce commodities. A representative of each family unit would 
present identification and rationing coupons on the fifteenth day of each month to receive the 
family rations, which consisted of rice and a number of different grains.
96
   The PDS was also 
useful for increasing regime control, as the population became dependent on the state for 
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96 LANKOV, A. 2005a. North Korea's antique food rationing . Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GA15Dg01.html 
[Accessed 25/04/2007]. 
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nearly all daily necessities.97  Yet according to Yang Sung-chul, the regime managed to re-
badge state rations as a gift from the Great Leader, as opposed to an entitlement.
98
  People 
tend to feel lucky if they receive a gift, no matter how small, whereas they are more likely to 
see an entitlement as inadequate.  Branding the PDS ration in this way was therefore a 
propaganda masterstroke.   
 
The PDS worked reasonably well during times of stability, but proved ineffectual in 
distributing food during the famine. As the PDS fell apart, a series of underground private 
markets sprang up around the country when it became clear the distribution mechanism was 
dysfunctional.  What little food was available was distributed preferentially to elite members 
of the Party and military while some regions and social groups were excluded altogether.  
Even the elite were exposed to food shortages to some extent during the famine; only those 
officials and their families in the leadership core would have been completely protected from 
hunger.
99
 
 
The collapse of the PDS was the direct consequence of a combination of inter-related 
problems: poor harvests due to floods and drought, the energy shortages, crumbling 
infrastructure, and the variety of systemic bottlenecks caused by central planning.
100
  This 
ensured that what little food was available for distribution was unable to reach outlying areas, 
leaving citizens in these regions to develop their own survival strategies.  Out of necessity, 
many North Koreans abandoned their assigned jobs to forage elsewhere for food, while those 
                                                 
97 SCOBELL, A. 2006. Kim Jong Il and North Korea: The Leader and the System. Strategic Studies Institute, 
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99 HAGGARD, S. & NOLAND, M. 2007a. Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform, New York, Columbia University Press. p .56. 
100 WOO, M. J.-E. 2005. North Korea in 2005: Maximising Profit to Save Socialism. Asian Survey, 46, p. 55. 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
 104 
people who could grow their own food sold surpluses in the illegal markets.
101
  Farmers often 
chose to hoard available food stocks rather than ship it to the larger urban centres and spent 
more time away from the collectivised farms working on their own private plots.
102
  Small 
private gardens proved to be the difference between sustenance and starvation for many 
North Koreans and have since become an important component of the food system.
103
   
 
The desperate food situation led the regime to loosen controls on private markets and the 
movement of people between districts.  Small farmers‘ markets were initially established in 
the early 1980s as an outlet for the sale of surplus produce from the collectivised farms that 
was not requisitioned by the PDS.
104
   They have since mushroomed into busy bazaars where 
all manner of goods, legal and illegal, are bought, sold and bartered.
105
  Marketisation 
allowed those with access to foreign currency to adapt to the food emergency, as they were in 
the enviable position of being able to purchase what they needed on the black market.  Those 
who cannot access the market are most at-risk, including urban industrial workers who 
formerly enjoyed a privileged status prior to the famine.
106
  The people who perished or 
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suffered most during this period were likely to have been those who were unable to grow 
their own food, produce some other goods, or perform a service to barter for food.
107
   
 
The regime revived the PDS in many areas during October 2005, offering a daily ration of 
500 grams of cereal.  Distribution delays due to transportation deficiencies and administrative 
inertia have prevented PDS rations from becoming available in all counties.  The revived 
PDS led to brief short-term improvements before the initiative was again withdrawn, with 
rations reverting to pre-revival levels.  Those living in or near the larger cities on the west 
coast have the greatest chance of accessing the PDS ration, while those in other areas 
continue to rely on adaptive strategies developed during the famine.
108
 
 
Conclusion 
The regime‘s persistence through the famine discredited proponents of rapid regime collapse, 
whose predictions were grounded in an economic reductionism which assumed that the 
failure of the North‘s command economy would inevitably lead to the rapid collapse of the 
DPRK state.  The relentless march of declining marginal returns on investment ensures that 
all political entities will eventually slide into decline.  What matters in North Korea‘s case is 
the timeframe, dictated by the severity of problems it confronts.  Many observers believe that 
collapse is inevitable in the long-term regardless of what course of action the regime chooses 
to take.   
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In the North Korean case, the cessation of subsidised Soviet oil drastically undercut the 
amount of energy available to service the North‘s complex industrial society.  The command 
economy ground to a halt because lack of oil created bottlenecks in transportation, heavy 
industry and mechanised agriculture.  The problems were numerous: shipping of components 
to and from factories became prohibitively difficult; huge collective farms could not be fully 
sown and harvested in the absence of functional farm machinery; the North‘s exhausted soils 
produced lower crop yields without fossil fuel-based fertiliser inputs; and harvested crops 
could not be distributed as transportation was shut down.  Energy shortages affected the 
military as well, despite its priority access to oil, which has decreased the training and combat 
readiness of the air force and mechanised infantry.
109
  In short, the sectors of the DPRK state 
that failed during the famine were the ones most exposed to energy shortages.  
 
This chapter finds that state decay in North Korea emanates from the fundamental 
inadequacy of its physical base to support the ideational and institutional bases of the Kim 
regime.  This situation arises because North Korea is a small country with a limited 
agricultural land area, no indigenous oil reserves and thus a constrained capacity for self 
sufficiency in either food production or industrial activity.  These are the conditions upon 
which the North Korean state, including its economy, institutions, political system and 
ideology are built.  The theory of organisational complexity indicates that declining marginal 
returns on investment are inevitable in complex social systems.  In the North Korean case, we 
see that returns on investment have tended to decrease rapidly, for two reasons: first, because 
of the unique geography of the country, which cannot support its population base; and two, 
because of the selection of poor strategies to maintain societal complexity in the face of these 
challenges of geography. 
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While it is generally true that weak states are capable of rebounding from episodes of 
institutional failure, in this particular case, North Korea‘s recovery has been partial and 
constitutes a stay of execution for the regime in its current form.  Theories suggesting that a 
weakened Kim regime will muddle through by making limited adjustments to specific crises, 
to preserve the quasi-totalitarian system and avoid reform, were an outgrowth of the 
discredited rapid collapse hypothesis.  However, it is not clear how long the regime can 
muddle through before the state fully recovers or change becomes unavoidable.  It is possible 
that North Korea‘s crisis and subsequent rebound are part of a step-wise long-term descent 
toward collapse, characterised by episodes of retrenchment and partial recovery, followed by 
further decay and another partial recovery, and so on.  If this is so, North Korea‘s rebound 
from the famine has resulted from a combination of the subsidy of systemic maintenance 
costs with international largesse, and the regime‘s efforts to lower these systemic 
maintenance costs by triaging segments of the population from the state‘s distributive 
functions.  As the following chapters will show in detail, the nuclear program has been 
integral to this effort.  North Korea‘s nuclear program is integral to the regime‘s efforts to 
postpone the onset of declining marginal returns, in order to preserve the status quo for as 
long as possible.  Given that the foundational elements of North Korea‘s state decay are not 
political but rather ecological, geographical and geological, it would be prudent to assume 
that state decay in the DPRK has yet to run its course.   
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4. The Post-famine North Korean Economies 
 
 
In the preceding chapter it was established that North Korea‘s rapid economic collapse during 
the mid-1990s is best conceptualised as the result of trigger events touching off crises in a 
system weakened by long-term degenerative trends within the political economy of the state.  
The famine period initiated a reconfiguration of the DPRK state to a lower level of 
organisational complexity, compatible with a diminished resource base.  This process is 
incomplete because the state has yet to reach organisational equilibrium.  External inputs 
support its institutions, which maintain this institutional structure at a higher level of 
complexity beyond what its resource base would otherwise allow.  One of the primary 
purposes of the nuclear program over this period has been to leverage largesse from the 
international community to cover the difference between systemic maintenance costs of the 
monolithic command economy, and a more simple political and institutional architecture 
commensurate with the available resource base.  Necessarily, the elements of the post-famine 
system that remain under regime control must be smaller and less complex than the command 
system that preceded it. 
 
At a theoretical level, this claim makes a great deal of sense.  This chapter verifies this 
hypothesis by examining how the North Korean economy has evolved after the famine, by 
establishing: one, that a trend of long-term systemic degradation did indeed take place, 
leaving the state vulnerable to external shocks; two, that the North Korean economy is 
reconfiguring to a less complex level of organisation; and three, that this process of 
reconfiguration has yet to run its course.  The chapter describes how the command economy 
splintered into a number of parallel economies that operate largely on proto-market 
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principles.  The post-famine economic order in the DPRK is much different to the one that 
existed in the DPRK prior to 1991.  The pre-famine command economy has shattered into a 
series of separate but inter-related parallel economies, which has reduced the complexity of 
the economic system in response to resource constraints.  This new system remains bounded 
by energy constraints and isolation from Western economies by economic sanctions, although 
interaction with other Asian economies via China and Russia is growing.  The chapter will 
then examine the prospects for economic reform in the context of parallel economies.  
Finally, it describes the importance of foreign aid and concessions to propping up the new 
economic system.  In so doing, it will point out how the nuclear program enables the regime 
to slow down this process in order to revitalise the remnants of the old economic system.  The 
nuclear program has become an important foundation beneath this post-famine economic 
system, giving the regime some breathing space to slow down the degeneration process and 
attempt to reconstitute some of the features of the pre-famine command economy. 
 
Reduced Organisational Complexity: Parallel Economies 
The multi-dimensional crisis set off a fundamental metamorphosis of the North Korean 
economy, a transformation that is still underway.  The idea of parallel economies is a useful 
metaphor for conceptualizing the disaggregation of the old command economy.  These 
parallel economies operate at arm‘s-length or completely independently from direct 
government control.  Parallel economies develop when the official economy becomes too 
rigid and dysfunctional.  In the North Korean case, the official command economy laboured 
under its own inefficiencies, exacerbated by the regime‘s ideological commitment to a system 
clearly in decline.  Furthermore, the regime‘s exclusion from the international economy drove 
the evolution of parallel economies that would service the hard currency needs of the regime 
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and provide a vehicle for regime perpetuation through the reorganisation of the domestic 
economy under the control of the military. 
 
There is considerable overlap between the North‘s parallel economies, yet each is distinct 
from the others and more importantly from the monolithic command economy that preceded 
them.  The first parallel economy exists amongst the remains of the official economy.  The 
second is the enormous military economy, which incorporates entire production and supply 
chains to provision the military and generate income through weapons exports and rent-
seeking activities.  The third is the illicit economy, featuring a basket of criminal activities 
through which the regime generates a large portion of its foreign currency earnings.  The 
fourth is the court economy, which the leadership uses to provision the wider regime elite 
with luxury items not available to the wider public.  Finally, the fifth parallel economy 
comprises the entrepreneurial black market in which budding cohorts of people from the 
lower levels of North Korean society do business outside of official channels.  Participants 
include those with access to foreign currency who trade in imported goods not available 
through the official economy, or farmers selling homegrown produce or goods appropriated 
from the state. 
 
The Official Economy 
In a system characterised by parallel economies, the official economy is that portion of the 
total economy that is planned and controlled by the state, which owns or regulates most of the 
means of production.
1
  In North Korea, the official economy is overseen by the People‘s 
Assembly and controlled by the State Planning Commission and consists of the remnants of 
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the pre-1991 command economy.  The contraction of the command system may have been so 
severe that it now may only account for five percent of total economic output.  This includes 
the dilapidated heavy industrial sector, which was the mainstay of the old command 
economy.  State controls have relaxed somewhat over state-owned enterprises, with 
production quotas and procurement rules having been eased to accommodate material 
shortages through the system.
2
  Approximately 20-30 percent of the population relies on 
incomes from the planned economy, through salaries from official companies and the PDS 
ration.
3
   
 
Kim Il-sung originally based the North‘s economic development on heavy industry.  This 
approach was initially successful, but fell away from the late-1960s as the growth curve for 
heavy industry plateaued and global demand for high-tech light manufactures began to 
outpace that for heavy industrial products.  As late as 1990, industry—mining, manufacturing 
and construction—accounted for 49 percent of the North Korean economy.  By 1997 
however the industrial sector had dropped to 32 percent of the overall economy, clearly 
affected by the resource shock that accompanied the cessation of imports from the Soviet 
bloc.  In 2003, the industrial sector had recovered somewhat to 36 percent of the economy, 
growing again to 40 percent by 2007.
4
  By 2004, the manufacturing sector accounted for only 
18.5 percent of GNP, compared with 28.7 percent in South Korea.
5
  A 2005 report 
commission by the International Crisis Group notes that a key factor keeping factories offline 
                                                 
2 SUH, J.-J. 2006. Social Changes in North Korea after the Economic Crisis. East Asian Review, 18, p. 46. 
3 PARK, I.-H. Interview with the author. 28 July 2008. Seoul, South Korea. 
4 NANTO, D. & CHANLETT-AVERY, E. 2008. The North Korean Economy: Leverage and Policy Analysis. Washington DC: 
Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32493.pdf . p. 13. 
5 2005b. Gross Domestic Product of North Korea in 2004. Seoul: Bank of Korea, 
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was that a large portion of the productive infrastructure was stripped and sold during the 
famine.
6
   
 
The Military Economy 
The military economy is by far the most important parallel economy, accounting for up to 
seventy percent of North Korea‘s domestic economic output and encompassing all economic 
activities related to the production, distribution and consumption of materials within the 
military sphere.
7
  The National Defence Commission (NDC) controls all activity within the 
military economy, beyond the reach of the People‘s Assembly, which controls the official 
economy.  The NDC is responsible for planning, financing, production and distribution of 
military-related equipment and technologies, as well as a large portion of foreign sales of 
military hardware.
8
  The relationship between Kim Jong-il, the government bureaucracy and 
the military is still highly symbiotic, with institutional economic relationships mirroring the 
political co-dependence between regime, Party and military. 
 
The vehicle for the growth of the military sector has been Kim Jong-il‘s doctrine of Songun 
(military-first) politics, first proclaimed in 1998.  The ultimate goal of Songun politics is to 
create a self-sustaining defence sector in which military activities generate more resources 
and economic goods than they consume.
9
  Estimates of annual military expenditure range 
from US$1.7 billion to US$5 billion, or between 15.7 and 27.2 percent of North Korea‘s 
                                                 
6 2005e. North Korea: Can the Iron Fist Accept the Invisible Hand? Brussels: International Crisis Group, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/north_korea/096_north_korea_can_the_iron_fist_accept_the_invisible.pdf. p . 14. 
7 PINKSTON, D. 2003. Domestic Politics and Stakeholders in the North Korean Missile Development Program. The Nonproliferation 
Review, 10, p. 9. 
8 BERMUDEZ, J. 2001. The Armed Forces of North Korea, London, I.B. Taurus. pp. 45-47. 
9 Nicholas Eberstadt quotes an official statement from Nodong Sinmun in April 2003 that describes the role of the military in leading North 
Korea‘s economic reinvigoration: ―Once we lay the foundations for a powerful self-sustaining national defence industry, we will be able to 
rejuvenate all economic fields, to include light industry and agriculture and enhance the quality of people‘s lives.‖  See: EBERSTADT, N. 
2006. Why Hasn‘t North Korea Collapsed? Understanding the Recent Past, Thinking About the Future. In: KIHL, Y. & KIM, H. (eds.) North 
Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival. New York: East Gate Books. pp. 288-89.   
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GNP.
10
  Yet these figures alone understate the size of the wider military economy, which 
commands preferential allocation of the country‘s materials, resources and labour force.11  
Estimates pin the size of the military economy at approximately 70-75 percent of the total 
North Korean economy, though this figure may be imprecise due to the dearth of statistics on 
the military economy.
12
  Not only does it subsume the tasks of provisioning supplies and 
armaments for the KPA, it incorporates many other aspects of the civilian economy, making 
it dissimilar from the military-industrial complexes of other countries.   
 
The military has come to control a number of powerful trading enterprises that control the 
internal distribution of food, uniforms and weapons throughout the military.
13
  These large 
military firms are also able to provide a labour force for many important infrastructure 
projects, such as land reclamation, road building, agriculture, housing construction, and 
mining.
14
  By providing manpower for important social functions such as these, the military 
is adding value to the economy beyond its security role and thus places less of a burden on 
the wider society than is presumed by foreign observers.  On top of providing labour for 
various non-military activities, the KPA oversees productive operations incorporating total 
production and supply chains: it operates railways, the best mines, farms, fisheries, and 
textile factories.  It sells surplus materials on the black market for profit.
15
  Alexander 
Vorontsov has suggested that these powerful military-run firms may be developing into 
enterprises similar to the chaebol in South Korea in that they are involved in many different 
                                                 
10 2007a. Country Profile: North Korea. Washington DC: US Library of Congress, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/North_Korea.pdf 
11 MOON, C.-I. & TAKESADA, H. 2001. North Korea: Institutionalized Military Intervention. In: ALAGAPPA, M. (ed.) Coercion and 
Governance. Stanford: Stanford University Press. p. 377. 
12 PARK, I.-H. Interview with the author. 28 July 2008. Seoul, South Korea; PINKSTON, D. 2003. Domestic Politics and Stakeholders in the 
North Korean Missile Development Program. The Nonproliferation Review, 10, p. 9. 
13 HAGGARD, S. & NOLAND, M. 2007a. Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform, New York, Columbia University Press. p. 54; 
CUMINGS, B. 2004b. North Korea: Another Country, Melbourne, Scribe. p. 190. 
14 POLLACK, J. 2005. The Strategic Futures and Military Capabilities of the Two Koreas. In: TELLIS, A. & WILLS, M. (eds.) Strategic 
Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty. Seattle & Washington DC: National Bureau of Asian Research. p. 144. 
15 PARK, I.-H. Interview with the author. 28 July 2008. Seoul, South Korea. 
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industries and maintain close ties with the bureaucracy, but enjoy a degree of independence 
from complete government intervention.
16
   
 
Arms exports have become an important sector of the military economy, with military-run 
enterprises producing products including small arms, artillery, and light tanks for export.  The 
regime has sold ballistic missile systems to Iran, Pakistan and Syria, along with alleged sales 
to Iraq (prior to 2003), Nigeria, Libya and Egypt.
17
  Earnings from weapons exports 
reportedly net North Korea up to US$1 billion annually, approximately half of which came 
from the sale of missile systems.  In 2001, Pyongyang received approximately US$580 
million in payments for missiles, which almost equals the North‘s civilian export income of 
US$650 million for the same year.
18 
 Sheena Chestnut believes the regime has used front 
companies to aid its missile proliferation efforts.  According to Chestnut, two particular front 
companies—the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation, and the Korea Ryongbong 
General Corporation—have facilitated the export of missile technology to Iran and 
Pakistan.
19
  However, some defectors—including Cho Myung-Chul, a former professor at 
Kim Il-sung University—have testified that revenue from weapons sales and crime is 
channelled directly to the military, bypassing the government.
20
  Exactly who Cho is referring 
to as ―the government‖ in this instance, be it the KWP or the regime leadership, is not clear.  
As chapter five will show, the military and the government have become synonymous under 
                                                 
16 VORONTSOV, A. 2006. North Korea's Military-First Policy: A Curse or a Blessing?  Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 
http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/fellows/vorontsov20060526.htm [Accessed 13/04/2007].  The South Korean chaebol are large 
corporate conglomerates, which, through their intimate relationship with the government, helped to develop the South Korean economy, in 
the process growing into massive corporate entities.  See: LEE, P.-S. 2000. Economic Crisis and Chaebol Reform in Korea. APEC Study 
Centre, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/business/apec/publications/PSLee.Pdf. p . 2. 
17 NOLAND, M. 2002. North Korea‘s External Economic Relations: Globalization in ‗Our Own Style‘. In: KIM, S. & LEE, T. (eds.) North 
Korea and Northeast Asia. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. p. 173; CUMINGS, B. 1997. Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern 
History, New York, WW Norton & Co. p. 462. 
18 PINKSTON, D. 2003. Domestic Politics and Stakeholders in the North Korean Missile Development Program. The Nonproliferation 
Review, 10, p. 5; MOON, C.-I. & TAKESADA, H. 2001. North Korea: Institutionalized Military Intervention. In: ALAGAPPA, M. (ed.) 
Coercion and Governance. Stanford: Stanford University Press. p. 378. 
19 CHESTNUT, S. 2007. Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks. International Security, 32, p. 98. 
20 Cho Myung-chul, quoted in 2005e. North Korea: Can the Iron Fist Accept the Invisible Hand? Brussels: International Crisis Group, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/north_korea/096_north_korea_can_the_iron_fist_accept_the_invisible.pdf. p . 8. 
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Songun politics. 
 
Since the advent of Songun politics, it has become a difficult task to delineate the official 
economy from economic activities controlled by the military.  The military economy has 
become so pervasive, and the official economy so small, that the military economy has come 
to dominate most sectors of economic activity.
21
  However, no official statistics exist to 
quantify its exact size.  Nonetheless, the regime has consistently leveraged the nuclear 
program in denuclearisation negotiations to obtain key inputs for the military economy that 
are not available indigenously and, as illustrated in chapter five, is employed regularly as a 
tool to legitimise the transfer of economic power to the KPA. 
 
The Illicit Economy 
North Korea has exhibited a consistent pattern of state involvement in criminal activities over 
a long period.  Sheena Chestnut argues that drug production, drug trafficking and 
counterfeiting activities operate within sensitive, closely-monitored areas of the government 
and exist on a scale large enough to require cross-institutional coordination and support.
22
  
Any factory can run a drug production operation alongside its ordinary productive functions, 
which for some factories may be the only function keeping them open.
23
  Activities of this 
kind could not have been possible without direct oversight from the highest echelons of the 
regime leadership via the penetration of all work teams by KWP cadres. 
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Contributions from state-sanctioned criminal enterprises represent another income source.  
The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of subsidised imports badly exposed North Korea‘s 
lack of foreign currency income.  As Russia and China began to demand payment for goods 
in hard currency, illegal activities became one of the few realistic sources of income for the 
North.
24
  The first documented case of official North Korean involvement in criminal activity 
dates back to the 1970s, when DPRK embassy officials in Norway, Sweden, Finland and 
Denmark were found to be using their diplomatic tax exemption to buy bulk quantities of 
alcohol and cigarettes for resale on the black market, while allegations surfaced of embassy 
involvement in drug smuggling.
25
   
 
It is possible these activities were fundraisers to help the North pay off its debts to Western 
creditors, who had lent the North money to purchase agricultural and industrial 
technologies.
26
  In the present day, a number of international investigations have implicated 
the regime in a number of illicit activities, including the production and distribution of 
narcotics, counterfeiting, smuggling, and money laundering.  Illicit exports may account for 
35-40 percent of the North‘s total exports, contributing to an even larger slice of total 
earnings.  Profit margins on illegal activities are often as high as five hundred percent, far 
beyond those earned by conventional trade, which is one of the reasons why criminal activity 
is so lucrative.
27
 
 
The Kim regime is widely accused of involvement in the production and distribution of 
                                                 
24 FRENCH, P. 2005. North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula - A Modern History, London, Zed Books. p. 99. 
25 NOLAND, M. 2006b. How North Korea Funds Its Regime . Washington DC: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=629 [Accessed 18/03/2007]; MARTIN, B. 2004. Under the Loving Care of 
the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and Kim Dynasty, New York, St. Martin‘s Press. p. 155; KOH, B. 1977. North Korea 1976: Under Stress. 
Asian Survey, 17, p. 61. 
26 KOH, B. 1977. North Korea 1976: Under Stress. Asian Survey, 17, 61-62. 
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drugs, including heroin and methamphetamine.  The Korean peninsula has a long history of 
opium production, dating back centuries.  Cultivation increased during the Japanese colonial 
era and has continued to the present day, with current estimates for the land area under opium 
cultivation ranging from 3,000 to 4,000 hectares.
28
  The Kim regime began industrial-scale 
production in earnest after establishing an experimental opium farm in Hamkyung Province 
in 1988, after which farmers in many regions were directed to plant an opium poppy crop, the 
harvest of which was turned over to special trading companies for production and export.
29
  
This also exacerbates food insecurity, because land under poppy cultivation is land that might 
otherwise be devoted to food production. 
 
There are several documented cases of North Korean involvement in the drug trade, including 
a well-documented incident in April 2003 when Australian law enforcement officials boarded 
a North Korean registered ship—the Pong Su—off Australia‘s east coast, producing a seizure 
of 125 kg of heroin worth US$150 million.  A Korean Workers‘ Party secretary was 
reportedly found on board.
30
  Konstantin Asmolov has suggested that the Pong Su incident 
was not the clear-cut evidence of North Korean drug production that it initially appeared.  
According to Asmolov, several anomalies cast doubt on the North Korean connection: first, 
the Pong Su was purchased in Taiwan and was sailing from Burma to Malaysia, far away 
from North Korea but well within the traffic channels exporting drugs out of the Golden 
Triangle.  Second, the ship‘s crew spoke Korean, but they were impoverished Korean 
refugees living in China, desperate enough to take a low-paying ship hand job.  Third, the 
Party card with the name of a member of North Korea‘s Political Bureau the commandos 
                                                 
28 LINTNER, B. 2007a. North Korea's burden of crime and terror . Asia Times Online, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/ID20Dg02.html [Accessed 24 April 2007]. 
29 CHESTNUT, S. 2007. Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks. International Security, 32, p. 89. 
30 LINTNER, B. 2007a. North Korea's burden of crime and terror . Asia Times Online, 
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found on board was a planted fake, because North Korean sailors leave their personal papers 
at port before sailing out to sea.
31
  The Pong Su incident may point to the regime‘s 
involvement in couriering drugs for others, generating income through their trafficking 
services.
32
  The heroin seized from the Pong Su was of the ―Double UO Globe‖ brand, 
usually produced in Myanmar by a government-sponsored militia group called the United Wa 
State Army, which corroborates Asmolov‘s assertion that in this instance North Korean 
connections were involved only as couriers.
33
  This, however, does not discount the existence 
of the North‘s indigenous drug production enterprises.   
 
Several other prominent cases have been documented.  In February 1995 Russian authorities 
detained two North Korean nationals in Vladivostok, seizing eight kilograms of heroin, which 
Russian police claim was a sample batch for a much larger shipment.  Between 1998 and 
2002, Japanese police intercepted nearly 1500 kg worth of methamphetamine, which was 
found to originate in the DPRK, with a wholesale value of over US$75 million.  In July 2002 
police in Taiwan seized 79 kilograms of heroin from a Taiwanese ship.  Investigations 
showed that a North Korean fishing boat had docked with the ship at sea to transfer the illicit 
cargo.
34
  According to the US State Department, methamphetamine is still traded across the 
China-DPRK border, although there have been no recorded instances of narco-trafficking 
linked back to the DPRK regime since 2003.
35
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Other lucrative criminal activities carry the Kim regime‘s fingerprints, including 
counterfeiting, money laundering and smuggling.  Elements of the Kim regime allegedly 
have cultivated links with organised crime groups throughout Asia, including Chinese triads, 
Japanese Yakuza and drug cartels in Southeast Asia.
36
  The United States Department of 
Justice learnt from indicted Irish republican paramilitary Sean Garland that North Korea was 
the source of so-called ―super-notes‖—high quality counterfeit US$100 bills—which have 
been circulating globally since 1989.  North Korean officials were reportedly involved in a 
worldwide distribution chain at both wholesale and retail levels.
37
  The counterfeit production 
of cigarettes has become a lucrative earner: a container-full of cigarettes may cost US$70,000 
to produce, but can retail on the street for between three and four million dollars.  Shipments 
of counterfeit cigarettes are regularly shipped from the North‘s seaports at Rajin and Nampo 
to China, South Korea and further afield.
38
  It is likely that North Korea‘s annual income 
from counterfeit cigarettes is as high as US$80 to US$160 million.
39
  North Korea has also 
been involved in smuggling items such as conflict diamonds, ivory, rhinoceros horn, and 
other exotic animal species, often under the cover of diplomatic protection.  For example, 689 
kg of ivory seizures linked to North Korean officials were documented in Kenya and 537 kg 
in Moscow during 1999, while 576 kg were confiscated in France during 1998.
40
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The DPRK has used banking partners around the world to launder money, a fact brought to 
prominence by the Macau-based bank Banco Delta Asia, which was used as a conduit for 
funds laundered between criminal groups and North Korean front companies.  Sanctions 
placed on Banco Delta Asia by the United States government forced the bank to sever its 
relationships with forty North Korean businesses and individuals thought to be laundering 
money for such groups, and replace several staff involved with these operations.
41
  This has 
had the effect of tightening the regime‘s revenue stream which some have argued was the 
catalyst for bringing North Korea back to the negotiating table in early 2007.
42
 
 
All these cases demonstrate that regime criminal activity is systematic and likely to be an 
important source of hard currency, with speculative estimates of illicit income ranging from 
US$500 million to US$1 billion annually.
43
  It is likely that these lucrative criminal activities 
have become entrenched and even diffused beyond the control of the upper echelon of regime 
leadership.  In the long run, it may be impossible for the regime to move beyond illicit 
revenue streams as a source of income. 
 
The Court Economy 
It is typical of communist states to develop a ―court‖ economy in which senior and middle-
ranking officials can exclusively access goods and services not legitimately available to other 
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citizens.
44
  North Korea is no exception in this regard, with the overwhelming majority of aid 
granted as cash funnelled directly into the court economy, allowing Kim Jong-il to lavish the 
regime‘s upper echelon with material largesse.45  The black market and the court economy 
are both outgrowths of shortage and inefficiency in the command economy.  The North 
Korean elite enjoy their own cloistered court economy, within which foreign market 
transactions secure imported goods such as cars and liquor via unaccountable financial, 
industrial and trading companies that exist outside the oversight of the financial bureaucracy.  
These companies satisfy the needs of exclusive groups—the army, special services or Kim 
Jong-il‘s immediate leadership core—rather than contributing to the government budget.  
Party bodies often set up economic departments in key institutions as a cover for these 
clandestine enterprises.
46
  The court economy constitutes approximately twenty percent of 
total economic activity in North Korea.
47
   
 
The Entrepreneurial Economy 
A further parallel economy exists beyond the penetration and involvement of the state.  It is 
not uncommon in communist states for an entrepreneurial economy, the colloquial ―black 
market,‖ to exist within which individuals and independent traders sell all manner of 
consumer goods.
48
  In North Korea, it is estimated that more than forty percent of the 
population derive their income purely from private black market business activities as traders, 
                                                 
44 HOLMES, L. 1993. The End of Communist Power: Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis, Melbourne, Melbourne 
University Press. p. 76.  This system was also described by a Soviet embassy official named Vasily Mikheev, who was posted in Pyongyang 
during the late 1980s.  See: OH, K. & HASSIG, R. 2000. North Korea: Through the Looking Glass, Washington DC, Brookings Institution 
Press. p. 66. 
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Korea; OH, K. & HASSIG, R. 2000. North Korea: Through the Looking Glass, Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press. p. 66. 
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47 PARK, I.-H. Interview with the author. 28 July 2008. Seoul, South Korea. 
48 According to Leslie Holmes, such black market or ―second‖ economies are anomalous within the structure of communist states because 
they are not planned or controlled in any meaningful way by the central authorities, and the means of production are owned wholly or largely 
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smugglers or shopkeepers.  A further ten to twenty percent of the population supplement their 
income in the official economy with revenue from private business activities.
49
 
 
Most noticeable of these in the North Korean context are the farmers‘ markets that became 
ubiquitous during the famine, where individuals could sell crops siphoned from collective 
farms, as well as surplus from kitchen gardens and expropriated food aid in informal private 
farmers markets.
50
  There is also evidence of an extensive black market in military surplus 
goods, operated for and among lower level military personnel.
51
  The marketisation of the 
lower levels of North Korean society has also seen an explosion in small-scale organised 
business activities such as restaurants, small shops, beauty parlours and other commercial 
activities.
52
  The ―semi-illegal marketeers‖ that operate these new businesses have been able 
to advance up the social ladder as those formerly privileged industrial proletarians have seen 
their fortunes deteriorate.
53
  Often these new entrepreneurs are former members of the hostile 
class, who through their links to relatives abroad have access to foreign currency.  This places 
them in a highly advantageous position to capitalise on opportunities available within the 
entrepreneurial economy. 
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Making Sense of the Post-Famine Economies 
Energy Dependence 
The end of fuel subsidies after the Soviet collapse created an energy shortfall in North Korea 
that undermined its command economy and contributed substantially to the economic 
collapse of the mid-1990s.  North Korea continues to depend on foreign oil for its economic 
survival, which it obtains from China as direct aid and at subsidised trade prices due to 
Beijing‘s strategic interest in preventing regime collapse in the North, as well as ad hoc 
shipments from other regional states as part of denuclearisation agreements.  Chinese oil is 
particularly sensitive to supply fluctuations due to the energy-intensive nature of its heavy 
industries and agriculture.
54
  The Chinese oil is piped across the Yalu River to a Chinese-built 
refinery in Sinuiju, from which petroleum is distributed to the rest of the country.
55
  North 
Korea does possess potential reserves of oil and natural gas in the Yellow Sea, adjacent to 
China‘s Bohai Gulf oil fields that are already in production.  However, the continuing 
political instability caused by the North‘s nuclear standoff with the United States is likely to 
discourage further exploration.
56
   
 
The DPRK has a substantial endowment of coal, mined principally at four major mines, and 
numerous smaller operations around the country. The North has anthracite and bituminous 
                                                 
54 North Korea continues to be a net energy importer; in 2005 it consumed 25,000 barrels of oil per day while producing a paltry 138 barrels 
per day.  See: 2007a. Country Profile: North Korea. Washington DC: US Library of Congress, 
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coal, the two highest grades of coal, which is used for metallurgical applications and power 
generation when converted into coke.
57
  The coking process requires feedstocks of materials 
imported from China, creating a further obstacle for heavy industrial sector.  Coal production 
has increased again after a steep decline during the famine years, when here it fell from 43 to 
32.2 million tons between 1989 and 1995.
58
  Annual production now ranges between the 
ROK Ministry of Unification‘s figure of 22.8 million tons to the US Energy Information 
Agency‘s estimate of 33.1 million tons.59  However, mines have encountered problems in 
extracting increasingly inaccessible and low-quality domestic reserves, due to damage to 
some mines originating with flooding episodes in the late-1990s, along with the likely 
passing of the production peak of the North‘s endowment of coal.60   
 
Similar problems have beset North Korea‘s electricity grid.  Prior to 1991, increasing national 
electricity demand placed the grid under stress, with overloading of the power network 
leading to breakdowns that brought the grid offline at regular intervals.
61
  By 1999, after the 
collapse of the North‘s industrial capacity, electricity generation fell to 40 percent of its 1990 
capacity due to the absence of backup energy systems, as well as its lack of indigenous 
petroleum reserves alternative energy sources.
62
  The regime has been promoting Juche-
inspired small-scale local hydroelectric power stations as a way to alleviate local power 
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shortages, which has contributed to a claimed fifty percent increase in electricity output since 
2002.
63
  Theoretically these should circumvent some of the supply bottlenecks that have left 
the large power plants idle, even though small-scale local plants are not as efficient.  North 
Korea does not lack electricity-generating capacity, but is short of generating fuels and 
reliable delivery systems to supply these fuels to power plants.
64
  Every energy bottleneck 
creates a ripple effect of lost output further down the chain of production.  For example, 
irrigation of rice paddies is driven by thousands of electric water pumps, which run at full 
capacity in May as the rice is planted, placing a major strain on the power grid.
65
  If 
electricity shortages cause blackouts, the pumps fail and crop-sowing delays, reduced 
harvests are inevitable due to the narrow time window available for planting during the short 
growing season.   
 
Isolation from the International Economy 
The international community has attempted to coerce North Korea into making concessions 
on its nuclear program through the application of economic sanctions.  Sanctions are 
restrictions maintained by a government or multilateral institution with respect to economic 
activity with foreign countries, particularly for foreign policy reasons.
66
  They can take the 
form of asset freezes, in which a bank account is blocked or ordinary property rights 
suspended, or refusal-to-deal, whereby financial or commercial dealings of any kind are 
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prohibited with designated individuals or entities.
67
  These measures may work by inflicting 
hardship on the civilians of the target society, hoping that their pain will generate popular 
resistance against the leadership of that country, who are the intended targets.
68
  
Alternatively, sanctions should be strong enough to inflict direct economic pain on the 
leadership of the target country, such that it must make concessions or face the collapse of its 
rule.
69
   
 
The US sanctions regime denies the DPRK access to international financial institutions and 
subjects it to severe restrictions on importation of dual use technologies, aid donations, 
banking restrictions, as well as denial of beneficial trade designations.
70
  Further sanctions 
codified by the United Nations Security Council in UNSC Resolution 1718 in the wake of the 
North‘s October 2006 nuclear test, imposed an asset freeze on all persons linked with the 
nuclear program and called for increased naval interdiction to prevent a range of goods from 
leaving or entering the DPRK.
71
  The Japanese government has unilaterally placed 
restrictions on North Korean ships entering Japanese ports and halted ferry services to North 
Korea, limited remittances sent to the North from Korean émigrés in Japan, over and above 
the measures adopted in UNSC Resolution 1718.
72
  After the May 2009 nuclear test, the UN 
Security Council adopted a new resolution—UNSC 1874—which further strengthened 
financial sanctions and naval interdiction powers for states tracking suspect North Korean 
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or supporter of international terrorism; (3) its designation as a Marxist-Leninist state, with a Communist government; and (4) its engagement 
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ships.
73
  One theory suggests that measures imposed in late 2006—the asset freeze in 
particular—have begun to bite into the regime‘s capacity to generate hard currency, which 
forced the North to return to denuclearisation negotiations in February 2007.
74
  If this theory 
is accurate, the sanctions regime is making a noticeable dent into either the country‘s GNP or 
the revenue raising capacity of key players in the regime.   
 
Marcus Noland has refuted this claim, however, arguing that sanctions imposed under UNSC 
1718 had no noticeable impact on North Korea‘s trade volumes with South Korea and 
China.
75
  If China and South Korea are not serious about enforcement, as appears the case, 
then the punitive effect of sanctions and interdiction on the North Korean economy is 
significantly weaker.
76
  The cause is likewise futile if the Kim regime values the benefits of 
nuclear deterrence over the increased suffering of vulnerable groups in the wider society.  
The longer sanctions remain in place without securing compliance from the North, the more 
likely it is that the regime will develop alternative coping strategies and revenue sources to 
countermand the restrictions in place.
77
  One of the regime‘s primary coping strategies for 
international isolation is its nuclear weapons program.  Leveraging the program for 
international aid allows the regime not only to circumvent economic sanctions through 
blackmail (that this results in strengthened sanctions in not a problem, as chapter seven will 
illustrate), but also avoid potentially destabilising systemic reforms that would smooth its 
integration into the global economy. 
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Foreign Trade 
Throughout its history, North Korea has used imports to fill voids in domestic supply and 
thus ensure the consistency of the central planning matrix.
78
  Since the famine North Korea‘s 
foreign trade grew in volume to US$3 billion by 2005, its highest value since 1991, though 
still at a deficit ratio of 2 to 1.
79
  Yet despite modest GDP growth from 1999 to 2005, GDP 
has declined by 1.1 percent in 2006 and further by 2.3 percent in 2007, which is partially 
explainable as the result of the dramatic reduction in two-way trade with Japan.
80
  North 
Korea is not completely isolated from the global economy, owing to its established linkages 
to international commerce through its trade relationship with China.  China-DPRK trade 
volume reached a historic high in 2008 of US$2.78 billion, up from a total bilateral trade 
volume of US$1.58 billion in 2005 and the 1999 low of only US$370 million.81  Chinese 
state-owned companies have begun investing in the commanding heights of the North Korean 
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economy, in industries such as heavy manufacturing, energy, mineral resources, and 
transportation.82   
 
South Korea is the DPRK‘s second largest trading partner, though economic interaction has 
long been politicised on both sides of the DMZ.  North-South trade is dominated by transfers 
of resources to the North through investment in economic zones and tourism, complimented 
by substantial aid packages of rice, fertilisers and fuel.
83
  The ROK Ministry of Unification 
has calculated total trade between North and South at US$1.56 billion in 2005, up from 
US$425.15 million in 2000.
84
  However, the chilling of North-South relations in 2008-09 is 
depressing two-way trade across the DMZ due to border closures and production stoppages in 
the Kaesong facility.  Japan was formerly the North‘s third-largest trade partner until 2004, 
when it was overtaken by Thailand.  Total trade between North Korea and Japan in 2005 
declined to US$194 million, down from US$1.3 billion in 2000, then down to almost zero in 
2007 because of economic measures enacted in retaliation for the October 2006 nuclear test.
85
  
Trade was conducted primarily through a string of North Korean-controlled front companies 
managed by the Chosen Soren—the Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in 
Japan—whose activities have been curtailed since 2006 by the Japanese government‘s strict 
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sanctions regimen imposed in the wake of the 2006 nuclear test.
86
  North Korea‘s next largest 
trading partners are Thailand and India.  Between January and November 2006, total trade 
between North Korea and Thailand reached US$345 million, of which North Korean exports 
accounted for US$145 million, besting the 2005 figure of US$329 million.  In 2007, this 
figure declined to US$218 million.
87
  Trade with India exploded in 2006, reaching a total 
volume in 2007 of US$701 million, a huge increase from the previous high of US$187 
million in 2002.
88
 
 
The global financial crisis has caused trade between North Korea and its key trading partners 
to decelerate.  The North‘s exposure to the crisis flows from its economic interactions with 
China and South Korea.  Resources from the mining sector dominate the export sector, with 
commodities sent principally to China.  The financial crisis has dramatically slashed 
economic growth in China and consequently decreased demand for natural resources from 
supplier countries like North Korea, resulting in falling prices for primary products.  It has 
been reported that the prices North Korea has fetched for its mineral exports have been 
almost halved, causing the North‘s trade deficit with China to further increase.89   
 
Special Economic Zones 
North Korea has attempted three times to establish special economic zones, where foreign 
companies can establish production facilities and enjoy special benefits and concessions, in 
order to attract foreign investment and kick-start its flagging manufacturing sector.  These 
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were inspired by the success of China‘s special administrative regions and similar economic 
zones operating all over Asia.  The first of these zones was the Rajin-Sonbong Trade and 
Economic Zone, established December 1991 in the northeast corner of the country.  This 
zone was earmarked to become a major container port, featuring export-oriented production 
facilities, an oil terminal at Sonbong and timber port at Unggi, with land linkages to China, 
Mongolia and the trans-Russian railway network with Europe.
90
  The site was chosen for its 
remoteness, as a precaution against the permeation of foreign ideas.  After a decade of 
operation, however, it has proven to be impractical as an export hub, because of its isolation 
from large population centres in the DPRK, China, South Korea and Russia, as well as border 
crossing difficulties and excessive red tape from Pyongyang.
91
     
 
The North‘s second attempt to establish a special economic zone was located at Sinuiju, a 
border town on the Yalu River frontier with China.  This is an obvious location for such a 
zone as Sinuiju lies on the Pyongyang to Beijing railway line, the main conduit of trade 
between North Korea and China, and is not far from the mouth of the Yalu River and access 
to the Yellow Sea.  The Sinuiju zone was envisaged as a regional hub for finance, trade and 
commerce, entertainment and tourism, as well as scientific research and development.  The 
Sinuiju zone fell into limbo when its administrator, Dutch-Chinese entrepreneur Yang Bin, 
was arrested in China in 2004 on corruption charges.
92
  During my own ten week stay in 
Dandong during mid-2004 I saw no signs of productive activity—by way of active smoke 
stacks, construction activity or night lighting—to suggest that a large industrial park was 
operating across the Yalu River in Sinuiju.  In comparison with the bustling border city of 
                                                 
90 COTTON, J. 1998. The Rajin-Sonbong Free Trade Zone Experiment: North Korea in Pursuit of New International Linkages. In: KIM, S. 
(ed.) North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 216.  See also: KIM, S. 2002b. North 
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Dandong, Sinuiju appeared to be a ghost town.   
 
More successful has been the special economic zone established near the old Koryo dynasty 
capital of Kaesong, just north of the DMZ.  The Kaesong industrial park is a 2,650 hectare 
compound housing factories producing goods for over 41 South Korean companies.
93
  
Kaesong has been more successful than its predecessors for a number of reasons.  First, there 
was bipartisan support in South Korea to underwrite the project, along with a willingness by 
many South Korean companies to invest.  Second, a prime attraction for South Korean 
investors is cheap labour, with the employees in Kaesong earning about one-twentieth the 
wages of South Korean workers performing the same jobs.
94
  South Korean companies 
usually sub-contract their operations to North Korean factory managers, thus avoiding some 
of the managerial complications and added costs—power blackouts, transportation 
bottlenecks and worker productivity issues—of full operational control.95   
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Figure 4: Construction of an extension to the Kaesong industrial zone, July 2008 (taken by the author). 
 
The Kim regime accumulated approximately US$20 million in revenue from several sources 
in the Kaesong special economic zone, including leasing fees and taxes on the salaries of 
North Korean workers.
96
  Southern firms do not hire North Korean workers directly, but are 
recruited through a North Korean government agency that retains almost half of the workers‘ 
monthly pay of US$57.50 to cover social security, transportation and other costs.  South 
Korean companies pay wages to the North Korean recruitment agency in hard currency, 
which the agency then converts into North Korean won at the greatly over-valued official 
exchange rate, leaving workers with a take-home pay of around US$2.00 a month.
97
     
 
Uncertainty now mires the continued operation of the Kaesong venture.  On 15 May 2009, 
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the regime announced that it had voided all contracts with South Korean companies operating 
in the Kaesong complex in favour of amended rules relating to rent, salaries and taxes.  It 
ordered the ROK government to evict South Korean companies from the industrial estate 
unless they honoured the amended regulations, at a time when these same companies are 
under stress from the global financial crisis.
98
  The contracting South Korean economy has 
dented consumer demand for manufactures produced at Kaesong and endangered the 
continued operation of these companies at the Kaesong site.
99
  North-South joint venture 
tourism projects have also run into trouble.  Prior to mid-2008, the tourism sector was 
growing into an important revenue source. The Mount Kumgang tourist complex became the 
flagship of North Korean tourism, but was closed down in July 2008 when North Korean 
soldiers shot a 53-year-old female South Korean tourist.  Since this incident, the tourist 
facility has been closed to visitors indefinitely as relations between the Kim regime and South 
Korea‘s Lee Myung-bak administration continue to sour.100  
 
These developments are symptomatic of the poisonous relationship between the Kim regime 
and the ROK administration of Lee Myung-bak.  The posturing over Kaesong may represent 
a new phase of North Korean coercive bargaining, in which the industrial precinct becomes a 
hostage project for Pyongyang‘s calculated escalations.101  If this proves to be true, it would 
give the regime greater leverage over South Korea in bilateral negotiations; Seoul will be 
compelled to offer compensation for the re-opening of the facility.  Conversely, the North 
may have chosen to wind down the project as its trade with China expands, thus lessening the 
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need for cooperation with South Korea.   
 
Agriculture 
Since the famine, North Korea has experienced an annual food deficit.  Meredith Woo-
Cumings has estimated the minimum amount of grain needed for subsistence at between five 
and six million tons per annum, an amount that has not been reached by domestic production 
since the 1980s.
102
  According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation, an annual cereal 
deficit of 836,000 tonnes (as of 2008-2009) has left 32 percent of North Koreans remain 
undernourished.
103
  The famine forced North Korea to re-evaluate some of its agricultural 
practices and even implement some new strategies to increase production.  State-run farms 
now run a rotation of winter, spring and summer crops.  Cereal production for the period 
November 2005 to October 2006 was estimated at 4.5 million tons, which remains well 
below the demand figure of 5.3 million tons.
104
  The double cropping program puts 
considerable strain on farm labourers and mechanised farming hardware, because of the short 
time interval between the winter crop harvest and planting of the summer crop.  Due to 
energy shortages, farm machinery and electric-powered irrigation systems are used 
sparingly.
105
  Farm production continues to depend on human and animal labour to 
compensate for aging and dilapidated mechanised farm equipment, which lies idle due to 
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economic sanctions and the inability of the regime to import new equipment and spare parts.  
Energy shortages compound the problem; even if the country‘s farm machinery was in 
optimal condition, insufficient fuel is available to power its tractor fleet, limiting the rate at 
which harvested land can be freshly cultivated.
106
  Heavy and continuous crop rotation also 
increases the risk of crop losses from pests and diseases.   
 
After 1991, the cessation of imports of fossil fuel feedstock for fertiliser production 
decimated the DPRK‘s large indigenous fertiliser industry, in turn reducing crop yields.  By 
growing crops with significantly less fertiliser inputs, North Korea‘s farms have effectively 
been mining nutrients from the soil, continually decreasing the fertility of those soils.
107
  
Because of these factors, it is likely that double cropping in North Korea has reached its 
efficiency peak and cannot be expanded further.    The North‘s transportation infrastructure is 
heavily dependent on intermittent fuel supplies, caused by shortages of fuel acquired from 
China.  This presents a critical problem for the distribution of food, because even in a year of 
good harvests, food may not reach certain parts of the country because of difficulties with 
transportation.   
 
These problems have left the agricultural system on a precipice, vulnerable to external 
shocks.  Agricultural systems are particularly at risk to extreme weather events during certain 
stages of the crop cycle.
108
  North Korea is susceptible to torrential rain and flooding, 
typhoons, drought, and acute cold weather.  Since 1991, large-scale flooding events have 
occurred in 1995, 1996, 2001-02, and 2004-07, punctuated by drought years in 1997 and 
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2000.  The winter of 2007-08 was abnormally dry and cold, which dramatically affected the 
growth of the wheat and barley crop.
109
  Although the North has increased its resilience 
against extreme weather events, repeated and sustained natural disasters have the potential to 
decrease agricultural yield and thus worsen food insecurity within the country.   
 
Reform, Aid and Future Economic Stability 
Economic Reforms 
Foreign observers often state that North Korea needs to reform its economy to ensure its 
long-term survival, which implies that the North Korean economy should be fully marketised 
and integrated into the global economy.  This would require a change in ideological discourse 
leading to changes in economic policies to restructure the labour system, an overhaul wage 
incentives for worker, and the prioritisation of profit seeking amongst productive entities.
110
  
What has occurred instead has been limited reform within the command system, involving 
procedural tinkering to increase efficiency within the existing ideological and economic 
framework.  The nuclear program has been instrumental here as a lightning rod for crisis 
escalation by the Kim leadership.  The aid, concessions and development assistance 
bargained from regional states in return for de-escalation has been critical in plugging holes 
in the system and allowing the regime to avoid substantive economic reforms. 
 
The first signs of embryonic systemic reform in the DPRK came in 1984 with the enactment 
of the Joint Venture Law, which called for improved economic ties with foreign countries 
leading to technical cooperation and joint venture development projects within the DPRK.
111
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By 1991, 85 joint venture projects had been proposed and 39 actually implemented, though 
most of those projects turned out to be loss making.
112
  These were not impressive numbers; 
given the choice of investing in North Korea, with its small domestic markets, political 
rigidity, economic stagnation and history of debt default, or the newly opened and more 
investor-friendly China, it rapidly became clear which country was the preferred destination 
for foreign capital.
113
 
 
In August 1984, Kim Il-sung unveiled a program aimed at producing and selling small 
consumer items outside of the central planning system.  Kim‘s plan called for small home-
based work teams to manufacture necessity goods and sell them directly to consumers at 
unregulated prices, in officially sanctioned market places in every district of North Korea‘s 
major cities.  By 1986, the number of officially sanctioned markets had reached over 200, 
while the number of work teams had topped 14,400.
114
  However, this program was less a 
reform measure and more a reflection of the regime‘s unwillingness at the time to reallocate 
resources away from the heavy industrial sector, an attempt to plug a hole in the planning 
matrix using local materials and mobilising untapped labour reserves.  Marketisation of these 
transactions was incidental to the overarching goal.
115
   
 
In 1996, the regime introduced the work squad system as a response to the famine.  Under 
this initiative, if a work squad on the state-run farms produced a harvest in excess of its 
production quota, the government would reward it with a matching sum and allow it to sell 
the surplus at farmers markets, where prices were 65 to 350 times higher than for the same 
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goods in state-owned stores.  Theoretically, this should have provided a huge incentive for 
farmers to increase production, but because of severe food shortages in the military the 
government began seizing surpluses from farmers for distribution within the KPA.
116
  As a 
result, farmers again began to protect themselves from confiscation through the measures 
described above.  
 
A series of reforms were launched in 2002, which, though falling well short of the systemic 
transformation hoped for by foreign observers, were unprecedented in the history of the Kim 
dynasty.  The first measure adopted was a two-tiered price reform where state-owned 
enterprises began paying market prices for resource inputs, while the price of merchandise in 
state-owned stores was adjusted to reflect the price of goods in the farmers markets.
117
  
Market pricing led to a hyperinflation, which saw the cost of consumables and other goods 
rise dramatically.  The regime attempted to accommodate inflation with across the board 
wage increases, which rose by an average of 1,818 percent.
118
  Inflation was evidently the 
trade-off for official toleration of the private markets and with the PDS still largely 
dysfunctional, the regime had little choice but to allow market trading in consumables and 
food.  The regime also allowed farmers to increase the size of their private plots and set up a 
leased private cultivation system on state-owned land, from which farmers could sell any 
surplus, which is estimated doubled grain production from the previous year.
119
  A new class 
of wholesalers, vendors and intermediaries emerged as the informal private markets became 
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the primary mechanism through which North Koreans sourced their food.
120
   
 
There is reason to believe that the regime induced inflation to undercut the black market and 
reincorporate the sale of consumables into the formal economy.  The price gap between the 
black market and the state-run distribution network was leading to a spillage of goods from 
the state sector into the black market, draining away the wealth of the state.  The inflation 
thus had the effect of reducing the purchasing power of those who had accumulated wealth 
by selling government produce on the black market, forcing them to transfer their resources 
back to the state.
121
  The toll on ordinary citizens was telling, as most families had to spend 
up to 80 percent of their income on food alone, while for others sustenance was beyond their 
means.
122
   
 
One should interpret the 2002 reforms as an attempt by the regime to regain control in the 
midst of challenging economic conditions.  Many of the concessions made in 2002 merely 
ratified changes in the economy that had already taken place.
123
  Since this time, the regime 
has issued several edicts rolling back concessions in an attempt to restore economic 
centralisation and consolidate the position of the regime by forcing minor market operators 
out of business.
124
  Many elements of the command economy cannot be fixed and require 
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complete removal, while other sectors of economic activity have completely cleaved away 
from state oversight.  In this context, drastic reforms could fundamentally change the North 
Korean economic and political order and even lead to Soviet-style systemic collapse.
125
   
 
Impediments to Reform  
Successful reform programs require a committed leadership, but as the Soviet case illustrates, 
systemic transformation will not succeed by mere dictate from the top.  Timothy Colton has 
identified several requirements for successful economic reform: a strongly pro-reform leader; 
a core elite united around the reform program; a bureaucracy receptive to the reform program 
and willing to execute it; intelligent advice and practical reform suggestions coming from 
advisors; and a population broadly supportive of such measures.
126
 
 
Kim Jong-il is caught in a no-man‘s land where further reforms will necessitate measures that 
will undermine the political and economic basis of his rule.  The notion that reform is 
necessary implies that the system is broken and that a better mode of social organisation 
exists, shattering the myth of infallibility in which the regime has cocooned itself in.  
Therefore, a radical break with the past would be extremely difficult to justify ideologically 
in official propaganda.
127
  Bruce Cumings has suggested however, that ideological 
commitment is not the impediment to change that it initially appears because ideology is open 
to reinterpretation.
128
  The Songun politics model already represents a remarkably different 
system of economic and political organisation to that which existed under Kim Il-sung. 
                                                 
125 OH, K. & HASSIG, R. 2000. North Korea: Through the Looking Glass, Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press. p. 70. 
126 COLTON, T. 1987. Approaches to the Politics of Systemic Economic Reform in the Soviet Union. Soviet Economy, 3, p. 149. 
127 BRADNER, S. 2001. North Korea‘s Strategy. In: SOKOLSKI, H. (ed.) Planning for a Peaceful Korea. Carlisle, PA: US Army War 
College, Strategic Studies Institute. p. 17; ARMSTRONG, C. 1998. ‗A Socialism of Our Style‘: North Korean Ideology in a Post-Communist 
Era. In: KIM, S. (ed.) North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 38. 
128 Cumings, B, from an International Crisis Group interview, Bruce Cumings, University of Chicago, 11 November 2004, in 2005e. North 
Korea: Can the Iron Fist Accept the Invisible Hand? Brussels: International Crisis Group, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/north_korea/096_north_korea_can_the_iron_fist_accept_the_invisible.pdf. p . 4. 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
 142 
 
Regime elites may fear losing their privileged positions if reforms bring about wide systemic 
change.  Of most importance to Kim Jong-il‘s leadership is the maintenance of the privileged 
position of the military within the Songun system.   The true test will come if changes begin 
to impact on the entrenched privileges of regime elites.  Dominique Dwor-Frécaut believes 
that the elites can be coopted into supporting reform through the promotion of limited rent-
seeking activities.129  This process has already began, though it has led to increasing official 
corruption as officials have used rank and social position to derive privileged personal benefit 
from emerging market mechanisms and illicit activities.130 
 
The position of the regime bureaucracy may be more complicated.  Mid-level functionaries 
are probably well aware of the problems with the system, but not ready and willing to execute 
a reform agenda.  Bureaucrats may hesitate to undertake adventurous tasks because of the 
limited window of independent action within which they could operate while maintaining 
their loyalty and fidelity to the existing system.
131
  As such, they may feel politically safe in 
shunning innovative ideas for the well-worn path of the Juche line, regardless of their 
personal commitment to the existing system.  Juche has guided the personal and professional 
lives of Party cadres for over forty years, a conformist pressure that has not equipped officials 
with the intellectual knowledge or practical experience necessary to direct a wider reform 
program.
132
  To renounce a worldview to which they have become so acculturated would be 
personally traumatic.   
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The scale of systemic reform is likely to be staggering.  It will require land redistribution and 
decollectivisation, marketisation, industrial restructuring and legal reform, while millions of 
workers may be forced to change employment or become unemployed.
133
  The general 
population would experience the process as one of great social upheaval, a development that 
would have great political implications.  Social controls, including the rationing system, 
information controls, travel restrictions, and work groups, would have to be loosened.  
Reform will open North Korea to foreign information and ideas, which could further 
undermine the regime‘s political control.  As an illustration, let us consider former political 
prisoner and defector Kang Chol-Hwan‘s description of the explosion of consciousness that 
came from listening to illegal South Korean radio broadcasts:  
Listening to the radio gave us the words we needed to express our dissatisfaction.  
Every program, each new discovery, helped us tear a little freer from the enveloping 
world of deception.  Knowledge that there was a counterpoint to official reality was 
already a kind of escape, one that could exhilarate as well as confuse.  It is difficult to 
explain, for example, the emotions we felt on hearing it demonstrated, proof positive, 
that the North had actually started the Korean War, not the American imperialists, as 
we had always been told.
134
   
As social controls give way in the manner described by Kang, the opportunity for alternative 
political mobilisation could open up, creating challenges to regime control linked to popular 
discontent at the pace and scope of change.   
 
Even if the regime was willing to implement change, there is no example of reform suitable 
for North Korea.  Observers often offer the Vietnamese and Chinese experiences as relevant 
examples of successful reform.  However, the Vietnamese and Chinese models may not work 
because gradual reform of a command economy enjoyed favourable conditions that 
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cushioned restructuring in the heavy industrial sector, including a relatively large rural 
agrarian population and a small heavy industrial sector, which allowed both countries to 
initiate reforms in the agricultural sector.  Price liberalization spurred rapid gains in 
efficiency, freeing up poorly productive surplus agricultural labour for absorption by the 
emerging non-state and semi-private light manufacturing and service sectors.
135
  North 
Korea, with its largely urban proletarian population, could suffer far more wrenching social 
instability during the reform process, creating greater political risk for the Kim regime. 
 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union serves as a warning to the North Korean leadership about 
the dangers of reform.  The Soviet communist system proved to be inelastic and incapable of 
change, so when Mikhail Gorbachev attempted political and economic reform the system 
could not accommodate evolution and rapidly imploded.
136
  Because the functionality of state 
institutions was so dependent upon established routines, the inertia and transaction costs of 
change were so high that rapid transformation became impossible when new circumstances 
arose that required a new modus operandi.
137
  Once marketisation penetrated the operations 
of state institutions, the incentives for state officials to pursue opportunist ventures outside of 
the formal system increased at the same time as political reforms weakened the monitoring 
and enforcement capacity of the Party, resulting in a massive exodus of officials from the 
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Party.
138
  The Kim regime undoubtedly fears that reform of this nature could lead to a similar 
regime-ending collapse in North Korea. 
 
Foreign Aid: Propping Up the System 
North Korea has received large amounts of foreign aid because of the regime‘s bargaining 
success in denuclearisation negotiations, and because of the potential risk that regional states 
associate with the North‘s collapse.  Massive injections of foreign aid during the late-1990s 
were significant in heading off the total failure of state institutions and maintaining the 
system to the present day.  International largesse comes in a variety of forms: food aid, 
energy supplies, fertilisers, development assistance and direct cash payments.  For example, 
South Korea contributed US$794.9 million worth of food aid to North Korea in the period 
1995-2004, with the United States contributing US$1.1 billion over the same period.  The 
United States has been the largest contributor to the World Food Program‘s operations in 
North Korea, contributing over half of the 4.2 million metric tons of food the WFP had 
delivered to DPRK up to 2005.  China is likely to continue its annual cereal concession of 
250,000 metric tons.  This is supplemented by contributions of fertilisers to help boost farm 
productivity.  South Korea sent US$387.9 million in fertiliser shipments to North Korea 
between 1995 and 2004.  Between October 2007 and September 2008, 657 tons of fertiliser 
was delivered as aid to North Korea.
139
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The Songun system diverts foreign inputs wholesale for military use, strengthening the 
position of the KPA as the vanguard institution of the state.  During the famine period, the 
regime managed food aid distribution through the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee 
(FDRC), an organ within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The FDRC distributes aid 
shipments according to detailed distribution plans drawn up with aid donor organisations, 
which detail the dispersal of shipments down to the ri (county) level.
140
  However, other 
North Korea watchers believe that the distribution process is less transparent.  For example, 
Park In-ho, from the Seoul-based Daily NK news portal, suggests that the KPA subtracts a 
portion for its own provisions then on-sells the remainder for profit through the 
entrepreneurial economy.
141
 According to Park, when a shipment arrives, representatives 
from the official, military and court economies are on hand to receive their portion. The 
military gets the first and largest slice of the shipment, the court economy gets the next 
portion, and the official economy is given the remainder. Because food aid is a fungible 
commodity, even if the military is not siphoning off aid shipments, money that otherwise 
might be spent on food procurement can be directed toward other spending priorities.
142
 
 
Energy aid has been a feature of international assistance to North Korea since the Agreed 
Framework in 1994.  Under the Agreed Framework, the United States pledged to deliver 
500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually until the two light-water reactors to be built by 
KEDO came online.
143
  As these deliveries went unfulfilled through the late-1990s, Chinese 
oil grants partially filled the void; between 1998 and 2003, China delivered 129,000 tons of 
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crude and diesel oil to the DPRK, along with 492,000 tons of coking coal.
144
  As part of the 
2007 nuclear freeze agreement negotiated in the Six Party talks, regional states committed to 
ship 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK, of which half was delivered by December 
2008.
145
 
 
South Korean cash payments and development assistance have been extensive.  Kim Kyung-
Won has argued that cash payments made by the Hyundai group to the regime during 1999-
2000 amounted to approximately twenty percent of its total foreign exchange earnings, a 
timely injection of funds as the regime struggled to overcome the famine period.
146
  South 
Korea under Lee Myung-bak has ceased to provide the North with cash handouts, which now 
come for the most part from the Chinese government.   During the period 1995-2004, the 
South Korean government provided Pyongyang with US$435.1 million in development 
assistance, including US$90.6 million for development of the Mount Kumgang tourist resort, 
US$21.8 million for the Kaesong industrial complex, and US$322.7 million to building road 
and rail links across the DMZ.
147
  From 1995 to 2004, net total development assistance from 
OECD countries for North Korea came to $US 1,529.6 million, including $US 1.151.1 
million receipt from France, $US 142.3 million from the United Kingdom, and $US 56.5 
million from the United States. In 2005, however, this figure dropped to $US 148.7 million as 
the nuclear dispute escalated, falling further to $US 59.6 million in 2006 as North Korea 
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made significant repayments of previously received grants.
148
  The OECD figures however 
do not include assistance provided by South Korea or China.   
 
China is North Korea‘s most important source of foreign assistance.  Chinese support to 
North Korea comes via three forms—grant-type aid, trade, and investment—which are 
sometimes difficult to delineate and often overlap.  For example, the petroleum component of 
Chinese energy assistance is delivered as (a) direct aid grants, (b) sold at ―friendship prices‖ 
below the international market price, and (c) in barter exchange for North Korean mineral 
resources, which Chinese firms help to extract.  Between 1996 and 2001, direct aid grants 
averaged 9.4 percent per annum of total Chinese exports to North Korea, however from 2002 
to 2006 the aid component had dropped to only 3.38 percent of total exports.
149
  The drop in 
aid is attributable to the expansion of barter exchanges of oil for mineral ores with the 
expansion of Chinese investment in North Korea‘s energy sector.150   
 
The regime views aid from Western donors as a poisoned chalice.  Frequent interaction with 
foreign aid agencies increases the chance of ideological pollution and the spread of dangerous 
information from the outside world.   According to this theory, social discord could result if 
the North Korean public are able to make a comparison of their everyday lives with the 
economic and political realities of the outside world.
151
  Andrew Natsios documented several 
outcomes of Western aid to North Korea during the late 1990s that would confirm the 
regime‘s wariness: first, food aid helped to stimulate the private farmers markets as people 
became less dependent on the PDS for their food, undermining government control over the 
                                                 
148 Ibid.  p. 31. 
149 LEE, J. J.-A. 2009. To Fuel or Not to Fuel: China‘s Energy Assistance to North Korea. Asian Security, 5, pp. 51-53. 
150 Dick Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery describe a number of examples of Chinese firms investing in the development of mineral 
extraction and refining projects in North Korea.  See: NANTO, D. & CHANLETT-AVERY, E. 2008. The North Korean Economy: Leverage 
and Policy Analysis. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32493.pdf. pp. 22-23. 
151 NATSIOS, A. 2001. The Great North Korean Famine, Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace Press. p. 218. 
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key function of food provision.  Second, the diversion of food into the private markets helped 
to stabilise food prices, allowing more people to obtain food than otherwise would have.  
Third, anti-US and anti-ROK propaganda was undermined because aid recipients understood 
who the donor countries were.  Fourth, public support for the regime was dented by the 
activities of Party cadres who would steal food aid and sell it in private markets, while the 
intended recipients starved.  Fifth, in a limited way, donor agencies brought a small slice of 
the outside world into North Korea and by their very presence undermined the Juche 
ideology of self-reliance.
152
  However, Peter Beck believes that foreign agencies are only a 
vehicle for the penetration of ideas to a very small extent.  The officials who liaise with 
foreign aid agencies on the ground, as the only conduit between foreign agencies and the 
North Korean people, are specially selected from the regime elite, having previously been 
vetted for their political loyalty and interest in maintaining the status quo.
153
  Either way, 
ordinary North Koreans are unlikely to have failed to connect the dots between the obvious 
food shortage, government corruption, and the arrival of mysterious grain supplies on the 
black market, no matter how well hidden the exact source of that grain is kept.  The political 
consequences of this realisation, however, are not so certain and will be considered more 
rigorously in the next chapter. 
 
Utility of Foreign Aid to the Kim Regime 
International aid has clearly been an important component of North Korea‘s splintered post-
famine economic system, yet the role that it plays in maintaining this system is complex.   
 
                                                 
152 Ibid. p. 222-24; ARMSTRONG, C. 1998. ‗A Socialism of Our Style‘: North Korean Ideology in a Post-Communist Era. In: KIM, S. (ed.) 
North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-34. 
153 BECK, P. Interview with the author. 22 July 2008. Seoul, South Korea.Peter Beck teaches at Yonsei University and is an Adjunct 
Professor at the Kogod School of Business at American University in Washington, D.C.  Previously, he was the executive director of the 
U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and directed the International Crisis Group's Northeast Asia Project in Seoul.  He was also 
the director of research and academic affairs at the Korea Economic Institute in Washington. 
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Food aid strengthens the military economy because the KPA has priority access to incoming 
shipments and can sell the remainder for profit on the open market.  This is cold comfort for 
citizens outside of the military; food aid tends to reach them via the market, favouring those 
who have secondary income sources beyond the official economy.  For the KPA, its priority 
access to foreign food aid is a source of tremendous power within North Korean society.
154
  
The court economy subsumes the overwhelming majority of aid granted as cash, allowing 
Kim Jong-il to provide the regime‘s upper echelon with material largesse, which is an 
important component of the leadership‘s ability to maintain the loyalty of important members 
of the elite.
155
  While North Korean elites live a Spartan lifestyle in comparison to those in 
other authoritarian regimes around the world, there is no doubt that they subsist at a far more 
comfortable level than other North Koreans.  International aid is therefore vital to the 
continued functioning of Songun politics as the mechanism and legitimising paradigm of the 
Kim regime.  North Korea‘s ability to influence the aid donation decisions of foreign 
governments though coercive diplomacy is likely to bear direct relevance on its ability to 
prolong the avoidance of systemic economic reform. 
 
Coercive Bargaining 
It is in this context that North Korea‘s nuclear program yields greatest value.  Nuclear 
weapon states may deploy or threaten to deploy their nuclear capability in order to extract 
concessions to prevent deployment.
156
  North Korea has used this ―coercive bargaining‖ 
tactic consistently in denuclearisation talks since the negotiation of the Agreed Framework in 
1994, in which deliberate, directed provocations put pressure on the US and regional states to 
                                                 
154 Ibid. 22 July 2008. 
155 Ibid. 22 July 2008.   
156 BECKMAN, P., CRUMLISH, P., DOBKOWSKI, M. & LEE, S. 2000. The Nuclear Predicament: Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First 
Century, New Jersey, Prentice Hall. p. 188.  
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provide material inducements to persuade the regime to pull back from the brink.
157
  These 
―deliberate pinpricks‖ fall short of war but are serious enough to raise concerns about 
possible escalation.
158
  Immediately following a provocation, Pyongyang then issues new 
demands or restates previous claims as conditions for a return to negotiations.  One demand 
often recycled by Pyongyang is the insistence on the completion of the light-water reactors 
promised in the Agreed Framework, a condition that seems to surface at the beginning of 
each new round of the Six Party talks in order to test the flexibility of the American 
negotiating position.  Light water reactors were, after all, the basis upon which the US and 
DPRK were able to reach accord on the Agreed Framework in 1994.  From the US 
perspective, the consistency with which Pyongyang has employed this coercive bargaining 
strategy is a good indication of the lack of leverage available to influence North Korea‘s 
behaviour.   
 
It is the contention of this thesis that of all the reasons for North Korea to maintain a nuclear 
capability, its utility as a bargaining chip for international largesse has been by far the most 
important in terms of the regime‘s survival.  This has been both the impetus for the North‘s 
nuclear development and one of the key reasons why Pyongyang cannot accede to 
denuclearisation.  The DPRK had become dependent on Soviet food subsidies for some time 
prior to 1991, unable to feed its population due to declining returns on agricultural production 
caused by grinding inefficiencies and technological decrepitude throughout the economy.
159
  
The end of Soviet food subsidies created a large dent in the North‘s food procurement 
capacity, into which flooding and drought during 1995-97 tore into a gaping hole.  Coercive 
                                                 
157 LIM, W.-H. 2006. North Korea's Missile Tests: Malign Neglect Meets Brinkmanship . Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable 
Development, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0653Lim.html [Accessed 12 July 2006]. 
158 CHA, V. 2003b. Why We Must Pursue 'Hawk' Engagement. In: CHA, V. & KANG, D. (eds.) North Korea: A Debate on Engagement 
Strategies. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 72. 
159 LANKOV, A. 2005b. North Korea hungry for control . Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GI10Dg01.html 
[Accessed 25 April 2007]. 
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bargaining has been utilised to acquire aid as a replacement for the subsidies previously 
inbound from the Soviet Union, which are used to plug holes in the central planning matrix 
and eliminate some of the bottlenecks of their economy.
160
  Stephen Haggard and Marcus 
Noland estimate that North Korea derives approximately one-third of its revenues from 
international aid.
161
  However, rather than using humanitarian assistance as an addition to 
supply, the regime used it as balance-of-payments support, offsetting aid by cutting 
commercial food imports and allocating savings to other priorities.  In addition, because aid 
shipments are distributed by the military, they become a rent-seeking commodity when 
diverted from formal distribution channels to be sold for huge profit by the military on the 
private market.
162
 
 
North Korea‘s coercive bargaining tactics have been successful in part because the ambiguity 
of its nuclear capability allowed Pyongyang to engineer artificial crises.  During the 
development phase, Pyongyang could threaten to take the next step in technological 
development then pull back in exchange for concessions.  As chapter six will show, the 
North‘s leverage came from the belief in regional states that Pyongyang could still be coaxed 
into denuclearisation, a belief that has since evaporated now that the nuclear development 
phase is complete and the North has demonstrated its nuclear capability, in effect removing 
the key lever of Pyongyang‘s bargaining position.  To continue with the tactic of coercive 
bargaining, the North must find new sources of advantage to extract concessions, or come up 
with a new strategy for plugging holes in its economy.  This is a potential source of danger 
for regional stability, as the type of provocations now available to Pyongyang tend to be more 
                                                 
160 BROWN, W. 2006. Changes in the North Korean Economy and Implications for the Energy Sector: Is North Korea Really Short of 
Energy? DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting. San Francisco: The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, 
http://nautilus.org/DPRKEnergyMeeting/papers/Brown.html 
161 HAGGARD, S. & NOLAND, M. 2007a. Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform, New York, Columbia University Press. pp. 
5-13. 
162 Ibid. pp. 5-13. 
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aggressive, such as further nuclear and missile tests, and carry a higher risk of escalation than 
the type of provocations it engaged in while its nuclear program was still in development. 
 
Conclusion: Stability of Parallel Economies 
The command economy splintered into a number of parallel economies through the 1990s, as 
an unregulated coping response to maintain the command economy following the Soviet 
collapse and three consecutive years of natural disasters.  What remained of the command 
economy, the heavy industrial sector, was a hollowed-out shell, as network of factories 
brought offline or in severely curtailed production, its formerly privileged workers facing 
starvation as their incomes dried up.  Agricultural production, long based on mechanised 
farming and vast utilisation of chemical fertilisers, also deteriorated.  Pyongyang did not look 
to procure food on the international market, due to its commitment to maintaining the 
crumbling command system and its lack of hard currency.  The regime‘s devotion to central 
planning in the face of these developments led to the gutting of the industrial sector and the 
onset of famine.  The splintering of the North Korean economy into a number of parallel 
economies was a systemic readjustment to a new equilibrium based on curtailed resource 
inputs.  The official economy contracted to a small fraction of its former size.  As the military 
and court economies expanded, so too did a new entrepreneurial economy on the margins, 
operating as a completely unregulated market system through which those with the means 
were able to survive the famine period.   
 
Kim Jong-il realigned his power base to incorporate the KPA through the Songun politics 
doctrine.  By giving the military priority access to the state‘s resource base, Kim ensured that 
the key institutions of the state would be maintained.  Kim has also provided high officials 
with access to luxury goods through the court economy, a further measure to buy the loyalty 
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of the regime elite and ensure their commitment to maintaining the system.  The explosion of 
an illicit economy generated a new income stream for the regime, further strengthening key 
institutions and individuals within the military and court economies.  The nuclear weapons 
program has been vital to this strategy, opening up alternative revenue and input streams that 
would not otherwise be available. 
 
The strengthening of the military and court economies had allowed Kim Jong-il to preserve 
the foundations of the totalitarian political system.  Still, the revenue stream was inadequate 
to maintain the remnants of the totalitarian political architecture.  Foreign aid is the final 
piece in this puzzle.  Food aid is funnelled to mid and upper-ranking figures of the KPA, 
allowing this group to avoid the food shortages that plague the rest of the population.  
Similarly, foreign energy supplies contribute to powering the country‘s industrial complex, 
even as enterprises within the official economy continue to decay.  Cash transfers are 
channelled directly into the court economy to fund the expenditures that ensure the 
ideological commitment of the elite.  International largesse is thus vital to the continued 
operation of the Songun system as the functional mechanism and legitimising paradigm of the 
Kim regime.   
 
This system is inherently unstable.  North Korea‘s multi-headed economies would function 
more efficiently and could be reintegrated into a whole national economy if the regime 
undertook system-wide economic reforms.  However, such reforms are likely to unleash a 
political transformation that could ultimately bring down the regime.  Its ability to extract aid 
from the international community is therefore the key to regime longevity.  If the aid flow 
slows or dries up, the political system will come under severe strain and may even lead to the 
full breakdown of the remaining totalitarian architecture. 
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5. North Korea Pre-Famine: A Totalitarian System 
 
The fortunes of political institutions in any state tend to reflect the health of the economy 
underlying those institutions.  In this respect North Korea holds true to the norm.  The rapid 
economic transformation in North Korea since 1991 has driven substantial political changes 
to the country, accelerating pre-existing long-term trends of gradual decay.   The economic 
crisis triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union was an acceleration of systemic decay 
underway since the late-1960s, eroding with it the other dimensions of the political order.  
This chapter describes North Korea‘s political system before the famine, when it harboured 
the characteristics of a totalitarian state.   
 
First, this chapter will explore the theory of totalitarianism, in which it will consider the 
strengths and criticisms of the model in relation to the North Korean case.  Second, it will 
explain the historical context in which the North‘s totalitarian system evolved, from the 
Japanese occupation to the formative stages of the North Korean state.  Finally, it will 
describe the features of North Korea‘s pre-famine totalitarian system, utilising Carl Friedrich 
and Zbigniew Brzezinski‘s definition of the characteristics of a totalitarian regime—absolute 
dictator and mass Party, transformational ideology, all-pervasive system of terror, and Party 
monopoly on communications technologies—as a frame of reference.1   
 
                                                 
1 FRIEDRICH, C. & BRZEZINSKI, Z. 1966. Totalitarian Dictatorship & Autrocracy, New York, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers.  
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The Totalitarian Model: A Definition 
Totalitarianism is a system of dictatorial rule in which the dictator pursues total control of his 
polity with the aid of modern technology.
2
  Such total control was only made possible during 
the twentieth century due to technological advancements in communications, transportation 
and weaponry, which provided the conditions for pervasive physical terror, mass 
indoctrination and dissemination of the ideology of the totalitarian movement.  In their classic 
typology of totalitarian regimes, Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski identified a group of 
mutually reinforcing characteristics that define totalitarian states: first, totalitarian states are 
led by an absolute dictator, with the backing of a mass party.  Second, a utopian 
transformational ideology legitimises the rule of the dictator and the mass party, which is 
usually based on a rejection of previous legitimating frameworks.  Third, the dictator and 
ruling oligarchy maintain absolute control through all-pervasive terror, using mechanisms 
such as secret police organisations, penetration of secret operatives into all institutions, and 
extreme social pressure.  Fourth, the party exerts monopoly control over media technology, 
which it uses for mass communication of the party‘s ideology and the insinuation of 
psychological terror.  Fifth, the dictator and ruling oligarchy similarly maintain complete 
control over the coercive institutions and armed forces.  Finally, the dictator and party 
maintain a centrally planned economy, maintaining tight control over all facets of economic 
activity.
3
   
 
Totalitarian states are characterised by a single mass party consisting of a small percentage of 
                                                 
2 FRIEDRICH, C. 1969. The Evolving Theory and Practice of Totalitarian Regimes. In: FRIEDRICH, C., CURTIS, M. & BARBER, B. 
(eds.) Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views. London: Pall Mall Press. p. 136. 
3 FRIEDRICH, C. & BRZEZINSKI, Z. 1966. Totalitarian Dictatorship & Autrocracy, New York, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers. p. 22.  
See also: FRIEDRICH, C. 1969. The Evolving Theory and Practice of Totalitarian Regimes. In: FRIEDRICH, C., CURTIS, M. & BARBER, 
B. (eds.) Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views. London: Pall Mall Press. p. 126; SCOBELL, A. 2006. Kim Jong Il and North Korea: 
The Leader and the System. Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB644.pdf  p. 3.  By contrast, 
authoritarian leaders are constrained by ill-defined but predictable norms, limited pluralism, lack of popular mobilisation, and distinctive 
mentalities that lack the coherence of a full-blown ideology.  See: THOMPSON, M. 2002. Totalitarian and Post-Totalitarian Regimes in 
Transitions and Non-Transitions from Communism. Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 3, p. 81. 
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the overall population who are passionately committed to the ideology of the movement and 
are prepared to assist in its general propagation.  The party is led by a single male figure, a 
charismatic leader, a dictator, who enjoys total personalised command over the party.
4
  The 
totalitarian leader is more than just a charismatic individual; he is indispensable as the 
functional core of the totalitarian system.  The purpose of the party, and by extension the 
entire political hierarchy, is to swiftly communicate and execute the will of the leader.  
Without the leader to issue commands, the whole system would lose its raison d’être.5  This 
differs markedly from the conception of political parties in democratic countries.  A political 
party requires at least one competitor to be a ‗real‘ party in the Western democratic sense, as 
political parties presuppose active participation in the political process, where conscious 
engagement and contests with competing groups give parties meaning.
6
  In the totalitarian 
context, the party is the epitome of the mass movement, the vehicle through which the entire 
population is mobilised behind the will of the leader. 
 
Totalitarian regimes rely on creating a system of terror to preserve the loyalty of their 
citizens.  Organised supervision and violence takes place, not only against the public but also 
against members of the bureaucracy and even the elite.  This is necessary because the world 
portrayed by official propaganda is a fictitious one, a reality from which the citizens need 
protection.  Hannah Arendt argued that physical terror is most efficient when citizens begin 
to fear the consequences of leaving the movement altogether, feeling more secure as 
members of the movement than they would as outsiders, even if they are complicit in 
reprehensible crimes.
7
  Being an insider in the movement is advantageous for good reason.  A 
                                                 
4 FRIEDRICH, C. & BRZEZINSKI, Z. 1966. Totalitarian Dictatorship & Autrocracy, New York, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers. p. 22; 
NEUMANN, S. 1965. Permanent Revolution: Totalitarianism in the Age of International Civil War, London, Pall Mall Press. p. 43. 
5 ARENDT, H. 1958. The Origins of Totalitarianism, London, George Allen and Unwin. p. 374. 
6 NEUMANN, S. 1965. Permanent Revolution: Totalitarianism in the Age of International Civil War, London, Pall Mall Press. p. 118. 
7 ARENDT, H. 1958. The Origins of Totalitarianism, London, George Allen and Unwin. p. 373. 
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totalitarian regime is more a movement under constant mobilisation rather than a 
government, requiring a constant stream of enemies against which to mobilise.  The range of 
official enemies can stretch from genuine political agitators to arbitrarily selected segments of 
the population.
8
  Therefore, personal safety and security depends on loyalty to the regime in a 
system of all-pervasive terror, because no one wants to find themselves on the list of official 
enemies.   
 
The purpose of the regime‘s communications monopoly and official propaganda is to drive to 
the ideological fervour necessary for the continued mobilisation required to maintain the 
revolutionary movement.  Official propaganda should paint a positive picture of the ruling 
regime, silence doubts and generate public loyalty.  It should illustrate accepted behaviour 
and the benefits of conformism, outlining the path to advancement and privileges within the 
system.  Concurrently, it should generate fear and demonstrate the helplessness of resistance, 
making clear that safety lies in conforming to accepted norms.  This message must be 
delivered in a vacuum, within which no outside information can penetrate that would 
generate doubts and expose the frailties of the revolutionary movement.
9
  This is why 
totalitarian regimes strive to maintain a monopoly of communications and information 
technologies in order to erect an information blockade, within which the polity is 
hermetically sealed. 
 
The totalitarian model is useful for analysing North Korea‘s political system because it 
allows the analyst to conceptualise the extreme level of institutionalised coercion for which 
                                                 
8 FRIEDRICH, C. & BRZEZINSKI, Z. 1966. Totalitarian Dictatorship & Autrocracy, New York, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers. p. 22.  
See also: FRIEDRICH, C. 1969. The Evolving Theory and Practice of Totalitarian Regimes. In: FRIEDRICH, C., CURTIS, M. & BARBER, 
B. (eds.) Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views. London: Pall Mall Press. p. 102. 
9 One of the chief characteristics of a controlled information flow is that every part of it is designed to enhance respect for the totalitarian 
regime, generate approval and silence doubts as to the power, benevolence, wisdom, and cohesion of the leader and his ruling clique.  See: 
KECSKEMETI, P. 1950. Totalitarian Communications as a Means of Control: A Note on the Sociology of Propaganda. The Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 14, p. 226. 
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the Kim Il-sung regime was known, along with other unique features of the state including its 
ideology and command economy.  For Yang Sung-chul, North Korea was inherently 
totalitarian, due to the KWP‘s almost complete penetration of the various organs of the North 
Korean state.
10
  It is the simplest and most comprehensive conceptual framework for 
understanding the politics of the North Korean state and is an appropriate reference point for 
analysing the weakening of the regime‘s institutional strength since the famine.  Indeed, the 
totalitarian architecture has been subject to the same degenerative trends, driven by declining 
marginal returns that have plagued the economy. 
 
Addressing Criticisms of the Totalitarian Model 
Some analysts object to the description of North Korea as a totalitarian system.  Bruce 
Cumings argues that nationalism and the Confucian hierarchy have enmeshed with Marxist-
Leninism as the foundation of the dominant ideology.  This progressive perversion of 
Marxist-Leninism led to the organisation of the state as a corporatist entity under the guise of 
socialism.
11
  In a corporatist system, the state recognises only one organisation as the sole 
representative of all the individuals and interest groups in each sector which form that 
organisation‘s assigned constituency.  Many such organisations exist in a corporatist state, 
which the state uses to top-down control and mediate the competing interests within each 
sector.
12
  If the body politic is conceived as the body of an organism, the leader represents the 
organism‘s head.13 
 
                                                 
10 YANG, S.-C. 1994. The North and South Korean Political Systems: A Comparative Analysis, Boulder, Westview Press. p. 225. 
11 CUMINGS, B. 1993. The Corporate State in North Korea. In: KOO, H. (ed.) State and Society in Contemporary Korea. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. pp. 201-04. 
12 UNGER, J. & CHAN, A. 1995. China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model. The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 33, pp. 30-31. 
13 CUMINGS, B. 1993. The Corporate State in North Korea. In: KOO, H. (ed.) State and Society in Contemporary Korea. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. p. 199. 
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This model, however, does not fully encapsulate the importance of the Korean Workers‘ 
Party and the Korean People‘s Army as the two organisations that penetrated and subsumed 
all other government organs.  Crosscutting institutional linkages and the highly personalised 
command structure ensured that every unit, from the local work unit, up through its parent 
organisations to the highest echelon of power, were mobilised as an expression of Kim Il-
sung‘s will.  There were no competing interests to mediate because the sole interest of all 
levels of the chain was to carry out directives issued from above.  Unlike in the corporatist 
model where the leader constitutes the head on the body of the political system, in totalitarian 
North Korea, the leader ‗is‘ the political system. 
 
Charles Armstrong also disagrees with the totalitarian label for North Korea, suggesting a 
number of criticisms: first, totalitarian theory overstates the degree of power actually wielded 
by the regime and does not account for the gap between the rhetoric of total control and the 
reality in which citizens avoid and manipulate control mechanisms.
14
  To counter, North 
Korea‘s confined geography and limited population allowed a degree of sustained control not 
sustainable in Nazi Germany or in the Stalinist USSR, where systemic maintenance costs for 
preserving total control were far higher as a consequence of geographic scale.  This led to an 
unprecedented degree of penetration by the Party into the public and private lives of 
individual citizens.  Equally important was the role of Juche as the regime‘s ideology, which 
combined communism with the pre-existing political culture of neo-Confucianism to produce 
a uniquely effective coercive paradigm.   
 
Second, Armstrong argues that the theory ignores the possibility of genuine popular 
                                                 
14 ARMSTRONG, C. 2001. The Nature, Origins, and Development of the North Korean State. In: KIM, S. (ed.) The North Korean System in 
the Post Cold War Era. New York: Palgrave. pp. 42-43. 
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resistance that may effect the development of the regime.
15
  For Armstrong, the level of 
actual support for the regime, as well as political pressure from below, has exerted pressure 
on the decision-making of the Kim regime.  This criticism belies the observation that a 
genuine popular resistance has been conspicuously absent from North Korean politics since 
the Korean War.  Kim Il-sung‘s great purge of factional rivals during the 1950s removed all 
viable candidates within the government that could have formed an alternative leadership 
from within.  Smaller periodic purges since that time cleaned out potentially disloyal 
elements from the bureaucracy, while the fear of retribution has undoubtedly driven Party 
officials to extreme self-censorship.  Among the public, extensive social control mechanisms 
made it virtually impossible for an organised resistance movement to take root.  What 
remained was a regime stuck in a time warp, wedded to the leadership and its ideology 
through intellectual rigidity and political atomisation.  
 
Third, Armstrong contends that totalitarian theory over-emphasises pervasive terror as the 
regime‘s primary social control mechanism.16  To retort, while terror is clearly the most 
important social control mechanism, it is no the only one described in the totalitarian model, 
nor was it the sole means of control evident in Kim Il-sung‘s North Korea.  The role of 
positive motivators such as ideology and materialism should not be underestimated.  In any 
society, the path to material well-being and a comfortable life lie in career advancement.  The 
Party and military bureaucracies offered that prospect to their members; the benefits available 
to loyal and competent functionaries exist as a positive social control mechanism, wedding 
them to the status quo through inducements as well as threats. 
 
These criticisms are a short summary of the wider critique of the totalitarian model.  
                                                 
15 Ibid. pp. 42-43. 
16 Ibid. pp. 42-43. 
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However, as this section has noted, the totalitarian model is nevertheless an appropriate 
application for assessing North Korea‘s political system.  In particular, it serves as an 
illustrative yardstick for evaluating the North Korean political system before and after the 
famine.  The usefulness of the totalitarian model both as an accurate descriptor of the North 
Korean system, and as a comparative benchmark, outweigh the drawbacks of the model 
identified by its critics. 
 
Development of Totalitarianism in North Korea 
Friedrich and Brzezinski suggest that as a general rule, totalitarian states tend to form from 
the rubble of great crises, when the groundswell for radical change in a society is at its 
peak.
17
  The long Japanese occupation of Korea provided an environment of social ferment, 
which transformed into a radical movement for social change at the conclusion of the 
occupation.  Japanese penetration into Korea began in 1876 with the Treaty of Kangwha and 
climaxed with Japan‘s formal annexation of the peninsula in 1910, lasting until the Japanese 
surrender in 1945.
18
  Korea was the first big prize of Japanese expansionism and as such 
suffered a long period of exploitation humiliation, providing the cauldron in which modern 
Korean nationalism fomented.   
 
The Japanese occupation greatly intensified the traditional characteristics of the Korean 
national spirit such as insularity and suspicion of foreign powers.  During the late nineteenth 
century, Korea under the crumbling Yi dynasty became the object of intense competition 
between its weak traditional suzerain China, an expansionist Russia engaged in territorial 
enlargement in the Far East, and a militarist Japan, growing in strength and power after the 
                                                 
17 FRIEDRICH, C. & BRZEZINSKI, Z. 1966. Totalitarian Dictatorship & Autrocracy, New York, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers. p. 17. 
18 For a thorough discussion of the period leading up to the annexation of Korea by the Japanese and the occupation itself, see: HAN, W.-K. 
1970. The History of Korea, Seoul, Eul-Yoo Publishing Company. pp. 361-510. 
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rapid modernisation program of the Meiji Restoration.  Japan won this contest by prosecuting 
victorious wars against China in 1895 and Russia a decade later in 1905, which facilitated its 
expansion into Korea.
19
  The United States loomed as the only obstacle to Japan‘s 
expansionist agenda.  However, during secret deliberations at the conclusion of the Russo-
Japanese War in July 1905, Washington gave Japan a green light to expand into the Korean 
peninsula, which led directly to Japan‘s occupation of Korea in 1905 and formal annexation 
in 1910.
20
  What followed was a period of national shame under the repressive yoke of the 
Japanese colonial regime, characterised in Yang Sung-chul‘s opinion by a ―high degree of 
negativism: anti-foreign, anti-Western, anti-Japanese, anti-Christian and anti-colonial.‖21  
This negativism remains evident in North Korean nationalist propaganda today, particularly 
with regard to the United States. 
 
The Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Movement 
Kim Il-sung led a band of guerrillas fighting the Japanese in Manchuria during the 1930s, a 
struggle that profoundly influenced Kim Il-sung‘s political thought and the later development 
of North Korean state ideology.  This group would go on to become the core of the DPRK 
ruling oligarchy after the Korean War.  The insecurity and privations of the guerrilla lifestyle 
instilled in Kim a deep suspicion of ‗outsiders,‘ manifested in a preference for secrecy and a 
tendency toward xenophobia.
22
  These qualities persist because the Korean peninsula, and the 
North in particular, has been mobilised on a war footing for over a century and has not 
enjoyed a period of calm from wars, both hot and cold.
23
  What has resulted in North Korea is 
an element of ―triumphant survivalism,‖ a belief that North Korean communism has 
                                                 
19 Ibid. pp. 414, 445-48. 
20 Annexation was made official when the Korean-Japanese Annexation Draft was signed on August 22, 1910.  See: Ibid. pp. 447, 464-65.   
21 YANG, S.-C. 1994. The North and South Korean Political Systems: A Comparative Analysis, Boulder, Westview Press. p. 130. 
22 BUZO, A. 1999. The Guerrilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea, Sydney, Allen & Unwin. p. 10. 
23 Ibid. p. 4. 
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overcome almost impossible odds to make it through the Japanese occupation, the Korean 
War and a hostile standoff with the US and ROK, along with an extended period of economic 
hardship.
24
  Self-reliance and military power are the backbone of the survivalist impulse, self-
proclaimed keys to the regime‘s continued existence. 
 
The violent brutality of guerrilla struggle may also have desensitised Kim to violence and led 
him to recognise its utility as a political tool.   Kim understood that the weakness of the Yi 
dynasty (1392-1910) during the nineteenth century had left the Choson state vulnerable to 
Japanese expansionism.  Leadership paralysis and lack of military preparation made the 
invasion and occupation of Korea much easier for the Japanese to undertake.
25
  For Kim, the 
utility of violence was starkly clear: while he and his men unsuccessfully fought the Japanese 
for fifteen years, the United States, was able to force Japan‘s rapid capitulation with the atom 
bomb.
26
  Kim saw utility in violence as an organising principle at the most basic level.  His 
revolutionary movement became organised as a disciplined political combat team, moulded 
by the clandestine nature of their activities under Japanese repression, the exclusive and 
revelatory ideology they espoused, and the elitism that characterised the leadership core of 
the movement.  Consequently, the mythology of the movement came to emphasise desirable 
qualities for its followers such as militancy, courage, loyalty, and self-sacrifice.
27
  To operate 
in the underground resistance was to be in constant danger.  Exposure would compromise the 
resistance struggle and meant certain death for any captured guerrillas.  Violence was the 
language of survival in this environment, firmly imprinting on Kim Il-sung its utility as a 
political instrument as he emerged as Moscow‘s favoured candidate to lead North Korea. 
                                                 
24 SCOBELL, A. 2006. Kim Jong Il and North Korea: The Leader and the System. Strategic Studies Institute, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB644.pdf. p p. 26-27. 
25 For a detailed description of Yi Dynasty weakness during this period, see: HAN, W.-K. 1970. The History of Korea, Seoul, Eul-Yoo 
Publishing Company. pp. 361-402. 
26 MANSOUROV, A. 1995. The Origins, Evolution, & Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program. The Nonproliferation Review, 
2, p. 28. 
27 BUZO, A. 1999. The Guerrilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea, Sydney, Allen & Unwin. p. 234. 
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The Pre-Famine Totalitarian System 
The Absolute Dictator and the Mass Party 
The Korean Workers‘ Party (KWP) was established under close Soviet guidance in 1945 to 
provide a working bureaucracy for the fledgling Korean communists to consolidate power.  
This organisational network, inspired by Soviet institutional models, led to the formation of a 
small oligarchy that directed political, social and economic change in the North during the 
liberation period.
28
  The KWP emerged at the pinnacle of this organisational network and 
over time has taken on a variety of functions, growing into its role today as a ―pocket 
cabinet‖ which works to align the interests of elite factions and manage the operations of 
specialist and mass organisations.  These activities encompassed the government, the 
military, and subgroups such as the technocracy, the intelligentsia, trade unions, youth, and 
women‘s organisations.29   
 
Operationally, the Party penetrated the various social subgroups via guidance committees at 
all levels of society, which always featured a local cadre as a key member.
30
  The Party 
representative, referred to as the secretary, was responsible for transmitting policy directives 
from the Party, evaluating the job performance of bureaucrats, and reporting back to the 
Party.  As an ideologue thoroughly educated in the official ideas of Juche, the Party 
representative was also in charge of the political education of the members of his or her 
unit.
31
   Through their efforts, Party cadres would educate and lead Party members and non-
Party citizens to ensure the proper execution of regime policies.  The committees functioned 
                                                 
28 Ibid. p. 28. 
29 ASMOLOV, K. 2005. North Korea: Stalinism, Stagnation, or Creeping Reform? Far Eastern Affairs, 33, p. 33.  See also: BUZO, A. 1999. 
The Guerrilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea, Sydney, Allen & Unwin. p. 29.   
30 1993. Country Study - North Korea . Washington DC: US Library of Congress, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/kptoc.html [Accessed 3 April 
2006]. 
31 PARK, H. S. 2002. North Korea: The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom, Boulder, Lynne Rienner. pp. 88-90; YANG, S.-C. 1994. The 
North and South Korean Political Systems: A Comparative Analysis, Boulder, Westview Press. pp. 720-21. 
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as an arm of bureaucratic action and as a mechanism of surveillance, ensuring that there was 
no organised collective unit or activity beyond the power of the KWP.   
 
Utopian Transformational Ideology: Juche and Kimism 
Broadly defined, ideology is ―the symbolic tool of political power,‖ which ruling elites use to 
maintain and strengthen their authority.
32
  In the North Korean case, ideology has served a 
number of purposes, articulating North Korea‘s national objectives, informing specific 
programs, and acting as a vehicle for the indoctrination of the people.  Through 
indoctrination, ideology legitimised the political control of the Kim regime and generated a 
national pride that formed the official justification for the rigours and austerity of everyday 
life for rank and file North Koreans.33  This was achieved through the conglomeration of two 
specific strands of thought to form North Korea‘s utopian transformational ideology: the 
philosophy of Juche, and the personality cult surrounding Kim Il-sung. 
 
Kim Il-sung Personality Cult 
Kim Il-sung was unknown to most within the Korean communist movement prior to 1945, 
but a number of factors paved the way for him to become first choice for leadership of 
Soviet-controlled North Korean Interim People’s Committee in February 1946.    For one, he 
had a verifiable record of anti-Japanese agitation.  Second, he was free of the tarnish of 
alleged collaboration with the Japanese, having never been captured and interrogated into 
giving up the names of comrades.  Of course, it did not help that Kim and his guerrilla band 
were forced to retreat from Manchuria into the Russian Far East between 1941 and 1945, as a 
result of a concerted Japanese counter-insurgency campaign.  During this time, Kim and his 
                                                 
32 YANG, S.-C. 1994. The North and South Korean Political Systems: A Comparative Analysis, Boulder, Westview Press. pp. 166-67. 
33 KOH, B. 1970. Ideology and Political Control in North Korea. The Journal of Politics, 32, p. 656.   
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group received military training and political instruction from the Soviet army near 
Khabarovsk, before returning to liberated Korea in 1945.
34
  Upon his return, Kim had a 
sizeable armed force under his direct control, greater in number than those of other Korean 
communist factions.
35
  Once in power, Kim‘s leadership quickly took on the characteristics of 
totalitarian Stalinism.  The intense atmosphere of political and economic mobilisation present 
during the turbulent birth of the regime brought to the fore Kim‘s qualities of personal 
leadership and triggered the metamorphosis of Kim Il-sung into the persona of the Great 
Leader.  Once in power, Kim to began to exercise his command on a personalistic basis was 
able to position himself as the centrepiece of the ideology of the state.  Kim evolved from the 
leader of the revolutionary clique into the hero-leader of the nation, transforming himself 
from Kim Il-sung the man, into Kim Il-sung the legend, the Great Leader.
36
 
 
As Kim Il-sung consolidated his power, a personality cult—Kimism—grew around his image 
as the hero-leader of communist North Korea.  Kimism built on Kim Il-sung‘s exploits as a 
guerrilla fighter, which served to legitimise his position as the hero-leader or even a 
Confucian philosopher-king.  His choice of name is an interesting case in point: in 1945, the 
name Kim Il-sung was widely associated with a legendary and possibly mythical guerrilla 
warrior who reputedly performed heroic exploits during an earlier period of the anti-Japanese 
resistance.  The latter Kim Il-sung gained notoriety in the popular mind by identifying 
himself with the older cult figure.
37
  Kim‘s image as an anti-Japanese guerrilla fighter was 
central to the personality cult.  The firm belief was cultivated that the guerrillas triumphed 
over the Japanese against all odds, permeating official propaganda through the message that 
                                                 
34 CUMINGS, B. 1981. The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945-1947, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press. pp. 397-401. 
35 Ibid. pp. 397-401. 
36 BUZO, A. 1999. The Guerrilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea, Sydney, Allen & Unwin. pp. 234-35. 
37 Ibid. p. 20. 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
 168 
no hardship is too great for the North Korean state to overcome, be it Japanese occupiers, the 
American military or economic deprivation.  As the leader of the Manchurian guerrilla 
clique, Kim Il-sung was the embodiment of this ―triumphal survivalism.‖38  
 
Kimism also makes clever use of the Confucian ideas of ancestor worship and filial piety to 
position Kim Il-sung as the patriarch and dynasty founder of the DPRK.  Confucianism 
became ingrained in Korean culture during the Yi dynasty, which differentiated itself from 
the previous Buddhist-leaning Koryo monarchy through its support for scholars of the neo-
Confucian school.
39
  In both North and South Korea today, Confucian values shape social 
interaction through strict rules centred on the five relationships: ruler-subject, husband-wife, 
parent-child, elder-youngster, and friend-friend.  The father-child and ruler-subject 
relationships are of particular relevance in the context of Juche.  The male patriarch of the 
family is analogous to a priest whose duty it is to cultivate reverence toward ancestors, while 
the officials of the state gained their high posts as leading students of Confucianism.  The 
family patriarch is due filial reverence from his family, while the state‘s due is political 
allegiance from the polity.  The king, in this cosmology, is both father and statesman, owed 
loyalty both through filial piety and political allegiance.
40
  These Confucian ideas—political 
centralisation and obedience to authority—date back over six centuries in Korea and are 
firmly entrenched in Korean culture.
41
   
 
Kimism represents a natural conglomeration of the traditional Confucian philosopher-king 
image with that of the totalitarian hero-leader, the central figure around which the state is 
                                                 
38 SCOBELL, A. 2006. Kim Jong Il and North Korea: The Leader and the System. Strategic Studies Institute, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB644.pdf. p p. 26-27. 
39 HAN, W.-K. 1970. The History of Korea, Seoul, Eul-Yoo Publishing Company. pp. 177-91. 
40 HAHM, C. 2004. The Ironies of Confucianism. Journal of Democracy, 15, pp. 93-107. p. 98.  See also: SCOBELL, A. 2006. Kim Jong Il 
and North Korea: The Leader and the System. Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB644.pdf. 
p . 27. 
41 HARRISON, S. 2001. Time to Leave Korea? Foreign Affairs, 80, pp. 70-71. 
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organised.  Adrian Buzo argues that both Confucianism and Stalinism substituted family and 
kinship loyalties for political and state-centric allegiance in the positioning of the leader as 
the national father-figure, featuring kinship images of the leader as the wise, benevolent 
parent caring for his family (the state).  Family is the recurring metaphor, particularly the 
parent-child relationship: Kim Il-sung as the father, the KWP as the mother, and the people as 
the children.
42
  Therefore, in North Korean propaganda, the society was presented as an 
indivisible and harmonious unit, built around Kim Il-sung.   
 
As well as carrying the mantle as the nation‘s father, Kimism presented Kim Il-sung as the 
paragon of genius and the creator of a new way of being from the chaos of the past.
43
  Bruce 
Cumings contends that because of their Confucian culture, Koreans generally implicitly 
accept that the king or leader is a fount of wisdom, an exceptional person of genius who is 
able to tutor those below him.
44
  Thus, the strength of the Kim Il-sung leadership cult is that it 
incorporated political values which sat comfortably with Korean neo-Confucianism, allowing 
the creation of a powerful image that had some basis in Korea‘s cultural heritage.  Its strength 
as a legitimising foundation of the North Korean state is that Kimism grew into a separate 
entity from the ideological core of communism, which may partially explain why the regime 
was able to ride out the Soviet collapse and the glaring inefficiencies of the command 
economy. 
 
Juche 
An insular Korean nationalism developed during the Japanese occupation, one born of 
                                                 
42 OH, K. & HASSIG, R. 2000. North Korea: Through the Looking Glass, Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press. p. 4; 
ARMSTRONG, C. 1998. ‗A Socialism of Our Style‘: North Korean Ideology in a Post-Communist Era. In: KIM, S. (ed.) North Korean 
Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 44. 
43 BUZO, A. 1999. The Guerrilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea, Sydney, Allen & Unwin. p. 48.  See also: HAHM, C. 
2004. The Ironies of Confucianism. Journal of Democracy, 15, p. 101. 
44 CUMINGS, B. 1997. Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History, New York, WW Norton & Co. p. 408. 
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victimisation and lacking in self-confidence.
45
  Andrew Scobell describes this collective 
victim complex as ―wounded ultra-nationalism,‖ which often finds expression both in 
xenophobia and in a corresponding strand of deep-seated and dignified pride.
46
  The 
nationalism espoused by Kim Il-sung took advantage of these feelings by harnessing historic 
xenophobia to create a pervasive fear of the outside world amongst the North Korean 
population, stressing the purity of Korean culture as opposed to the contamination of foreign 
ideas.
47
  These impulses have found expression in Juche, the state ideology of the DPRK.   
 
The term Juche was first used in North Korean politics in 1955, when Kim Il-sung was facing 
down factional rivals and attempting to manoeuvre through the tumult of the emerging Sino-
Soviet schism.
48
  Kim Il-sung used the term in a speech entitled On Eliminating Dogmatism 
and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work, in which he criticised the Soviet 
Union in a broadside against the Soviet faction of the KWP.
49
  Juche translates literally into 
English as ―main body,‖ but also means ―subject‖ or ―subjectivity,‖ and ―master‖ as opposed 
to ―slave.‖  In the context of North Korean politics, it can mean ―independence‖ or ―self-
reliance.‖50  Kim Il-sung saw Juche as the independent creative adaptation of Marxism-
Leninism to the unique realities of Korea.  Kim warned against the wholesale adoption of the 
experiences of foreign movements without regard for the history, traditions and politics of 
Korea, as well as the dogmatic adherence to Marxism-Leninism as the only true path for the 
                                                 
45 Adrian Buzo describes as a ―resentful nationalism which characteristically evinced a profound sense of injustice, impotence and inequality 
and which had little faith that the world could ever be anything but a threatening place.‖  See: BUZO, A. 1999. The Guerrilla Dynasty: 
Politics and Leadership in North Korea, Sydney, Allen & Unwin. p. 5. 
46 SCOBELL, A. 2006. Kim Jong Il and North Korea: The Leader and the System. Strategic Studies Institute, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB644.pdf. pp. 28-29. 
47 HODGE, H. 2003. North Korea‘s Military Strategy. Parameters, Spring 2003, p. 72. 
48 PINKSTON, D. 2003. Domestic Politics and Stakeholders in the North Korean Missile Development Program. The Nonproliferation 
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49 OH, K. & HASSIG, R. 2000. North Korea: Through the Looking Glass, Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press. p. 17. 
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revolutionary movement.
51
   
 
Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig contend that Juche has incorporated layers of meaning to 
adapt it to the changing needs of the ruling elite and thus is not a particularly profound or 
cohesive set of ideas.
52
  Instead, the core of Juche is better understood as national pride, 
which Bruce Cumings suggests is more of a Korea-centric ―state of mind,‖ of putting Korea 
first in everything.
53
  This is especially appropriate for Koreans, who have always lived in a 
land surrounded by greater powers.  It is understandable that a powerful ethnocentrism 
developed in Korea after four decades of Japanese occupation.  Juche is thus characterised as 
a mixture of wounded ethnocentrism resulting from oppression under the Japanese imperial 
machine, and a post-colonial lust for independence that called for the development of a self-
managed national economy in a secure environment, guarded by indigenous self-defence 
forces.
54
  This kind of thinking is evident in an elucidation of Juche by Kim Il-sung in 1982, 
where he made it clear that North Korea should not become ―a play thing of great powers.‖  
This has manifested not only anti-imperialism, through phobia of the United States and South 
Korea, but also through repugnance of Soviet and Chinese intervention into North Korean 
affairs.
55
   
 
One of the other pitfalls of adhering to the literal translation of Juche as ―self-reliance‖ is that 
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52 OH, K. & HASSIG, R. 2000. North Korea: Through the Looking Glass, Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press. p. 16. 
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55 Quoted in: CUMINGS, B. 1997. Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History, New York, WW Norton & Co. p. 404.  See also: KIM, S.-
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it traps one into thinking that Juche champions complete isolation.  For Kim Il-sung, the 
quest for self-sufficiency did not preclude international trade or the acceptance of aid: ―If you 
provide economic aid, we will accept it, but if you don‘t, we‘ll be OK nevertheless.  This is 
the principle of self-sufficiency.‖56  Kim Yeon-gak believes ―self-standing‖ is a more 
appropriate than ―self-reliance‖ as a translation of Juche in the economic realm, an 
interpretation that implies the regime can self-manage the economy regardless of whether 
outside assistance is available.
57
  As was shown in the previous chapter, North Korea had 
long-established trade and aid relationships with the Soviet Union and other communist bloc 
countries, as well as Western-aligned European countries and Japan.  Such activities were 
acceptable under Juche if they helped to plug holes in the planning matrix and consolidated 
the overall economy. 
 
Maintaining All-Pervasive Terror: Social Control and Coercion 
Consolidating Power 
This section will demonstrate that both active and passive mechanisms combined to create 
North Korea‘s system of all-pervasive terror prior to the famine.  A striking feature of the 
liberation period was the coalescence of all the disparate resistance groups returning from 
exile.  The resistance evolved in a number of different countries with each group developing 
unique characteristics, with their own regional affiliations and connections to external 
organisations.
58
  Four distinct groupings were identifiable in the Korean communist 
oligarchy:  (1) the domestic communists consisted of members who lived within Korea 
during the time of the occupation, whose activities were confined to underground agitation.  
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After liberation, they were vulnerable to criticism by hardliners who labelled them as 
collaborators.  (2) The Manchurian faction, including Kim Il-sung‘s group, fought a 
protracted guerrilla campaign against the Japanese military in Manchuria alongside Chinese 
communist forces.  (3) Another faction of Korean resistance soldiers, the Yan‘an group, 
fought as a part of the Chinese communist army against the Japanese in China proper.  (4) 
Finally, the Soviet-Korean faction consisted of émigrés affiliated with the Soviet army 
emanating out of Siberia.
59
   
 
Each faction tried to undermine the others and jockey for power during the Korean War.  
Kim Il-sung continued to rely on his own Manchurian faction for political support, while 
slowly beginning the process of weeding out dissenters from the other factions.
60
  As a rule, 
the formative phase of totalitarian regimes usually culminates with a great purge in which the 
leader eliminates all other potential challengers to his power.  Nothing less than a monopoly 
of power is sufficient, requiring the liquidation of all rivals.
61
  Kim first weakened the Soviet-
Korean faction by expelling its leader, Ho Kai, in November 1951.  Kim later blamed the 
domestic faction for military failures and accused Ho of plotting a coup against him during 
the war, which led to the execution of ten members of the domestic clique.  By 1958, Kim 
had purged the leadership core of the Yan‘an and Soviet groups as well after key factional 
figures attempted to replace him as leader during a KWP Central Committee Plenum in 1956.  
The rebels and their associates were promptly expelled from the Party and most were 
arrested.  Between October 1958 and May 1959, the regime purged approximately one 
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hundred thousand people on political grounds.
62
  By the Korean Workers Party‘s Fourth 
Congress in September 1961, Kim had solidified his position as absolute ruler of North 
Korea. 
 
Kim Il-sung‘s purges of the KWP during the 1950s had several important consequences that 
continue to plague North Korea today.  The purges ushered in an era of harsher repression of 
perceived dissidents and even tighter government control of social, political and economic 
spheres.  This degraded the KWP to a deadening level of uniformity.  Members who survived 
the cull usually originated from the north of the country or Manchuria, were of peasant class 
and had little formal education.  They had very limited, if any, contact with the outside world, 
bounding their intellectual framework within a perception of socialist states constantly under 
duress from the capitalist world.  Juche was the ideological formula derived from this 
worldview, which was then applied to a broad range of practical problems for which 
specialist knowledge would have been far more appropriate.
63
   
 
This trend toward anti-intellectualism grew in parallel with the importance of official 
ideology.  The persecution of intellectuals in totalitarian regimes is the inevitable outgrowth 
of the quest for total domination; free initiative and thought in any field, or any activity that is 
not entirely predictable, is a threat to the exercise of total power.  Freethinking does not 
conform with the total commitment to the official ideology necessary in such systems, of 
which North Korea was no exception.
64
  Apart from enforcing values of cohesion and 
discipline, the anti-intellectual ideology contributed little to the country‘s rapid social and 
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economic transformation.  The reification of the Manchurian guerrilla clique may have 
buttressed Kim‘s authority, but the insistence that the guerrilla encampment represented the 
ideal model of social organisation for the entire population contributed enormously to the 
numbing uniformity and regimentation of North Korean life.
65
  Intellectuals lost their high 
social status and became working class functionaries, as the lionisation of Kimism resulted in 
the devaluation of intellectual activity and stifled scientific advancement and technological 
innovation.  Many were put to work on tasks related to ideological and political mobilisation 
rather than the practical tasks for which they were trained, which alienated them from the 
research output of foreign scholars and quarantined them from important scientific and 
technological advancements.  They also found it impossible to conduct research or advance 
theories that contradicted Juche, for fear of punishment.
66
  Ossification of the KWP was an 
inevitable result of these trends.  The enforced uniformity and savaging of intellectual talent 
left Kim surrounded by devoted ideologues and compliant bureaucrats.  The Party became 
highly resistant to new ideas, capable only of applying a rigid dogma to a raft of complex 
practical problems.   
 
The Coercive Apparatus 
The social control mechanisms associated with maintaining political security lay with the 
numerous national security service agencies.  The Ministry of State Security, formerly known 
as the Ministry of State Political Security, was the leading coercive body of the DPRK state.  
According to Andrei Lankov, the Ministry of State Security, along with the Ministry of 
Defence and the Ministry of Public Security, were special organs of the government reporting 
directly to the leader.
67
  This agency is notorious for the disappearance, torture and execution 
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of political prisoners, as well as the use of collective punishment.
68
   
 
The entire family of individuals arrested for political crimes against the state were 
incarcerated in ―re-education‖ camps to weed out ideological impurity and to deter others 
from engaging in anti-regime behaviour.  Parents, siblings and other relatives were 
imprisoned for the crimes of an individual, even a long-dead ancestor.
69
  This form of 
punishment had been employed in other countries as well.  Hannah Arendt argued that in the 
Stalinist USSR, as soon as a person was accused of crimes against the state, his friends and 
family would transform immediately into bitter denunciators to save themselves; they would 
volunteer information to corroborate the official evidence against the accused, as a way to 
prove their trustworthiness and loyalty to the regime.
70
  Therefore, for personal safety 
individuals would avoid intimate contacts to reduce the risk of denunciation.  For Arendt, the 
process of collective punishment was integral to the atomisation of the individual through the 
destruction of all social bonds except those of the individual to the state.  Without any other 
social connections, the individual would derive their place of being in the world from their 
belonging to the revolutionary movement.   
 
An extensive gulag system was set up to house people who transgressed against the regime‘s 
strict laws.  Many prison camps are scattered through North Korea to this day, placed in 
locations chosen for their remoteness and difficult terrain.  Pierre Rigoulot has identified five 
different types of prison complex within this system: (1) transit facilities called ―help posts‖ 
house inmates awaiting trial for minor political and non-political crimes. (2) ―Work 
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regeneration centres,‖ located in all major towns and cities, house people who labelled as 
ineffective, anti-social or lazy.  These facilities generally house 100-200 people for stays of 
between one month to a year, often without trial or charge for any specific offence. (3) 
Approximately twelve ―hard labour camps‖ are scattered through the country, holding 500 to 
2,000 inmates, held on accusation of crimes such as theft, murder or rape, as well as the 
children of political prisoners, captured defectors, and minor political prisoners. (4) 
―Deportation zones‖ hold tens of thousands of people under house arrest in remote regions.  
Those held are ―untrustworthy elements‖ including former landowners and people with 
relatives who have defected to South Korea. (5) ―Special dictatorship zones‖ located in the 
inaccessible mountain regions in the north of the country are full-fledged concentration 
camps for political prisoners, of which a dozen are known to exist housing 150,000 to 
200,000 people, or approximately one percent of the North Korean population.  Prisoners 
perform extremely hard labour, working 12-18 hour days while subsisting on poor food.  The 
mortality rate is high, while torture and sexual violence against inmates is common.
71
  The 
gulag system was one of the features of the totalitarian architecture to survive the famine 
period undiminished. 
 
Social Controls 
The Ministry of Public Security oversaw social controls, which fell under five mutually 
reinforcing categories: residence, travel, employment, food and clothing.  It was the primary 
organ responsible for internal security and basic police functions, including the maintenance 
of law and order, common criminal investigation, prison management, civil registrations, 
background checking, travel control, protection of Party officials, safekeeping of classified 
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government documents, and government building security.
72
  The tentacles of official 
surveillance extended all the way down to the communal level to People‘s Neighbourhood 
Teams (PNT) or inminban.  PNT‘s were the basic social cell of state control, linking families 
and households to the KWP‘s extensive bureaucratic network.  The local PNT leader 
(inminbanjang, or ―head of a people‘s group‖) would manage political control and 
ideological mobilisation within the local unit of 20-50 households, advising members about 
the ideological purity of their daily lives.
73
  The local PNT leader had to monitor the activities 
of those under their responsibility as any misdemeanours meant dire consequences not only 
for the perpetrator, but for the PNT leader as well.  The main purpose of this system was to 
suppress dissent at every level of society and thus eliminate opportunities for anti-regime 
agitation.
74
 
 
Employment was fully regulated by the KWP, making its decisions on the basis of the 
political reliability and the family background of the individuals concerned.  A system of 
personal security ratings, codified during the 1950s, categorised the political reliability of 
individuals.  The population was divided into 51 social groupings that not only influenced 
employment prospects but also access to higher education, health care, food supplies and 
Party membership.  This cumbersome system was streamlined in the 1980s into three broad 
categories: the ―core‖ or ―central‖ class, consisting of the families of Party members, soldiers 
and industrial proletarians; the ―wavering‖ or ―undecided‖ class, incorporating the families of 
middle-ranking peasants, small business owners and traders; and the ―hostile‖ class, 
including the families of well-to-do peasants, individuals with religious affiliations, the 
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intelligentsia, and returning Chinese and Japanese Koreans, which comprised approximately 
one quarter of the North Korean population.
75
   
 
The prospect of career advancement worked as both carrot and stick in acculturating Party 
members and prospective cadres into appropriate behaviour.
76
  The execution of commands 
from above to the highest precision possible was good for career advancement, while 
excessive questioning and overt disloyalty were not.  The rewards of advancement in the 
Party, combined with the consequences of dissent or even slight disagreement produced a 
stifling pressure toward self-censorship and depoliticisation amongst individual Party 
members.  These entry barriers and conformist pressures decreased the likelihood of 
individuals opposed to the system rising to positions of influence and raised the costs of 
dissident collective action against the regime.
77
      
 
Another important component of control was to keep people rooted in one place, which the 
regime achieved through a number of restrictions.  North Korean citizens generally lived in 
apartment complexes or residential compounds close to their places of employment.
78
  
Freedom of relocation was strictly limited, as people were prohibited from changing jobs or 
moving to new locations without official permission from the Party.  PNT leaders would keep 
track of people movements within their jurisdiction and had the power to inspect any 
residence at any time to conduct a roll call.  Any person staying at a dwelling other than their 
                                                 
75 HAGGARD, S. & NOLAND, M. 2007a. Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform, New York, Columbia University Press. p. 55; 
RIGOULOT, P. 1999. Crimes, Terror, and Secrecy in North Korea. In: COURTOIS, S., WERTH, N., PANNE, J., PACZKOWSKI, A., 
BARTOSEK, K. & MARGOLIN, J. (eds.) The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression. London: Harvard University Press. 
p. 560; 1993. Country Study - North Korea . Washington DC: US Library of Congress, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/kptoc.html [Accessed 
03/04/2006]. 
76 2002a. The Invisible Exodus: North Koreans in the People’s Republic of China. Washington DC: Human Rights Watch, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/northkorea/norkor1102.pdf. pp. 19-20; BUZO, A. 1999. The Guerrilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in 
North Korea, Sydney, Allen & Unwin. p. 29. 
77 PINKSTON, D. 2003. Domestic Politics and Stakeholders in the North Korean Missile Development Program. The Nonproliferation 
Review, 10, p. 4. 
78 SUH, J.-J. 2006. Social Changes in North Korea after the Economic Crisis. East Asian Review, 18, pp. 53-54. 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
 180 
home was required to register with the local PNT leader, present their identification papers, 
explain the reason for their visit and obtain written permission authorising the stay.
79
  A 
travel pass granted by the Ministry of Public Security was needed to travel outside one‘s 
home district, which took a long time to obtain and could only be granted for official business 
or important family functions.  To further impede travel, food distributed from the state 
rationing system was not available to people travelling outside their home district.
80
   
 
Ritualised self-criticism sessions were the basis of social control at the individual level.  The 
general pattern of these rituals can be constructed from the testimony of former North Korean 
residents.  Self-criticism sessions were usually conducted once a week in work groups or 
PNT‘s, with long and detailed written self-criticism documents submitted once per month.  
American defector Charles Jenkins, who crossed the DMZ into North Korea in 1965 to avoid 
deployment to Vietnam, recalled documenting his various transgressions through the week to 
recite during self-criticism sessions.
81
  During the meeting, a person would begin by standing 
to attention and reciting verbatim one of the teachings of Kim Il-sung, after which they would 
list their failings from the previous week.  They would then express regret for their 
transgressions and list ways that their future conduct would better reflect Juche and the 
teachings of Kim Il-sung.  At this point, the presiding Party official would decide if the self-
criticism had been satisfactory; if it had been, the individual would then go on to criticize 
others in the group.  If the self-criticism was deemed unsatisfactory, other group members 
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would be ordered to expand on the criticisms offered.  If a specific criticism was deemed 
sufficiently serious, the Party cadre would call out the individual for a special session.
82
 
 
Self-criticism meetings generally would focus on minor and unimportant transgressions.  
However, their value as a method of social control lay in deterring individuals from engaging 
in risky behaviours for which they would be discovered and criticized.  In these cases, 
criticisms would become more intense and punishments more severe.  Any behaviour that 
was too perilous to confess was therefore too dangerous to risk.  The result was a 
psychological climate which for the most part deterred people from engaging in subversive or 
anti-social behaviour.
83
   
 
Communications Monopoly and Official Propaganda 
The regime maintained a tight monopoly on communications and the media in North Korea 
and used its monopoly to disseminate ideological messages, Party propaganda and 
psychological terror.  The news agency most familiar to analysts in the West for its 
outrageous hyperbole and vainglorious descriptions of the regime was the Korean Central 
News Agency (KCNA), which was the primary conduit for official pronouncements to the 
outside world.  Within the DPRK, it was the primary agency for gathering and disseminating 
news, and was responsible for publishing the daily paper Korean Central News, the 
Photographic News and the Korean Central Yearbook.  Other organs of the state circulate 
their own print media as well: the KWP Central Committee publishes the newspapers 
Nodong Sinmun and Minju Choson, which were likely to be the only available sources of 
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written information about the ―world‖ of North Korean citizens.84  North Koreans had access 
to specially calibrated televisions and radios that could only receive government channels.  
Typical programs usually centred on the themes of the greatness of Kim Il-sung, the KWP 
and the working class, and often included musical performances, films and documentaries, 
and interviews with Korean War veterans.
85
 
 
As a rule, the North Korean population became susceptible to suggestion and manipulation 
because of the media monopoly described above.  In the absence of external information 
sources, ordinary North Koreans were unlikely to have imagined alternative lifestyles and 
political arrangements, let alone create new alternatives on their own initiative.  This state of 
affairs was the product of prolonged isolation, of a social environment unchallenged by 
external ideas for an extended period.  Most adult North Koreans have grown up under Kim 
regime rule since 1945 and have been educated in the same political and ideological system.  
Therefore, their belief systems have developed in step with the evolution of Juche; people 
seamlessly assimilated new components of Juche, leading to an intensification of their 
beliefs.  From their perspective, Juche’s capacity to evolve overrode any doubts that may 
have arisen had the ideology maintained strict rigidity.  Therefore, in the absence of pressures 
toward cognitive dissonance, their beliefs were reinforced.
86
 
 
Regime Propaganda 
In general terms, propaganda should deliver an image of the ruling regime that silences 
doubts and generates public loyalty, by outlining accepted behaviour and the path to 
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advancement and privileges within the system.  Concurrently, it should generate fear and 
demonstrate the helplessness of resistance, making clear that safety lies in conforming to 
accepted norms.  North Korean propaganda achieved this by emphasising themes related to 
the revolutionary program, enemies of the revolution, and the leader of the revolutionary 
movement.  The leader of the revolution, Kim Il-sung, was positioned through a personality 
cult as the father of the nation, the philosopher-king, the fount of wisdom, the warrior-hero 
who made the revolution possible and led the movement to victory.  The propaganda 
surrounding Kim Il-sung reached the levels of mythology, not only establishing his 
omnipotence and his will as that of both heaven and Earth, but also his tenderness and 
compassion for the North Korean people.  For Brian Myers, the ability of North Korean 
propaganda to speak to the psyche through emotion made it far superior to the propaganda of 
the European communist regimes.
87
  
 
North Korean propaganda lionised Juche as the ideology through which the revolution was 
able to establish a paradise on Earth.
88
  It achieved this by communicating two important 
aspects: on the one hand, it extolled the virtues of the ideology and on the other, it provided 
the template through which individuals could embody the ideology in practice.  The anti-
Japanese guerrillas led by Kim Il-sung became the role model for self-reliance and 
perseverance through adversity.  When Juche was adapted to accommodate changes in 
management styles, including mobilisation drives such as the Chollima movement, the 
Chongsan-ri agricultural method, and the Three Revolutions Teams drive, propaganda was 
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marshalled as an instructional tool to inform the public of their obligations and duties within 
these new programs.  Propaganda thus provided the template for the public to follow when 
changes were made to the accepted way of doing things. 
 
The establishment of official enemies enhanced the urgency of the revolutionary program.  
North Korean propaganda has leant heavily on anti-imperialism as the theme through which 
it established fear of threats from both outside and within.  The United States was identified 
as the mortal enemy, the antithesis of Juche and thus a threat to North Korea‘s paradise on 
Earth.
89
  South Korea fit into this narrative as a puppet of the United States, the compliant 
tool of the imperialist enemy.  Together, they constantly threatened the security of North 
Korea and the continuity of the revolution.
90
   By extension, those within North Korean 
society who did not conform to the template of acceptable behaviour and loyalty were 
labelled as imperial sympathisers, for whom the most extreme punishments would apply.  
The implied threat of coercive terror is the narrative through which purges and incarceration 
of political prisoners should be understood.  
 
Constant repetition drove home the message of North Korea propaganda.  Successful 
repetition requires the presence of a set of necessary preconditions that mutually reinforce the 
desired attributes and dispositions within the target community.  These include difficult 
existential circumstances (Japanese occupation and the Korean War), the presence of a cult 
personality (Kimism), an appealing doctrine that prescribes moral and ethical standards for 
human conduct (Juche), a sacred mission (reunification), as well as an external threat that 
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leads to the internalisation of a siege mentality (US/ROK military threat).
91
  All of these 
criteria were satisfied in North Korea between 1945 and 1991.  By controlling the flow of 
information and keeping the people enclosed in a vacuum, the regime was able to evoke a 
high degree of conformity in attitudes and beliefs.  This is consistent with observations made 
in other totalitarian societies, where it was found that constant repetition of propaganda 
messages, without respite or infusion of competing ideas, created a sense of helplessness 
amongst the citizens in the face of irresistible power.
92
  Coercive terror enhanced this 
message, as conformity with accepted norms was the only way individuals could maximise 
their personal safety.  In other words, the propaganda message compounds the coercive 
capacities of the state in maintaining the populace in a state of psychological terror.   
 
Conclusion 
North Korea‘s pre-famine totalitarian system grew from a tough and extreme form of 
nationalism that developed within the cauldron of the Japanese occupation and the chaotic 
atmosphere of the liberation period.  These tumultuous events catalysed support among 
traumatised Koreans for a political figure like Kim Il-sung, promising a transformative vision 
to alleviate their suffering.  The vision offered by Kim was based on the Stalinist model of 
communism, reflective of the North‘s status as a protectorate of the USSR following 
liberation, and Kim Il-sung‘s Soviet military and ideological training in the Russian Far East.  
This model centred on Kim Il-sung as an absolute dictator, with the Korean Workers‘ Party 
as the vehicle for his total personalised control over North Korean society.  The personality 
cult surrounding Kim, as well as the transformational ideology of Juche, was the ideational 
foundation of the regime.  All-pervasive terror based on violent coercion and the threat of 
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severe punishment was the foundation of social control.  Other positive inducements such as 
material well-being (in the uniquely North Korean sense of the term) and career advancement 
played a role, though these were located within the overall structure of terror.  The regime 
maintained a communications blockade to restrict the flow of information in, out and around 
the country, which kept North Koreans trapped in a world strictly bounded by the limits of 
official ideology. 
 
The systemic maintenance costs of such a comprehensive network of social controls were 
great and could not be maintained in the long term by a state with such an inefficient 
economy.  Declining marginal returns on investment seen in the command economy leading 
up to 1991 were reflected in the political system and its institutions.  The famine period 
crippled the regime‘s institutional structure and undermined the positive incentives for 
obedience, which filtered through to the coercive apparatus and made it less effective.  The 
ground has now been prepared for a comparison of today‘s North Korea with the pre-famine 
regime of Kim Il-sung, which will expose the systemic weaknesses wrought by the famine.  
This in turn will provide an indication of the problems the nuclear program has been tasked to 
address and paint a clearer picture of the regime‘s motivations for nuclear proliferation. 
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6. North Korea Post-Famine: Decay of the 
Totalitarian System 
 
 
North Korea‘s political system today is no longer that of a full-blown totalitarian regime, 
though the foundations of the totalitarian architecture remain in place.  The economic 
transformation that has taken place has triggered a process of political change at the grass-
roots level that is undercutting the institutions of the old order, a process that has not reached 
its conclusion.  In this context, the nuclear program is not only utilised by the regime as a 
bargaining chip to acquire inputs for the economy, but also functions as a tool for 
regenerating the totalitarian order as a symbol of self-reliance in regime propaganda, and as a 
vehicle to advance bureaucratic interests within the military, the paramount institution in 
post-famine North Korea.  These findings clearly demonstrate the importance of the nuclear 
program to the political economy of the North Korean state and the perpetuation of the Kim 
regime. 
 
Yet while it is true that certain dimensions of the totalitarian order in the DPRK have been 
degraded, the architecture of the old order remains as an ―eroded‖ totalitarian system.  This 
chapter will document how the foundations of the totalitarian order have changed since the 
famine period.  First, it will describe the concept of post-totalitarianism, suggesting that 
North Korea today is in the process of evolving into a post-totalitarian state.  Second, the 
chapter will describe the new relationship between the leader, Party and military that has 
arisen within Kim Jong-il‘s leadership paradigm of Songun politics.  Third, it will document 
the decline of pervasive terror and the weakening of social controls that has occurred since 
the famine.  Fourth, it will analyse the decay of the communications monopoly and state 
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ideology over the same period, identifying anti-imperialism as the regime‘s most effective 
remaining legitimising paradigm.  Finally, the chapter will investigate the capacity of the 
Songun system to regenerate itself.  This system currently exists in a state of flux, captive to 
the economic changes that are transforming the political and social relationships of North 
Korean society.  It is an inherently unstable system, unlikely to persist in its current form 
without substantial subsidisation of its systemic maintenance costs.  The nuclear program is 
the tool that facilitates this aim by propping up the economy, ideology and institutions of the 
fading totalitarian system. 
 
Post-Totalitarianism 
Charles Armstrong argues that totalitarian theory fails to account for change that occurs as 
the state evolves.
1
  Armstrong argues that North Korea has changed significantly over time; 
the state as it exists today is not the same as that which predominated in the aftermath of the 
Korean War.  To a degree this is true, as the shape of institutional power structures and 
influence of individual actors within the system has metamorphosed markedly, especially 
since the famine and the assumption of power by Kim Jong-il.  As shown in chapter three, 
these institutional changes resulted from declining marginal returns on investment.   In spite 
of declining marginal returns, the five characteristics of totalitarianism defined by Friedrich 
and Bzrzenski remain in place despite their erosion under duress. 
 
Yet there are processes in train precipitating changes in the political economy of the North 
Korean state that are permanently altering the totalitarian architecture.  The long-term process 
of degeneration and accelerated systemic transformation has transitioned North Korea toward 
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a post-totalitarian order.  A post-totalitarian regime is one in which the centralised power of 
the dictator has weakened in conjunction with the declining pervasiveness of the coercive 
apparatus.  Often the transition to post-totalitarianism occurs when a dictator dies and no one 
figure has amassed a bureaucratic power base sufficient to wield total control.  In the absence 
of a charismatic dictator at the apex of the power structure, what emerges is usually some 
form of collective bureaucratic leadership.
2
   
 
A collective leadership is likely to prevent wholesale purges of the elite, though it may 
continue to sacrifice individuals from time to time.
3
  For Carl Friedrich, the transformation of 
a totalitarian system into other forms of authoritarianism resulted when the ideology and 
organisation of the ruling regime became ossified and weak, isolating the ruling clique and 
creating a power vacuum at the top.  A bureaucratic faction could fill the gap, in partnership 
with a corruptible coercive apparatus more concerned with politics and power, as opposed to 
upholding the old order.
4
  The frenzy of public mobilisation behind the revolutionary 
movement also subsides in a post-totalitarian system as the official ideology becomes 
discredited, the cult of personality surrounding the dictator wanes, the communication 
monopoly breaks down and open repression is scaled back.  This creates a space in which 
embryonic opposition movements can grow.
5
    
 
According to the definition above, North Korea cannot yet be considered a post-totalitarian 
state, despite compelling evidence that it is no longer that of a full-blown totalitarian regime.  
It is more accurate to describe the North as an eroding totalitarian regime in which significant 
                                                 
2 THOMPSON, M. 2002. Totalitarian and Post-Totalitarian Regimes in Transitions and Non-Transitions from Communism. Totalitarian 
Movements and Political Religions, 3, pp. 83-84. 
3 Ibid. pp. 83-4. 
4 FRIEDRICH, C. 1969. The Evolving Theory and Practice of Totalitarian Regimes. In: FRIEDRICH, C., CURTIS, M. & BARBER, B. 
(eds.) Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views. London: Pall Mall Press. p. 78. 
5 SCOBELL, A. 2006. Kim Jong Il and North Korea: The Leader and the System. Strategic Studies Institute, 
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changes have occurred, but which has not yet changed sufficiently to be considered post-
totalitarian.
6
  Peter Beck offers a similar assertion, suggesting that the political system today 
is a cross between totalitarianism and neo-traditionalism, where the totalitarian architecture 
remains in place but with significant cracks, which the regime attempts to cover through 
appeals to Confucian tradition and dynastic rule.
7
  This thesis goes further, arguing that the 
regime is attempting to forestall state decay and cover up these weaknesses by utilising the 
nuclear weapons program to plug holes in the political economy of the North Korean state. 
 
Dictator, Party and Military: A New Relationship 
In the midst of unfolding catastrophe in 1994, a significant change occurred at the summit of the 
regime, when Kim Jong-il succeeded his deceased father Kim Il-sung.  Kim Jong-il‘s rise to the 
pinnacle of the North Korean regime was a long one, beginning in September 1973 with his 
promotion to Secretary of the KWP.  In this position, Kim held dual positions as head of 
organisational affairs, as well as propaganda and agitation, where he became the authoritative 
interpreter of the ideas developed by Kim Il-sung.  He also created an enhanced role for Party cadres 
in local administrative units through the Three Revolutions Teams movement and strengthened self-
criticism practices in workplace units.  Clearly, Kim Jong-il had inserted himself at the crucial node of 
power at the beginning of the era of power transition, from where he was able to build an institutional 
power base that would eventually allow him to assume power in a manner previously unheard of in 
communist dictatorships.
8
  The younger Kim‘s penchant for promoting young technocrats to 
senior positions ahead of traditional ideologues demonstrated his ability to be a more 
                                                 
6 Ibid.  p. 4; SCOBELL, A. 2005. Making Sense of North Korea: Pyongyang and Comparative Communism. Asian Security, 1, p. 249. 
7 BECK, P. Interview with the author. 22 July 2008. Seoul, South Korea. 
8 KIM, S.-C. 2006b. North Korea under Kim Jong Il: From Consolidation to Systemic Dissonance, Albany, State University of New York 
Press. pp. 54-57. 
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pragmatic political operator, setting the stage, as Patrick McEachern has suggested, for him to 
assume a different leadership style from that of his father.
9
 
 
During the four-year power transition period after Kim Il-sung‘s death, the younger Kim 
assumed leadership of the KWP Central Committee and thus the Politburo and the 
Secretariat, the three key organisations within the Party.  However, with the Party under 
sustained assault from the difficulties of economic crisis, famine, and ideological de-
legitimation, Kim Jong-il may have  come to the realisation that if his leadership was to 
survive, he would need the support of the KPA, the strongest institution in an otherwise 
crumbling state.  In this context, the younger Kim‘s pragmatic political skills came to the 
fore. 
 
Songun Politics 
To understand how the KPA became the foundation of Kim Jong-il‘s leadership, one must 
hark back to the early-1960s and Kim Il-sung‘s decision to turn North Korea into a veritable 
fortress.  North Korea is a militarised state—a garrison state—in which the military has 
become the backbone, ideologically and organisationally, of the society.
10
  During the early 
1960s, international events such as the Cuban missile crisis and the Sino-Soviet split led Kim 
Il-sung to place a renewed emphasis on national security.  The KWP issued a statement at its 
Central Committee plenary session on December 10-14, 1962, emphasising the strengthening 
of national self-defence.  This doctrine—the Equal Emphasis policy—called for the 
fortification of the country, arming of the entire nation, and modernisation of the KPA into an 
                                                 
9 McEACHERN, P. (2009). Inside the Red Box: North Korea’s Post-Totalitarian Politics. PhD dissertation submitted to the Department of 
Political Science, Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-04142009-
234949/unrestricted/McEachern_diss.pdf [Accessed 21 December 2010]. 
10 CHOI, K. 1999. Korea: A Tradition of Peace – the Danger of War. In: BOOTH, K. & TROOD, R. (eds.) Strategic Cultures in the Asia-
Pacific Region. New York: St. Martin‘s Press. p. 106. 
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elite fighting force, even at the expense of the nation‘s economic progress.11  The reasons for 
the rapid militarisation stem from the regime‘s feeling of insecurity from external threats, 
linked with events abroad.
12
 
 
The threat posed by the United States forced North Korea to make one of two choices: either 
accept an external security guarantee from a foreign power, or turn the DPRK into a fortress 
state.  Kim Il-sung viewed Nikita Krushchev‘s back down in the Cuban missile crisis as a 
sign that the Soviet security guarantee could not be counted on in a crisis, occurring as it did 
in the context of post-Stalin revisionism in the USSR and the eroding solidarity of the 
communist bloc created by the Sino-Soviet rivalry.
13
  From this period onward, North Korea 
became the heavily militarised country in which military production increasingly became an 
important part of the national economy.  The militarisation of the economy from 1962 
precipitated a long movement, a shift in political importance away from the KWP toward the 
KPA as the KPA began to become more involved in the commanding heights of the North 
Korean economy.
14
   
 
Returning now to the fledgling leadership of Kim Jong-il, one can see how the military 
became integral to the new leader and the survival of the state.  In December 1998 Kim Jong-
il consolidated his grip on power through the introduction of a new state ideology—Songun 
or ―miltiary-first‖ politics—which was based on kangsong daeguk, the idea of North Korea as 
                                                 
11 BUZO, A. 1999. The Guerrilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea, Sydney, Allen & Unwin. p. 240.  See also: MOON, C.-I. 
& TAKESADA, H. 2001. North Korea: Institutionalized Military Intervention. In: ALAGAPPA, M. (ed.) Coercion and Governance. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press.  p. 364. 
12 MOON, C.-I. & TAKESADA, H. 2001. North Korea: Institutionalized Military Intervention. In: ALAGAPPA, M. (ed.) Coercion and 
Governance. Stanford: Stanford University Press. p. 379. 
13 Ibid.  p. 364. 
14 SCOBELL, A. 2006. Kim Jong Il and North Korea: The Leader and the System. Strategic Studies Institute, 
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a ―strong and powerful country.‖15   The building of kangson daeguk required North Korea to 
become strong in political ideology, economic capacity and military capabilities, goals 
toward which the nuclear program appears to have been directed.  Given the relative decline 
in the North‘s conventional military capability, the nuclear program thus became a symbol of 
the military component of the new legitimising paradigm.  According to Daniel Pinkston, 
Songun politics was formulated to demonstrate Kim Jong-il‘s dedication to providing 
national security against external threats and to reassure the military that Kim and the Party 
would provide the military with priority access to the state‘s scarce resources.16   
 
Not surprisingly, the role of the KPA in everyday affairs in North Korea has increased since 
the implementation of Songun politics.  The military has been mobilised to undertake a 
number of public tasks from infrastructure development to food procurement, while the KPA 
hierarchy has played an increasing role in social and economic decision-making processes.
17
  
The ultimate goal is a self-sustaining defence sector in which military activities generate 
more resources and economic goods than they consume, thus leading the country to economic 
recovery.
18
  In short, under Songun politics the military became the spearhead of economic 
re-invigoration.   
 
The ascendency and entrenchment of the military-industrial complex in North Korea has 
                                                 
15 PINKSTON, D. 2003. Domestic Politics and Stakeholders in the North Korean Missile Development Program. The Nonproliferation 
Review, 10, p. 10. 
16 PINKSTON, D. 2006. North Korea‘s Foreign Policy Towards the United States. Strategic Insights, V, p. 3.   
17 VORONTSOV, A. 2006. North Korea's Military-First Policy: A Curse or a Blessing? . Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 
http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/fellows/vorontsov20060526.htm [Accessed 13/04/2007].  
18 Nicholas Eberstadt quotes an official statement from Nodong Sinmun in April 2003 that describes the role of the military in leading North 
Korea‘s economic reinvigoration: ―Once we lay the foundations for a powerful self-sustaining national defence industry, we will be able to 
rejuvenate all economic fields, to include light industry and agriculture and enhance the quality of people‘s lives.‖  See: EBERSTADT, N. 
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elevated the KPA as the most important political institution within the regime.
19
  This 
institutional shift has taken place at the expense of the KWP, which is no longer the driving 
force of society.
20
  The KPA‘s expanded power derives from the incorporation of large 
swathes of the North Korean economy under military control, outside of the official 
command system.  This shift was necessary because during the famine, the Party bureaucracy 
became overly inefficient in the area of economic allocation, to the point of breakdown, and 
ceased to serve as an effective means to transmit the policy directives of the leadership.
21
  
Songun politics was thus Kim Jong-il‘s conscious attempt to rescue the North Korean 
economy from the wreckage of the broken central planning mechanism.   
 
This is not to say, however, that the military replaced the KWP entirely as a key organ of 
power.  The KPA does not dominate the internal machinations of the Party, nor has it 
replaced the Party‘s extensive role of internal surveillance through institutional penetration to 
the lower levels of North Korean society.
22
  The Party continues to maintain its surveillance 
capability, which now represents its most important function, though for the most part it no 
longer maintains oversight over economic activity.  As the economic centre of gravity has 
moved, so too has the political chain of command.  Traditionally, the Secretariat of the KWP 
coordinated policy implementation in the affairs of the KPA in military strategy, the defence 
industries, and resource mobilisation, through institutionalised lines of communication 
established through its penetration of the military.  Every level of the military command was 
infiltrated by Party appointees, who monitored the activities of their appointed unit and 
reported directly back to the KWP Central Committee.  Through these channels, Party cadres 
                                                 
19 KIM, T. 2006f. Pathology of North Korea’s Military-First Politics. Korea Focus Commentary, 
http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/main_view.asp?volume_id=51&cate_code=A&g_cate_code=AB&g_code=101246 [Accessed 10/10/2006]. 
20 VORONTSOV, A. 2006. North Korea's Military-First Policy: A Curse or a Blessing? . Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 
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21 KIM, S.-C. 2006b. North Korea under Kim Jong Il: From Consolidation to Systemic Dissonance, Albany, State University of New York 
Press. p. 95. 
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transmitted the policy line from Party headquarters and supervised policy implementation 
within army units.  Military commanders had little room for independent action and could not 
undertake exercises or operations without prior approval from the Party apparatus.
 23
   
 
This arrangement is no longer operational; the network of Party organisations cutting across 
the KPA now report directly to Kim Jong-il via the National Defence Commission, bypassing 
the KWP.  The National Defence Commission was an organ of the KWP prior to 
constitutional revision in 1998, however, the newly-revised constitution eliminated two 
previously existing organisations—the state president and the Central People‘s Committee—
to make the NDC the regime‘s peak bureaucratic body, at the top of which stood Kim Jong-
il.
24
  By re-arranging his command and control structure, Kim Jong-il was able to ensure that 
no senior Party figure could use the military to challenge his leadership, while simultaneously 
keeping the military itself divided by playing off high ranking generals against each other.
25
  
In sum, Kim‘s aim was to keep the KWP at arms length from the military while quarantining 
the KPA from pretensions of an overthrow using divide-and-conquer tactics.  Thus while the 
KWP continues to exercise an important role in the government structure, it has been 
alienated from the decision-making chain of command. 
 
Yet while the pendulum of institutional power has swung toward the military under Kim 
Jong-il, it has been suggested that the pendulum is beginning to swing back toward a 
regenerating Korea Workers‘ Party.  Ruediger Frank postulates that since 2008, the KWP has 
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entered a phase of regeneration ahead of the upcoming leadership transition.
26
  The 
September 2010 Korean Workers‘ Party Congress, an event not held since 1980, the KWP‘s 
formal institutional organs were restored to accommodate the promotion of heir apparent Kim 
Jong-un.  If Frank is correct, it illustrates the political management acumen of Kim Jong-il in 
attempting to mould institutional arrangements that will best protect the ruling regime under 
the tutelage of a new leader, much as his Songun arrangements cemented his position up to 
the present day. 
 
 
Kim Jong-il’s Command and Control over the Military 
Kim Jong-il maintains control over the military through a series of overlapping 
institutionalised structures and by fostering competition between military organs and leaders.  
The National Defence Commission (NDC), of which Kim Jong-il is Chairman, sits at the 
pinnacle of the military bureaucratic structure.  Other key branches of power within the 
military are subordinate to the NDC, including the Ministry of People‘s Security, the Security 
Service, the Ministry of People‘s Armed Forces, the State Security Department, and most 
importantly, the KPA.
27
  Kim reduces the risk of a united military challenge to his leadership 
by encouraging competition between the state‘s many military sub-organs through 
compartmentalisation.  Each sub-organ has responsibility for a small aspect of the overall 
military mobilization which encourages them to compete with each other for the political 
influence, resources and prestige needed to effectively execute their own activities.
28
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Competition between military leaders is fostered as a complement to institutional control 
mechanisms.  Kim Jong-il practices a divide-and-rule strategy amongst senior military 
officials through material inducements via the court economy to secure loyalty and foster 
competition for his favour between high-ranking officials.
29
  Kim Jong-il promoted 524 
second-generation military leaders, out of a total of 664 generals who were promoted 
immediately after his inauguration as supreme commander of the KPA.  These men owed 
their rapid career advancement to Kim Jong-il and thus became the vanguard of his power 
base within the military.
30
  Konstantin Asmolov suggests that reforms within the military, 
such as manpower reductions and shorter length of service for non-commissioned personnel, 
are signs of the ascendancy of Kim Jong-il‘s appointees.31    
 
Decline of Pervasive Terror: Weakening Social Controls 
Government coercion remains in place in the DPRK, though it has become gradually less 
pervasive since the famine.  The regime continues to execute political prisoners, including 
many repatriated defectors, as well as those accused of such vague transgressions as 
―collusion with the imperialists,‖ ―ideological divergence,‖ ―counter-revolutionary crimes,‖ 
and ―opposing socialism.‖32  The authorities continue to curtail freedom of expression, with 
any unauthorised assembly regarded as a ―collective disturbance.‖33  As was the case prior to 
the famine, the maintenance of coercive terror requires mobilisation of the internal security 
                                                 
29 BECK, P. Interview with the author. 22 July 2008. Seoul, South Korea. 
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31 ASMOLOV, K. 2005. North Korea: Stalinism, Stagnation, or Creeping Reform? Far Eastern Affairs, 33, p. 48. 
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apparatus against individuals or groups that perform the role of scapegoat for the country‘s 
problems.  North Korean nationals caught leaving the country without official permission 
face punishment of two to three years in a labour training camp or detention centre.  Itinerant 
workers and illegal traders crossing the border temporarily into China fall into this category, 
though more serious consequences await repatriated defectors who face a minimum of five 
years incarceration in a political labour camp or re-education facility.  Those accused of 
making contact with churches, foreign journalists or South Korean citizens are considered to 
have made the ultimate political betrayal and face indefinite detention, or in many cases 
execution.
34
  However, the fact that so many North Koreans are willing to risk such 
punishments to escape the DPRK, and have succeeded in doing so, suggests that living 
conditions have deteriorated to such a degree that fleeing the country is worth the risk, and 
that avenues for circumventing official travel restrictions and border controls exist to 
facilitate the movement of outbound refugees.   
 
The crumbling of the state-run official economy has largely eliminated the regime‘s capacity 
to on the one hand offer inducements for politically-correct conduct and on the other, 
sanction those less diligent about participating in the old totalitarian rituals.  Prior to the 
famine, individuals were required to participate in many hours of ideological indoctrination 
and self-criticism meetings every week, yet today, the regime is finding it increasingly 
difficult to make people attend these sessions.  As Andrei Lankov points out, a worker in a 
long-defunct factory now understands that the state bureaucracy does not possess the means 
to reward his good conduct through promotion or material rewards, or the resources to detect 
and punish their absence from official functions by demotion or ration reduction.
35
  Higher-
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level officials still must observe the rituals as they have careers to protect, but rank-and-file 
North Koreans for the most part have ceased to care.  Similarly, the PNT system is in decline 
because local PNT leaders no longer receive any material benefits for strictly enforcing travel 
and residency regulations.  Incentives in the form of bribes now motivate PNT leaders to 
allow residents under their charge to flout official regulations.
36
  The forty percent of the 
population who derive their income from entrepreneurial activities are completely 
independent from the official economy and therefore immune to the carrots and sticks that 
ensured daily compliance of workers in the command economy for decades.
37
  The collapse 
of the PDS forced many North Koreans to find alternative means to survive, driving many 
toward entrepreneurialism.  The result, while far from an engaged civil society, is a citizenry 
becoming increasingly independent of the regime, harbouring a new feeling of individual 
self-reliance.
38
 
 
This highlights another consequence of the grassroots economic transformation: the inversion 
of the old class hierarchy as grassroots marketisation has begun to supersede the command 
system.  The old social classifications remain relevant in the allocation of rations, housing, 
and jobs within the official economy, however the market-driven forces of socio-economic 
transformation have created a de facto class hierarchy that governs the activities of those 
citizens who exist outside of the official economy.
39
  At the highest level sit the regime elite, 
including high-ranking military leaders and Party cadres, who enjoy privileges from the court 
economy unavailable to members of the lower social strata. This group, encompassing as 
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38 SUH, J.-J. 2006. Social Changes in North Korea after the Economic Crisis. East Asian Review, 18, p. 56. 
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much as a quarter of the population, has seen no degradation of their social position despite 
the visitation of some limited privations during the famine.
40
 
 
At the second tier sit previously persecuted members of the ―hostile‖ class with family ties 
outside of North Korea who are now advantageously positioned to succeed in the new 
entrepreneurial economy because they have access to foreign currency.
41
  From this group 
have emerged a growing number of prosperous merchants and traders.  Their access to 
foreign currency has allowed them to set up their own business ventures or participate in 
black market activities, a choice unavailable to the industrial proletarians who have been 
priced out of the marketplace.  The last five years have witnessed an explosion of small-scale 
business ventures including restaurants, shops, beauty parlours and other activities.
42
  Below 
those with access to foreign currency lie those who make a living trading in food and materiel 
appropriated from state-owned enterprises.  Low-ranking soldiers, farm labourers and 
industrial workers often supplement their state-derived incomes by participating in this black 
market trade.  The lowest rung of market traders are the farmers who grow food in private 
plots, selling the surplus to supplement their income.
43
 
 
The industrial proletariat, formerly part of the privileged ―core‖ class prior to the famine, 
have seen their social position deteriorate as the heavy industrial sector collapsed.  This 
group, concentrated among the urban non-elite who are dependent on government rations for 
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survival, is now the most disadvantaged social strata in North Korean society.
44
  They had 
been economically significant in the old economy, providing the workforce for the steel, 
chemical and fertiliser industries that sustained North Korea‘s mechanised agro-industrial 
development.  Yet during the famine, it was this group who was most exposed to starvation 
when the PDS collapsed, dependent as they were on non-existent PDS rations, isolated from 
the expropriated and home-grown farm produce that sustained rural residents, and lacking the 
means to buy food on the black market.  Those who survived the famine did so by harnessing 
one of a number of coping measures.  Some fled the country to China as refugees, others 
were able to secure food from relatives in rural areas, and some became petty traders, selling 
or bartering whatever possessions they had.
45
   
 
Public Discontent, Corruption & Legitimacy 
In the past it was unimaginable for North Koreans to publicly express dissent or revisionist 
views regarding the ideas of state. Apart from fear of the coercive institutions, the average 
worker or farmer was probably engaged in the often desperate struggle for subsistence, 
which, as North Korean defector and gulag survivor Kang Chol-hwan has attested, left them 
little energy for subversive activity.
46
  Most citizens abandoned political thought altogether 
and acquiesced to the official dogma.
47
  They may have had doubts about the system but no 
avenue through which to discuss their thoughts with others.  Even the thought of raising 
questions in one‘s own mind would have been a cross too heavy to bear in such a repressive 
                                                 
44 NANTO, D. & CHANLETT-AVERY, E. 2008. The North Korean Economy: Leverage and Policy Analysis. Washington DC: 
Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32493.pdf. p . 10; HAGGARD, S. & NOLAND, M. 2007a. Famine in 
North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform, New York, Columbia University Press. pp. 70-71; NOLAND, M. 2006c. Transition from the 
Bottom-Up: Institutional Change in North Korea. Comparative Economic Studies, 48, p. 203. 
45 SMITH, H. 2005. Disintegration and reconstitution in the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea. In: CHESTERMAN, S., IGNATIEFF, 
M. & THAKUR, R. (eds.) Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance. New York: United Nations University Press. p. 
175. 
46 SNYDER, S. 2000. North Korea‘s Challenge of Regime Survival: Internal Problems and Implications for the Future. Pacific Review, 73, p. 
518; KANG, C.-H. & RIGOULOT, P. 2001. The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in a North Korean Gulag, New York, Basic Books. p. 
141. 
47 OH, K. & HASSIG, R. 2000. North Korea: Through the Looking Glass, Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press. p. 37. 
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environment and as survival was the leading imperative, most North Koreans probably 
avoided the complication of pondering subversive questions. 
 
North Korea‘s elites faced a similar dilemma to the rank and file in confronting the 
complications of internal doubts, especially given that they were generally better informed 
than the masses. The elite, comprising several thousand top Party and military officials, have 
access to restricted government publications featuring international and domestic news, while 
some of their number may even have traveled abroad for education or official business. Such 
officials probably understand the contradictions of official ideology and recognise the glaring 
practical problems facing the regime, but are unable to raise concerns out of fear of 
punishment.  The testimony of North Korean defector Ji Hae-nam, who worked as a 
propaganda member in the government bureaucracy, is a case in point:  
I went around explaining and promoting Party policy to everyone in several factories. I 
shouted out slogans such as ―What the Party decides, we follow‖ encouraging all 
workers with my songs to complete their tasks within the set timeframe. In 1989 when 
the 13th Party Convention was held I began having skepticisms [sic] about the 
inappropriate actions of Party cadres.  At that time anyone who raised an issue against 
the wrongdoings of the deified cadres was punished.
48 
As company men and women, and staunch nationalists, such officials are wedded to the 
status quo.
49
 This is common to most communist countries; low- and mid-level officials in 
over-sized state bureaucracies are dependent on a strong state sector for their livelihoods, no 
matter what their personal beliefs.
50
  These people may have a more acute understanding of 
the country‘s problems and contradictions, but they have even less freedom to discuss such 
issues because they are subjected to even greater internal surveillance than the masses.
51
 Thus 
it is likely that regime elites, in the same vein as the general public, disengage themselves 
                                                 
48 JI, H.-N. 2003. Testimony of Mrs. Hae-Nam Ji, North Korean defector. Washington DC: Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2003/NamJiTestimony030605.pdf. p. 1. 
49 Ibid; OH, K. & HASSIG, R. 2000. North Korea: Through the Looking Glass, Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press. p. 38. 
50 CURRY, J. 1995. The Sociological Legacies of Communism. In: BARANY, Z. & VOLDYES, I. (eds.) The Legacies of Communism in 
Eastern Europe. London: Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 62-63. 
51 OH, K. & HASSIG, R. 2000. North Korea: Through the Looking Glass, Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press. pp. 38-39. 
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from subversive political thought to avoid the discomfort facing intractable contradictions 
over which they have negligible control. 
 
It is intuitive that if doubters cannot discuss their doubts with others then no collective action 
or organised opposition can develop. Without organised opposition and debate there can be 
no reinterpretation of national myths and philosophies, which perpetuates the strong veneer 
of pro-regime mass consensus.  This does not mean, however, that the national myths and 
philosophies enjoy true legitimacy among the population, as the reservoir of pent-up public 
frustration with the regime may indeed be vast.  Reports do surface—through the anecdotal 
testimony of defectors and video footage smuggled out of the country—indicating the 
presence of underground dissent within North Korea.
52
  In numerous interviews with North 
Korean defectors, Suh Jae-jean learnt that ordinary North Koreans view members of the 
bureaucracy as ―robbers and sycophants,‖ reflecting a deep bitterness toward the corruption 
of regime officials.
53
  This information indicates that the biggest symptom of social decay 
since the famine is endemic corruption. 
 
The vestiges of the regime‘s enormous state bureaucracy remain in place, even though the 
economy has splintered into parallel systems.  The market-based activities occurring within 
the non-official parallel economies have been able to proliferate courtesy of the corruption of 
officials at all levels of the bureaucracy, who have turned a blind eye to activities once 
considered illegal.
54
  Authority over access to state benefits during a time of crisis provides 
                                                 
52 Journalist David Scofield has described video footage in which ―the videographer entered a warehouse and filmed a sign taped to the wall 
that said "Overthrow (North Korean leader) Kim Jong-il. Comrades, let's fight." Later the camera moved to a picture of the Dear Leader 
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D. 2005. Kim Jong-il and the 'A' word . Hong Kong: Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GA21Dg01.html [Accessed 
12 August 2007]. 
53 According to Suh, one interviewee proclaimed that if war broke out the people would turn their guns at corrupt officials.  Interestingly 
however, the target of discontent among the interviewees was corrupt officials and not Kim Jong-il.  See: SUH, J.-J. 2006. Social Changes in 
North Korea after the Economic Crisis. East Asian Review, 18, pp. 64-65. 
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Party officials with a unique opportunity to profit from their positions.  In the harsh economic 
climate, rent-seeking through bribery is an obvious method of obtaining income for 
bureaucrats who no longer receive rewards from the state for fulfilling their duties.  In the 
absence of institutional reforms to change the workings of the bureaucracy, commercial 
traders circumvent the rules by offering bribes to officials to overlook commercial 
regulations. Traders and officials maintain symbiotic relationships, with officials taking 
bribes in exchange for information on impending inspections or government crackdowns. All 
bureaucracies, including the military and the Party, protect black market operations.
55
  
 
Systematic corruption is extremely difficult for reformist leaders to dismantle once it 
becomes the norm.  North Korean defectors have testified that the level of corruption in 
North Korea is rampant and reaches to the highest levels of power.  Many were able to escape 
the country by bribing state officials, including border guards and travel inspectors, to reach 
and cross the Chinese border.56  Corrupt officials also solicit payoffs via extortion.  Hungry 
people violated travel restrictions in the search for food and there is even a growing 
suggestion that people can buy their way out of incarceration in the re-education camps.
57
  
Money and self-enrichment are replacing career advancement within the Party and fear of the 
coercive apparatus as behavioural motivators, illustrating the waning strength of the regime‘s 
system of coercion.  The legitimacy of institutional structures suffers equally when the 
                                                                                                                                                        
appointed position(s)—that are perceived, by at least some criteria, to be improper and illegitimate in the particular sense of being seen as 
simultaneously against the collective (societal) interest and in the official‘s (officials‘) individual (self-regarding) interests.‖  See: HOLMES, 
L. 1993. The End of Communist Power: Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press. p. 77. 
55 SUH, J.-J. 2006. Social Changes in North Korea after the Economic Crisis. East Asian Review, 18, p. 63. 
56 North Korean defector Ji Hae-nam recounts her use of bribes to escape the country: ―I brought 200 won worth of food on top of 200 won 
in cash to a guard from National Border Patrol in Musan telling him that I will give him more when I come back from China after selling my 
merchandise. He believed me and let me pass and I arrived in China after crossing the Tuman River at 3:30 p.m. Even the soldiers are 
starving in North Korea that they would do anything for money and their goal is to accrue 500,000 won by the time they are dismissed from 
the military service.‖  See: JI, H.-N. 2003. Testimony of Mrs. Hae-Nam Ji, North Korean defector. Washington DC: Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2003/NamJiTestimony030605.pdf 
57 2006i. A Matter of Survival: The North Korean Government’s Control of Food and the Risk of Hunger. Human Rights Watch, 18, p. 10; 
MANSOUROV, A. 2006. Emergence of the Second Republic: The Kim Regime Adapts to the Challenges of Modernity. In: KIHL, Y. & 
KIM, H. (eds.) North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival. New York: East Gate Books. p. 55. 
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citizenry can subvert the ruling structure through bribery and when ruling officials can prey 
upon the population through extortion.   
 
Broken Communications Monopoly and Crumbling 
Ideology 
The Korean Workers‘ Party continues to maintain information controls.  The KWP publishes 
twelve principal newspapers and twenty major periodicals, as well as numerous radio stations 
and television stations.  Locally manufactured radios and televisions are still calibrated to 
receive only domestic programming.
58
  Clearly, the regime remains committed to insulating 
the North Korean population from information about the outside world.  This April 2003 
excerpt from Nodong Sinmun is worth quoting at length to illustrate the regime‘s concerns 
about the penetration of foreign ideas: 
It is the imperialist‘s old trick to carry out ideological and cultural infiltration prior to 
their launching of an aggression openly.  Their bourgeois ideology and culture are 
reactionary toxins to paralyse people‘s ideological consciousness.  Through such 
infiltration, they try to paralyse the independent consciousness of other nations and make 
them spineless.  At the same time, they work to create illusions about capitalism and 
promote lifestyles among them based on the law of the jungle, in an attempt to induce the 
collapse of socialist and progressive nations.  The ideological and cultural infiltration is 
their silent, crafty and villainous method of aggression, intervention and domination.
59
 
Exposure to foreign ideas is likely to broaden the people‘s awareness of their objective 
reality, providing a basis of comparison with which to judge their own society.  This is liable 
to bring on a feeling of cognitive dissonance among individual citizens as they weigh up the 
incongruity between official propaganda, stories about life outside North Korea and their 
day-to-day reality.  Cognitive dissonance tends to occur when where a person encounters new 
information about a given topic that cannot be rationalised away by currently held belief and 
ideas, causing psychological discomfort, which leads the person to seek or develop new 
                                                 
58 2007a. Country Profile: North Korea. Washington DC: US Library of Congress, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/North_Korea.pdf. pp. 
13-16. 
59 Quoted in: EBERSTADT, N. 2006. Why Hasn‘t North Korea Collapsed? Understanding the Recent Past, Thinking About the Future. In: 
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paradigms for interpreting that topic.
60
  This process fosters dissatisfaction with the political 
status quo, first individually then collectively as people realise they are not alone in their 
thoughts, leading eventually to the formation of a true civil society and the emergence 
opposition movements based on alternative visions of how North Korea should be governed. 
 
The penetration of information technologies into North Korea has been increasing for some 
time.  Modern information technology is capable of breaking down barriers of information 
control, which is a key reason why the regime is hesitant to open the economy further.  Some 
citizens have access to radios that have been smuggled from China or recalibrated to pick up 
broadcasts from South Korea, which they tune into at risk of incarceration.
61
  Citizens living 
in regions along the northern frontier can also access Chinese mobile phone networks if they 
can afford a mobile phone.
62
   
 
The proliferation of videocassette recorders (VCRs) through North Korea has been an 
important factor in eroding the information blockade.  Smugglers began buying obsolete 
VCRs in China from 2001 when many households in northern China began discarding their 
old VCRs when DVD players became popular.
63
  It is estimated that as many as ten percent 
of households in North Korea now own a VCR, which is politically significant because the 
world‘s only mass-producer of Korean-language programs is South Korea.  The image of 
South Korean life portrayed in South Korean television programs and movies diverges 
                                                 
60 FESTINGER, L. 1962. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Stanford, Tavistock Publications. p. 2.  See also: SMITH, H. 2005. 
Disintegration and reconstitution in the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea. In: CHESTERMAN, S., IGNATIEFF, M. & THAKUR, R. 
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KIM, Y.-H. 2001. The Future of the North Korean System. In: KIM, S. (ed.) The North Korean System in the Post Cold War Era. New 
York: Palgrave. p. 237. 
61 LANKOV, A. 2007. North of the DMZ: Essays on Daily Life in North Korea, Jefferson, NC, McFarland & Company. p. 313; KANG, C.-
H. & RIGOULOT, P. 2001. The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in a North Korean Gulag, New York, Basic Books. p. 186. 
62 EBERSTADT, N. 2006. Why Hasn‘t North Korea Collapsed? Understanding the Recent Past, Thinking About the Future. In: KIHL, Y. & 
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markedly from official propaganda and illustrates the stark material differences between the 
two societies.
64
  For a decade since the famine, knowledge of the outside world has 
penetrated the country through repatriated defectors, short-term travellers to China, 
diplomats, and exchange students who have travelled abroad.  Diplomats and travellers have 
given credibility to the seemingly fantastic depictions of life in South Korea featured on 
smuggled CD‘s, DVD‘s and short-wave radio transmissions.65   North Koreans are aware that 
their country is lacking in the rule of law and free elections, and understand that South 
Koreans are more prosperous and enjoy a better standard of living.  It seems highly likely that 
the information blockade, porous as it has been for some time, will continue to deteriorate.   
 
As the information blockade continues to break down and alternative messages creep into the 
public psyche, the effect of repetitious propaganda will diminish in effectiveness, a prime 
example of declining returns on investment.  To maintain high levels of belief in the 
revolutionary movement the regime must constantly invest resources to refresh the 
propaganda message in order to maintain public enthusiasm for constant social mobilisation.  
The effectiveness of official messages repeated ad nauseum tends to wear down with time, 
especially when they diverge from the lived reality of many citizens.
66
   
 
The collectivism propounded in official mobilisation efforts lies starkly at odds with the spirit 
of individualism necessary for survival in the marketised system of parallel economies.
67
   
The new individualism in post-famine North Korea is a radical interpretation of Juche, whose 
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core thesis states, ―the masses are the masters of revolution and construction.‖68  In the new 
market-driven system, the master of one‘s own destiny is increasingly oneself and not the 
leader, acting on behalf of the masses.  The collectivist mentality of the revolutionary 
movement is giving way to the individualism of a society transforming from its grassroots.  
The more the regime attempts to propagate the virtues of its traditional ideational paradigms, 
the more ridiculous they are likely to appear to ordinary people in light of the facts on the 
ground.   
 
The Kim Il-sung personality cult, from which Kim Jong-il derives his legitimacy to rule, is 
losing its appeal.  In Confucianism, the father-king, according to cultural convention, is 
entitled to strict obedience and respect.  However, the Confucian hierarchy works both ways: 
in exchange for loyalty and obedience, the father-king has a responsibility for the wellbeing 
of his family-nation and is obliged to ensure a basic standard of living for all members of the 
nation.
69
  An argument can be made that the withering of the cult is a result of Kim Jong-il‘s 
failure to fulfil his responsibilities to the people as the Confucian father-king.  Defectors have 
testified that the public does not hold the younger Kim in the same high esteem as his father.  
For these reasons, Kim Jong-il has rolled back the personality cult of his father and removed 
some of the extremes of Kimism from public view.  Portraits of the Great Leader are not as 
common and the characteristic Kim Il-sung stickpins are no longer a compulsory fashion 
accessory for all North Koreans.
70
 
 
                                                 
68 Suh Jae-jean reports that many defectors found the inspiration to flee North Korea from this interpretation of Juche.  See: SUH, J.-J. 2006. 
Social Changes in North Korea after the Economic Crisis. East Asian Review, 18, pp. 58-59. 
69 FRENCH, P. 2005. North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula - A Modern History, London, Zed Books. pp. 38-40. 
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The Last Legitimising Paradigm: Anti-Imperialism 
 
The regime is increasingly leaning on hyper-nationalism to legitimise itself as the other facets 
of its ideology slide into obsolescence.  Bruce Cumings has argued that North Korean 
ideology has evolved from its Marxist-Leninist roots toward nationalism as the focus of the 
revolution.  The key antagonism ceased to be the class struggle of the workers against the 
owners of capital, replaced instead by the struggle between the rich nations (United States) 
and the poor nations (North Korea).
71
   Brian Myers also picks up on this theme, arguing that 
the basis for North Korean nationalism is a race-based moralist worldview in which the 
Korean people view themselves to be inherently morally superior to all other peoples.
72
  This 
inherent goodness is one of the reasons that Korea has been the perennial victim of rapacious 
foreign powers, allowing the regime to ascribe evil actions to foreign powers alone.  Unlike 
other facets of North Korean ideology, such as Juche and Kimism, which real-world events 
have undermined, North Korea‘s race-based nationalism is grounded upon an irrational myth 
that is much harder to disprove, making it extremely resilient in both good times and bad.  
 
This race-based nationalism is based on a two-pronged anti-imperialist narrative.  First, North 
Korean propaganda employs backward-looking themes attacking the Japanese for the crimes 
of their colonial occupation of Korea.  Second, all of North Korea‘s contemporary problems 
are blamed on the United States.  Indeed, Kim Il-sung regularly ascribed all of the miseries of 
North Korea, the developing countries and the entire world to US imperialism.
73
  This is a 
narrative that has been refined and amplified under Kim Jong-il; as economic conditions 
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72 MYERS, B. Interview with the author. 27 July 2008. Seoul, South Korea; MYERS, B. 2006. Concerted Front: Why Seoul is soft on North 
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73 KOH, B. 1986. Ideology and North Korean Foreign Policy. In: SCALAPINO, R. & LEE, H. (eds.) North Korea in a Regional and Global 
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deteriorated and the old ideological paradigms came into conflict with the realities of the 
famine, anti-imperialism emerged as the one reliable propaganda tool on which the regime 
could base its legitimacy.  In this context, the nuclear weapons program is a distraction that 
heightens the people‘s fear of the external enemy—why would we need the bomb unless the 
enemy was coming?—and distracts them from their everyday miseries.74   
 
The regime needs the US as an enemy figure upon which to focus the people‘s attention 
while the country remains under extreme hardship.
75
  North Korean propaganda positions the 
nuclear weapons program within this context.  For example, the first six paragraphs of the 
regime‘s statement through KCNA announcing their October 2006 nuclear test were devoted 
to listing a series of American ―provocations‖ as the justification for the North‘s nuclear 
deterrent.
76
  The first paragraph of the statement reads:  
The Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued the 
following statement Tuesday solemnly clarifying the DPRK stand on the new measure 
to be taken by it to bolster its war deterrent for self-defence: The U.S. daily increasing 
threat of a nuclear war and its vicious sanctions and pressure have caused a grave 
situation on the Korean Peninsula in which the supreme interests and security of our 
State are seriously infringed upon and the Korean nation stands at the crossroads of life 
and death.
77
 
It seems logical to suggest therefore that the loss of this imperial enemy would undermine the 
regime‘s justification for its nuclear deterrent.  This may be so, but the loss of the external 
adversary would also undercut other facets of the organisation of the North‘s political system, 
                                                 
74 BAZHANOVA, N. 2000b. North Korea‘s Decision fo Develop an Independent Nuclear Program. In: MOLTZ, J. C. & MANSOUROV, A. 
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including social mobilisation, economic austerity, internal repression, and Songun politics.
78
  
For these reasons, anti-imperialism embodied in hatred of the United States has been critical 
to the political economy of the North Korean state. 
 
Songun politics and Juche have a symbiotic relationship, with each providing meaning for the 
other.  John S Park and Lee Dong-sun suggest that Songun politics on its own would be 
unsustainable because of the excessive economic hardship that the military‘s priority resource 
allocation imposes on the people.
79
  Similarly, the famine rendered Juche practically and 
philosophically bankrupt as a means of facilitating national self-reliance.  However, together 
they provide the regime with a self-sustaining ideological and organisational structure that 
legitimises the channelling of vast resources into the military and by extension the indigenous 
nuclear program.  The technological achievement embodied in the nuclear program boosts 
Kim Jong-il‘s nationalist credentials and brings prestige to his leadership, which in turn 
strengthens the relationship between Kim and the military.  It provides the ideological pretext 
to divert the nation‘s resources to the military. In this way, it helps to legitimise the privations 
that ordinary citizens bear in order for the military to be the privileged recipient of state 
resources. 
 
Nuclear weapons have become an integral legitimising tool for the Kim regime.  For Brian 
Myers, North Korea‘s reliance on anti-American nationalism is not unproblematic.  Myers 
believes the regime has painted itself into a corner through its rampant use of virulent anti-
American, anti-imperialist propaganda.
80
  The profligacy of the regime‘s anti-American 
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79 PARK, J. S. & LEE, D.-S. 2008. North Korea: Existential Deterrence and Diplomatic Leverage. In: ALAGAPPA, M. (ed.) The Long 
Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press. pp. 275-76. 
80 MYERS, B. Interview with the author. 27 July 2008. Seoul, South Korea. 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
 212 
rhetoric is a function of the failure of practical failure of Juche and the reality that anti-
imperialism is the only credible legitimising idea the regime has left after the famine.  This 
says a great deal about Pyongyang‘s recalcitrant position in the Six Party Talks; after all, if 
the US is integral to the Kim regime‘s ideological legitimation, it is highly unlikely that 
Pyongyang will reach a rapprochement with Washington based on nuclear relinquishment, or 
any other issue for that matter.  
 
Systemic Regeneration or Further Decay? 
Chollima Revived and 2012 
New evidence suggests that the regime is attempting to reverse the country‘s economic 
fortunes and reconsolidate the totalitarian system through a reintroduction of the Chollima 
movement.  Their goal is to turn North Korea into a ―strong and prosperous country‖ through 
a concerted nation-wide mobilisation campaign, in time for the centenary of Kim Il-sung‘s 
birth in 2012.  The original Chollima movement was North Korea‘s golden age, when its 
economic growth and standard of living was the highest.
 81
  The 2009 Joint New Year 
Editorial, published in KCNA, describes the new movement in the following terms: 
An era of a new great revolutionary surge lies ahead of us. Kim Jong-il kindled the torch 
of a new revolutionary upsurge in Kangson, the birthplace of the Chollima Movement, on 
December 24 last year which will shine for ever in the history of Songun Korea. It is such 
a great event that has brought about a turning point in the development of our Party and 
revolution as that in December 1956 when Kim Il-sung set the great Chollima Movement 
in motion. Herein lies our Party's invariable will to build a powerful socialist country that 
ensures the eternal prosperity of the nation under the blue sky of our country highly 
dignified with Songun and hand it down to posterity by racing against the time in the 
spirit and the mettle of having overcome manifold difficulties and built on the war debris 
a strong country independent in politics, self-supporting in the economy and self-reliant 
in national defence through a great Chollima upsurge.
82
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from the Past or a New Path? Washington DC: U.S. Institute of Peace & Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars' North Korea 
International Documentation Project, http://www.usip.org/events/2009/0210_dprk.html#audio 
82 2009c. Joint New Year Editorial Issued . Pyongyang: Korean Central News Agency, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm [Accessed 20 
January 2009]. 
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Importantly the statement cites the original Chollima movement as a turning point in North 
Korean history and that the reinstitution of Chollima in December 2008 would similarly 
herald a new dawn for the DPRK.  Also important is the reference to overcoming difficulties 
to build a ―strong country of independent politics‖ through reconsolidation of totalitarian 
system, ―a self-supporting economy‖ brought about by increasing productivity through labour 
mobilisation, and ―self-reliant national defence,‖ within which one can locate the nuclear 
program.  Unlike the piecemeal attempts at systemic regeneration attempted between 2002 
and 2008, this new movement appears to be a concerted campaign to strengthen the 
ideological, institutional and economic bases of regime power simultaneously. 
 
This new revolutionary upsurge features a general mobilisation of all sectors of the country in 
a manner similar to that pursued in the original Chollima campaign.  Workers are being 
organised into ―combat units‖ in line with the model of Songun politics, in an apparent 
attempt to prioritise the integration of the industrial proletariat into the Songun model of 
economic development.
83
   The militaristic labour mobilisation seems tailored to incorporate 
industrial workers, who were hardest hit by the economic transformations that have taken 
place since the famine.  It also looks like an attempt to revive the spirit of collectivism, which 
the individualist tendencies of de facto economic marketisation have severely eroded.  The 
great success of Chollima circa 1958 was its ability to subordinate their thoughts and actions 
of individuals to the needs of the collective.
84
  Whether Chollima circa 2009 can live up to 
                                                 
83 CHUNG, Y.-C. 2009. Economic Upsurge in the 2009 New Year‘s Joint Editorial. Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, 
http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/admin/upload_file/ifes_forum/1-19-Chung.pdf. p . 2.  The 2009 New Year Joint Editorial states that: ―We should 
make it an iron rule to solve all problems on the strength of the collective and by enlisting the inexhaustible wisdom and creativity of the 
masses. All the posts, units and fields should help and lead one another to kindle the flame of collective innovation.‖  See: 2009c. Joint New 
Year Editorial Issued . Pyongyang: Korean Central News Agency, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm [Accessed 20 January 2009]., KCNA.  
The theme of full public mobilisation runs deep in this revival of Chollima.  Kim Myong-chol, known as the unofficial foreign spokesman of 
the North Korean regime, has quoted Kim Jong-il as stating ―The entire Party, the entire armed force, the entire population should re-double 
their efforts to bring about a new revolutionary surge,‖ in order to ―fling open the gate of a great prosperous powerful nation by 2012.‖  See: 
KIM, M.-C. 2009b. Kim Jong-il shifts to plan B . Hong Kong: Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KE21Dg02.html 
[Accessed 22 May 2009]. 
84 PERSON, J. 2009. Insights on the Chollima Movement from Archival Material. The 2009 'New DPRK Revolutionary Upsurge'—A Blast 
from the Past or a New Path? Washington DC: U.S. Institute of Peace & Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars' North Korea 
International Documentation Project, http://www.usip.org/events/2009/0210_dprk.html#audio 
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the hype and accomplish its stated goals remains to be seen.  It promises more of the same 
institutional organisation and coercive controls that have characterised the Songun system up 
to this point, turbo-charged by greater labour inputs and more fervent public mobilisation.  
The nuclear program is likely to increase in importance as an economic, political and 
ideational pillar of the Songun system if the new Chollima campaign is to be successful.  The 
long trend of economic, institutional and ideological degeneration in North Korea may have 
advanced far enough to be irreversible, which does not bode well for the success of the 
revolutionary upsurge. 
 
Conclusion 
Economic transformation in North Korea has been the driver of substantial political changes 
since the famine.   As with the economy, the totalitarian system experienced declining 
marginal returns for some time leading up to the early-1990s.  The economic crisis triggered 
by the collapse of the Soviet Union was an acceleration of systemic decay underway since the 
late-1960s, wearing away the other dimensions of the totalitarian political order.  Since the 
famine, the old system has become an eroded totalitarianism, pushing the DRPK toward a 
post-totalitarian future.  Social controls are weaker since the famine, despite efforts to 
reimpose strict restrictions on the behaviour, movement and thought of the citizenry.  The 
communications blockade has become porous, largely due to the proliferation of South 
Korean content video cassettes smuggled from China, as well as the stories of travellers, 
captured defectors and students returning from abroad.  The ideological pillars of the old 
order have ceased to purvey legitimacy in the eyes of the people.  The economic 
transformation that has taken place has triggered a process of political change at the grass-
roots level that is undercutting the institutions of the old order, a process that has not reached 
its conclusion.   
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This thesis argues that the nuclear program holds the remnants of the old order together.  The 
nuclear program is about far more than weapons and national security.  It provides the regime 
with a powerful tool for ideological legitimation through anti-imperialism and bureaucratic 
cohesion through Songun politics, as well as economic stability through the importation of 
goods to plug holes in the multi-headed economic system.  Yet this arrangement is unstable 
and is not sustainable in the long term.  North Korea‘s political system today is no longer that 
of a full-blown totalitarian regime, but one moving along the trajectory toward a post-
totalitarian system.  The changes that have taken place so far are not likely to be the last.  The 
nuclear program is clearly important to the political economy of the DPRK state in terms of 
slowing the progression to post-totalitarianism and is likely to become even more 
indispensable to regime perpetuation as the state decays with the passing of time.  The 
conclusion to derive is therefore obvious: North Korea will not willingly relinquish its 
nuclear program. 
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Part III: Northeast Asia—
Cooperation, Competition & 
Conflict 
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7. Northeast Asian Security Environment 
 
Having established that North Korea‘s voluntary relinquishment of its nuclear weapons 
program is highly unlikely, the thesis will now turn to the question of whether regional states 
can compel North Korea to do so.  This is the external dimension of the North Korean nuclear 
question, where regional politics comes into play.  Northeast Asia—comprising China, Japan, 
South Korea, North Korea, Russia, Taiwan and the United States as a vested external 
player—is a complex strategic environment characterised by ongoing rivalry and historic 
animosity.  The Korean peninsula is the geographic junction linking each of the regional 
powers within the system and the venue for great power competition.  Three countries from 
this group—the United States, China and Russia—are fully-fledged nuclear powers that also 
occupy permanent seats on the UN Security Council.  China, Russia, North Korea and South 
Korea possess four of the world‘s six largest armed forces.1  All of these states have fought 
wars with one or more of the others in recent memory, leaving a heritage of suspicion that 
continues to influence their relations today.
2
  These differences extend to the question of 
North Korea.  The strategic significance of the Korean peninsula varies for each of the 
regional players, creating a divergence in attitudes to North Korea‘s nuclearisation and 
important differences that are evident in the commitment of each country to nonproliferation 
initiatives.  This lack of regional consensus gives Pyongyang a great deal of leverage in 
nuclear diplomacy. 
 
Making sense of the complexity of the Northeast Asian security environment requires a high 
level of analytical sophistication.  This chapter is structured around Muthiah Alagappa‘s 
                                                 
1 DEVINO, M. C. 2004. Should the US Continue to Maintain Forces in Korea? Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/KSIL/files/00081.doc. p. 3. 
2 HUISKEN, R. 2006. Northeast Asian Security Challenges. In: AYSON, R., & BALL, DESMOND (ed.) Strategy and Security in the Asia-
Pacific. Sydney: Allen & Unwin. p. 191. 
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characterisation of Northeast Asian politics as a combination of "cooperation, competition, 
and conflict."
3
  These three axes of regional interaction make for a strategic uncertainty that 
drives states to pursue parallel foreign policy strategies as a means of maximising their 
security and power, while minimising risk to vital national interests.  It is not a theory in and 
of itself, but an organising principle to make sense of insights from competing international 
relations theories.  This idea will form the explanatory framework here in Part II of the thesis 
and help to explain the incoherent collective response of regional states to North Korea's 
nuclear proliferation as well as the deficit of leverage regional states suffer in 
denuclearisation negotiations with Pyongyang. 
 
International Relations Theory: An Overview 
International relations theory has much to say about Northeast Asian politics.  The three 
primary theories of the discipline—realism, liberalism and constructivism—provide 
important insights into regional dynamics and the prospects for peace and stability.  
However, each theory acts like a polarising lens, taking in certain information while filtering 
out that which does not conform to its assumptions, leaving a view that is informative, but not 
representative, of the whole picture.  This section will investigate how the polarising lenses of 
international relations theory operate in the Northeast Asian context, then explore a more 
inclusive analytical framework—based on cooperation, competition and conflict—that will 
form the basis for this chapter‘s analysis of the Northeast Asian security environment. 
 
                                                 
3 ALAGAPPA, M. 2008. Asia‘s Security Environment: From Subordinate to Region Dominant System. In: ALAGAPPA, M. (ed.) The Long 
Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia Stanford: Stanford University Press. pp. 38, 60-61. 
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Realism 
Realism has been the dominant paradigm in the modern study of international relations, 
principally because its insights into the regularity of interstate conflict are difficult to refute 
when looking at the historical record.  All strands of realism converge on a similar set of 
assumptions about how the international system works.  Realists see states as the dominant 
actors in an anarchic international system, where there is no supreme authority to adjudicate 
the relations between states.
4
  In the absence of a supreme authority, it is material power and 
military strength that are decisive in shaping the pattern of interstate relations.  As a result, 
insecurity pervades the system and breeds an ongoing struggle between states for power and 
survival.
5
 
 
These features of the international system lead to the security dilemma, where mistrust 
between regional adversaries can lead to increased tension and insecurity spirals.  In an 
anarchic system, mistrust between potential adversaries pushes each side to adopt defensively 
motivated security measures.  Opposing states perceive these defence-oriented moves as 
offensive threats, which lead them to adopt countermeasures, creating a self-fulfilling 
prophesy about the danger of the security environment in which regional tensions are raised 
and each side becomes less secure.
6
  This drives a constant quest for power maximisation that 
creates a tendency for states to resist the hegemonic aspirations of rival countries.  This is the 
balance of power thesis, which posits that when one country comes to predominate over 
others, less-powerful states tend to form loose coalitions to balance the power of the 
                                                 
4 MEARSHEIMER, J. 2001b. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York, W.W. Norton and Company. p. 30. 
5 FRANKEL, B. 1996. Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction. Security Studies, 5, pp. xiii-xv. 
6 WALTZ, K. 1979. Theory of International Politics, Boston, McGraw Hill. pp. 186-87.  See also: CHRISTENSEN, T. 2003. China, the US-
Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia. In: IKENBERRY, G. J. & MASTANDUNO, M. (eds.) International Relations 
Theory and the Asia-Pacific. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 25-26. 
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hegemonic state.
7
  In a unipolar system, the hegemonic state will be unable to resist the 
temptation for unilateral action, which will inevitably provoke a balancing response from 
rival powers.
8
  In a bipolar or multipolar system, revisionist states or alliance blocks are 
likely to spur the formation of balancing enemy coalitions of countervailing alliances.
9
  As 
this chapter will later illustrate, Northeast Asian relations do include various degrees of 
balancing behaviour. 
 
A corollary of the balance of power thesis is hegemonic stability theory.  There are two 
dimensions to this theory: on the one hand, a reigning hegemonic state is likely to be a status 
quo power because it will have been influential in moulding the international order to its own 
benefit.  Once ascendant, it will adopt policies to maintain the system as it is by deterring or 
preventing the rise of revisionist powers and by suppressing conflicts within its sphere of 
influence that disrupt the operation of the hegemonic system, either through direct 
intervention or by proxy through allies.
10
  Conversely, rising powers are likely to become 
frustrated by the incongruity between their growing economic might and their inferior status 
in the international system, leading to rivalry, balancing and ultimately military confrontation 
with the reigning hegemon.
11
  In Northeast Asia, this dichotomy is evident in the rivalry 
between China and the United States. 
 
Variants of Realism 
The key principles of realism as an international relations theory originate from the writings 
of the Greek historian Thucydides, who in his fifth century BC treatise the History of the 
                                                 
7 MEARSHEIMER, J. 2001b. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York, W.W. Norton and Company. p. 34. 
8 JERVIS, R. 2009. Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective. World Politics, 61, p. 196. 
9 SNYDER, G. 1997. Alliance Politics, Ithaca, Cornell University Press. p. 17. 
10 RUSSETT, B. & ONEAL, J. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, New York, WW 
Norton & Company. pp. 185-186. 
11 GOLDSTEIN, A. 1997/98. Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival. International Security, 22, pp. 62-63. 
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Peloponnesian Wars argued that "the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak 
accept what they have to accept" in the quest for survival.
12
  Florentine monk Niccolo 
Machiavelli developed these ideas further during the renaissance in his famous essay The 
Prince, as did enlightenment philosopher Thomas Hobbes in his seminal work The 
Leviathan.
13
 In the modern era, classical realism was initially developed by thinkers such as 
Hans Morganthau, who emphasised the war-like nature of human beings as the key variable 
of interstate relations.
14
  Classical realism held sway from the 1940s until the mid-1970s, 
when a new generation of theorists emphasised structural factors as the driving force of 
international relations.  Defensive (structural) realism assumes that the anarchic international 
system provides incentives for moderate behaviour on the part of states and thus has an 
inherently status quo bias.  Defensive realism's most prominent adherent, Kenneth Waltz, 
argued that great powers will act to preserve rather than upset the balance of power in the 
international system, in order to maintain their great power status.
15
 
 
In the Northeast Asian context, defensive realists would therefore predict a relatively stable 
system.  The United States, despite being the dominant actor on the world stage and master of 
maritime East Asia, lacks the power to directly challenge China on the Asian mainland 
without incurring extraordinary costs.  For similar reasons, China would be unwise to 
challenge US supremacy in the East Asian littoral in the short to medium term while its naval 
capabilities remain inferior to the American capability.
16
  The region's middle powers are 
                                                 
12 THUCYDIDES 1972. History of the Peloponnesian War, London, Penguin Books. p. 402. 
13 MACHIAVELLI, N. 1965. The Prince, New York, Airmont Publishing Company; HOBBES, T. 1962. Leviathan: Or the Matter, Forme 
and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, New York, Collier Books. 
14 MORGENTHAU, H. 1978. Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace, New York, Knopf. 
15 WALTZ, K. 1979. Theory of International Politics, Boston, McGraw Hill. p. 126.  It is a matter of cause and effect: the actions of 
hegemonic powers generate balancing coalitions of other states; the expansion of spheres of influence experience declining returns over time 
as costs come to exceed benefits; aggressive states are met with resistance from other powers; and most importantly, defence usually enjoys a 
strategic advantage over offense in conflict scenarios.  See: FRANKEL, B. 1996. Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction. Security 
Studies, 5, p. xvii. 
16 GOLDSTEIN, A. 1997/98. Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival. International Security, 22, p. 71. 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
 222 
likely to hedge and promote cooperative interaction between the two larger powers in order to 
forestall having to bandwagon completely with one or the other.
17
  The eventuating bipolar 
system would be characterised by cautious efforts at power accretion between the two poles 
and strategic hedging between the poles and the middle powers.  What we see in actuality is 
widespread strategic hedging, arising in response to the bipolar power dynamic on the one 
hand and the network of economic interdependence linking regional powers on the other. 
 
Offensive realists also regard anarchy as the structural driver of international relations, 
though, in contrast to defensive realists, they see systemic incentives for power maximisation 
rather than mere survival.  Offensive realists emphasise the inherent uncertainty that exists in 
interstate relations, in which states can never be certain about the intentions of their rivals, all 
of whom possess some form of offensive military capability as a function of their national 
defensive posture.  John Mearsheimer suggests that the combination of the anarchic system 
and the ambiguity of the intentions of states armed with offensive military capabilities leads 
to heightened suspicion and fear among the actors in the system, which in turn leads states to 
pursue offensive strategies in a never-ending bid for hegemonic power.
18
 
 
A Northeast Asia predicted by offensive realism is likely to feature strong bipolar 
competition between the United States and China, in which both actively try to undermine the 
position of the other.  This would lead to hard balancing between the US and its allies against 
China, Russia and North Korea on the Asian mainland, blocs that Scott Snyder refers to as 
competing "security triangles."
19
  This prediction arises from the balance of power thesis, 
                                                 
17 ALAGAPPA, M. 2008. Asia‘s Security Environment: From Subordinate to Region Dominant System. In: ALAGAPPA, M. (ed.) The Long 
Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia Stanford: Stanford University Press. p. 38; KIM, S. S. (ed.) 1998. North 
Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. p. 58. 
18 MEARSHEIMER, J. 2001b. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York, W.W. Norton and Company. pp. 21, pp. 30-31; See also: 
FRIEDBERG, A. 2005. The Future of US-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable? International Security, 30, 7p. 26. 
19 SNYDER, S. 2009. China's Rise and the Two Korea's: Politics, Economics, Security, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 166. 
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which asserts that China's growing economic power and concurrent military strengthening 
will inevitably trigger a balancing reaction among other regional states.
20
  John Mearsheimer 
suggests that it is not in the interest of the United States to allow China to challenge its 
hegemonic status, which will lead to increasing tensions at the region‘s two trouble spots—
the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait—where the two competing blocks come into 
direct military contact.
21
  Yet while it is true that these two locations remain Northeast Asia's 
most likely conflict zones, it is not the case that regional states are engaged in a hard-edged 
balance of power contest.
22
  This points to the existence of other factors which may mitigate 
the pernicious effects of the regional security dilemma and bipolar competition between the 
United States and China, factors which can be explained by the liberal theory of international 
relations. 
 
Liberalism 
Liberalism is the foremost competing theory to realism in international relations.  The 
political theory of liberalism was pioneered by enlightenment figures such as John Locke and 
Immanuel Kant, who argued in favour of the rights of individuals in relation to the state 
during the period when absolutist monarchical power was giving way to proto-parliamentary 
forms of government in Western Europe.
23
  As a modern international relations theory, 
liberalism gained popularity through American President Woodrow Wilson and his ill-fated 
"fourteen points," which he presented at the post-World War One treaty negotiations at 
Versailles in 1919.  Wilson's vision expounded an international system based on global 
collective security and national self-determination, with the League of Nations as its 
                                                 
20 GOLDSTEIN, A. 1997/98. Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival. International Security, 22, p. 63. 
21 MEARSHEIMER, J. 2001a. The Future of the American Pacifier. Foreign Affairs, 80, p. 58. 
22 JOHNSTON, A. I. 2003. Is China a Status Quo Power? International Security, 27, p. 49. 
23 For a description of the development of liberal ideas during this period, see: GROTH, A. J. 1971. Major Ideologies: An Interpretive Survey 
of Democracy, Socialism and Nationalism, New York, John Wiley and Sons. chapter 3, pp. 37-60. 
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linchpin.
24
  In the aftermath of World War Two, the United States became a hegemonic 
power and redesigned the international system around international institutional cooperation 
and the spread of liberal democracy around the globe.  Central to this system were a new set 
of international institutions to regulate security and economic affairs: the United Nations, the 
World Bank (originally known as the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development), the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT).
25
  This institutional framework has underpinned American hegemony since 
the conclusion of World War Two in 1945 and has been the foundation upon which present-
day economic interdependencies are built. 
 
In contrast to realists, liberals tend to see international relations in optimistic terms.  Like 
realists, they see the international system as anarchic but believe it is possible for states to 
escape the security dilemma.  They reject the realist assertion that warfare between states is 
inevitable and believe that humankind can transcend conflict through the pacifying influence 
of economic interdependence, international institutions and the spread of liberal democratic 
political systems.  Bruce Russett and John Oneal argue that democracy, economic 
interdependence, and international organisations should act as a "virtuous circle," a self-
reinforcing positive feedback that over time will make the international system more pacific 
and stable.
26
  These systemic interventions can subdue or even eliminate the security 
dilemma, dramatically decreasing the threat of conflict between states.   
 
                                                 
24 IKENBERRY, G. J. 2009. Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order. Perspectives on Politics, 7, p. 
73. 
25 KEOHANE, R. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
p. 139.  See also: IKENBERRY, G. J. 2009. Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order. Perspectives 
on Politics, 7, p. 76.   
26 RUSSETT, B. & ONEAL, J. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, New York, WW 
Norton & Company. p. 35. 
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The democratic peace theory is a key component of the liberal vision.  It has two 
components, one relating to the politically transformative power of economic development 
and the second the moderating effect of public accountability on foreign policy decision-
making.  First, economic development tends to stir the desire for political rights because trade 
and commerce operate most efficiently in societies that have stable, transparent governance 
and a strong legal system.  Liberals argue that capitalism cannot function properly without a 
reliable rule of law featuring courts and enforceable contractual obligations. States that 
restrict political freedoms and attempt to control information are said to be disadvantaged 
within the global economic system, while those that facilitate the free flow of information 
and capital are rewarded with sustained economic growth.  Second, liberals believe 
governments that are accountable to the public through regular elections are less likely to 
enter into expansionist military adventures or engage in wars of dubious strategic value.  As a 
consequence of democratic accountability, it follows then that democracies rarely go to war 
with one another.
27
 As the number of democracies in the world increases, as it has quite 
dramatically over the last two centuries, the likelihood of international conflict should 
theoretically diminish.
28
   
 
Liberal internationalists believe that the volume of commerce creates a momentum toward 
good relations between states, through their mutual self-interest in maintaining stability to 
facilitate economic exchange.  This foundation of trade, investment and exchange forms the 
                                                 
27 Ibid. p. 82. 
28 However, recent examples, including the Israeli attack on Lebanon in 2006 and Russia's attack on Georgia in 2008, suggest it is not strictly 
correct to claim that democracies do not fight each other.  The American invasion of Iraq in 2003, backed primarily by Great Britain and 
Australia (all democracies) also invalidates the proposition that public accountability is an impediment to democratic states engaging in wars 
of dubious strategic significance.  Even though Iraq was not a democratic country, the public accountability dimension of the democratic 
peace theory should still hold true.  In contradiction of the proposition, however, not even the largest global anti-war demonstrations in living 
memory could dissuade these governments from embarking on a military campaign that has proven costly for the US economy and damaging 
to American hard and soft power. 
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basis for conflict resolution and pacific relations between interdependent states.
29
  This 
proposition of the liberal paradigm is easier to demonstrate, particularly in the Northeast 
Asian context.  Northeast Asia has become the locus of global economic production.  The 
extraordinary growth of the capitalist economies of Washington's East Asian allies over the 
last thirty years has attracted a great deal of investment from the West, luring American 
companies to set up manufacturing plants and take advantage of the lower production costs 
on offer.  In a similar vein, China began its steep growth trajectory in the mid-1990s and in 
turn lured investment from the newly-industrialised Asian capitalist states, as well as from 
companies in the US.  What has evolved from this process is a complex web of economic 
interdependence spanning all of Northeast Asia's key players, bar North Korea, which has 
reduced the likelihood of conflict because of the minimal benefits and high costs of 
aggression in such an integrated economic milieu.
30
   
 
Economic interdependence requires international institutions to promote rules in order to 
make interstate relations more stable and predictable.  International institutions are "stable 
sets of related constitutive, regulative and procedural norms and rules," often, though not 
always, made manifest in the form of an international organisation.
31
  These norms, rules and 
procedures prescribe certain behaviour and imply obligations for states choosing to be bound 
by their injunctions.
32
  These assist in mitigating conflict in two distinct ways by 
consolidating a congruence of interests between states and by reducing the inherent 
                                                 
29 RUSSETT, B. & ONEAL, J. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, New York, WW 
Norton & Company. p. 155.  See also: FRIEDBERG, A. 2005. The Future of US-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable? International 
Security, 30, p. 12. 
30 ALAGAPPA, M. 2008. Asia‘s Security Environment: From Subordinate to Region Dominant System. In: ALAGAPPA, M. (ed.) The Long 
Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. p. 62. 
31 Duffield, John, "What Are International Institutions?" International Studies Review, (2007), Vol. 9, pp. 7-8. 
32 KEOHANE, R. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
p. 59. 
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uncertainty over intentions that plagues interstate relations as a result of anarchy.
33
  This 
occurs because the norms and rules that constitute international institutions create a 
behavioural dynamic that is predictable and thus more stable than one characterised by 
uncertainty and suspicion.
34
 
 
In the security realm, Northeast Asia lacks the multilateral security architecture of the type 
that developed in Europe after 1945.  Within the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO), European countries such as France and Germany that had been strategic rivals for 
nearly a century were able to define mutual common interests upon which to base pacific 
relationships.  This was not the case is East Asia, where Washington chose to pursue a series 
of bilateral security alliances rather than construct a multilateral security architecture.
35
  The 
legacy of Japanese imperialism was an important factor in this choice, as it was unlikely that 
other regional states would enter into an alliance with a state under which they had so 
recently been subjugated.  It remains today that the dominant strands of nationalism on the 
Korean peninsula and in China remain staunchly anti-Japanese.  Consequently, the norms of 
behaviour that have developed between the regional powers are characterised more by 
competition than by cooperation, in spite of the growing economic interdependence in the 
region.   
 
                                                 
33 KIM, S. 2002b. North Korea and Northeast Asia in World Politics. In: KIM, S. & LEE, T. (eds.) North Korea and Northeast Asia. 
Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. p. 13. 
34 ALAGAPPA, M. 2008. Asia‘s Security Environment: From Subordinate to Region Dominant System. In: ALAGAPPA, M. (ed.) The Long 
Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia Stanford: Stanford University Press. p. 62. 
35 For an extensive discussion of the US bilateral alliance system in East Asia and the lack of a multilateral security architecture, see: 
HEMMER, C. & KATZENSTEIN, P. J. 2002. Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of 
Multilateralism. International Organization, 56, pp. 575–607. 
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Constructivism 
The Northeast Asian case study provides excellent examples demonstrating the theoretical 
terrain of constructivism.  Constructivism evolved as an international relations theory during 
the 1980s as an offshoot of a wider trend in the social sciences questioning the validity of 
positivism and empiricism as the appropriate epistemological framework for social 
research.
36
  Constructivists argue that international interactions have less to do with the 
balance of material power than with the socially constructed ideas that deeply influence the 
decision-making and behaviour of states.  Using this logic, Alexander Wendt, the most 
celebrated of the constructivist theorists, claimed that the realist concept of self-help was not 
an inherent feature of interstate relations but one of many possible identity roles in an 
anarchic security environment.
37
  The identity of states shapes their foreign policy decision-
making, because it moulds the worldviews and preferences of national leaders.
38
  The identity 
roles of states arose out of their interaction with other countries; therefore, states are bound to 
feel insecure if self-help is the dominant paradigm, leading them to interpret other states as 
threatening and thus forcing them to "mirror" this behaviour.
39
  This identity role choice, 
rather than the system itself, is what is driving the security dilemma and forcing states to 
adopt self-help strategies.   If states were to alter the norms and values that underscore their 
identity roles by defining their interests in a different way, then, inevitably, the operation of 
the international system would change in the process.
40
 
 
                                                 
36 For a thorough description of the trend toward "post-positivism" in international relations research, see: LAPID, Y. 1989. The Third 
Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era. International Studies Quarterly, 33, pp. 235-254. 
37 WENDT, A. 1992. Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. International Organisation, 46, pp. 395, 
399. 
38 KIM, S. 2002b. North Korea and Northeast Asia in World Politics. In: KIM, S. & LEE, T. (eds.) North Korea and Northeast Asia. 
Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. pp. 17-18. 
39 WENDT, A. 1992. Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. International Organisation, 46, p. 406. 
40 FRANKEL, B. 1996. Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction. Security Studies, 5, p. xxi. 
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The subjective identities that states adopt are a function of domestic factors, constituted by 
three broad components.  First, nationalism defines the self-image of individuals within 
governments, including national leaders, which also informs their perceptions of other states 
and their leaders.  A firmly established national ethos is extremely difficult to alter or 
remove, because its cultural transference from old to young becomes entrenched in a nation's 
social system.
41
  Second, a state's strategic culture informs its perceptions about the utility of 
coercion and cooperation in interstate relations, based on fundamental beliefs about the 
character of the international system.  These beliefs are influenced by factors such as a state's 
history, domestic political culture, and geopolitical setting.
42
  Finally, norms relate to 
accepted practice in relations between states and beliefs about appropriate and legitimate 
behaviour in international politics.  Together, these three concepts coalesce to form a state's 
identity, shaping its behaviour and the decision-making choices of its leaders.
43
  Nationalism 
provides the narrative informing the strategic culture of states, which in turn provide the basis 
for the norms of behaviour that pervade the international system. 
 
National identity in Northeast Asia is a combustible mixture of ethnocentrism and 
xenophobia, heavily influenced by the legacy of Japanese and Western imperialism.  For 
example, the Chinese national psyche has evolved from several millennia of continuous 
civilisation, during which time the Chinese considered their nation to be the "middle 
kingdom,‖ the centre of the universe.  However, Chinese history from the beginning of the 
First Opium War in 1836 until the renaissance of the late-Deng Xiaoping era is generally 
considered to be a period of national shame, during which time foreign powers were thought 
                                                 
41 BUZAN, B. 1991. People, States and Fear: An Agenda For International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Boulder, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers. p. 78. 
42 MACMILLAN, A., BOOTH, K. & TROOD, R. 1999. Strategic Culture. In: BOOTH, K. & TROOD, R. (eds.) Strategic Cultures in the 
Asia-Pacific Region. New York: St. Martin‘s Press. p. 8. 
43 FRIEDBERG, A. 2005. The Future of US-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable? International Security, 30, p. 34. 
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to be instrumental in dislodging the Chinese nation from its rightful position at the centre of 
the world.
44
  An outgrowth of this shame is a virulent anti-Japanese nationalism, stemming 
from the brutal Japanese occupation between 1937 and 1945.  This anti-Japanese sentiment is 
also shared on the Korean peninsula, which lay under Japanese occupation for much longer 
than any other mainland Asian country (1910-1945).  Korean nationalism is also 
ethnocentric, but is split along sectarian lines between the totalitarian North and newly-
democratic South, both vying to be the legitimate face of the entire Korean nation.  In 
contrast, Japanese nationalism since World War Two has been characterised by anti-
militarism and collective pride as an economically successful trading state.
45
  This belies an 
inability, officially at least, of the country to come to terms with the regional fallout of its 
imperial heritage.  Into this mix one must also add the United States, with its long-held 
national belief in "manifest destiny" and the zeal of its quest to spread liberal democracy 
throughout the world.  These ideas do not always find a receptive audience in Northeast Asia, 
particularly during periods when Washington has been perceived to be acting unilaterally in 
international affairs.  This brief synopsis of regional nationalisms demonstrates one of the key 
reasons why liberal internationalism has not taken root in Northeast Asia, why constructivist 
notions of national identity are geared toward competition over cooperation, and why 
defensive realist assumptions continue to hold salience in regional interactions. 
 
From Theory to Practice: Cooperation, Competition and Conflict 
This section has shown that each of the major international relations theories has important 
insights to offer in describing the nature of the Northeast Asian security environment. 
                                                 
44 According to Derek McDougall, the sense of injustice many Chinese feel about the country‘s treatment by the Western imperial powers 
and Japan during this period is a powerful driver of modern Chinese nationalism.  See: MCDOUGALL, D. 2007. Asia Pacific in World 
Politics, Boulder, Lynne Rienner. p. 56. 
45 MIHASHITA, A. 2007. Where do norms come from? Foundations of Japan‘s postwar pacifism. International Relations of the Asia-
Pacific, 7, p. 107. 
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However, no one theory can lay claim to completely and accurately describing the full 
picture.  Several analysts have attempted to draw inferences about the system as a whole by 
comparing the insights of the three main international relations theories.  It follows, therefore, 
that an explanatory framework is needed that can incorporate the insights of the three major 
international relations theories to produce a coherent picture of the complexities and 
contradictions of the Northeast Asian security environment.   
 
Foreign policy problems can rarely be compartmentalised within one theoretical framework 
and the Korean nuclear crisis is no exception.  In the practice of foreign policy worldwide, a 
government will seldom practice paradigmatic fidelity and apply rigid, theory-based solutions 
to policy issues.
46
  Not surprisingly, Northeast Asian regional politics escapes ready 
explanation according to any single international relations theory because, as Samuel Kim 
has pointed out, none of the dominant international relations theories "provides a completely 
satisfactory explanation of the geopolitical dynamics of Northeast Asia as a whole."
47
  
Perhaps the best work illustrating this point is that of Aaron Friedberg who provides an 
outstanding overview of the East Asian security environment from the realist, liberal and 
constructivist perspectives.  Friedberg divides each theory into optimistic and pessimistic 
camps, demonstrating the heterogeneity of positions within each theory on the likelihood of 
regional conflict.
48
  In deference to this heterogeneity, Martin Wight encouraged international 
relations scholars to ―move round the circle‖ of international relations theory and ―enter into 
a position without settling anywhere,‖ as an explicit rejection of extreme paradigmatic 
fidelity.
49
  This theme was picked up by Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, who argued 
                                                 
46 LEE, C.-J. 2006. A Troubled Peace: US Policy and the Two Koreas, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press. p. 278. 
47 KIM, S. S. 2006e. Inter-Korean Relations in Northeast Asian Geopolitics. In: ARMSTRONG, C., ROZMAN, G., KIM, S. & KOTKIN, S. 
(eds.) Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia. Armonk: ME Sharpe. p. 181. 
48 FRIEDBERG, A. 2005. The Future of US-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable? International Security, 30, pp. 7-45. 
49 WIGHT, M. 1991. International Theory: The Three Traditions, Leicester, Leicester University Press. p. 268. 
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for "analytical eclecticism," a utilisation of insights from multiple theoretical traditions and 
consideration of causal mechanisms at multiple levels of analysis.
50
  In the absence of a 
strong a priori commitment to any one analytical perspective, the researcher has the capacity 
to address complicated foreign policy problems free from the confines of a single paradigm.   
 
However, there still needs to be some organising principle underpinning foreign policy 
analysis; paradigmatic infidelity should not imply the acceptance of a conceptual void.  
Aaron Friedberg sees the theoretical debate dividing into two camps: cooperation and 
competition.  Those favouring cooperation include defensive realists, with their emphasis on 
systemic incentives for moderate behaviour, liberals who stress the pacifying effect of 
economic interdependence, and optimistic constructivists who point out the socialising effect 
of economic interdependence on behavioural norms.  Those favouring competition and 
conflict include offensive realists, who see a systemic bias toward aggressive behaviour in the 
international system, pessimistic liberals who decry the absence of regional multilateral 
security mechanisms, and pessimistic constructivists who stress the divisive influence of 
competing antagonistic nationalisms amongst regional states.
51
  In conclusion, Friedberg 
points to a regional system characterised by "bounded competition," featuring cooperation in 
the economic sphere in tandem with mistrust, diplomatic intrigue and military competition.
52
  
While a regional focus is clearly not Friedberg‘s intent, the drawback of Friedberg‘s analysis, 
for the purpose of this thesis, is its heavy emphasis on the US-China relationship to the 
exclusion of the other players.  To properly conceptualise the North Korean nuclear question 
in a regional context, it is necessary to consider the position of Japan, South Korea and 
Russia in addition to that of the US and China. 
                                                 
50 KATZENSTEIN, P. & OKAWARA, N. 2001/02. Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism. International 
Security, 26, pp. 167. 
51 FRIEDBERG, A. 2005. The Future of US-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable? Ibid.30, p. 40. 
52 Ibid. p. 44. 
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For Robert Jervis, the common ground between optimistic and pessimistic factions of each 
theory, as described by Friedberg, highlight the need to take a "systems" view of the situation 
that emphasises feedback loops.  For example, China's rising economic and military power 
are likely to trigger balancing behaviour on the part of regional states, not only because of 
strategic uncertainty, but also because China's increasing power triggers a nationalist nerve 
among the leadership and general public of these states.  In turn, the Chinese leadership is 
likely to interpret this development through its own nationalist, as well as strategic lens, 
further justifying an enhanced military modernisation.  What Jervis stresses here is a positive 
feedback loop created by the combination of both systemic imperatives and the socially 
constructed ideas prevalent in neighbouring states.
53
  Jervis' systems approach is useful for 
studying individual relationships within the regional matrix, but may be less suited to a 
comparative study of the strategic imperatives affecting each of the six regional powers.   
 
The preferred explanatory framework here is one adapted from the cooperation, competition 
and conflict rubric offered by Muthiah Alagappa.  This framework captures the essence of the 
theoretical convergence suggested by Friedberg, in a format that allows comparative study of 
the strategic orientations of each regional state.  Cooperation manifests itself in the bilateral 
or multilateral congressing of states in pursuit of mutual self-interest.  It can take a number of 
forms, growing through bilateral commercial and aid relationships, or through regional 
economic cooperation and institution-building, creating rules for mutually beneficial 
commercial interaction.  It may also spring from bilateral efforts to build security-based 
confidence-building measures to ameliorate the security dilemma, in both bilateral and 
multilateral forums. 
                                                 
53 JERVIS, R. 2006. Correspondence: Thinking Systemically About China. Ibid.31, pp. 206-207. 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
 234 
 
Conflict in the region is recognisable at four distinct levels.  First, constructivists would 
identify conflict occurring at the level of rhetoric, manifesting as competing projections of 
soft power (for instance, the American liberal-democratic project versus the Chinese 
Confucianism-based order), and as exclusivist, ethno-centric nationalism (for example, the 
periodic crises in Sino-Japanese relations that are enflamed by conflicting nationalisms, each 
positioning itself as superior over the other).  Second, conflict occurs at the level of alliance 
formation.  Security alliances are inevitably the product of conflict because the primary 
purpose of an alliance is protection against an enemy external to the alliance.  They are not 
generally geared to achieving some mutual interest through cooperative relations within the 
alliance membership, but rather for protecting the alliance membership from and external 
threat by pooling the aggregate military strength.  Thus, realist-inspired security alliances 
differ from classic formulations of liberal internationalist cooperation in that their orientation 
is external, against an enemy, rather than within, for mutual advantage (though this may be a 
by-product of security cooperation).
54
  Third, regional conflict occurs in the form of "cold 
war" (as distinct from the Cold War), an environment of mutual hostility in the absence of 
actual military engagement, resulting from the regional security dilemma.
55
  This condition 
does occur in the Northeast Asian system, particularly on the Korean peninsula.  Finally, 
conflict may occur in the form of hot war, or actual military engagement between conflicting 
states.
56
  
 
                                                 
54 SNYDER, G. 1997. Alliance Politics, Ithaca, Cornell University Press. p. 4. 
55 Sandy Leo and Ray Perkins have defined "cold war" as: This condition is characterized by propaganda, war preparations, and arms races--
always at the expense of human needs. During a cold war, nationalism prevails, and the object is to have a stalemate where neither side will 
initiate aggression--nuclear or conventional--because of the overwhelming destructive capability of the retaliatory response.‖  They contrast 
cold war with cold peace (no mutual hostility, but an absence of mutually beneficial interactions), hot peace (collaboration on confidence- 
and peace-building measures), and hot war (mutual hostility and actual military engagement).  See: SANDY, L. & PERKINS, R. 2002. The 
Nature of Peace and Its Implications for Peace Education. The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, 4, p. 3. 
56 Ibid.p. 3. 
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Strategic competition is the foreign policy orientation of states caught between cooperation 
and conflict.  Competition arises when states have to navigate between antagonism and 
interdependence.  States caught in this dilemma often choose policies of strategic hedging in 
order to accommodate these competing pressures, in their relationships with their allies as 
well as in those with their enemies.  For realists, this occurs because states always act in their 
own self-interest and no two states‘ self-interests are the same.  Therefore, in relationships of 
interdependence, be they between allies or enemies, it is prudent for states to hedge their bets 
so as not to leave themselves exposed should the bonds of interdependence break down.  As 
noted above, in an environment where antagonism comes to outweigh interdependence, 
particularly where one state pursues its own self-interest too vigorously in a bid for 
hegemony, competing states may choose to balance—to form a coalition against the would-
be hegemon.   
 
The Northeast Asian security environment, as a bipolar system, is divisible into two 
competing strategic triangles: the US bloc (United States, Japan, South Korea) and the China 
block (China, Russia, North Korea).  The country-by-country analysis within the two 
competing strategic triangles—the US block and the China bloc—will show that strategic 
hedging is the dominant foreign policy position of states in the region, because of the 
coexistence of economic interdependence and the security dilemma.  Again, this emphasises 
Cooperation Competition Conflict 
Economic 
Interdependence 
Bilateral Commerce & 
Aid Hedging Rhetoric 
Soft Power 
Multilateral Institutions Nationalism 
Security 
Bilateral Confidence-
building Measures 
Balancing 
Alliances 
Multilateral Confidence-
building Measures 
Cold War 
Multilateral Institutions Hot War 
Figure 5: Cooperation, Competition & Conflict explanatory framework, adapted and expanded from that 
offered by Muthiah Alagappa. 
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that realist theory provides the structural foundation of the region, constructivism the 
narrative, and liberalism the policy options for ameliorating the negative influences of both. 
 
Bipolar System: The US Alliance Network 
The United States 
The United States, as the world‘s pre-eminent power, has been a pivotal actor in Northeast 
Asian politics since 1945.  This section provides a synopsis of the voluminous literature on 
the foreign policy of the United States in Northeast Asia and the themes which shape its 
relations with regional states.  The US alliance network in the region is a legacy of the Cold 
War.  During this period, Washington positioned its forces to defend the East Asian littoral 
from Soviet expansion through a series of bilateral alliances—the ―hub-and-spokes‖ 
system—with South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, as well as other Pacific allies such as 
Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand.
57
  Today, the hub-and-spokes system 
and the presence of the United States military has been a major factor in ameliorating the East 
Asian security dilemma.  As an outside arbiter, an "offshore balancer" in the estimation of 
John Mearsheimer, the US is able to prevent spirals of instability by reducing the perceived 
need of regional states to engage in military competition and arms racing.
58
   
 
The US can only maintain this role while it remains the most powerful state in the region.  
Thus, a key goal of US strategy is to prevent the emergence of a regional peer competitor that 
could destabilise the hub-and-spokes system and challenge American dominance of the East 
                                                 
57 HUISKEN, R. 2006. Northeast Asian Security Challenges. In: AYSON, R., & BALL, DESMOND (ed.) Strategy and Security in the Asia-
Pacific. Sydney: Allen & Unwin. p. 192. 
58 MEARSHEIMER, J. 2001a. The Future of the American Pacifier. Foreign Affairs, 80, p. 46; CHRISTENSEN, T. 2003. China, the US-
Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia. In: IKENBERRY, G. J. & MASTANDUNO, M. (eds.) International Relations 
Theory and the Asia-Pacific. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 26. 
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Asian littoral.
59
  Because China is the only regional power with anything approaching the 
capacity to disrupt the American regional order, preventing the emergence of a regional 
challenger has come to imply controlling the rise of China.  Here we find the outlines of a 
belief that US economic power and military dominance provides Washington with the 
capacity to impose its hegemony in any theatre.
60
  In general this rings true because it has 
accurately reflected the existing distribution of power, which, as constructivists argue, is a 
product of a discourse that socialises Americans and their leaders as well as Washington's 
soft power targets.
61
   
 
The US brand of national exceptionalism is rooted in a historical experience of territorial 
expansion. US overseas expansion traditionally revolved around securing new markets and 
access to raw materials for its manufacturing base.  This crusade to batter down the doors of 
other countries was clothed in a sense of mission and inevitability, of ―manifest destiny.‖62  
Today, this missionary zeal finds expression as Pax Americana, the vision of a global 
community of free market democracies.
63
  In terms of security, this begets a doctrine of 
global military supremacy involving a US monopoly of power in the western hemisphere and 
balance of power relations in other key regions such as Europe, Northeast Asia and the 
Middle East, where Washington will work to prevent the emergence of great power rivals.
64
 
 
                                                 
59 OTT, M. 2001. East Asia: Security and Complexity. Current History, 645, p. 152 
60 COGHLIN, D. 2008. Prospects from Korean Reunification. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute – US Army War College, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB859.pdf. p  30. 
61 According to Robert Jervis, ―Constructivists (and some modern liberals) would go further and expect the unipole to come to believe its 
own arguments about acting impartially. It should become socialized as much as it socializes others, its form of discourse should develop a 
life of its own and shape much of the way the superpower thinks and acts."  See: JERVIS, R. 2009. Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective. 
World Politics, 61, p. 196. 
62 WHITE, D. 1996. The American Century: The Rise & Decline of the United States as a World Power, New Haven & London, Yale 
University Press. p. 2. 
63 RHEE, S.-W. 1999. Russia and a new balance of power in East Asia: implications for stability on the Korean Peninsula. In: CHUFRIN, G. 
(ed.) Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security Agenda. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 404-05. 
64 MEAD, W. R. 2005. American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk. Orbis, 49, p. 590. 
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Cooperation: Setting the Agenda 
The flowering of economic cooperation through Northeast Asia has been made possible by 
American hegemony.  US hard power dominance over the capitalist world since 1945 and 
more broadly since the fall of the Soviet Union allowed the development of a US-managed 
liberal order—what John Ikenberry has labelled ―Liberalism 2.0‖—based on Cold War 
multilateral alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), international 
institutions including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO—formerly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT), 
and the US dollar as the global reserve currency.
65
  The economic dimension of US primacy 
has allowed economic cooperation in Northeast Asia to bloom over the past two decades, 
which, combined with advances in rapid long-haul transportation and communication 
technologies have facilitated an explosion of commerce between the region‘s key players.  
The attraction of American soft power was a key to the success of this system.  For Joseph 
Nye, the key to US success since 1945 has been its ability to coopt other states into its 
hegemonic framework through attraction and persuasion rather than by force of arms alone.
66
  
Washington‘s promotion of peace through liberal democracy and free markets has been a 
tremendously powerful vision, one that competing powers have failed to match.
67
  
 
It is not merely the American liberal democratic free market system that is attractive to other 
states.  The global economic order allows countries to enrich themselves by participating in 
                                                 
65 IKENBERRY, G. J. 2009. Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order. Perspectives on Politics, 7, p. 
76-78. 
66 NYE, J. 2002. The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone, New York, Oxford University 
Press. p. 8-9. 
67 China has attempted to present an alternative vision based on economic the gravity of its economic power.  China‘s economic success has 
made this vision is more powerful than the ideology-heavy but materially austere vision of traditional communism.  The important variable 
here is the authoritarian politics inherent to Beijing‘s soft power mantra.  Where Beijing has engaged with other countries that exclusively on 
an economic level, it has met with success, particularly in relation to its resource partnerships with states in Africa.  When it has dabbled in 
the political sphere, as it has with Australia over issues such as iron ore pricing, the Olympic Games torch relay, and visiting Uighur activists, 
the limitations of its authoritarian politics become apparent.  This may say as much about China‘s engagement partners as it does about 
China‘s engagement strategy, which has less appeal for established liberal democracies than it does for other regimes.  For a comprehensive 
analysis of China‘s soft power strategy, see: HUANG, Y. & DING, S. 2006. Dragon's Underbelly: An Analysis of China's Soft Power. East 
Asia, 23, pp. 22--44. 
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the system, pacifying Washington‘s potential enemies.  Once captured, dependency on US 
export markets and US-controlled foreign energy resources, along with the possibility of 
losing access to the benefits of the system, acts as a deterrent to revisionist foreign policy 
behaviour by other states.
68
   Germany and Japan were quickly transformed from mortal 
enemies during World War II into key allies and trading partners through their incorporation 
into the American hegemonic system.  Even China‘s rise has been accommodationist, for the 
most part, due to its vested stake in the current global economic order.  In the security realm, 
the US role as regional balancer in Northeast Asia has muted tensions between regional states 
that would otherwise preclude such close economic cooperation.  The US security guarantee 
has been a key factor in delaying Japanese remilitarisation and preventing Japan from 
acquiring nuclear weapons.
69
  Bitter historic experience has left China and the two Koreas 
extremely sensitive to any moves by Tokyo to expand Japan‘s military capacity to reflect its 
economic power.  Regional apprehension is minimised while the United States is responsible 
for Japan‘s security, yet without this restraining element, Japanese remilitarisation would 
dramatically increase the intensity of the Sino-Japanese rivalry.   
 
Competition: Imperial Temptation & Rivalry with China 
It is the very success of the hub-and-spokes system, however, that has inhibited the evolution 
of a cooperative multilateral security framework in Northeast Asia similar to that which has 
been so successful in Europe.  Bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea exist to restrain 
their freedom of action as much as contain the Soviet threat or today, the rise of China.  
During the Cold War, this restraining function helped to prevent the junior partners from 
                                                 
68 MEAD, W. R. 2005. American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk. Orbis, 49, p. 590-591. 
69 ART, R. 2008. The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul. In: ROSS, R. & FENG, Z. (eds.) China’s Ascent: 
Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. p. 278; DEVINO, M. C. 2004. Should the US 
Continue to Maintain Forces in Korea? Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/KSIL/files/00081.doc p. 4.  Some Japanese scholars argue that Japan‘s ―pacifist identity‖ has 
been an important obstacle blocking the efforts of Japanese hardliners who advocate adopting a nuclear weapons capability.  See: 
MIHASHITA, A. 2007. Where do norms come from? Foundations of Japan‘s postwar pacifism. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 
7, p. 107. 
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entangling the United States in an unnecessary conflict with its rival powers on the Asian 
mainland.
70
  In the post-Cold War environment, these relationships have been mobilised in 
pursuit of a number of key geopolitical objectives.  These include the preservation of US-
China deterrence relationship, continuation of the US-Japan alliance and maintenance of 
Japan‘s non-nuclear status, the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, denuclearisation of 
the Korean peninsula, freedom of navigation through important sea lines of communication 
(SLOCs), and the preservation of economic openness in East Asia.
71
    
 
According to the realist interpretation, the retreat or retrenchment of the US presence could 
remove restraints on Japan, China and others that restrict the intensity of their regional 
competition.  The liberal counter-argument maintains that US withdrawal would not 
automatically lead to exacerbation of the regional security dilemma, because the growing 
economic interdependencies between China and Japan place a premium on cooperation over 
competition.  In addition, Japan‘s dependence on foreign resources, its proximity to China, 
and its strategic vulnerability are likely to encourage the Japanese to bandwagon with 
Chinese power in the event of US retreat.
72
  The extent to which this may occur would 
depend largely on Chinese receptivity to strategic cooperation with Japan which, if the liberal 
arguments of economic inter-dependency are correct, may be more likely than not.  The 
North Korean nuclear threat undermines the liberal interpretation by inflaming Japanese 
nationalism and enhancing the position of the far-right in Japanese domestic politics, pushing 
the Sino-Japanese relationship back in the direction of increasing strategic competition. 
 
                                                 
70 CHA, V. 2009/10. Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia. International Security, 34, p. 158-159; RUSSETT, B. & 
ONEAL, J. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, New York, WW Norton & 
Company. p. 89. 
71 ART, R. 2008. The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul. In: ROSS, R. & FENG, Z. (eds.) China’s Ascent: 
Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp. 273-74. 
72 ROSS, R. 1999. The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century. International Security, 23, p. 115. 
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The Sino-American relationship adds further complexity to the regional dynamic.  Policy 
debate in Washington is split between those who view China as a threat and recommend 
balancing as a prudent strategy, and those who see economic interdependence as a driver of 
cooperation and believe China can be socialised into adhering to international norms.
73
  For 
the latter, US efforts to engage China have been largely successful, resulting in deeper 
economic cooperation and more substantive multilateral diplomacy, developments that have 
helped to lower regional security concerns by muting the suspicions that fuel the regional 
security dilemma.  Advocates of the former, however, view Sino-American relations as a 
zero-sum game in which US economic engagement has facilitated China‘s increasing 
regional power at the Washington‘s expense, which has been a disaster for American power 
in East Asia.
74
  It comes as little surprise then that Washington's policies on China tend 
toward the contradictory, resulting from the competing interests of actors including factions 
of Congress, lobby groups of all kinds, influential ideologues, and public opinion.
75
   
 
Conflict: China & the Korean Peninsula 
Robert Ross characterises the region as a bipolar system dominated by the United States and 
China, where China has achieved control of the continental mainland while the maritime 
environment has been the exclusive domain of the US.
76
  Ross does not define the system as 
multipolar because Russia and Japan lack the geopolitical prerequisites to be poles in their 
own right and instead tend to bandwagon with China and the US respectively.  Why is 
Northeast Asia bipolar when the United States has been acknowledged for some time as the 
most powerful state on the planet?  For John Mearsheimer, the difficultly for any state in 
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achieving total hegemony is the impediment of projecting military power from a distance 
onto the territory of a rival great power.
77
  While the United States is more than capable of 
bombing China from air and sea, it does not possess the land forces to capture Chinese 
territory on the Asian mainland, while China‘s defensive posture is more than adequate to 
repel any such land-based attack.  Therefore, in Northeast Asia, the United States and China 
exist in approximate strategic parity.  In addition, the bipolar balance is fluid, owing to 
China‘s ascendant trajectory and the relative decline of US power78.  This trend has begun to 
accelerate in the wake of the global financial crisis, which has weakened the economic 
foundation of US military power and added an air of urgency to what was already a 
potentially combustible regional mix. 
 
The Taiwan issue has traditionally been the central problem in the Sino-American 
relationship.  The United States has established very clearly that Taiwan‘s status should be 
resolved peacefully between the Chinese and Taiwanese governments.  The US has stated it 
will not allow China to reincorporate Taiwan by force, as demonstrated in 1996 when 
President Clinton sent two carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait in response to aggressive 
Chinese military exercises.
79
  Nor does Washington desire a unilateral independence 
declaration from the Taiwanese leadership that would corner China into a forceful response.  
Such a declaration looked increasingly likely under the Taiwanese leadership of Chen Shui-
bian, though independence talk has become more muted with the ascension of the more 
China-friendly Ma Ying-jeou as president of Taiwan.
80
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US strategy vis-à-vis the Korean peninsula is inevitably nested in these wider issues.  The 
North Korean nuclear capability increases the risk premium for South Korea‘s defence 
because the South is indefensible from missile attack, in spite of limited missile defence 
systems.  The missile threat undermines the US-Japan alliance because it enhances the 
argument of those within Japan who favour remilitarisation.  It constrains US freedom of 
action by tying up forces in Korea while simultaneously freeing the Chinese military from the 
northeast for deployment along the Taiwan Strait.  The North Korea threat complicates the 
situation, as it demands a considerable American deterrent posture in South Korea that diverts 
forces from focussing on the Taiwan Strait.
81
   
 
North Korea‘s nuclear capability has damaged American interests beyond Northeast Asia, 
particularly with respect to the global nonproliferation regime, embodied in the Nuclear Non 
Proliferation Treaty.  The NPT represents a bargain between the existing nuclear powers and 
non-nuclear states in which the non-nuclear countries pledged not to develop nuclear 
weapons in exchange for assistance with peaceful nuclear energy programs and the capping 
and reduction of the arsenals of the nuclear powers.  The NPT for the most part has been a 
success: only four additional states have acquired nuclear weapons since 1970, while US and 
Soviet/Russian nuclear arsenals have shrunk significantly since their Cold War peak, while 
all other states bar the de facto nuclear powers have ratified the treaty.
82
  North Korea‘s 
successful nuclear weapons development weakens this system in two ways: first, it serves as 
an example to other would-be proliferators that they can develop nuclear weapons without 
any meaningful consequences beyond economic sanctions.
83
  It demonstrates that a state can 
obtain nuclear weapons while still a member of the NPT, thereby casting doubt on the treaty's 
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effectiveness.  If this is the case, the international community can do little to limit horizontal 
nuclear proliferation.  Second, the North Korean regime may seek to generate hard currency 
income by selling fissile materials to terrorist groups that wish to blackmail or attack 
American targets abroad or the continental United States itself.
84
  There is some suggestion 
that the North has sold nuclear technology to Syria and Myanmar and while these exchanges 
are unlikely to have included fissile material, the widening of the arc of nuclear proliferation 
that these sales represent is certainly troubling.
85
 
 
Synthesis: Preserving Pax Americana 
The global goal of the United States is the preservation of Pax Americana, the hegemonic 
order through which it has become the world‘s preeminent power.  Cooperation occurs within 
this framework globally, as in Northeast Asia, through the integration of states into the global 
capitalist economy, which is regulated by international organisations to benefit the economic 
interests of the United States.  Clearly this system needs to provide mutual benefits in order 
to attract the compliance of other countries; Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and now China have 
all benefited from integration into this system.  However, the economic interdependence thus 
sown occurs within the context of adversarial security relations.  Washington is hedging 
between the economic benefits of China‘s incorporation into the global economy and the 
perceived security risk posed by China‘s rise as a peer competitor.   The goal of the United 
States in Northeast Asia is to preserve maintain the regional balance of power such that the 
simmering Sino-Japanese rivalry is contained and to prevent China from contending for 
regional hegemony.  Two potential flashpoints exist where conflict remains a possibility: the 
Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula.  While Washington and Beijing appear to have 
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reached a modus vivendi regarding Taiwan, in Korea, the US has been active in attempting to 
alter the balance of power by disarming North Korea of its nuclear capability and 
transforming or replacing its ruling regime.  It is this activism in pursuing North Korea‘s 
denuclearisation, without success, that is exposing a growing trend of US strategic paralysis 
in the region that belies its apparent strength. 
 
Japan 
Japan could be considered the linchpin of the Northeast Asian security dilemma because the 
threat perceptions of the other regional states are acutely sensitive to Japan‘s defence posture, 
owing to its military modernisation by stealth, and its unwillingness or inability to come to 
common agreement with its neighbours on a mutually acceptable historical narrative of its 
colonial past.  Therefore, any alterations of its security posture in the direction of greater 
autonomy are likely to encourage balancing behaviour among its neighbours.
86
  This 
constraint is problematic for Tokyo.  Japan is a geographically small but densely populated 
island-chain state that is dependent on imports for almost all of its energy and just under half 
of its food supply.  These imports, as well as Japanese exports, come and go via vulnerable 
sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that stretch thousands of miles from the East China Sea 
to the Middle East.
87
  One would expect any other state in this predicament to have some 
level of power projection capability to protect vital SLOCs and territorial waters, yet Article 
9 of Japan‘s ―Peace Constitution‖ restrains Japan‘s ability to do this.  SLOC policing and the 
national coast guard have been one avenue through which conservatives in Tokyo have 
expanded Japan‘s security role within the constitution.88 
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Cooperation: The Yoshida Doctrine and Regional Engagement 
The United States has been Japan‘s security guarantor since the conclusion of World War 
Two, fulfilling the dual roles of providing for the defence of Japan as well as functioning as a 
regional balancer, reassuring regional states that Japan was not a security threat.  During the 
Cold War Japan adhered to a strategy known as the Yoshida Doctrine—named after post-
WWII Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru—that placed economic development as the highest 
national priority while leaving the nation‘s military defence to the United States.  The 
Yoshida Government effectively decoupled economics and trade from national security to 
minimise Japan‘s strategic risk, ensure an uninterrupted supply of energy and food to ease the 
chronic resource deficiencies of the home islands, and to reassure Japan‘s neighbours that the 
era of Japanese imperialism had ended.
89
  Over time, this strategy allowed Japan to grow into 
East Asia‘s pre-eminent economic power by the 1980s. 
 
Japanese investment played a significant role in the Chinese economic miracle.  By 2004, 
Japanese companies had invested US$56 billion in nearly development projects within China, 
leading to bilateral trade nearing US$200 billion per year.  Together, the two countries‘ 
economic output constitutes approximately 80 percent of East Asia's GDP.
90
  Clearly, China 
and Japan are the region's two most important economic powers.  These economic linkages 
have been strengthened by growing institutional frameworks.  Both countries, along with 
South Korea, have engaged in annual trilateral economic summits since 2000, and both are 
involved in the region's key multilateral institutions: APEC and ASEAN+3, along with the 
ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) launched in 2010.
91
  However, Japan has 
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advocated multilateral frameworks that incorporate the entire Asia-Pacific region, thereby 
including allies such as the United States and Australia.  In contrast, China has espoused 
institutional arrangements that are strictly limited to East Asian states, rightly recognising 
Tokyo's efforts to dilute Beijing's influence in these multilateral fora.
92
  The trend of events 
has flowed in China's favour, with Japan's preferred Asia-Pacific bodies such as APEC losing 
influence in favour of other East Asia-centric institutional arrangements. 
 
In the context of regional security, and particularly with regard to the Korean peninsula, 
Japan has engaged in both bilateral and multilateral diplomatic processes over the past 
decade.  Prime Minister Koizumi Junichi made substantial progress in negotiating the 
normalisation of relations between Japan and the DPRK during the early-2000s, culminating 
in his one-day summit with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang on 17 September 2002.  However, the 
momentum generated by the summit evaporated in response to North Korea's October 2002 
HEU disclosure and Kim Jong-il's admission that North Korea had kidnapped thirteen 
Japanese youths during the 1970s and 1980s, which provoked a heated public backlash within 
Japan and made Koizumi's engagement strategy untenable.  Since this time, Japan's 
engagement in the Six Party Talks process has been contingent on the adequate resolution of 
the abductee issue, which has resulted in Tokyo assuming a back-seat role in the multilateral 
process. 
 
Competition: Hedging Between the US and China 
Like any junior partner in an alliance relationship, Japan‘s perception of its relationship with 
the US has fluctuated periodically between apprehension over abandonment by its alliance 
partner and anxieties about entrapment in American military adventurism foreign policy 
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crises beyond the theatre of Northeast Asia and thus not directly relevant to Japan.  
Dependence on the US security guarantee has generated a fear of abandonment among 
Japanese policy makers, which arises from the realisation that in an anarchic security 
environment, alliance commitment are ultimately unenforceable because there is no higher 
authority to enforce treaty obligations.
93
  Through the 1970s, events such as the US defeat in 
Afghanistan, the oil shocks, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan played on Japan‘s fear of 
abandonment and began to erode Tokyo‘s faith in the US security guarantee.94  
Consequently, Tokyo has bandwagoned with Washington's wider global strategy and support 
American ventures beyond the defence of Japan.
95
  This, in turn, leads to the fear that over-
accommodation with American global interests could lead to Japan‘s entrapment in US 
military ventures not directly involving Japan that exact costs and consequences that are not 
in the Japanese national interest.  For example, the eruption of conflict between the United 
States and China over Taiwan would force Japan to choose sides between its long-time 
security guarantor and the region‘s rising economic power, with which Japan shares both 
extensive economic linkages and a growing strategic rivalry.  As home to the bulk of 
American forces in the region, the US would expect Japan to provide rear support for naval 
and air power dispatched to defend Taiwan, thereby exposing itself to Chinese retaliation and 
the risk of being drawn into direct combat.
96
  Article 9 helped Japan to avoid such 
entanglement in the past; however, the danger of entrapment may increase as the peace clause 
of the constitution is diluted and reinterpreted.  
 
                                                 
93 SNYDER, G. 1997. Alliance Politics, Ithaca, Cornell University Press. pp. 17-18. 
94 DUPONT, A. 2004. Unsheathing the Samurai sword: Japan's changing security policy. Lowy Institute Paper 03 ed. Sydney: Lowy 
Institute, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=180. p. 2. 
95 SAMUELS, R. 2007. Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, Ithaca, Cornell University Press. p. 199. 
96 KANG, D. 2007. China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia, New York, Columbia University Press. pp. 166-67; DUPONT, A. 
2004. Unsheathing the Samurai sword: Japan's changing security policy. Lowy Institute Paper 03 ed. Sydney: Lowy Institute, 
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=180. p. 42-43. 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
 249 
Although the alliance remains close, despite a current dispute over basing rights in Okinawa, 
the restraints on Japanese remilitarisation are slowly being removed.  The consensus 
underlying the Yoshida Doctrine has begun unravelling for some time, domestically behind 
calls for Japan to assume as security posture commensurate with its economic power, and 
externally from the United States, which has prodded Japan to assume more responsibility for 
its self-defence.
97
  Evolving defence policy has embodied modernisation of land, sea and air 
defence forces and more active forward projection of forces beyond the Japanese archipelago, 
including non-combat deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq.
98
  Politicians in Tokyo have 
begun to advocate modification of Article 9 at a time when the Japanese Self Defence Force 
(SDF) is bankrolled by the fifth largest defence budget in the world at US$41 billion per 
annum.
99
  Marcus Noland notes that firms involved in Japan‘s military-industrial complex 
have benefited through budget increases and procurement orders designed specifically to 
counter the North Korean threat, creating an economic and political momentum that could 
lead inexorably to Japan‘s political normalisation and the abandonment of Article 9.100   
 
Conflict: North Korean Threat Complicating the Hedging Strategy 
Japan's military modernisation is primarily a product of the perceived threat posed by China‘s 
resurgence.  Tokyo aspires to the great power status that any other state with such economic 
and technological prowess would expect.  The primary obstacle to achieving this goal is 
China, whose rapid economic growth, diplomatic influence and military projection 
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capabilities produce fears that Beijing is seeking to dominate the region, including Japan.
101
  
China‘s growing naval capability may come to threaten the SLOCs through which pass the 
imported goods and energy supplies upon which Japan relies.  To illustrate, should China 
reclaim Taiwan, the Chinese navy would have access to deep waters beyond the mainland 
continental shelf in which its submarines could operate at greater depths, safer from detection 
by US and Japanese sea- and airborne reconnaissance than they would be in the shallow 
waters within the Chinese littoral.
102
  Incidents such as the 10 November 2004 incursion of a 
Chinese submarine into Japanese waters off Okinawa do not help to assuage such concerns in 
Tokyo.
103
 
 
Domestic politics has a significant bearing on Tokyo‘s responses to North Korea, which in 
turn affects the success of its wider hedging strategy.  The issue of the status of Japanese 
abductees kidnapped by North Korean agents arouses emotional and widespread anger in 
Japan, a sentiment that obliges politicians of all stripes to take a hard line on this issue and by 
extension the broader relationship with the DPRK.
104
  As the only nation to have suffered a 
nuclear attack, Japan is extremely sensitive to North Korea‘s missile and nuclear capability.  
The missile threat came to prominent attention in August 1998 and again in April 2009 when 
the North launched long-range rockets over Japan.  Of particular concern to Japanese officials 
is the North‘s stockpile of medium-range Nodong missiles, which with a range of about 1,000 
kilometres, are capable of threatening the entire Japanese archipelago.  Tokyo worries that an 
outbreak of conflict on the Korean peninsula could lead North Korea to launch ballistic 
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missiles at targets in Japan.  North Korea‘s admission in October 2002 that it had maintained 
a highly-enriched uranium program was a further jolt to Japanese sensitivities, pushing 
Tokyo into active participation in the US ballistic missile defence program.
105
  If operational, 
the US missile defence system would eliminate the missile threat to Japan from North Korea.  
However, there is a perception in China that US missile defence programs in East Asia are 
intended for the containment of China.  Japan‘s participation may be a sign of Tokyo‘s 
weariness of China‘s growing military power.106  In responding to the North Korean threat, 
Japan has triggered Chinese sensitivities about the dangers of its remilitarisation.   
 
North Korea‘s nuclear and missile capabilities have also provided ammunition for right-wing 
nationalists in Japan to argue for the acceleration of Japan‘s normalisation and military 
modernisation.  On 10 July 2006, Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe Shinzo advocated pre-emptive 
strikes against North Korean missile installations on the grounds that they were justified 
under Japan‘s constitutional right to self-defence.107  On 4 August 2006, the Subcommittee 
on Defense Policies in the Liberal Democratic Party‘s National Defense Division began a 
debate on whether Tokyo should acquire the capability to attack ―a foreign enemy base.‖108  
Daniel Pinkston and Kazutaka Sakurai argue that domestic constituents were the intended 
target audience for these threats, in order to shore up political support.
109
  Nonetheless, such 
messages play badly in a region harbouring deep mistrust of Japan‘s intentions.  
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Synthesis: Hedging as Japan's Preferred Strategy 
Japan‘s preferred foreign policy embodies a hedge between economic engagement with 
China and the ongoing security commitment to the United States, with an eye on the growing 
threat posed by China‘s resurgence as a great power.  With this in mind, Tokyo is pursuing 
incremental strategic normalisation through piecemeal increases in militarisation, in tandem 
with continued economic interaction with China, in order to become the great power it 
desires without exacerbating the regional security dilemma.  Richard Samuels has labelled 
Japan's efforts at strategic hedging the ―Goldilocks consensus‖ in which Tokyo positions 
itself not too close and not too far from its American protector during its simultaneous efforts 
to engage with China.
110
   
 
On the one hand, Japan has continued to indulge the United States by band-wagoning with 
American operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and acceding to requests from Washington to 
assume more responsibility for its self-defence, all the while leaning on the its alliance 
partner as the best bet for countering a resurgent China.
111
  On the other hand, Japan has built 
substantial economic linkages with China, with the intention of assuaging concerns about any 
possible Japanese military threat, leading to an acceleration of regional economic 
interdependence, as demonstrated by flows of investment and trade.
112
  The Achilles heel of 
this strategy, as mentioned above, is that the regional threat perception is likely to linger until 
the Japanese government acknowledges its wartime past.  As Yang Jian notes, for China, 
Japan‘s deployment of troops abroad is a very sensitive issue.113  North Korean bellicosity 
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creates added momentum in Japanese domestic politics in favour of strategic normalisation, 
which in turn amplifies the concerns about Japan's intentions that are harboured by 
neighbouring countries.  In short, Japan's policy of strategic hedging is slowly evolving as a 
losing gambit, due mainly to the inability of Japan and China to reconcile their competing 
strategic and economic priorities and the tension within the Japan-US alliance.  North Korea's 
nuclear proliferation further complicates what is already a problematic strategic position. 
 
South Korea 
It has been the fate of Korea over many centuries to be geographically sandwiched between 
its more powerful neighbours.  Today, South Korea is caught in a balancing act between its 
Cold War ally and security guarantor, the United States, and its largest trading partner in 
China.  Seoul does not want to be forced to choose between Washington and Beijing, yet its 
major security problems inevitably incur the risk of alienating one or the other.
114
   Seoul has 
to consider two major factors in its tense balancing act between the United States and China: 
first, the changing dynamics of the US-ROK alliance, and second, its uncomfortable political 
accommodation with North Korea.
115
  North Korea's nuclear proliferation is the wildcard that 
complicates South Korea's position, because it often forces Seoul to diverge from the 
American position in favour of the position taken by China.   
 
Competition: Drifting Between Two Poles 
The US-ROK alliance was the foundation of efforts to deter Soviet expansion during the Cold 
War, and by extension prevent further North Korean aggression against the South.  In the 
post-Cold War era, the alliance has lost much of its raison d’etre; the Soviet Union has 
                                                 
114 KANG, D. 2007. China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia, New York, Columbia University Press. p. 120. 
115 POLLACK, J. 2005. The Strategic Futures and Military Capabilities of the Two Koreas. In: TELLIS, A. & WILLS, M. (eds.) Strategic 
Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty. Seattle & Washington DC: National Bureau of Asian Research. p. 138. 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
 254 
collapsed, South Korea has won the ideological war against the North and the Kim regime 
teeters on the edge of major systemic transformation.  For South Koreans, especially younger 
generations born after the Korean War, the military threat posed by the DPRK is assumed to 
be less palpable, which has led many South Koreans to express a desire for increased 
autonomy within the alliance.  As the junior alliance partner, Seoul is entrapped by its 
partner‘s requirement for strategic flexibility in its use of its troops stationed in the ROK.116   
 
Issues of sovereignty are at the heart of South Korean objections to the footprint of the US 
military in Korea.  The US military maintains almost complete command and control over 
American and ROK forces in South Korea, while the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 
signed between the two countries exempts American military personnel from local legal 
jurisdiction.
117
  The Yongsan military base in central Seoul, near the north bank of the Han 
River, was a source of local resentment for some time.  Indeed, the Yongsan base has been a 
symbol of a wider resentment with the American military presence stemming from numerous 
instances of unsavoury incidents between US military personnel and local people.  For Lee 
Chae-jin, the South Korean government must perform a delicate juggling act between 
accommodation of rising anti-American sentiment within the democratic process, and the 
requirements of its military alliance with the United States.
118
  With this in mind, the 
Yongsan military base has been relocated south of Seoul to Osan, at cost to the South Korean 
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government.  This represents a phase of a wider US plan to drawdown forces from Korea and 
move American military installations to locations south of the Han River.
119
   
 
South Korean officials are anxious that Washington‘s insistence on ―strategic flexibility‖ and 
consolidation of its forces toward the south of the Han River and away from the DMZ may 
provide the United States with the necessary insurance against attack by North Korea.  
Traditionally, these forward deployments were thought of as a ―tripwire,‖ which if attacked 
would guarantee an expanded military commitment from Washington in the event of a 
conflict.
120
  In the absence of the tripwire, the US security guarantee may not hold in the 
event of conflict.  Seoul fears that such a move may embolden Washington to use military 
force with disastrous consequences for South Korean military forces and civilians.
121
  This 
illustrates the complexity of South Korea‘s attempts to simultaneously maintain its alliance 
with the US while pursuing greater autonomy within that structure, a difficult path that has 
created a great deal of friction between Seoul and Washington.
122
 
 
Cooperation: A Greater Stake in Engagement 
The greatest source of friction between Seoul and Washington has arisen over South Korea‘s 
engagement policy toward North Korea.  As David Kang has observed, the United States has 
consistently made the elimination of North Korea‘s nuclear program and missile capability its 
primary goal in Korea, whereas many South Koreans see the ROK‘s primary objective as the 
                                                 
119 2008. Washington Urges Seoul to Pay More for Troops. The Korea Times, 23 July 2008, p.4. 
120 HARRISON, S. 2002c. Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and US Disengagement, Princeton, Princeton University Press. p. 
133.  American troop redeployments have to be understood as a component of Washington‘s wider global commitments; a full battalion—
approximately 4,000 personnel—of frontline troops have been removed Korea and relocated to serve in Iraq.  See: 2004f. US to move Korea 
troops to Iraq . London: BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3720029.stm [Accessed 12 February 2009]. 
121 HUGHES, C. 2007. North Korea‘s Nuclear Weapons: Implications for the Nuclear Ambitions of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Asia 
Policy, 3, p. 96. 
122 KIM, B.-K. 2008a. Between China, America, and North Korea: South Korea‘s Hedging. In: ROSS, R. & FENG, Z. (eds.) China’s Ascent: 
Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. p. 193. 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
 256 
unification of the peninsula, regardless of whether the North denuclearises.
123
  Implicit here is 
a common assumption that the North would not subject their Korean brethren in the South to 
a WMD attack, a product of a strong sense of Korean nationalism on both sides of the 
DMZ.
124
  South Korea has come to view North Korea primarily as an issue of national 
unification as opposed to one of direct military threat, and until recently has de-emphasised 
direct military and ideological competition in favour of economic and cultural engagement.  
The engagement strategy evolved from the early-1990s, when it became clear that the South 
had won the ideological and economic competition between the two Koreas.  Many South 
Koreans believed the North was too weak and demoralised to present a serious security 
threat.  The goal of engagement was to promote evolutionary change and reform within North 
Korea through increased economic and cultural ties, a regime transformation by stealth.
125
   
 
Engagement took place under the rubric of the Sunshine Policy during the presidencies of 
Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, which emphasised that the South should persevere with 
unilateral and unconditional concessions to calm the North‘s threat perception and facilitate 
reciprocated goodwill in denuclearisation negotiations.  Nonetheless, North Korean 
reciprocity has not been forthcoming.  The DPRK regime pocketed the aid and profited from 
joint development projects, but has shown little inclination toward economic reforms or 
meaningful concessions in the Six Party talks.  Consequently, the current administration in 
Seoul under President Lee Myung-bak has tapered engagement efforts and made further 
assistance conditional on reciprocal North Korean actions.  Since North Korea has continued 
to escalate tensions since 2008, Seoul's aid to the North has all but dried up.  Lee has also re-
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emphasised the importance of the US-ROK alliance as a hedge against the total breakdown of 
the Six Party talks, which seems prudent in light of Pyongyang‘s withdrawal from the Six 
Party Talks process.
126
   
 
A security threat would arise, however, if the Kim regime were to suddenly collapse.  Rapid 
reunification would force South Korea to accommodate a massive out-migration of North 
Korean refugees, establish security and order north of the DMZ, cater to enormous demands 
for economic assistance, and sort through the momentous legal and administrative problems 
with the absorption of an economically backward and psychologically scarred North Korean 
population.
127
  South Korean engagement efforts could decrease the likelihood of this 
scenario by encouraging economic development in North Korea to lessen the enormity of the 
task and the cost to Seoul of reincorporation, in the event that reunification occurs.  This 
policy moved South Korea closer to the Chinese position of support for the Kim regime, a 
convergence of strategic perspectives that has been one of the primary irritants giving rise to 
the perceived drift in the US-ROK relationship.
128
 
 
Conflict: The Past and the Present 
The most obvious ongoing conflict in Northeast Asia is the cold war between North and 
South Korea.  The DMZ remains the most heavily fortified frontier on the planet with tens of 
thousands of military personnel arrayed against each other across the four kilometre-wide 
demarcation corridor between North and South.  Periodic small-scale provocations by the 
North Koreans add to the tense atmosphere along this frontier.  For Seoul, the strategic 
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priorities here are first to deter another North Korean assault on the south with a strong 
military posture.  Second, Seoul has concentrated on engaging constructively with 
Pyongyang to reduce the likelihood of conflict, whether planned or miscalculated.
129
  Third, it 
seeks to preserve the vibrancy of the South Korean economy in spite of the North Korean 
threat.  Finally, South Korean planners must prepare for the eventual reunification of the 
peninsula. 
 
South Korea and Japan share many similarities, such as their well-developed capitalist 
economies and incorporation under the US security umbrella.  On the surface, one would 
expect their commonalities to give rise to a close international relationship, yet the reality is 
far more complex.  Many South Koreans harbour a deep-seated grudge against the Japanese, 
stemming from the latter‘s colonisation of the Korean peninsula in the early-20th century 
when Japan attempted to "obliterate Korean culture."
130
  The Dokdo/Takeshima territorial 
dispute, the visits to the Yasukuni shrine by successive Japanese prime ministers, and the 
controversy over revisionist history textbooks suggest to many South Koreans that Japan‘s 
view of the world has not fundamentally changed from that of its imperial heyday, and that a 
remilitarised Japan would be far more dangerous than any other regional player.
131
  The 
Seoul-Beijing strategic convergence is a corollary of their lingering mutual fear of Japan; 
South Koreans generally worry more about Japanese militarisation than they do about 
Chinese regional hegemonism.
132
  This further complicates bilateral relations with the US, 
because many officials in Seoul are likely to interpret Washington‘s encouragement of Japan 
to assume more responsibility for its defence as a negative development. 
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Synthesis: Playing the Delaying Game 
South Korea, like its neighbour Japan, is pursuing a policy of strategic hedging to navigate 
between the United States, its security guarantor, and China, its economic lifeblood.  For 
South Korea, hedging is prudent because it forestalls Seoul being caught in a compromising 
position between its security relationship with the US and its growing economic 
interdependence with China.
133
  Normally states will select economic and security policies 
that are compatible and mutually reinforcing, however, in this period of power transition in 
Northeast Asia, that choice is not open to Seoul.  In contrast to Japan, South Korea's strategic 
outlook continues to be shaped by its cold war with the DPRK.  The two parties technically 
remain at war, since no official peace treaty was signed after the armistice agreement of 1953 
to end the Korean War.  As the country with the most to lose from war with North Korea, 
with fraternal ties across the DMZ, and as the state most likely to be responsible for 
reconstructing a North Korean failed state, it should come as no surprise that South Korea has 
been the regional state most committed to engaging with Pyongyang.  Also, in contrast to 
Japan, South Korea is not engaged in vigorous strategic competition with China, which gives 
Seoul greater flexibility in its own hedging strategy, swinging between Beijing and 
Washington. 
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Bipolar System: The China Bloc 
China 
The Chinese proudly boast over 4,000 years of continuous civilisation, which has produced a 
rich political philosophy and remarkably consistent brand of strategic thinking that continues 
to influence Chinese policy makers today.  The Confucian power hierarchy with China at its 
apex is central to Chinese strategic culture, as is an emphasis on domestic political unity, both 
of which derive from the continuing cycle of Chinese dynastic history featuring periods of 
strong centralised government (for example, the Han, Tang, Ming, and Qing dynasties) 
punctuated by intervals of political fracturing, instability and warlordism (such as the 
Warring States period, Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period, and Republican period).  
Scholars including Alastair Iain Johnston and Andrew Scobell have argued that this pendular 
history of political centralisation and fragmentation has led to the development of a ―Chinese 
cult of defense,‖ incorporating two key strands: (1) a Confucian legacy emphasising strategy 
and psychological manipulation over direct battlefield confrontation, a strategic outlook best 
known in the West through Sun Zi‘s classic The Art of War; and (2) a streak of Realpolitik 
featuring a predisposition to employ force when confronting a crisis.
134
   
 
Historically, invasion threats against the Han Chinese heartland were most likely to arrive 
from the north through Mongolia, Manchuria or the Korean peninsula.  The Himalayas and 
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the Gobi desert provide ample protection along the southern and western frontiers.
135
  When 
centralised government has been strong in China over the last 3,000 years, buffer regions 
have protected the Han Chinese heartland.  The borders of contemporary China reflect this, 
incorporating traditional buffer regions along the northern steppe such as Inner Mongolia and 
the Manchurian provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning, along with Xinjiang in the 
west and Tibet in the South West.
136
  North Korea, as China‘s ally in the northeast, forms an 
extension of this buffer zone structure.
137
  In the early-20
th
 century, the Korean peninsula was 
the corridor through which imperial Japan expanded into China.  Since the Korean War, the 
Chinese have supported North Korea as a bulwark against American encroachment in this 
area.  However, a buffer zone becomes a strategic liability if it becomes politically unstable.  
The intention of Chinese support for the Kim regime is to prevent a flood of North Korea 
refugees crossing into north eastern China should the regime collapse.  Some projections 
estimate scenarios in which up to one million displaced people flee the North, of which more 
than five hundred thousand are likely to end up in China,  creating social and economic 
destabilisation in its north-eastern provinces due to the difficulties of attempting to 
accommodate such a massive refugee influx.
138
  For this reason, China has ceased to grant 
asylum to North Korean refugees and those who are caught are repatriated back to the 
DPRK.
139
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With its land borders protected by geographic barriers and strategic buffer zones, China‘s 
main geostrategic weak-point is its coastal regions, ringed by the Yellow Sea, the East China 
Sea, and the South China Sea. Such a long, open and exposed border has presented a major 
challenge to every Chinese government‘s efforts to maintain an adequate defence against 
external attack.
140
  This is not to say that military invasion is the primary coastal threat: 
during the 19
th
 and early-20
th
 century, the encroachment of European commercial interests 
resulted in the enrichment of an indigenous trading class in China‘s port cities.  These groups 
developed economic interests that paralleled those of the European powers, creating social 
tensions and inviting foreign military interventions that fatally undermined Qing dynasty 
rule.
141
  Today, China‘s export-driven economy has created great wealth along its highly 
developed coastal corridor, albeit inequitably distributed.  This large wealth disparity within 
the coastal regions, as well as between the coastal provinces and the less-developed 
hinterland, has created worrisome new sources of social friction.  This economic system is 
heavily dependent on sea-borne trade, meaning that blockade or attack by a hostile naval 
power could cause enormous damage to China‘s export economy and thus expose the 
underlying cracks in the social fabric.
142
 
 
It should be no surprise then, based on history, geography and strategic culture, that China‘s 
primary geopolitical imperatives are inter-related and include the following: one, to maintain 
control of buffer regions around the Han Chinese heartland and along the borders of the 
current Chinese state, with a view not only toward self-protection but also regional pre-
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eminence; two, to protect its coastline from foreign encroachment; and three, to maintain 
internal political stability.
143
  For China, the internal dimension is the most important; without 
domestic political cohesion, none of its other strategic objectives are attainable.  Chinese 
policymakers are well aware that strong centralised government in China has crumbled many 
times before through its long political history.   
 
Cooperation: Globalisation with Chinese Characteristics 
One of the optimistic beliefs held by liberal internationalists and constructivists analysing 
East Asian politics is that China can be peacefully accommodated into the international 
system through its incorporation into international institutions and socialisation into the 
behavioural norms of the system.  This would in turn blunt Beijing‘s desire to pursue a 
revisionist foreign policy and instead give it a vested interest in maintaining the status quo 
under US hegemony.  To some degree this is an accurate appraisal of what has taken place.  
For Yong Deng and Thomas Moore, the concern of China‘s political elite with transnational 
issues such as trade liberalisation, international terrorism, nuclear proliferation and pandemic 
diseases—issues of concern throughout much of the wider international community—reflects 
China‘s growing integration into the global political arena.144  Indeed, Deng and Moore 
suggest that this congruence of interests reflects Beijing‘s desire to foster China‘s gradual rise 
to great power status within the broader framework of US hegemony. 
 
China began to integrate itself into regional and global multilateral institutions during the 
1990s, as its economic miracle began to gather momentum.  In 1990, it became a member of 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process in an effort to attract foreign 
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investment.  Beijing‘s involvement expanded to incorporate participation in economic 
dialogue with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as security 
consultation within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
145
  In more recent times China has 
played a role in regional nonproliferation negotiations by hosting the Six Party Talks.  At the 
global level, Beijing based its foreign policy on active participation in multilateral 
institutions, including the United Nations (as a permanent member of the Security Council) 
and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which have provided with a forum to express 
grievances, defend their economic interests and participate in global governance as a status 
quo power.
146
 
 
Yet, evidence suggests that Chinese policy makers are not altogether comfortable with the 
diminution of sovereignty inherent in multilateral regimes.  A major sticking point for Beijing 
in the ARF, for example, involved the issue of sovereignty, particularly with regard to 
competing claims over the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea.  For Beijing, 
such territorial disputes were a domestic concern better handled through bilateral negotiations 
between competing claimants rather than through multilateral processes.
147
  Similarly, 
Beijing‘s immovable unilateral position that Taiwan is a part of mainland China visibly 
demonstrates the limits of China‘s willingness to engage multilaterally on security issues.  
These examples show China‘s appetite for multilateral cooperation comes with heavy 
caveats, giving the impression that its cooperation with international regimes remains 
experimental and may be withdrawn at any time.
148
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Competition: Democratisation of US Hegemony 
China‘s efforts to integrate into the global economy and the institutional framework of the 
current world order cannot disguise Beijing‘s aversion to US global power and the 
penetration of American hegemony into the traditional Chinese sphere of influence in East 
Asia.  According to Jin Canrong, this wariness has led Beijing on the one hand to seek 
accommodation with the United States, and on the other to favour ―multipolarization‖ in East 
Asia, implying a dilution of US power.
149
  It is the missionary zeal of US foreign policy in 
promoting the globalisation of liberal democracy and political liberalisation through free 
market economics for which Beijing is particularly averse.  There is a lingering view among 
the Chinese ruling class that the United States was engaged in a form of soft subversion—an 
effort to transform Chinese society through the penetration of market capitalism—of Chinese 
Communist Party rule.
150
  Since the commencement of Deng Xiaoping‘s economic reforms—
―socialism with Chinese characteristics‖—in 1978, the Chinese government has been careful 
to decouple economic liberalisation from increasing political freedom, understanding well the 
transformative impact that the two combined would likely have on the Chinese political 
system.  The Chinese elite feared the type of political implosion that brought down the USSR 
after Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev attempted economic and political reform at the same 
time.  Many Chinese policymakers suspect that the United States was attempting to hasten a 
similar political avalanche within China, an outcome that policy makers in Beijing have been 
working to prevent.  As Deng Hong has noted, Beijing is not willing to allow economic and 
institutional engagement with the West to become the Trojan horse for a democratic 
transition in China.
151
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Beijing‘s regional multilateral diplomacy is therefore instrumental and not necessarily a 
reflection of its commitment to the utopian vision of US-led liberal internationalism.  While 
China‘s exploitation of globalisation and liberal institutions has allowed it to foster its 
comprehensive national power without engendering too much resistance from regional states, 
this strategy may also reflect a tendency of Chinese foreign policy elites to view international 
relations on much longer timelines than their Western contemporaries.  In this view, the 
balance of power in East Asia will inevitably swing away from the United States toward 
China as a consequence of economic momentum, which China‘s embrace of globalisation is 
helping to facilitate.  According to Scott Snyder, Chinese planners view globalisation as a 
force for ―democratising US hegemony‖ by ensnaring regional states—including US allies—
in a web of economic interdependency.
152
   It is unusual for states to depend on one country 
for their economic well-being and the enemy of that country for security, as situation which 
many erstwhile US allies find themselves in through their economic linkages with China.  
Economic dependence therefore increases Beijing‘s leverage vis-à-vis the United States 
because Washington‘s regional allies can be manipulated through economic pressure. If this 
is the case, the momentum shift in the centre of gravity in the global economic system 
renders bold revisionist policies unnecessary for Beijing, with its rapidly expanding economy 
acting as a ―centripetal force‖ drawing regional states into increasing dependence on China 
for their own wellbeing.  The hedging strategies adopted by South Korea and Japan are 
therefore a function of this economic interdependence and a demonstration of China‘s 
growing capacity to undermine US military alliances within the region.    In this context, 
economic interdependence may foster strategic rivalry as much as strategic cooperation in the 
Sino-American relationship. 
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This situation is complicated by the fundamental economic symbiosis that exists between the 
United States and China.  Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick colourfully describe this 
economic symbiosis by referring to the China and the US as two halves of an imaginary 
super-state called ―Chimerica.‖153  What Ferguson and Schularick are describing here is 
China‘s reliance on the United States as the primary consumer market for its export products, 
and the reliance of the US on China (primarily, but other states are involved too) to finance 
its extraordinarily high foreign debt through the purchase of US treasury bonds.  The result, 
as Deng and Moore note, is an unusual inversion of traditional hegemonic relationships in 
which China, a rising power, is supplying export products and loans to the United States, the 
existing hegemon.
154
  This symbiotic relationship is unsustainable and its inevitable 
implosion, as will be explored in Chapter Seven, is likely to have profound consequences for 
international relations in Northeast Asia.  
 
Conflict: Taiwan, Korean Peninsula and Japan 
Central to China‘s grand strategy is the reincorporation of Taiwan.  Domestically, the 
Chinese Communist Party has staked considerable political capital in announcing that it will 
reclaim Taiwan by force if Taipei unilaterally declares independence.  Nationalism and 
growing prosperity have become the legitimising paradigms of the Chinese Communist Party 
as it has moved away from communism as the organising principle of the state.  
Reincorporation of Taiwan is the cornerstone of the nationalist agenda; failure to deliver on 
that promise would constitute an irreparable loss of face for the government and delegitimise 
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its rule.  According to Wang Jisi, many Chinese feel that China‘s revival would be 
meaningless and incomplete if the mainland failed to reincorporate Taiwan.
155
 
 
In the past, Taiwan was a symbol in Chinese eyes of American efforts to contain China.  
During the 1990s, analysts suggested that Taiwan could provide the US with an ―unsinkable 
aircraft carrier‖ close to the Chinese mainland from which it could threaten the crucial 
economic zones along China‘s coastal fringe.  Taiwan‘s location relative to the Chinese 
mainland is such that it could readily serve as a naval and air base from which the United 
States could cut off maritime movement along the northern Chinese coastline between the 
South China Sea and East China Sea.
156
  In current discourse, however, the ―unsinkable 
aircraft carrier‖ metaphor has declined in relevance for two reasons: first, an unsinkable 
aircraft carrier is also an ―immovable‖ one, moored permanently off the Chinese coast and 
vulnerable to a vast barrage of missiles.  Second, with bases in South Korea, Japan and 
Guam, and three aircraft carrier groups in the region, Washington is already strategically well 
placed in the East Asian littoral and does not need Taiwan as an ―unsinkable aircraft 
carrier.‖157   
 
Several other factors seem to support the view that the US is attempting to contain China.  
The hub-and-spokes alliance relationships with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, which 
demonstrate an American dominance of the East Asian littoral, along with American basing 
agreements with Central Asian and Southeast Asian states and the US-India agreement, give 
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the impression the United States is surrounding China with military installations.
158
  Also, 
Washington‘s controversial US ballistic missile defence system—the National Defence 
Initiative—could be construed as a first strike weapon because if operational it would cancel 
out Sino-American mutually assured destruction by eliminating the ability of the Chinese to 
retaliate to an American nuclear first strike.
159
  Improved tactical nuclear weapons and 
delivery systems reinforce this perception.   
 
China‘s alliance with North Korea must be seen in this context.  North Korea‘s expansive 
military has in effect provided China with a critical buffer that limits US freedom of action in 
Northeast Asia.  Shen Dingli contends that the US is in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis 
North Korea: the 90,000-strong force of American military personnel in South Korea and 
Japan fall well below the numerical strength of the DPRK armed forces.  Though 
technologically inferior, the North Korean military possesses sufficient short-range missiles 
and artillery pieces to cause significant damage and casualties to civilian and American 
military targets in South Korea.
160
  The North‘s overall military capability is robust enough to 
deter a US attack, which substantially reduces the possibility that China will have to face 
American troops across the Yalu and Tumen Rivers.  Were North Korea to fall into US/ROK 
hands, the eventual outcome could lead to a grand US-backed anti-China alliance of Japan, 
South Korea, North Korea and Taiwan.  In that scenario, the Communist Party‘s promise to 
reclaim Taiwan would be nigh impossible to fulfil.  North Korea‘s military capability is 
strong enough to warrant a sizeable American deterrent force in South Korea, tied up well 
away from China‘s core strategic zone along the Taiwan Strait.  Pyongyang‘s nuclear 
capability restricts the US military‘s options for action on the Korean peninsula, which also 
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limits US policy choices regarding Taiwan.  The North Korean buffer has also allowed China 
to reduce its military deployments in the northeast in order to focus more directly on other 
critical regions, including the Taiwan Strait.
161
 
 
China‘s other great strategic concern is its rivalry with Japan and the prospect of normalised 
Japanese statehood, culminating in remilitarisation.  At face value, US withdrawal from 
Japan should be welcomed in Beijing, given the fear of American power documented above 
and given that economic interdependence between China and Japan has grown considerably 
over the last two decades.  This is not the case, however, as Sino-Japanese relations continue 
to be dogged by the legacy of Japanese imperialism during the first half of the twentieth 
century, as evidenced by the propensity of Chinese analysts to view Japan with a venom and 
distrust rarely articulated in their attitudes to the United States.
162
  Beyond historic 
antagonism, Japanese remilitarisation will present China with a new set of strategic problems.  
A Japanese navy, free of Article 9 restrictions, would also complicate the Sino-Japanese 
dispute of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea, while a more assertive Japanese 
navy could tempt Tokyo to pursue unilateral resource development in the East China Sea.
163
  
Given Chinese antagonism to Japan, this development would be interpreted as hostile.   
 
In this context, North Korea‘s nuclear and ballistic missile capability is a liability to China‘s 
national security.
164
  North Korea‘s missile and nuclear tests have strengthened the position 
of hard-liners in Japan who have called for the reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Peace 
Constitution.  Japan‘s approach to its security interests has evolved in recent years, depending 
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less on the American security guarantee in favour of a more active defence policy involving 
force-projection capabilities, as evidenced by its participation in operations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.  In effect, the North‘s actions are accelerating the normalisation of Japanese 
statehood and militarisation of Japan‘s strategic posture, thus intensifying the Sino-Japanese 
strategic rivalry.  China‘s hierarchy of interests vis-à-vis the Korean peninsula is thus 
predicated on preventing regional instability resulting from North Korea‘s collapse and 
blunting regional strategic rivalry aggravated by provocative behaviour in Pyongyang.
165
 
 
Synthesis: Soft Balancing Against US Hegemony 
China‘s period of national shame between the First Opium War beginning in 1836 and the 
advent of the Deng Xiaoping era in 1978 has instilled in Chinese policymakers the 
importance of domestic social and political cohesion, necessarily resulting from a strong 
national economy.  China‘s economic miracle, achieved through domestic reform and 
integration into the global economy has enabled the Chinese Communist Party to consolidate 
its domestic position.  Beijing has utilised globalisation and participation within the US-led 
world economic order to consolidate its economic and political resurgence as a great power.  
However, the distasteful security implications of American hegemony and the suspicion that 
the United States is attempting to encircle China has led Beijing to hedge its bets by coupling 
its economic and institutional engagement within the structure of US hegemony with limited 
efforts to balance against encroachments of American power in its East Asian sphere of 
interest, and the drawing of a red line over the potential conflict point of Taiwan.  What has 
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resulted is a limited balance of power strategy—soft balancing—to grow its own power and 
limit US hegemonic influence in East Asia while American power is ascendant.
166
 
  
Russia 
Of the six states entwined within the Northeast Asian security environment, Russia is perhaps 
the least consequential.  As a great power, Russia is primarily oriented toward Europe and as 
such has had only a peripheral role in East Asian affairs since the Soviet collapse in 1991.  
Yet the geographic proximity of the Russian Far East dictates that Moscow play a role in 
Northeast Asian affairs.  Traditionally the Russian Far East has been a frontier region valued 
largely for its raw materials and considered strategically vulnerable to incursion from the 
southeast because of its sparse population and remoteness from European Russia.    
Consequently, Russia‘s goals in Asia are threefold: one, to integrate the Russian Far East into 
the Asian economy; two, to reduce tensions and prevent further conflict on the Korean 
peninsula; and three, to restore Russian influence in Northeast Asia as a whole.
167
  
 
Cooperation: Economic Development of the Russian Far East 
The Korean peninsula is the key to stimulating the economic development of the 
economically backward Russian Far East, due its geographic proximity and integration into 
the network of global trade.
168
  Specifically, Russia intends to establish energy networks and 
rail corridors through the Korean peninsula, linked to existing networks in Russia.  A state-
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owned Russian railway company plans to build a container terminal in the North Korean port 
city of Rajin, where goods shipped from South Korea could be unloaded for freighting along 
a land railway corridor to Europe.
169
  These proposals for transport and energy linkages are 
intended to serve two purposes: one, to lay the foundation for Russia‘s integration into the 
Northeast Asian economic network, and two, to gain leverage over Pyongyang in the Six 
Party Talks in order to exert more influence in the diplomatic arena.
170
  This ―constructive 
engagement‖ strategy is the key to providing provide Moscow with the economic and 
political influence it requires to again become an important regional player.
171
 
 
Competition and Conflict: The Cold War and Beyond 
One of the defining events of the Cold War was the Sino-Soviet split, when the goals and 
strategy of the Chinese Communist Party diverged from those of its ideological brethren in 
Moscow.  The split had many dimensions, but in part resulted from an ongoing border 
conflict along the disputed Sino-Russian frontier.  China claimed that the existing border was 
a relic of unequal treaties signed between the Qing government and Tsarist Russia during the 
nineteenth century, an assertion that was rejected in Moscow.  In March 1969, at the height of 
the split, a skirmish at Zhenbao Island on the Ussuri River brought Moscow and Beijing to 
the brink of war.
172
  Today, Russian planners fear that growth of Chinese power could lead to 
the Sinification of the geographically vulnerable Russian Far East.  Officially, it would 
remain a part of Russia but in practice could become incorporated economically, 
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demographically and militarily into the Chinese sphere of influence.
173
  Elizabeth Wishnick, 
however, argues that the Chinese demographic threat is often exaggerated by Russian 
politicians, particularly at the regional level, to obtain political leverage in electoral contexts.    
Yet regardless of the degree to which the ―yellow peril‖ is hyped for domestic political 
purposes within Russia, the fact remains that Moscow believes it can counter Sinification of 
the Russian Far East through economic development and the incorporation of the Russian Far 
East into the global economy.   
 
Because the topic has received such extensive coverage in the international relations 
literature, little has to be said about the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet 
Union that lasted from 1945 until the collapse of the USSR in 1991.  While the two 
superpowers never engaged each other in military conflict directly, both were involved in a 
series of proxy wars where one power either fought directly against a local adversary, or by 
proxy in supporting duelling parties in internecine conflicts.  Needless to say, Moscow‘s 
hostility to US hegemony did not evaporate with the conclusion of the Cold War.  Post-Soviet 
Russia continues to be wary of American encroachments into its traditional spheres of 
influence in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Northeast Asia.  Therefore, the loss of North 
Korea into the US sphere of interest in the event of regime transformation or collapse would 
be an unwelcome development for Moscow.  Russia views North Korea as the key to its 
diplomatic and political resurgence; it was the rationale for Moscow‘s involvement in the 
presently defunct Six Party Talks as well as a useful deterrent against American hegemonism 
in the region.
174
  Consequently, Russian planners generally favour regional relationships that 
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foster the peaceful economic development of North Korea.
175
  With a peaceful North Korea 
secured, the development of the Russian Far East would be made all the more practical. 
 
Russia‘s posture in Northeast Asia could have a demonstrative effect for its relations with 
other frontier states in its ―near abroad.‖  As such, it does not serve Moscow‘s interests to 
join a united front with the United States against North Korea, or to participate in any 
punitive US-led coalition against the DPRK.  To do so would encourage the perception that 
Russia is incapable of defending its own interests and in the eyes of officials in Moscow, 
would invite instability in other regions along the Russian frontier.
176
  More broadly, Russia 
has an interest in restraining US freedom of action in Northeast Asia.  Moscow wishes to 
ensure that the United States works to solve its problems with North Korea diplomatically 
and does not attempt to bring down the Kim regime by force, with the attendant problems this 
will bring.
177
  Like China, Russia opposed tough sanctions against North Korea following the 
North‘s October 2006 nuclear test and both are contesting American plans for theatre and 
strategic missile defence systems.
178
  More generally, Washington‘s unilateralist approach to 
foreign affairs has disturbed Russia and China, a common interest that has led both countries 
into a strategic cooperative relationship in spite of the fact that the two countries have been 
traditional rivals.
179
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With numerous potential conflict zones on its western and southern borders, Russia has an 
interest in preserving the status quo.  The reunification of Korea would raise a number of 
awkward strategic consequences for Russia.  Moscow shares with Beijing concerns that the 
implosion of North Korea could generate a large refugee flow, pushing masses of displaced 
people over the Tumen River into Russia, as well as the prospect that a unified Korea allied 
with the United States is likely to lead to the installation of US military forces near its frontier 
with Korea.
180
  Alternatively, a unified Korea that aligns with China to balance a 
remilitarising Japan would stoke the traditional Sino-Russian rivalry and increase China‘s 
strategic advantage over Russia.  This would force Moscow to confront a number of difficult 
strategic choices: it could adjust to Chinese hegemony as a junior partner, form a balancing 
coalition with Japan against China, or even join with Japan and the United States to balance 
China.
181
  It seems clear that none of these choices is palatable to the Russian leadership.  
 
Synthesis: Carving Out a Niche in Northeast Asia  
Russia‘s strategy in Northeast Asia is driven by the desire to develop the far east of the 
country.  To do this, it must incorporate its Far East region into the Northeast Asia economy 
and re-inject itself as an important player in Northeast Asia diplomacy.  A stable Korean 
peninsula is the key to this strategy and it is the United States‘ rigid stance on North Korea‘s 
nuclear proliferation which is the major obstacle to its fulfilment.  Consequently, what we see 
from Russia are subtle moves to check US regional influence by rejecting tough punitive 
sanctions against North Korea in the Six Party Talks, in concert with China, and the pursuit 
of economic linkages with both Koreas.  In sum, Russia, as much as the other protagonists, is 
engaged in the great game of regional strategic competition. 
                                                 
180 HA, Y.-C. 2002. The Dynamics of Russian-South Korean Relations and Implications for the Russian Far East. In: THORNTON, J. & 
ZIEGLER, C. (eds.) Russia’s Far East: A Region at Risk. Seattle and London: National Bureau of Asian Research. p. 407. 
181 MENON, R. & ZIEGLER, C. Ibid.The Balance of Power and US Foreign Policy Interests in the Russian Far East. pp. 40-41. 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
 277 
 
Conclusion 
As a practical expression, international relations theory manifests in various forms of 
cooperation, competition and conflict between regional states: cooperation embraces liberal 
ideas of economic interdependence and international institutionalism as drivers of peace, as 
well as the constructivist notion that participation in multilateral institutions fosters learned 
behaviours of peaceful interaction among states.  Conflict includes clashes at the level of 
rhetoric, such as differences in soft power and hyper-nationalism that are recognisable to 
constructivists, as well as alliance building and military engagement that realists see as 
inevitable outcomes of the regional security dilemma.  Competition incorporates elements of 
cooperation and conflict, in which the conflicting economic and security interests force states 
to adopt hedging strategies.  Where one state becomes overly powerful within this dynamic, 
realist impulses find expression in balancing strategies. 
 
The analysis in this chapter makes clear that all of Northeast Asia‘s players are engaged in 
competition, adopting strategic hedging as their modus operandi.  Indeed, none is a strictly 
status quo power: China‘s star is on the rise as the United States attempts to prevent the rise 
of a peer competitor.  Japan is edging toward normalisation while Russia is attempting to 
increase its role in the region.  South Korea is attempting to alter economic and political 
conditions within the DPRK in anticipation of future national reunification, while 
simultaneously navigating between the competing economic and security imperatives of its 
relationships with China and the United States.  And within this morass, North Korea has 
become a nuclear power.  Indeed, this intrinsic strategic competition is the foundation upon 
which regional states have attempted to craft strategies to address the North Korean nuclear 
threat. 
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The strategic significance of the Korean peninsula varies for each of the regional players, 
creating substantial divergence in attitudes to North Korea‘s nuclearisation and important 
differences that are evident in the commitment of each player to nonproliferation initiatives.  
The lack of regional consensus on how to deal with North Korea that derives from these 
differing perspectives gives Pyongyang a great deal of leverage in nuclear diplomacy.  The 
North Korean leadership is adept at exploiting the divisions between regional states and 
playing wedge diplomacy to bring alliance partners to disagreement, both of which 
strengthen their leverage in regional diplomacy.  Between the inherent differences in the 
strategic outlook of regional states and Pyongyang‘s active cultivation of these cleavages, it is 
little wonder that denuclearisation strategies have ultimately failed.  The following chapter 
will document these failures in detail, in the context of cooperation, competition and conflict, 
and thus set the scene for the mapping of scenarios for the future of the denuclearisation 
agenda that is more realistic than the many optimistic predictions of denuclearisation success. 
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8. The Failure of Denuclearisation Strategies 
 
Regional states do not possess practical military solutions or the economic leverage, be it 
individually or as a collective, to compel North Korea to denuclearise.  As the previous 
chapter has demonstrated, regional states have specific and differing priorities that shape their 
interactions with neighbouring countries.  Consequently, their strategies for addressing the 
North Korean nuclear issue must fit into this wider strategic matrix.  In the context of 
cooperation, competition and conflict, this chapter will outline the menu of nonproliferation 
stratagems considered by regional states as tools to secure North Korea‘s denuclearisation, 
describing the intended outcomes and problems of implementation for each.  Strategic 
conflict has not been a productive avenue for progress; military options have proven to be 
unviable in the absence of a catalysing event such as a North Korean attack over the DMZ.  
Regional strategic competition has been unhelpful in the Korean context, due to the inevitable 
disunity of purpose described in the previous chapter expressing itself in often incompatible 
ad hoc bilateral efforts to pressure or engage with Pyongyang.  Cooperative strategies have 
shown greater promise through evolving multilateral engagement initiatives.  Efforts to 
engage North Korea through the Six Party Talks, to secure nuclear relinquishment in 
exchange for a raft of incentives, have achieved the most constructive progress, though 
tangible results have fallen well short of expectations for successful denuclearisation.  
Ultimately, North Korea‘s unwillingness to dismantle its nuclear program, combined with the 
failure of collective denuclearisation strategies, may compel regional states to adapt to the 
reality of a nuclear DPRK. 
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Conflict Strategies: An Exercise in Unreality 
The Korean peninsula is one of Northeast Asia‘s potential conflict hot spots.  This remains so 
as a relic of the Korean War; although an armistice was reached in July 1953, no formal 
peace treaty has since been formalised between the belligerent parties, who technically 
remain at war.  Throughout the Cold War, the stark ideological division between the two 
Koreas was a zero sum contest in which North Korea‘s unique brand of communism vied 
with South Korea‘s US-inspired capitalism for legitimacy as the heir to a unified Korea.  
These systems remain mutually incompatible and continue to make coexistence, let alone 
reunification, an extremely difficult proposition.  This contest is embodied on the ground by 
the DMZ, the most heavily fortified frontier in the world today.  The North Korean military 
continues to face off against the combined might of South Korean and US forces.  If any 
place in North Korea is vulnerable to an outbreak of armed confrontation between states, this 
is it. 
 
Regime Change 
Regime change encompasses options for removal of the Kim regime over the short and long-
term.  In general, regime change allows a state to solve its problems with a troublesome 
adversary by removing its leadership and replacing it with a less offensive ruling clique.
1
  In 
the North Korean case, advocates argue, the only realistic way to eradicate the North‘s 
proliferation threat is to remove the Kim regime itself.
2
  The necessity arises, from this 
perspective, because the Kim regime is inherently irrational and that without its removal there 
                                                 
1 HAASS, R. 2005. Regime Change and its Limits. Foreign Affairs, 84, p. 67. 
2 BOLTON, J. 2008. Standoff at the 38th Parallel: One Korea . The National Interest, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20094 
[Accessed 12 February 2009].  
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is unlikely to be any semblance of long-term security on the Korean peninsula.
3
  They cite a 
number of reasons, including: the threat to global security of North Korea‘s nuclear 
capability; the Kim regime‘s terrible human rights record; and the remoteness of internal 
change in North Korea as evidence that the removal of the Kim regime is the only sensible 
course of action. 
 
In the short run, the military defeat of North Korea in war would be the quickest route to 
regime change.  Robert Ayson and Brendan Taylor suggest that the costs of war may not be 
as bad as living with the threat of a rogue nuclear North Korea that continues to defy the 
international community.  Thus, they suggest, war may be the least-worst option for 
removing the nuclear threat.
4
  Nuclear nonproliferation theory posits that any spread of 
nuclear weapons represents a blow to the stability of the international system, regardless of 
the context of specific cases.  The key assumption is that the probabilities of nuclear weapons 
use increases as more countries acquire nuclear weapons capability.  Because new nuclear 
powers predominate, nuclear deterrence and mutually assured destruction (MAD) will prove 
insufficient to prevent nuclear conflict in the international system.
5
  In an influential 1999 
review of US policy on North Korea, William Perry suggested that nuclear weapons and 
long-range missiles in the hands of the DPRK could weaken regional deterrence postures and 
increase the damage to South Korea and Japan if deterrence failed.
6
  According to this view, 
the ―strategic immaturity‖ of a new nuclear state such as North Korea could hinder its ability 
                                                 
3 GENSER, J. 2006. Stop Pyongyang‘s Autogenocide. Far Eastern Economic Review, 169, p. 16; HAVEL, V., BONDEVIK, K. M. & 
WIESEL, E. 2006. Failure to Protect: A Call to the UN Security Council to Act in North Korea. Washington DC: US Committee for Human 
Rights in North Korea, http://www.hrnk.org/failureToProtect-Report.pdf; HAWK, D. 2003. The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s 
Prison Camps. Washington DC: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, http://www.hrnk.org/HiddenGulag.pdf 
4 AYSON, R. & TAYLOR, B. 2004. Attacking North Korea: Why War Might Be Preferred. Comparative Strategy, 23, p. 275. 
5 O'NEIL, A. 2005. Learning to Live with Uncertainty: The Strategic Implications of North Korea‘s Nuclear Weapons Capability. 
Contemporary Security Policy, 26, p. 323.   
6 PERRY, W. 1999. A Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations. Washington DC: United States 
Department of State.  p. 3. 
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to maintain stability during crises with other nuclear powers, strengthening their inclination 
to use nuclear weapons.   
 
In an extreme proposition of wishful thinking, Ted Galen Carpenter suggests that the US 
exploit the ―distinct undertone of exasperation with Pyongyang‖ felt by policymakers in 
Beijing in inducing China to topple the Kim regime and install a more pragmatic government 
in North Korea, one that would keep the country nuclear weapons-free.
7
  That this plan has 
even been considered is an acknowledgement of Washington‘s lack of economic and 
diplomatic leverage and inability to bring military pressure to bear on the North.  However, it 
is foolhardy to believe that China would risk the stability of a strategically important 
neighbouring state for Washington‘s nonproliferation agenda, or that any client regime 
installed by Beijing would be friendly to American interests. 
 
Advocates of regime change through war argue that the diplomatic track has exhausted itself 
in the face of North Korean provocations that demonstrated intent to preserve their nuclear 
program.  Because they believe, with justification, that the North Koreans are purposefully 
developing their nuclear capability at any cost, to delay action is to grant Pyongyang time to 
expand its arsenal, increasing the nuclear threat.  Therefore, it would be prudent to intervene 
sooner before the threat grows beyond control.
8
  This premise is enunciated in the US 
National Security Strategy of 2002: 
If necessary, however, under long-standing principles of self defence, we do not rule out 
the use of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place 
of the enemy‘s attack. When the consequences of an attack with WMD are potentially so 
                                                 
7 GALEN CARPENTER, T. 2009. A Bold Plan B for North Korea . Washington DC: Cato Institute, 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10124 [Accessed 01 May 2009]. 
8 AYSON, R. & TAYLOR, B. 2004. Attacking North Korea: Why War Might Be Preferred. Comparative Strategy, 23, pp. 263-64; WIT, J., 
PONEMAN, D. & GALLUCCI, R. 2004. Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, Washington DC, Brookings Institution 
Press. p. 382. 
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devastating, we cannot afford to stand idly by as grave dangers materialize. This is the 
principle and logic of pre-emption.
9
 
The implication here is that rogue states are determined to acquire WMD to threaten or attack 
American interests.  To prevent such an eventuality, the US must take action to dismantle an 
adversary‘s WMD capability before it becomes operational.  If the expected price of peace is 
higher than the potential costs of conflict, doing nothing would leave the US and its allies 
vulnerable to growing relative inferiority vis-à-vis the rogue enemy.
10
   
 
This doctrine reflects a tendency to infer the intentions of an adversary from their 
capabilities, which can lead military officials and policy makers to exaggerate the risk posed 
by an enemy.
11
  American officials have consistently tarred the leaders of ―rogue states‖ with 
the label of irrationality.  This includes President George W Bush who labelled rogue state 
leaders as commanders of ―outlaw regimes‖ who ―accept no morality and have no limit to 
their violent ambitions.‖12  Andrew Linklater posits, ―the language of evil carries the obvious 
implication that there is nothing in the behaviour of the victims or the wider society which 
could be said to explain—or to have contributed to—the acts of violence.‖13  Instead, the 
language of evil attributes undeterrable irrationality to rogue state behaviour, generating 
strategic choices on the part of the US that favour the use of force over diplomacy.  If 
inherent irrationality is the explanation for the regime‘s violation of nuclear freeze 
                                                 
9 2006k. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. In: WHITEHOUSE, U. S. D. O. T. (ed.). Washington DC: United 
States National Security Council, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf. p . 23. 
10 CHA, V. 2002a. Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula. International Security, 27, p. 48. 
11 O'NEIL, A. 2005. Learning to Live with Uncertainty: The Strategic Implications of North Korea‘s Nuclear Weapons Capability. 
Contemporary Security Policy, 26, p. 323. 
12 BUSH, G. W. 2002. President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly - September 12, 2002 . US Department of the 
Whitehouse, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html [Accessed 17/7/03 2003]. 
13 LINKLATER, A. 2002. Unnecessary Suffering. In: BOOTH, K. & DUNNE, T. (eds.) Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of 
Global Order. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. p. 308.  See also: BLEIKER, R. 2003. A rogue is a rogue is a rogue: US foreign policy and the 
Korean nuclear crisis. International Affairs, 79, p. 721. 
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agreements, use of limited belligerent actions to engineer crises, and mistreatment of its own 
citizens, then military action is the only rational response.
14
     
 
These claims are not credible in the North Korean context; the window of opportunity for 
preventive military action has closed since North Korea has demonstrated a nuclear weapon 
capability, and it is not obvious that the costs of deterring the DPRK would be greater than 
the cost of war.  For Leon Sigal, military action was not even a serious threat in 1994 at the 
height of the first nuclear crisis.
15
  The potential devastation caused by full-scale war on the 
Korean peninsula would be immense.  The Seoul metropolitan area is located approximately 
forty kilometres from the DMZ and is hostage to North Korean artillery and missile batteries 
dug into forward positions.
16
  A US attack increases the chances that North Korea will use 
their WMD assets, be they nuclear, chemical or biological; according to high-ranking North 
Korean defector Cho Myung-chul, the North would use everything in its arsenal in the event 
of war.
17
  North Korea maintains a standing army of one million personnel, backed by up to 
six million reserves, giving it a huge numerical advantage over combined US/ROK forces.  
Estimates of civilian and military casualties in the event of war are very high due to the 
population density of probable target areas in North and South Korea, coupled with the 
probability of considerable damage to residential areas and important infrastructure.  The 
United States could not assure success in an attack without heavy cost.  Placing its allies in 
                                                 
14 LITWAK, R. 2003. The New Calculus of Pre-emption. Survival, 44, p. 56; HOYT, P. 2000. The ‗Rogue State‘ Image in American Foreign 
Policy. Global Society, 14, p. 309. 
15 SIGAL, L. 1998. Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea, Princeton Princeton University Press. p. 9. 
16 These include five hundred 170 Koksan artillery pieces and two hundred multiple-launch rocket systems.  The artillery pieces alone could 
rain up to 500,000 rounds per hour against South Korean targets.  See: O'HANLON, M. 2005. Defense Strategy for the Post-Saddam Era, 
Washington DC, The Brookings Institution. p. 101; PINKSTON, D., MOLTZ, C., DIAMOND, A., LIEGGI, S. & YUAN, J. 2005. Special 
Report on the North Korean Nuclear Weapons Statement. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/pdf/050211.pdf. p . 10; SAUNDERS, P. 2003. Military Options for Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear 
Program . Center for Nonproliferation Studies, http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/korea/dprkmil.htm [Accessed 17 May 2006]. 
17 Quoted in BANDOW, D. 2003. Wrong War, Wrong Place, Wrong Time: Why Military Action Should Not Be Used to Resolve the North 
Korean Nuclear Crisis. CATO Institute, http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb76.pdf. p . 6. 
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South Korea and Japan unnecessarily in harm‘s way could do irreparable damage to those 
alliances and fatally weaken America‘s position in Northeast Asia.   
 
Public opinion in the United States will play a role in the likelihood of American military 
action against North Korea.  Echoing the democratic peace theory, John S. Park and Lee 
Dong-sun argue that given that over 61 percent of Americans surveyed in December 2006 
believed the Iraq war was not worth fighting after combat deaths had surpassed 3,000 and the 
cost of the war had reached US$350 billion, the negative public backlash against a far more 
costly and deadly conflict in Korea is likely to be more extreme.
18
  It is questionable whether 
the US government could convince the American public to support such a war in the absence 
of a direct attack by North Korea on the United States or one of its allies, especially while its 
forces remain engaged in ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  As Zbigniew Brzezinski has 
noted, the economic self-denial and human sacrifice necessary to win a major war are 
―uncongenial to democratic instincts.‖19 
 
A war on the Korean peninsula is likely to displace a large number of people.  To a 
significant degree, the refugee issue explains why Seoul has cooled on the idea of the rapid 
reunification with North Korea.  The South Korean government has had problems in 
integrating North Korean defectors into a South Korean society radically different from their 
own.  Defectors have struggled with the competitive nature of life in a market-driven society, 
lacking the skills necessary to function in a competitive, technological employment market, 
and the experience to handle money and make wise consumption decisions amongst a sea of 
product choices.
20
   Many suffer from psychological trauma, including post-traumatic stress, 
                                                 
18 PARK, J. S. & LEE, D.-S. 2008. North Korea: Existential Deterrence and Diplomatic Leverage. In: ALAGAPPA, M. (ed.) The Long 
Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press. p. 280. 
19 BRZEZINSKI, Z. 1997. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York, Basic Books. p. 36. 
20 KIM, S. 2006c. The Mirage of A United Korea. Far Eastern Economic Review, 169, p. 13. 
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which further impedes their ability to integrate into South Korean society.
 21
  South Korean 
officials expect the cost of social services, re-skilling and accommodation of the vast number 
of refugees in the event of reunification to be enormous, with estimates varying widely from 
US$25 billion to upwards of US$3.5 trillion.
22
  The low-end estimates tend to adopt narrow 
methodologies for calculating the overall cost, while the high-end estimates are more diligent 
in factoring in the broad array of programs necessary for reunification in their final figure.  
For these reasons, the South Korean government now favours a long-term strategy of 
reunification via slow economic integration with a view to improving the North Korean 
economy to reduce the eventual cost of reintegration. 
 
Rapid regime change would represent a strategic blow for China.  Like the South Koreans, 
the Chinese government fears the economic and social consequences of incorporating large 
flows of refugees from the North.  The Chinese worry that a large refugee influx into its 
northeastern provinces would stifle the economic development of these areas and stoke the 
fires of social unrest.
23
  China has become a destination for large inflows of investment from 
South Korea, which is likely to dry up in the event of reunification because South Korean 
companies may redirect investment toward reconstruction projects in the North.
24
  A North 
Korea occupied by the American military would also represent a strategic defeat for Beijing.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the DPRK functions as a buffer zone for China along its 
northeastern frontier, keeping US forces occupied and focussed, to some degree, away from 
the Taiwan Strait.  For these reasons, China vehemently opposes any plans by the United 
States to remove the Kim regime by force. 
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Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Among North Korean Defectors in South Korea. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 18, pp. 147-154. 
22 COGHLIN, D. 2008. Prospects from Korean Reunification. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute – US Army War College, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB859.pdf. p . 3. 
23 SCOBELL, A. & CHAMBERS, M. 2005. The Fallout of a Nuclear North Korea. Current History, 104, p. 292. 
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For the sake of argument, consider a hypothetical scenario that the window for preventive 
military action is open and the costs of war are not prohibitively high.  Would the United 
States be in a position launch a war against North Korea?  Washington has for some time 
planned for the contingency of fighting two regional wars simultaneously, the 1-4-2-1 force-
planning framework.  According to this conception, the US military should be capable of 
defending the continental United States, maintain a military presence and deterrent capability 
in four foreign theatres, and fight two wars simultaneously, winning one decisively.
25
  The 
US military should be capable of winning one of these wars decisively, followed by regime 
change and occupation of the enemy state.  To prosecute a successful war of regime change 
against North Korea, the US would require hundreds of thousands of troops, along with ROK 
forces, to overcome the KPA and pacify the country.
26
  However, the United States cannot 
deploy that number of troops while engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, because US military 
commitments in the Middle East reduce potential American strike and intelligence 
capabilities on the Korean peninsula and limit the number of troops that could be deployed.
27
  
The heavy involvement of US forces in the Middle East reduces the chances of applying 
military pressure against the Kim regime or convincing regional states that it is serious about 
this possibility.
28
  With pre-existing engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US is 
extremely unlikely to consider military action against North Korea concurrent with these 
operations.
29
 
 
                                                 
25 2006p. Quadrennial Defense Review. In: DEFENSE, U. D. O. (ed.). Washington DC: US Department of Defense, 
http://www.qr.hq.af.mil/pdf/2006%20QDR%20Report.pdf. p . 38.  See also: O'HANLON, M. 2005. Defense Strategy for the Post-Saddam 
Era, Washington DC, The Brookings Institution. p. 7. 
26 O'HANLON, M. 2005. Defense Strategy for the Post-Saddam Era, Washington DC, The Brookings Institution. p. 102. 
27 SAUNDERS, P. 2003. Military Options for Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Program . Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 
http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/korea/dprkmil.htm [Accessed 17 May 2006].  
28 ROZMAN, G. 2007. The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and US Strategy in Northeast Asia. Asian Survey, 47, p. 603. 
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Slow Motion Regime Change: Containment 
In the long run, regime change could be fomented in slow-motion through the strangulation 
of the North Korean economy, embodied in a policy of containment.  Containment strategy 
emerged in the US at the beginning of the Cold War to thwart the ideological expansion of 
communism into post-colonial states and the territorial ambitions of the Soviet Union.  It is a 
broad strategy that attempts to enclose and restrict the actions of a target state with the aim of 
precipitating internal political changes or hastening the collapse of its ruling regime.
30
  The 
adoption of containment is an implicit acknowledgement of the limits of coercive power in a 
given strategic context.
31
  During the Cold War, the approximate strategic parity between the 
two superpowers mitigated against either one pressing for a military victory over the other.  
The primary goal of American containment doctrine during the Cold War, according to John 
Lewis Gaddis, was to ―foster the seeds of destruction‖ within the Soviet system so that the 
Kremlin was forced, at a minimum, to modify its behaviour to conform to generally accepted 
international standards.
32
  George Kennan, one of the architects of Cold War containment 
doctrine, was less obscure: ―What they [US government] and the others wanted from 
Moscow, with respect to the future of Europe, was essentially ‗unconditional surrender.‘  
They were prepared to wait for it.‖33  What this entailed was a costly arms race, a spending 
orgy that forced the Soviets to devote excessive economic resources to competition with the 
US.
34
  Many analysts believe that over time the excessive economic spending on its military, 
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31 KISSINGER, H. 1994. Reflections on Containment. Foreign Affairs.73, p. 130. 
32 GADDIS, J. L. 1982. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, New York, Oxford 
University Press. pp. 98-99. 
33 George Kennan, 1994, quoted in CUMINGS, B. 2004a. Decoupled from History: North Korea in the "Axis of Evil". In: ABRAHAMIAN, 
E., CUMINGS, B. & MA'OZ, M. (eds.) Inventing the Axis of Evil. New York: The New Press. pp. 45-46. 
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combined with a resource crisis and the economic inefficiencies inherent to its command 
economy undermined the Soviet state and accelerated its collapse.
35
   
 
Containment has become the default strategy for the United States in its relations with the 
DPRK.  The United States and ROK enjoy a significant advantage over North Korea in most 
facets of power.  However, this advantage is blunted by the North Korean nuclear deterrent, 
the lack of regional consensus on military action, the potential for catastrophic war that 
accompanies any use of coercive force, and the ineffectiveness of engagement in pursuing 
North Korea‘s nuclear relinquishment.  Because containment tends to involve foreign policy 
tools other than military force, the strategy will take time to achieve its ends.
36
  After all, if 
one accepts the argument that US containment was decisive in the fall of the Soviet Union, 
then it also pays to remember that the policy itself took over forty years to succeed. 
 
Containment has both a passive and an active dimension.  In the passive dimension—
strategic neglect—all Washington need do is wait patiently for the North Korean state to 
implode, allowing it to devote its attention to other theatres.
37
  In this instance, inaction is a 
strategy in itself and not an absence of policy.
38
  The forward deployments of US forces in 
South Korea and Japan, along with South Korea‘s indigenous military capability are intended 
to undercut the North Korean economy by forcing the regime to respond in kind, at an 
unsustainable rate of outlay.  The foundation position of the US is predicated on making 
North Korea expend as much of its resource base as possible on non-productive military 
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International Peace Non-Proliferation Project Roundtable . Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
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spending, on the assumption that the North‘s economic woes will eventually force it to make 
unilateral military concessions, or even cause the regime‘s implosion.39   
 
Such a policy makes sense if one believes that the regime is on the verge of collapse.  To be 
successful, it would also require a North Korea that is incapable of causing problems and 
creating crises in order to get Washington‘s attention.  Under the thematic heading ―benign 
neglect,‖ the Bush administration in 2001 attempted to differentiate its stance from that of 
former President Clinton by refusing to offer inducements to participate in negotiations.
40
  
Denuclearisation negotiations ground to a standstill and North Korea, accustomed to 
extracting concessions for its participation in diplomatic talks, found itself hung out to dry, 
which led directly to Pyongyang‘s October 2002 admission that it had a clandestine HEU 
program.  When confronted with the accusation from US Assistant Secretary of State James 
Kelly, the North could easily have issued a denial.  That it instead chose admission is a clear 
example of a conscious attempt to engineer a crisis that would get the world‘s attention.  This 
led to US-DPRK negotiations mediated by China, and then to the formation of the Six Party 
Talks, which provided Pyongyang with a new avenue through which to extract international 
largesse and forced the abandonment of neglect as a serious US strategy. 
 
Under strategic isolation, the aggressive variant, the US and its allies attempt to accelerate 
the timeline of DPRK regime collapse by economic strangulation and arms racing, 
undermining the North Korean economy by any means available, including through measures 
such as economic sanctions and naval interdiction of illegal exports.  The first administration 
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of President George W Bush adopted an approach known as called ―tailored containment‖ to 
strangle North Korea.  It aimed to isolate the DPRK by exposing it to continual economic and 
political pressure, with the assistance of the wider international community, to weaken 
Pyongyang‘s bargaining position and eventually force it to relinquish its nuclear program.41 
 
The US has saddled North Korea with a variety of economic sanctions since the Korean War, 
which have severely restricted the DPRK‘s trade to interaction with only a handful of 
countries, limiting its export income.
42
  Over time, the US has added certain measures, while 
some suspended periodically and then reintroduced, depending on the prevailing political 
winds.  The types of economic sanctions in place since 2000 are broad and varied.  They 
include heavy restrictions on North Korean exports, travel restrictions for US nationals 
intending to visit the DPRK, restrictions on exports of dual-use technologies to North Korea, 
sanctions applied to specific North Korean enterprises, prohibitions on US entities operating 
DPRK-flagged ships, and targeted actions against banks holding money laundered from 
North Korean criminal activities.
43
  Just such an action against Macau-based bank Banco 
Delta Asia in 2005 highlighted the importance of revenues from illicit sources to the regime‘s 
financial health.  Chinese authorities froze Banco Delta Asia‘s assets after a US Department 
of Treasury memo designated it as a ―money laundering concern,‖ leading to a run on the 
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bank.  Once the assets were frozen, Pyongyang walked away from the Six Party Talks and 
refused to resume negotiations until the funds were released.
44
 
 
The Banco Delta Asia affair was a minor victory for an otherwise ineffective strategy.  
Marcus Noland has found that the imposition of stricter economic sanctions by the United 
Nations Security Council—specifically in UNSC Resolution 1718—in the wake of the 
October 2006 nuclear test had no perceptible effect on North Korea‘s trade with China and 
South Korea.
45
  It was widely believed before the event that a nuclear test would be ruinous 
for North Korea‘s relations with its two largest trading partners, but this has not been the 
case.  China and Russia were reluctant signatories to UNSC 1718 and only signed on after the 
resolution was substantially watered down, a stance clearly in line with their preference for 
regime stability.  The South Korean government adopted a similar stance in the Six Party 
Talks, in line with their policy at the time of political accommodation with the North.  Two 
points become clear from this episode: the United States has minimal economic leverage over 
North Korea, and no system of economic sanctions can be effective without the active 
cooperation of China, South Korea and Russia.
46
  Indeed, sanctions cannot achieve the 
desired goals unless all potential supplier nations actively support the denial effort.  That 
Chinese opposition to robust enforcement has been critical here should not come as a 
surprise, given Beijing‘s strategic interest in maintaining the integrity of its northeastern 
border region.  As a consequence, there are virtually no conditions that would prompt Beijing 
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to cut off its assistance to the Kim regime.
47
  Moreover, given Washington‘s dependence on 
China to continue holding US Treasury bonds to fund the soaring American foreign debt, US 
officials are in no position to pressure Beijing into enforcing the sanctions regime more 
vigorously.
48
 
 
The effort to tighten the economic stranglehold on the Kim regime has found further 
expression in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  The PSI, launched by President 
Bush in May 2003, is a global naval interdiction effort aimed at disrupting the trafficking of 
WMD, their delivery systems and related components to and from states and non-state actors 
of proliferation concern.  In the North Korean case, it involves the selective targeting of ships 
outbound from North Korea to intercept cargoes of narcotics, missiles and weapons 
technology.
49
  The PSI was designed to achieve two objectives: (1) to stem the trade of North 
Korean ballistic missiles to other states hostile to the US, and (2) to further restrict North 
Korea‘s hard currency income by intercepting shipments on-route and deterring potential 
buyers from investing in a product that may not be delivered.  A shrinking market means 
diminished income for the regime, increasing the prospect of broader economic failure in the 
DPRK.
50
 
 
The PSI effort against North Korea has had limited success.  In June 2003, then US 
Undersecretary of State John Bolton declared that in the preceding two months PSI 
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operations had intercepted suspicious aluminium tubes on route to the DPRK, which could 
have been used as gas centrifuges in the uranium enrichment process, as well as a shipment 
of sodium cyanide, a possible component in chemical weapons production.  In June 2003, the 
Japanese government placed restrictions on ferries operating from North Korea that required 
mandatory inspections for PSI-related materiel, customs violations, and infectious diseases 
upon docking at any port in Japan.  Pyongyang responded by cancelling all ferries travelling 
between the two countries.
51
  Despite these efforts, however, the PSI has not had a significant 
effect in strangling North Korea‘s missile-related export income.   It is illuminating that 
China is not one of the 97 countries committed to the PSI, in keeping with its strategic 
commitment to regime perpetuation in the DPRK.
52
  Without Chinese participation, any naval 
blockade of North Korea is unlikely to succeed.
53
  Furthermore, the lower-risk transport route 
for North Korean exports to clients in the Middle East is overland through China, out of the 
reach of any naval blockade. 
 
The United Nations Security Council strengthened the interdiction regime in June 2009 
through UNSC Resolution 1874, which strengthened the PSI mandate to authorise all states to 
inspect any vessel from the DPRK for prohibited WMD-related items.
54
  Almost immediately 
however, the resolution was made to look like a paper tiger.  Chinese objections prevented an 
American destroyer from interdicting a North Korean cargo ship, the Kang Nam, which had 
been tracked from the North Korean port of Nampo en route to Myanmar.  The Chinese 
Foreign Ministry insistence that ―ample evidence and proper cause‖ are required for 
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enforcement of ship inspections is a clear signal of Beijing‘s intention not to strictly enforce 
the new interdiction regime.
55
   
 
The strategic isolation strategy embodied by economic sanctions and the PSI is unlikely to 
bring about North Korea‘s collapse.  If it was intended specifically as a nonproliferation tool 
to stop North Korea developing a nuclear weapon then it is already a failure; Pyongyang has 
the bomb because the timescale of successful strategic isolation is too distant compared with 
the short timeframe needed to develop nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems.
56
  
The lesson is clear: containment has been unsuccessful in denying North Korea the 
possession of nuclear weapons. 
 
Limited Military Action 
One military option that does not theoretically require regime change is the targeting of North 
Korea‘s nuclear facilities with surgical air strikes.  In the period leading up to North Korea‘s 
missile tests on 5 July 2006, Ashton Carter and William Perry suggested the United States 
could prevent a missile test and send a strong message to the DPRK leadership by surgically 
attacking the missile launch platform.
57
  The proposed token attack would have very little 
impact on North Korea‘s overall capability, but would send a strong message to the DPRK 
leadership demonstrating the consequences of further escalatory behaviour.  They contend 
that warning the DPRK of the impending strike and limiting the attack to the launch platform 
only will contain casualties and prevent escalation.  Furthermore, the North Korean 
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leadership would be paralysed by its desire for regime survival and would not retaliate, 
knowing the consequence of escalation would be the regime's downfall.
58
  The limited 
surgical strikes would not remove the nuclear threat, but would force North Korea back to the 
diplomatic arena of the Six Party Talks in a weakened bargaining position, improving the 
chances of a negotiated settlement to remove the North‘s nuclear program.   
 
These calls were echoed in Japan, where right wing politicians flagged the notion that strikes 
against North Korean missile facilities could be justified as pre-emptive self-defence and thus 
permissible under the restrictions of the Japanese constitution.  On 10 July 2006, Cabinet 
Secretary Abe Shinzo stated that Japan should discuss whether pre-emptive strikes against 
North Korean missile sites fell within Japan‘s constitutional right to self-defence.  A month 
later, the Subcommittee on Defence Policies in the Liberal Democratic Party‘s National 
Defence Division began a debate on the merits of Japan acquiring the capacity to attack ―a 
foreign enemy base.‖59  This prompted an angry response from the Chinese government, 
which through the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a pointed statement claiming that the 
remarks in Japan were ―extremely irresponsible‖ and aggravated tension in Northeast Asia, 
interfering with international diplomatic efforts.
60
 
 
There are three key criteria for successful military strikes.  First, military planners need to 
know the location of all facilities containing nuclear weapons, missile sites and related 
materials.
61
  Air strikes against the Yongbyon facility were considered during the most tense 
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moments of the first nuclear crisis in 1994, but were rejected due to doubts that the North‘s 
plutonium stockpile was all in the same place.
62
  Today, there are numerous sites around the 
country associated with the North‘s nuclear fuel cycle, as well as several other facilities 
thought to be located in fortified underground bunkers.   
 
This leads to the second key criteria: the capability must exist to destroy all of these targets.
63
  
North Korea has constructed an elaborate system of fortified underground facilities to protect 
all manner of military assets, including nuclear materials.  There is little point in trying to 
eliminate North Korea‘s nuclear capability with air strikes if these facilities are deep 
underground or cannot be located.  The Americans are developing new missiles that carry 
low-yield nuclear warheads capable of penetrating underground, though there are doubts as to 
whether these weapons will be powerful enough to be effective against North Korean 
underground installations.
64
  This detail is not so critical if the political aim of military strikes 
is merely to degrade the DPRK‘s capability as a warning against further proliferation.   
 
Finally, surgical air strikes are only viable if the risk of North Korean retaliation and 
escalation to war is minimal, as escalation is likely to lead to the type of carnage described 
above.
65
  An attack similar to Israeli strikes on Iraq‘s Osirak reactor in 1981 is not viable in 
the North Korean case.  As demonstrated in chapter four, Kim Jong-il would come under 
great domestic pressure to respond with force because of the dominance of the Korean 
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Peoples Army under Songun politics.
66
  Just as Carter and Perry have framed pre-emption as 
preferable to allowing a deteriorating balance of power with North Korea, so too could the 
North Korean leadership frame a limited strike as a losing scenario.  With the alternative 
being the potential loss of its nuclear deterrent, the North Koreans could well choose to 
escalate the conflict rather than acquiesce to American demands.
67
  Ayson and Taylor concur, 
suggesting that an initial surgical strike could provoke significant retaliatory action from the 
DPRK.
68
  Surgical military strikes appear therefore to be a high-risk bet with limited 
expected payoff, akin to playing Russian roulette with a gun squarely aimed squarely at the 
city of Seoul and its ten million inhabitants. 
 
Strategic Competition: Korea as a Regional Microcosm 
Bilateral Engagement 
The preceding paragraphs demonstrate two main points: desire for military intervention to 
denuclearise North Korea is largely the province of hawkish factions in the United States and 
to a lesser extent Japan, and that for a number of reasons military solutions are for the most 
part prohibitively impractical.  As noted earlier, regional states have contrasting viewpoints 
on the North Korean nuclear issue according to their differing strategic objectives in the 
wider Northeast Asian theatre.  All regional states have pursued some form of bilateral 
engagement with North Korea, though often for different ends, as one would expect in a 
regional security environment characterised by strategic competition.  For the United States, 
bilateral engagement grew from the realisation in 1994 that victory by military force would 
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be pyrrhic at best, a price too heavy to pay for its nonproliferation objectives.  For China, the 
motivation for engagement stems from its commitment to preserve North Korea as a buffer 
state.  For South Korea, reunification of the peninsula serves as the raison d’être for their 
engagement efforts, while for Japan the bilateral negotiations have been both a matter of 
national honour, in the case of the abduction issue, and a matter of enhancing national 
security by reducing the North Korean missile threat through normalisation of relations 
between the two countries. 
 
The United States: False Promise of Bilateralism 
The first opening of bilateral relations between the US and DPRK since the Korean War 
occurred in 1988 when the Reagan administration began easing trade restriction on the North, 
arguing that an isolated North Korea, abandoned by its traditional partners in the Soviet bloc, 
would be more dangerous than one plugged into the international community.  The two 
parties met again thirty-four times over the following five years, with North‘s Korea‘s 
demands focussing on US troop withdrawals from South Korea and the desire for a security 
treaty, while the US agenda included progress on North-South relations, addressing the 
North‘s nuclear and missile programs and ending Pyongyang‘s support for terrorism.69 
 
The thaw quickly froze over as the first nuclear crisis began brewing in 1992.
70
  In October 
1994, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework, which brought to an 
end the first Korean nuclear crisis.  The Agreed Framework obligated North Korea to freeze 
its reactor and related facilities at Yongbyon and safely store spent fuel from its 5MW(e) 
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reactor, subject to regular verification.  In exchange, the United States was to organise an 
international consortium—the Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO)—to build 
two proliferation-resistant light-water reactors to replace the graphite-core reactor at 
Yongbyon.  The US would offset the energy lost from the shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor 
with annual shipments of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil.
71
  While not ideal, the Agreed 
Framework brought the two protagonists to a workable compromise and allowed them to 
climb down from the brink of war.  As Joel Wit et al concede, negotiation seemed ―the least 
bad first option.‖72  
 
US bilateral engagement with the DPRK reached its apex with the 1994 Agreed Framework, 
which gradually fell apart over the 1990s as both sides engaged in hedging behaviour.  Lack 
of enthusiasm for the deal in Congress left the Clinton administration in a constant battle to 
secure funding for the heavy oil shipments.  Many American officials outside of the 
negotiating team were confident that the US could abrogate its side of the deal because North 
Korea would collapse prior to the implementation of their obligations.  Internationally, the 
Clinton administration struggled to find countries willing to fund KEDO beyond South Korea 
and Japan.  With such unsteady external and internal support, heavy oil shipments dropped 
well below promised levels and the light water reactor project fell badly behind schedule.
73
 
 
For its part, North Korea placed its own roadblocks to implementation of the Agreed 
Framework.  Provocations such as the 1996 submarine incursion into South Korean waters 
and the August 1998 ballistic missile launch over Japan were unhelpful in presenting an 
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image in Washington of Pyongyang as a reliable and trustworthy negotiating partner.  The 
discovery in satellite pictures of a secret underground chamber at Kumchang-ri in 1997, 
which Washington claimed was a nuclear weapons factory, fuelled fears of clandestine 
nuclear development in the North.  Although on later inspection the Kumchang-ri chamber 
was found to be harmless, the incident added to the perception that North Korea was cheating 
on the 1994 agreement.
74
  This suspicion was not without reason, according to Russian 
analyst Roald Savel‘yev, who suggested that the leadership in Pyongyang viewed KEDO and 
the Agreed Framework as a Trojan horse for the social and economic transformation of North 
Korea.
75
  Given the extreme caution and sometimes outright hostility shown by Pyongyang 
toward proposals for economic cooperation with regional state, Saval‘yev‘s  observation is 
probably accurate. 
 
A Grand Bargain 
In October 1999, the US State Department published a report by former Secretary of Defence 
William Perry, which reviewed US policy toward North Korea in light of the flagging Agreed 
Framework.  The Perry report recommended the US pursue a ―comprehensive and integrated 
approach‖ to negotiations with North Korea, in which the US would move to reduce the 
pressures that the North perceived as threatening, in a ―step-by-step and reciprocal fashion,‖ 
giving Pyongyang space to recover from the famine, develop economically and co-exist with 
the United States.
76
  For its contribution to this grand bargain, the United States would offer 
to normalise relations, relax economic sanctions and take other positive steps to provide 
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opportunity for the DPRK to integrate into the international community, in exchange for the 
North‘s elimination of its nuclear and long-range missile capability.77 
 
Other analysts seized on the idea of the grand bargain and offered their own versions.  
Michael O‘Hanlon expanded the catalogue of mutual pledges for consideration in 
negotiations.  In addition to eliminating its nuclear and missile threat, the North would be 
encouraged to continue to refrain from terrorism, participate in a human rights dialogue, 
cease participation in illicit activities such as drug smuggling and currency counterfeiting, 
sign and implement chemical and biological weapons conventions, and return all kidnapping 
victims to Japan.  For its part, the US would normalise relations with Pyongyang, remove 
economic sanctions, including removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of 
terrorism, sign a formal peace treaty ending the Korean War and provide a non-aggression 
pledge, including a binding promise of no first-use of WMD.
78
  That Pyongyang never 
seriously considered such a sweeping proposal should come as no surprise.  It seems 
inconceivable that the regime would relinquish its military deterrent, physical sources of 
leverage, sovereignty over internal security and accede to Washington‘s entire wish list in 
exchange for a paper security pledge and a few economic inducements for which its 
economic system was ill-adapted.
79
 
 
Some commentators argued that the United States could overcome this obstacle if it took 
concrete steps to address North Korea‘s perception of threat by withdrawing some or all of its 
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military presence from South Korea.  Doug Bandow contends that the US presence in Korea 
is a relic of the Cold War and unnecessary in the current environment.  According to 
Bandow, US withdrawal from Korea is desirable for three specific reasons: first, in his 
opinion, South Korea is capable of defending itself and does not require US assistance to 
deter North Korean aggression.  Second, Washington‘s alliance commitment in Korea is 
expensive, and with military spending contributing a large slice of the US deficit, the best 
way to cut costs would be to sacrifice superfluous overseas commitments such as the 
deployment of forces in South Korea.  Third, the continuing military presence in South Korea 
has caused a continuous list of grievances with the local population.  The US has an image 
problem with young South Koreans in particular, who tend to see the United States as a 
greater threat than the DPRK.
80
  Selig Harrison reasoned that the United States should 
gradually disengage most of its forces from South Korea over a ten year period, leaving 
behind a small non-combat presence that could facilitate the rapid reintroduction of combat 
forces in the event of conflict.  This redeployment would take place in concert with the 
simultaneous pullback of North Korean units forward deployed along the DMZ.  With 
Pyongyang‘s threat matrix taken into consideration, a negotiated settlement on 
denuclearisation would become far more practical.
81
   
 
In January 2003, the Russian government came up with its own grand bargain proposal.  This 
package incorporated four main points: (1) to guarantee a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, (2) 
to fulfil obligations of international agreements, including the 1994 Agreed Framework, (3) 
to guarantee the security of the DPRK, and (4) to resume humanitarian and economic 
programs.  Economic aid would include joint assistance to replace the KEDO light water 
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reactors promised in the Agreed Framework with non-threatening hydro-electric plants in 
order to address the North‘s energy shortages.82  This proposal went nowhere, largely due to 
the Bush administration‘s insistence at the time on complete and verifiable nuclear 
dismantlement as a precondition for negotiations.  
 
There are numerous objections to the grand bargain strategy.  The Kim regime may have 
backed itself into a corner and precluded a deal with Washington, because the extreme 
nationalism upon which the regime derives its legitimacy in the post-Kim Il-sung era has 
anti-Americanism as its foundation.  Without the external threat of American ―imperialism,‖ 
the ideological system will lose its basis for existence.
83
  Conservative commentators such as 
Nicholas Eberstadt and US officials like John Bolton have warned that the consecration of 
such a deal would set a dangerous global precedent, persuading hostile would-be proliferators 
that they could pursue nuclear weapons development in the knowledge that they could avoid 
punishment and even earn new rewards for promising to roll back their nuclear programs.
84
  
To uphold its global counter-proliferation objectives, the United States had to maintain a 
strong stance against Pyongyang.  Given the objections, talk of a grand bargain went 
nowhere. 
 
Hawk Engagement 
The hard line of those opposed to a grand bargain spawned a more robust approach to 
negotiation, described as hawk engagement.  Victor Cha coined the term, believing that the 
DPRK was more likely to launch a pre-emptive attack against South Korea if it felt 
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continually threatened.  To prevent this outcome, the US and its allies should engage 
conditionally with North Korea in order to decrease the likelihood of it lashing out against 
South Korea out of desperation.  According to Cha, engagement avoids the crystallisation of 
conditions under which Pyongyang could calculate hostile provocation as a rational course of 
action, even if victory were impossible.‖85  If North Korea were to ratchet up tensions in a 
manner consistent with the coercive bargaining strategy it has utilised in the past, the US 
would find it much easier to form a coalition for harder punitive measures, including military 
action.
86
  The danger of this approach is that negotiation assumes the mantle of a token 
gesture, thrown in up-front to couch threats of military intervention.  Unlike the grand 
bargain strategy, there is no provision here for alleviating North Korea‘s perception of threat 
and no confidence-building measures to build trust between Pyongyang and Washington.
87
  
More importantly however, the foundation of hawk engagement was the threat of violence 
against North Korea with a military option that was not credible.  As the Bush administration 
learnt to its detriment, issuing threats to Pyongyang that cannot be backed up damages 
Washington‘s bargaining position and international prestige. 
 
Failure of Bilateralism: A Lack of Leverage 
Between 1994 and 2003, Washington‘s bilateral denuclearisation negotiations with the 
DPRK suffered from two major drawbacks: first, disunity in Washington over the appropriate 
course of action led to weak political support for engagement measures and a lack of 
continuity.
88
  From Pyongyang‘s viewpoint, US engagement efforts appeared half-hearted, 
with all the elements of a strategic hedge.  Second, those advocating a hard line approach 
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kept referring to a military option that was, essentially, not on the table.  A carrot and stick 
approach only works if the stick is credible.  The likely condition of mutually assured 
destruction between North and South Korea in the event of conflict has erected an almost 
insurmountable barrier to American military action, absent the catalysing effect of a North 
Korean attack.  Not even Pyongyang‘s October 2006 nuclear test, a previously stated redline 
for military action, was sufficient to provoke forceful response from Washington.  As was 
mentioned earlier, economic sanctions have not been able to push Pyongyang to make 
meaningful concessions by strangling the regime‘s income stream.  In short, the US had a 
long list of demands but very little of equal value to offer in return and no means to enforce 
compliance.  For these reasons, Washington has had to enlist the help of the regional states in 
order to bring pressure to bear on North Korea in the multilateral forum of the Six Party 
Talks.   
 
China: As Close as Lips and Teeth? 
The People‘s Republic of China‘s relationship with the DPRK dates back to the Korean War 
when Mao ordered a million troops into the North after UN forces had driven the Korean 
communists north to the Yalu River.  That intervention formed an alliance in blood between 
China and the DPRK that has lasted to the present day, a relationship for Mao Zedong that 
was ―as close as lips and teeth.‖  The establishment of buffer zones along its frontier regions 
is a long-standing historic principle of Chinese strategy, as demonstrated by China‘s 
intervention in the Korean War.  Since that time, Beijing has maintained a security treaty 
with Pyongyang, promising to come to the aid of the North in the event it comes under 
attack.
89
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In recent times, however the Chinese security commitment to North Korea has come under 
revision, with some analysts describing North Korea as a net liability for China.  China has 
often found its security interests compromised by Pyongyang‘s provocative and 
confrontational policies.
90
  Given that economic development is China‘s highest national 
priority and that a peaceful regional environment is necessary to maintain this objective, the 
Kim regime‘s recurrent pattern of crisis engineering is an unnecessary impediment to 
regional stability.  China‘s burgeoning relationship with South Korea has helped in this 
regard and given Beijing some room to manoeuvre.  South Korea‘s accommodation with the 
North and its increasingly close relationship with China have allowed Beijing‘s Korea 
diplomacy to move beyond the zero-sum game of the Cold War in which improving relations 
with one Korean state inevitably came at the expense of the other.
91
  As the regional strategic 
environment has changed, so has China‘s security alliance with North Korea.  The Chinese 
government has reserved the right to interpret on a case-by-case basis its obligations under 
Article II of the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the 
two countries, outlining its commitment to defend North Korea in the event of armed attack.
92
  
Beijing has not withdrawn its security guarantee, but made its stance ambiguous to deter both 
armed aggression against North Korea and excessive military provocation by Pyongyang.  
However, the North‘s May 2009 nuclear test may have been one provocation too many; 
Korea experts in China‘s foreign policy establishment are now publicly warning against the 
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dangers of North Korea‘s nuclear gambit.93  John Tkacik disagrees, arguing that the tough 
talk of Chinese Foreign Ministry press releases, designed for foreign consumption, does not 
match the measured commentary of the Chinese language debate over the issue within China, 
nor do the actions of the Chinese government reflect any particular urgency in punishing 
Pyongyang.
94
 
 
This raises the question of influence within the Sino-North Korean alliance.  American 
analysts often claim that China has significant advantage over Pyongyang because China is 
North Korea‘s largest trade partner, its main source of foreign direct investment, supplier of 
ninety percent of the North‘s oil and donor of considerable quantities of food aid.95  Beijing‘s 
multi-dimensional assistance to the DPRK serves two purposes: first, it helps to prop up the 
Kim regime and prevent the economic collapse of the North Korean state.  Second, energy 
assistance gives China a degree of diplomatic leverage over Pyongyang, which it uses subtly 
to encourage North Korea‘s participation in denuclearisation negotiations.  Third, investment 
in mineral development projects is part of Beijing‘s wider effort to secure diverse supplies of 
mineral commodities from around the world to drive China‘s economic development.96 
 
On face value this appears to give Beijing a decisive edge in strategic power within the 
alliance, yet the maverick provocations periodically conducted by the Kim regime suggest 
that this strategic imbalance is exaggerated.  In fact, Pyongyang derives its own leverage 
from the importance China attaches to maintaining regional stability and preserving the North 
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as a buffer zone.  China‘s limited leverage over North Korea was evident in the following 
example: on the one hand, Beijing was able to bring North Korea back to the Six Party Talks 
in 2005 after a thirteen month hiatus, but on the other was unable to obtain advance 
information on Pyongyang‘s missile and nuclear tests in 2006.97  Within the alliance, North 
Korea‘s weakness has become a strength and provided Pyongyang with strategic 
manoeuvrability.  According to Shen Dingli, North Korea likely made the decision to conduct 
its 2006 nuclear test in the knowledge that Beijing is more concerned with preserving 
political stability on the Korean peninsula than it is with nuclear nonproliferation, a clear 
demonstration that the alliance is not one-sided.
98
  China‘s concern with regime stability was 
a key reason for its measured response to Pyongyang‘s 2009 nuclear test.99  Though China is 
on paper committed to defend North Korea, the North also provides China with a degree of 
security that Beijing is unlikely to jeopardise.  Despite North Korea‘s energy dependence on 
China, North Korea often employs asymmetric tactics to exploit Beijing‘s fear of regional 
instability and impeded economic growth.
100
  Therefore, one should not expect Chinese 
activism in pushing for North Korea‘s denuclearisation. 
 
South Korea and the Sunshine Policy 
Since the early 1990s, South Korea has pursued a policy of accommodation and economic 
engagement with the North, reaching its zenith as President Kim Dae-jung‘s Sunshine Policy.  
Kim Dae-jung first articulated the Sunshine Policy in a speech at the Heritage Foundation in 
Washington DC in September 1994, several years before his election as president.  Citing 
Aesop‘s fable on ―wind and sunshine,‖ Kim argued that sunshine would be more effective 
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than strong wind in bringing North Korea out of its isolation.
101
  South Korea‘s dramatic 
economic success relative to the North, coupled with the inexorable shift in the balance of 
power between the two states resulting after the end of the Cold War provided an opportunity 
for Seoul to pursue a new strategy for decreasing the threat of conflict across the DMZ and 
for facilitating reunification on South Korean terms.  Undergirding this new approach was a 
growing feeling that the imminence of the North Korean threat had declined since the fall of 
the USSR.  The threat instead would be economic: North Korea‘s rapid collapse would 
overwhelm the South with refugees and a crushing burden in the cost of reincorporating the 
North into a united Korea.
102
  Seoul thus approached bilateral engagement with Pyongyang 
with three related goals: (1) to gradually build trust through economic, humanitarian and 
security exchanges between the two countries; (2) provide aid to the North to help alleviate 
the food crisis and maintain political stability; and (3) attempt to stimulate economic 
development in the North within the rubric of economic exchange.  Its proponents hoped that 
unilateral gestures would prompt the regime to make concessions of its own and reduce 
tensions on the peninsula. 
 
The June Declaration signed at the 2000 DPRK-ROK summit in Pyongyang led to a number 
of confidence-building measures.  By March 2004, there had been thirteen rounds of North-
South ministerial talks, including a meeting of defence ministers, numerous economic 
negotiations and six rounds of discussions on the reunion of separated families.  
Symbolically, athletes from both countries entered the opening ceremony of the Sydney 
Olympics as a single team under a single flag.
103
  Talks and symbolism led to concrete 
results, with the South Korean government sending aid to the DPRK from 1995, supplied 
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through direct cash payments as well as shipments of food products such as grain (rice, corn, 
wheat, flour and dried milk), fertiliser, and electricity from the South Korean grid.
104
  
Economic exchange between the two Koreas is most visible in two joint venture projects 
located north of the DMZ: the Kaesong industrial precinct and the Kumgangsan tourist resort.  
Underlying these projects is the goal of exposing North Korea to capitalism and market-based 
economics in order to slowly transform the wider North Korean economy. 
 
Lack of Reciprocity 
Despite the best efforts of liberal governments in Seoul under Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-
hyun, North Korean reciprocity was not forthcoming, precisely because economic 
engagement had proven to be so transformative.  The DPRK regime pocketed the aid and 
profited from joint development projects, but showed little inclination to pursue economic 
reforms or make meaningful concessions in the Six Party Talks.  Support for government 
policies in any democratic society, South Korea included, ultimately hinges on the public 
perception that the policies concerned are effective in achieving their stated goals and 
advancing important national interests.  In the case of the Sunshine Policy, the payback for 
Seoul‘s largesse had become difficult to demonstrate in light of the North‘s continued 
military provocations, placing the Roh government under increasing pressure to back off 
from the Sunshine Policy and take a harder line with the Kim regime.
105
  Lee Myung-bak 
came to power in early 2008 promising to roll back unilateral engagement efforts and make 
further assistance conditional on reciprocal North Korean actions.  Lee has also re-
emphasised the importance of the US-ROK alliance as a hedge against the total breakdown of 
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the Six Party Talks.
106
  The North Korean response has been uncooperative, even hostile, and 
North-South relations are currently at their lowest ebb in over a decade.  In part this may be 
attributable to a belief in Pyongyang that the engagement rhetoric emanating from South 
Korea concealed a real desire among elites in Seoul to undermine the Kim regime and cause 
its collapse.
107
  In this context, further cooperation with South Korea was tantamount to 
accepting a Trojan horse.  For the North Korean regime, preserving the North‘s socio-
economic and political system was worth sacrificing the economic benefits of cooperation 
with the South.   
 
Japan: Elusive Normalisation 
Japan has embarked on a double-edged diplomatic approach to North Korea.  On one hand, 
Tokyo has band-wagoned with US denuclearisation efforts, of which its participation in 
KEDO was an important contribution.  On the other hand, it has conducted independent 
bilateral dialogue with Pyongyang with a view to negotiating diplomatic normalisation.  
Through normalisation, Japan could expand its influence in Korean peninsula affairs and thus 
increase its influence in the wider region.
108
  This represents a strategic hedge: collaboration 
with US counter-proliferation efforts to counter the North Korean WMD threat, while 
simultaneously pursuing bilateral rapprochement to ease tensions by improving the political 
relationship between the two countries. 
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Japan began negotiations with the DPRK in pursuit of diplomatic normalisation after the 
conclusion of the Cold War.  Prime Minister Koizumi Junichi made substantial progress in 
this area.  During the one-day summit between Koizumi and Kim Jong-il on 17 September 
2002, the pair signed a document called the Pyongyang Declaration, in which Kim made a 
conditional pledge to unilaterally extend his country‘s missile testing moratorium beyond its 
expiration in 2003.  He also admitted that North Korean agents had kidnapped thirteen 
Japanese in the 1970s and 1980s, and made an ambiguous promise to comply with 
international agreements related to nuclear issues.  For his part, Koizumi apologized for 
Japan‘s colonization of Korea and offered to provide North Korea with a large-scale 
economic aid package.
109
 
 
Public Backlash Against the DPRK 
The momentum generated by the successful summit in Pyongyang quickly stalled in response 
to two developments that generated a fierce anti-DPRK backlash in Japan.  First, North 
Korea‘s October 2002 HEU disclosure rekindled fears over Pyongyang‘s WMD capability 
that were first whipped up by the 1998 Taepodong-1 missile test.  Second, Kim Jong-il‘s 
admission that North Korea had kidnapped thirteen Japanese, of which he claimed eight had 
since died, provoked a passionate public reaction.  Under intense pressure, Prime Minister 
Koizumi insisted that normalisation negotiations would not continue unless North Korea 
cooperated in clarifying the abduction issue and began to dismantle its nuclear program.
110
  In 
a significant concession, Pyongyang allowed the five known surviving abductees to travel on 
a short trip to Japan.  None of the returnees were allowed to bring their spouses or children on 
the trip and were expected to return to North Korea.  Koizumi to refuse to return the 
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abductees and demanded the return to Japan of the other family members after a public 
outcry that the relatives were being held as hostages back in North Korea.
111
  Further 
normalisation talks were held on neutral ground in Kuala Lumpur on 29 October 2002, at 
which the Japanese delegation informed their North Korean counterparts that further 
negotiations could not proceed until Pyongyang returned the families of the five back to 
Japan, and further requested that Pyongyang halt its nuclear program and dismantle its 
Nodong medium-range missiles.  The North Korean delegation accused the Japanese of 
violating the Pyongyang Declaration and the meeting ended without agreement on a joint 
statement.
112
   
 
Normalisation negotiations have floundered since October 2002.  In November 2004, North 
Korea returned cremated remains said to be those of Megumi Yokoda.  However, when DNA 
testing did not reveal a match with Yokoda the would-be conciliatory gesture only served to 
inflame anti-North Korean sentiment.
113
  North Korea‘s missile and nuclear tests in July and 
October 2006, followed by those of April-May 2009 have substantially strengthened the hand 
of right-wing politicians in Japan.  Rather than diplomatic normalisation with North Korea, 
these officials are instead using this issue to drive their push for Japan‘s normalisation as a 
militarised state.
114
  In this environment, diplomatic rapprochement between Japan and North 
Korea appears a long way off, which could see Japan increasingly marginalised from the 
regional security dialogue. 
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Russia: Dealing Itself Back into the Game 
In the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Republic squandered its 
diplomatic advantage of decades of allied relationship with North Korea, which allowed the 
United States to become the key player on the Korean peninsula.
115
  Russia‘s economic and 
military weakness after the Soviet collapse contributed greatly to its declining influence in 
Northeast Asia.  Consequently, the current objective of Russian diplomacy in the region has 
been to secure a place in multilateral negotiations over the DPRK nuclear issue.  In the period 
after the ascension of Vladimir Putin to the presidency, Russia attempted to reinvigorate its 
position in the region by promoting a more balanced relationship with the two Koreas with 
the goal of furthering Russian economic interests through regional cooperation.  Central to 
this plan was the need for intergovernmental cooperation to facilitate the exploitation of 
natural resources in Siberia and establish a new ―iron silk road‖ linking the Trans-Siberian 
Railway to the Inter-Korean Railroad.  This plan was contingent on the availability of 
external capital supplied by South Korea, China and Japan, a dependency that has constrained 
Russia as a weak player in regional negotiations, unwilling to break step with the other 
participants over important issues.
116
  As such the Russians have displayed very little 
activism in the Six Party Talks and where they have taken a stance, particularly in response to 
North Korean provocations and American punitive measures, it has bandwagoned with 
China. 
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Multilateral Cooperation: Concerted Pressure or 
Microcosm of Regional Competition? 
Historic experience has borne out the difficulty of coordinating multilateral security 
cooperation in a region characterised by strategic competition.  The idea of a multilateral 
security framework for the Korean peninsula first gained traction during the mid-1990s, 
although the concept did not initially take off because each regional state pushed its own 
favoured model.  Officials in the Clinton administration proposed a four Party framework 
encompassing the US, China and the two Koreas.  Pyongyang baulked at the plan and instead 
offered a three-plus-one approach in which the US and the two Koreas would engage first, 
then bring in China at the second stage.  South Korea opposed the exclusion of China and 
lobbied hard for the Chinese to be included in any four Party negotiations.  For its part, 
Beijing preferred a trilateral scheme incorporating itself with the US and North Korea, with 
South Korea an interested peripheral observer.  China saw no place for Japan and Russia at 
the table during this period, taking the view that they could be included in later six-Party 
consultations.  Not surprisingly, the Japanese and Russians preferred the six-Party format to 
deal themselves into negotiations.
117
  In the end the idea foundered because Pyongyang 
ultimately insisted on dealing bilaterally with the United States, a tactic perceived in 
Washington as an attempt to drive a wedge between the US and South Korea.
118
   Thus for 
the remainder of the Clinton presidency bilateral negotiations between the US and DPRK 
remained the order of the day.   
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The Six Party Talks 
The incoming Bush administration had little success with its initial policy of benign neglect 
and its unrealistic pre-conditions for further talks, leading to led to a two-year hiatus in 
negotiations.  The Bush team saw the Agreed Framework as a form of appeasement, likening 
US negotiating efforts to those of Britain and France in their capitulation to the Nazis at 
Munich prior to World War II.
119
  In response to continued American intransigence and its 
isolation after the October 2002 HEU admission, Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from 
the NPT and expulsion of IAEA monitors and surveillance devices on 10 January 2003, and 
began preparing to restart its plutonium-based operations at Yongbyon.  Alarmed, the 
Chinese brought pressure to bear on both the US and North Korea to resume negotiations, 
culminating in the Chinese government hosting a three-way summit in Beijing in April 
2003.
120
  In a move to further provoke Washington, North Korean negotiator Li Gun declared 
at the summit that the North did indeed possess nuclear weapons, adding, ―what we do with 
them is up to you.‖121 
 
Six Party Talks: Rounds 1-3  
With few options to place direct pressure on Pyongyang, the US enlisted Chinese assistance 
to corral the North into a broader multilateral forum where Pyongyang could be isolated 
through pressure from all five regional states, forcing it to back down and make concessions 
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on its nuclear program.
122
  For the Bush team, a multilateral forum would still allow the US 
to avoid direct negotiations with North Korea and thus avoid repeating the failure of 
―appeasement‖ committed by the Clinton team in 1994. 
 
China hosted the first round of the Six Party Talks in Beijing in late-August 2003.  The Bush 
administration had chosen to maintain its position that complete, verifiable, irreversible 
denuclearisation (CVID) was necessary before North Korea could reap any benefits from 
negotiations.  Indeed, the Americans were adamant that talks on any forthcoming incentives 
would not begin until these demands were met.
123
  The North Korean delegation was 
unimpressed with the US position, which did not address their requests for security 
guarantees and energy assistance.  It was provocative and naïve for the US to demand deeply 
intrusive inspections of military facilities in exchange for a vague promise of no hostile intent 
from the Bush administration.
124
  It was a nothing-for-something ultimatum, which, not 
surprisingly, failed to yield any results.  The six parties were unable to agree on a joint 
statement from the conference, leaving Chinese Vice-Minister Wang Yi to issue a vague 
Chairman‘s statement documenting the willingness of the six parties to continue dialogue in 
the future.
125
 
 
The second round of negotiations, held in February 2004, initially appeared on course for a 
more positive outcome.  Again, the sticking point was the US insistence on CVID, to the 
frustration of the other participants, and again, Beijing was forced to issue a Chairman‘s 
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statement in the absence of an agreed joint statement from the participants.
126
  The new 
statement rehashed the generalities of the first round of talks in which the participants 
expressed a commitment to a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and a willingness to pursue 
peaceful coexistence.  Somewhat more encouragingly, they also agreed to conduct a third 
round of talks by the middle of the year, indicating a willingness to make progress.
127
 
 
During the third round, the Japanese delegation adopted a compromise position to set CVID 
aside and instead stress a readiness to discuss all matters once Pyongyang made a firm 
commitment to denuclearisation, believing that a firm proposal would put North Korea under 
pressure to offer something in return.
128
  The moderation of the unhelpful CVID conditions 
led to some progress.  The United States offered a proposal in which North Korea would be 
given three months to prepare for the dismantlement and removal of its nuclear capability.  
Within this three-month period, the North would be required to provide a complete listing of 
its nuclear inventory and cease all nuclear operations, permit the securing of all fissile 
material and monitoring of spent fuel rods, and publicly disclose and dismantle all nuclear 
weapons, weapon components and centrifuge parts.  This was to include the HEU program as 
well as inventory from the plutonium-based program at Yongbyon.
129
  In exchange, the North 
would receive a security assurance from the US as well as energy aid from China, Japan and 
South Korea.   
 
Although satisfied that a more realistic offer had been made, the North Koreans were 
displeased that the United States was not obligated to provide any concrete incentives under 
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this offer.  Their counter-proposal offered a freeze on all facilities related to nuclear weapons 
and the plutonium fuel cycle, which, according to Pyongyang, meant that nuclear weapons 
could no longer be manufactured, tested or transferred to a third Party.
130
  The North Korean 
proposal made no mention of the HEU program.  The third round of talks was more 
constructive in that the parties were able to move beyond the unbreakable deadlock posed by 
the US insistence on CVID and with more room to manoeuvre, were able to put forward 
proposals for denuclearisation.  Little more was achieved than this, however, as neither side 
seriously discussed or considered the offers made by the opposing camp.  
 
Six Party Talks: Round 4 
The North Koreans returned to the Six Party Talks after a hiatus of thirteen months, having 
waited for the outcome of the 2004 US presidential elections.   Pyongyang‘s announcement 
on 10 February 2005 that it had manufactured nuclear weapons came as a shock, given the 
strides made in the previous round of negotiations.  The tactic was either a calculated 
announcement to increase gradually the exposure of its nuclear arsenal, or, alternatively, a 
rushed attempt to trump the US discovery of evidence that the North was exporting uranium 
hexafluoride to Libya.  Pyongyang‘s announcement may have been intended to forestall 
further participation in the Six Party Talks, where the US could have brought up the 
accusation to weaken the North‘s position.131 
 
Despite the February 10 provocation, the prospects for progress in the fourth round of talks 
looked to be improving.  According to Charles Pritchard, who had been involved in previous 
negotiations, three important developments in Washington had transpired in the interim that 
                                                 
130 Ibid. p. 106. 
131 FUNABASHI, Y. 2007. The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, Washington DC, Brookings 
Institution Press. p. 374. 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
 321 
indicated the US would engage in negotiations more seriously.  First, President Bush and a 
small cabal of advisors led by incoming Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reassessed the 
administration‘s North Korea policy and come to the view that it was a failure.  Second, the 
appointment of Rice as Secretary of State was itself important because of the fresh 
momentum she gave to the negotiating process.  Third, the appointment of Chris Hill as 
Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, and head of delegation for the US at the 
Six Party Talks, capped the tactical change-up necessary to make progress in spite of the 
limitation and divisions of US domestic politics.
132
 
 
In the first phase of negotiations from 26 July to 7 August, the North Korean delegation 
tabled a new demand that support to build a light-water reactor (LWR) be part of any 
agreement.  The US did not endorse this amendment and the negotiations recessed for the 
ASEAN Regional Forum in deadlock.  The talks resumed in mid-September, still hinging on 
North Korea‘s right to peaceful nuclear power development.  A joint statement was agreed 
upon after a Chinese official had warned the US delegation that it would be blamed as the 
spoiler for rejecting a formula accepted by all the other parties.
133
  Along with the usual 
pledges from the DPRK to denuclearise and the US to assure North Korea‘s security, the joint 
statement included a number of significant new points: all parties agreed to recognise North 
Korea‘s right to peaceful nuclear energy; the issue of light-water reactors would be discussed 
at an appropriate time; regional states would engage in economic cooperation with North 
Korea in the areas of energy, trade, and investment; and South Korea promised to channel 
two million kW of electricity to the DPRK.
134
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Almost immediately the US and North Korea began backtracking on promises made in the 
joint statement.  Assistant Secretary Chris Hill issued a follow-up statement that placed a 
narrow interpretation on the joint statement that was unacceptable to the North and a 
disappointment to the other participants who hoped to build momentum for the next round of 
negotiations.
135
  Pyongyang responded rapidly, claiming that construction of the light-water 
reactor begin immediately and that the regime would only begin to implement the agreement 
when construction on the reactor began.
136
  Soon after the US Treasury Department 
announced that the Macau-based bank Banco Delta Asia had been designated a ―money 
laundering concern‖ because of evidence linking it with North Korean counterfeit operations, 
which led the Chinese government to freeze its assets, locking up some US$24 million in 
North Korean funds.
137
 
 
Six Party Talks: Round 5 
The fifth round began in early November 2005 in the wake of substantial backtracking by the 
US and DPRK the positions they established at the conclusion of the fourth round in 
September.  During this first phase, the North Korean delegation endeavoured to determine 
whether the United States was prepared to discuss the release of the frozen funds.  The 
American negotiating team stated categorically that they would treat the nuclear and financial 
issues as separate and would only discuss matters relevant to the nuclear program.
138
  With 
the funds frozen in Banco Delta Asia not up for negotiation, the North Korean delegation 
ceased participation in the talks.  Later, in April 2006, North Korea followed up with an offer 
to rejoin the Six Party Talks upon the release of the frozen US$24 million.  North Korea‘s 
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chief negotiator Kim Gye-gwan reiterated this offer in Tokyo during meetings aimed at 
reviving the multilateral negotiations: "the minute we have the funds... I will be at the 
talks.‖139  Yet again however, the North‘s demands were rebuffed, leaving negotiations in 
hiatus until December. 
 
North Korea used the intervening period to demonstrate the kind of trouble it could cause if 
its requests were ignored.  In July, it conducted a series of missile tests, including a 
successful demonstration of its medium-range Nodong missiles and short-range Scud-C 
missiles, as well as a less successful test firing of its long-range Taepodong-2 multi-stage 
ballistic missile, followed in early October by its first nuclear test.  Though generally thought 
to have been a technical failure, the test nonetheless sent shockwaves through the region and 
galvanised regional states in condemnation of Pyongyang.  The unanimity ceased however 
when it came time to mete out punishment for Pyongyang‘s nuclear provocation.  UN 
Security Council Resolution 1718 contained a strongly worded condemnation of the test but 
was light on punitive measures, limited to weak and substantially watered down economic 
sanctions, at the insistence of China, South Korea and Russia.
140
  In spite of some angry 
rhetoric, Seoul and Beijing continued assistance to North Korea as if nothing had happened.  
The strategic interests of the five parties had trumped the need for a united front to bring 
pressure to bear on the Kim regime.   
 
The nuclear test stung regional states into action on the diplomatic front.  On October 31 the 
Chinese government announced that the Six Party Talks would resume, with active behind-
the-scenes diplomacy bringing the parties together for the second phase of the fifth round on 
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18 December 2006.  Most of the action in this phase occurred in the many separate bilateral 
meetings that took place on the fringes of the official talks.  A delegation from the US 
Treasury led by Daniel Glaser met with a North Korean team from the DPRK‘s Foreign 
Trade Bank, led by its president O Kwang-chol, to discuss the regime‘s frozen financial 
assets.
141
  The parties failed to reach an agreement, but did consent to meet again in January 
2007 for further talks in New York.  Meanwhile, US National Security Council representative 
Victor Cha managed to organise a bilateral round of US-DPRK negotiations after a chance 
meeting with North Korean officials at Beijing airport.  The Berlin meeting, held from 16-18 
January 2007, became an important preparatory discussion in which Chris Hill and Kim Gye-
gwan hammered out the outlines of a possible new deal for consideration after the resumption 
of the Six Party Talks the following month.
142
   
 
The momentum generated by the bilateral meetings through January culminated in a fruitful 
third phase of the fifth round.  The talks produced a joint document announcing a nuclear 
freeze agreement in which North Korea had agreed to cease operations at Yongbyon and seal 
all facilities on the site, inviting inspectors from the IAEA back to monitor the shutdown and 
conduct necessary verifications.  In exchange, the other five parties would provide 50,000 
tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea, with shipments to commence within sixty days.  In 
addition, five new working groups attached to the six Party process would be established, 
covering the following areas of interest: (1) denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula; (2) 
DPRK-US diplomatic normalisation; (3) DPRK-Japan diplomatic normalisation; (4) 
economic and energy cooperation; and (5) Northeast Asian security cooperation.  This 
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nuclear freeze deal would be, according to Assistant Secretary Chris Hill, the initial step on 
the road to complete nuclear dismantlement.
143
 
 
It did not take long for critics of the deal to surface.  Halting production in facilities of the 
North‘s plutonium nuclear fuel cycle was one thing, but eliminating the existing weapons 
inventory and stock of fissile material was quite another.  For the regime, the freeze could be 
sold at home as a gesture of strength and superiority and abroad as a gesture of goodwill.  
Nuclear relinquishment however would be political suicide for Kim Jong-il, appearing like 
surrender to the North‘s mortal enemy.144  Others doubted that the North would be honest in 
its nuclear inventory.  Former North Korean defector Hwang Jang-yop argued that the DPRK 
had given up nothing in the deal, claiming that the Yongbyon complex was ―an obsolete 
piece of junk.‖  Nuclear weapons, Hwang claimed, were now being produced using uranium-
based processes.
145
   
 
For American hawks, the nuclear freeze deal represented a blow to global US 
nonproliferation efforts.  Former US Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton, long 
renowned for his hard line on North Korea, argued that rewarding the regime for a partial 
shutdown of its nuclear program (the HEU program was not included) ―sends exactly the 
wrong signal to would-be proliferators around the world.‖146  Bolton reasoned that countries 
such as Iran would interpret the deal as a green light to continue nuclear development, safe in 
the knowledge that the international community would attempt to buy them off rather than 
pursue military-based counter-proliferation strategies. 
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Six Party Talks: Round 6 
The first phase of the sixth round began in a similar vein to each proceeding round of the six 
Party process: with complications, obstacles and stalemate.  The transfer of the frozen money 
from Banco Delta Asia to North Korea had been held up by the Bank of China—acting as 
receiving intermediary for the transaction—which expressed reservations about dealing with 
a bank that remained on the US Treasury Department blacklist.  The North Koreans, having 
already begun the process of shutting down the facilities at Yongbyon, refused to negotiate 
until the money was cleared, so the talks were placed in recess to give sufficient time for the 
transfer to take place.  The delay extended much longer than expected due to the Bank of 
China‘s refusal to process the payment, and it was not until 11 June 2007 that the Russian 
government agreed to wire the funds to Pyongyang via one of its state-owned banks.  With 
the money finally unfrozen, the North declared on 14 July that it had fully shutdown the 
Yongbyon complex, which was verified by IAEA inspectors four days later.
147
  Talks 
resumed on 18 July and culminated in the release of a joint statement on the 20
th
.  In the new 
joint statement, the parties confirmed their commitment to the February 2007 nuclear freeze 
agreement, while the North reiterated its promise to disclose all of its plutonium-based 
nuclear programs and disable all nuclear-related facilities.
148
   
 
The second phase of sixth round negotiations took place in October 2007, concluding with a 
list of actions for implementation.  The DPRK agreed to disable all nuclear facilities by 31 
December 2007, including the 5 MW(e) experimental reactor, the reprocessing facility, and 
the fuel fabrication plant, as well as provide a complete and correct declaration of all its 
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nuclear programs by the same date.  The United States was to fulfil its commitments to North 
Korea—the removal of the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism and 
termination of sanctions applicable under the Trading with the Enemy Act—in parallel with 
North Korea‘s actions.  The other parties were to provide energy assistance to North Korea 
up to the equivalent of one million tons of heavy fuel oil.
149
 
 
By November however, the process had stalled once again.  Pyongyang issued its nuclear 
inventory and demanded its promised shipment of aid for fulfilling its side of the deal.  The 
US claimed that the inventory was incomplete and suspended delivery of the promised aid 
until the complete list was forwarded and provisions for verification of the inventory were in 
place.
150
  To break the deadlock the US reached a compromise in which the North would only 
have to declare its past uranium production.  In May 2008 Pyongyang issued a revised 
inventory, including over 18,000 pages of documents detailing the production records of its 
nuclear facilities and later, on June 26, handed over a full declaration of its nuclear inventory 
and production facilities.
151
  This was coupled shortly thereafter by the demolition of the 
cooling tower at Yongbyon.  The destruction of the obsolete cooling tower was largely 
symbolic, but it did represent an important first step in the roll-back of the North‘s plutonium 
program.  In response, the Bush administration agreed to remove North Korea from the State 
Sponsors of Terrorism List and remove sanctions applied under the Trading with the Enemy 
Act.
152
  However, critics in the US pointed out three major flaws of the deal: (1) the North 
Korean declaration did not include details of HEU programs; (2) it did not address 
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Pyongyang‘s proliferation linkages with third parties such as Syria and Libya; and (3) it 
failed to adequately quantify the number of nuclear weapons already produced.
153
 
 
The process hit another snag after Washington failed to remove North Korea from the State 
Sponsors of Terrorism list within the agreed forty-five day period, stating that it had not fully 
verified the documents handed over by Pyongyang in June.  Pyongyang responded by 
expelling all international inspectors from the Yongbyon facility and threatening to re-start 
the reactor.  To break the deadlock, the regime agreed to some verification measures in 
October —including site visits and sample collection—which prompted Washington to 
finally remove North Korea from the list.
154
  At a meeting of the Six Party Talks on 11 
December 2008 the parties again affirmed their commitment to the denuclearisation process 
and recognised the positive steps of implementation achieved to that point, including North 
Korea‘s nuclear inventory declaration, the demolition of the Yongbyon cooling tower and the 
delivery of heavy fuel to North Korea.  Beyond that, little more was agreed to and a date for 
further talks was not set.
155
  The Kim regime intended to wait out the waning days of the 
Bush presidency before restarting negotiations with the incoming Obama administration. 
 
In January 2009 Pyongyang again decided to stall the process by declaring that it would keep 
its nuclear arsenal for the time being.  The North Korean foreign ministry issued a statement 
saying ―We won't need atomic weapons when US nuclear threats are removed, and the US 
nuclear umbrella over South Korea is gone.‖  This became a major sticking point of 
implementation of the third phase of the denuclearisation agreement.  The North went on to 
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request joint verification of nuclear programs in South Korea, in conjunction with the 
inspections of its own nuclear sites, a demand the US and South Korea considered out of the 
question.
156
  Progress on the dismantlement of the plutonium program facilities was still 
being made, with a group of nuclear experts from South Korea visiting Yongbyon to assess 
the safe movement and disposal of the North‘s 8,000 spent fuel rods.157  Joel Wit interpreted 
the machinations during this period as an attempt by Pyongyang to trade the aging 
infrastructure at Yongbyon for normalised relations with the United States, all the while 
placing its nuclear weapons stockpile behind a firewall by insisting on a cessation of 
Washington‘s hostile attitude to the DPRK as a prerequisite toward full denuclearisation.158 
 
Little did foreign observers realise, however, that the dynamics of North Korea‘s strategy 
were about to change.  Reports in August 2008 suggested that Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke, 
which has kept him from performing his normal role as North Korea‘s paramount leader, 
prompting questions about the leadership succession.  Secretary of State Hilary Clinton 
believed that North Korea‘s harder stance in denuclearisation discussions from late-2008 was 
a product of succession-related machinations behind the scenes in Pyongyang.
159
  According 
to Selig Harrison, a power shift has occurred in the wake of Kim‘s illness, with day-to-day 
authority in domestic affairs placed in the hands of Kim‘s brother-in-law Chang Song-taek 
and effective control over national security issues presided over by the National Defence 
Commission.
160
  In April 2009, the world learned that Kim Jong-il‘s youngest son Kim Jong-
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un had been officially designated as the heir to the leadership of North Korea, under the 
temporary regency of Chang Song-taek.
161
  
 
This could help to explain the new round of provocations launched by the North in the early 
part of 2009, beginning with an announcement in mid-January that the KPA would adopt an 
―all-out confrontation posture‖ against South Korea, followed by its declaration on 30 
January that it was abrogating the non-aggression pact signed with Seoul in 1991.
162
  On 4 
April 2009, the North conducted a rocket launch, ostensibly to place a satellite in orbit, which 
took place amid the fervent revolutionary surge of the revived Chollima movement.  On 14 
April 2009 the regime announced that it was withdrawing from the Six Party Talks and 
would expel all foreign nuclear observers, with a view to resuming operations at the 
Yongbyon facility.  The international response to the satellite launch was used as the pretext 
for withdrawal from the multilateral process.
163
  This was followed shortly afterward by its 
second nuclear test and further missile trials on May 25, with the threat of further nuclear and 
missile tests to come.  In the wake of this barrage of provocations, the Six Party Talks appear 
to be all but finished as a vehicle for securing North Korea‘s denuclearisation.  Peter Beck 
suggests that if the process does survive, it is likely to function as a crisis management 
mechanism rather than a nonproliferation forum.
164
 
 
Since 2003, the Six Party Talks have been the locus of international efforts to denuclearise 
North Korea.  Unfortunately, this concentration of activity has not led to any substantial 
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quantifiable nonproliferation results.  As a nonproliferation instrument, the six Party process 
has ultimately been a failure.  The solidarity that was expected to pressure the North into 
making concessions has proven fragile at best, unable to prevent Pyongyang conducting two 
nuclear tests and extracting all kinds of concessions from the process without coming close to 
relinquishing its nuclear capability.
165
  North Korea‘s pattern of engineering crises to extract 
concessions allowed it to successfully stall for time, giving the regime space to develop its 
nuclear deterrent.  Yoichi Funabashi is unequivocal in this assessment: ―The six-Party talks 
had failed.  It was clear now, as of mid-2009, that the new process had not prevented North 
Korea from developing a nuclear weapon.‖166  The new course for diplomacy now was to 
limit the size of North Korea‘s nuclear arsenal, and manage the regional security environment 
to accommodate this new development.   
 
Conclusion: Regional States Lack Leverage to Compel 
Previous chapters analysing the political economy of the DPRK state have concluded that 
North Korea will not willingly relinquish its nuclear capability.  Using the framework of 
cooperation, competition and conflict, this chapter has established that regional states lack the 
leverage to compel North Korea denuclearise.  North Korea has played an extremely weak 
hand very well, yet it is not necessarily the case that Pyongyang‘s cards are as bad as they are 
made out to be.  In fact, the balance of leverage in negotiations leans heavily in its favour.  
The inflexibility of US nonproliferation goals turned out to be a major bargaining weakness: 
Pyongyang could live without détente with the United States, but for Washington, giving up 
on denuclearisation is unconscionable.    
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Institution Press. p. 476. 
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The bargaining dynamics are clear: because the United States desires denuclearisation and 
because North Korea has no wish dismantle its nuclear capability, the US has needed to 
develop an effective strategy for obtaining or compelling North Korean acquiescence.  If 
nonproliferation solutions are to incorporate military action, the threat of violence must be 
credible.
167
  American hardliners have an inflated confidence in the capacity of the US 
military to act decisively in the Korean theatre.  The estimated cost of military action is too 
high to justify the desired gain and the outcome is subject to unacceptable uncertainty.  
Furthermore, unity among regional states is vital if military options are to achieve their 
desired goals and clearly, regional states are not united around the use of military force.  
From this, we can infer that the threat of violence against North Korea is not credible enough 
to enforce North Korea‘s compliance.   
 
Failing the use of force, compelling denuclearisation may involve regional states placing 
North Korea under malign economic and political pressure.  For this to succeed, the Kim 
regime must be pressured to the point of unbearable strain in order to force it to back down.  
Again, however, regional states have not united around a containment strategy and some, 
including China and Russia, have proven unwilling to apply the pressure necessary to force 
the regime to relent.  North Korea has little trade, outside of that with China, which the 
international community can embargo, while sanctions have been ineffective in squeezing the 
North Korean economy. 
 
Denuclearisation strategies can involve the offer of incentives.  Regional states have to offer 
North Korea something of roughly equivalent value to trade for denuclearisation.  The 
problem is there is no equal trade to be made: the international community cannot offer any 
                                                 
167 BRAMS, S. 2003. Negotiation Games: Applying Game Theory to Bargaining and Arbitration, London, Routlege. pp. 139-40. 
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incentives that match the host of functions that the North‘s nuclear program performs, as 
illustrated in chapters two, three and four.  Multilateral engagement has failed because 
regional states mistakenly believe North Korea will relinquish for the right price.  The cold, 
hard reality is that there is no price high enough for Pyongyang to justify that trade.  Western 
analysts mistakenly believe their ―carrots‖ are benign, despite the likelihood that they would 
lead to rapid systemic changes within North Korea.  The Kim regime understands that from 
the perspective of its perpetuation, these grand bargains are not really incentives at all.  
Bilateral engagement has also been unsuccessful, as regional actors have too much incentive 
to hedge in the absence of the formal ties that characterise normalised relations between 
states.  North Korea has defied the nonproliferation efforts of regional states and the 
international community and has demonstrated that in the right context, a determined 
proliferator can develop a nuclear capability in the face of strident international opposition.  
Regional states must now confront the reality of a nuclear North Korea and develop new 
methods of managing their relations in light of this new development.   
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Part IV: Adapting to North 
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9. Charting Northeast Asia’s Futures 
 
Preceding chapters have established that (1) Pyongyang is unwilling to relinquish its nuclear 
program, and (2) regional states are unable to compel North Korea to denuclearise.  The 
North Korean nuclear question has thus reached a crossroads.  The ―muddle through‖ status 
quo ante of the past two decades has proven durable, but may be unsustainable in the longer 
term as various internal and external variables alter the dynamics of North Korean domestic 
politics, North Korea‘s relations with neighbouring states, and the broader regional security 
environment.  This begs the question: what are the possible trajectories along which the 
nuclear issue may evolve?  This chapter will identify six possible scenarios, based on the 
cooperation, competition and conflict framework.  These scenarios include a regional nuclear 
arms race at one extreme and institutional multilateral security cooperation on the other, both 
of which are equally unlikely outcomes.  In between conflict and cooperation lie four other 
scenarios that take into account the existence of regional strategic competition, along with the 
intransigence of North Korea toward denuclearisation.  These scenarios are more likely to 
come to pass, as they reflect pragmatic policy options that lie within the parameters defined 
by North Korea‘s internal proliferation calculus on the one hand and the regional security 
environment on the other.  These scenarios are important from a policy context, as they 
provide an academic foundation upon which policy makers can frame approaches that 
acknowledge the impotence of past nonproliferation strategies and instead seek new ways of 
managing North Korea‘s ascension to the nuclear club.   
 
This chapter also considers wildcard scenarios—featuring events and trends that could 
fundamentally alter the dynamics of politics within North Korea as well as that of the region.  
Internally, the next leadership transition may dramatically alter the politics of the North 
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Korean state.  Externally, the global environment within which the North Korean nuclear 
crisis is nested may itself be transformed by events and trends including the global financial 
crisis, the peaking of global oil production and climate change.  Global trends such as these 
are beginning to have a profound effect on international politics, from which the Korean 
peninsula will not be immune. 
 
Conflict: Nuclear Arms Race 
While conflict scenarios are unlikely in Northeast Asia, the underlying security dilemma 
nonetheless requires regional states to carefully manage their relationships and maximise 
areas of common interest.  If regional affairs are poorly managed, the entropy of the security 
dilemma will make conflict scenarios more likely.  War on the Korean peninsula, though not 
impossible, remains a remote possibility for reasons outlined in chapter seven.  A more 
plausible scenario is a nuclear arms race, sparked by the competing strategic imperatives of 
regional states, in combination with their poor management of the nuclear issue and the 
influence of hyper-nationalist discourses in their domestic politics. 
 
The realist interpretation of North Korea‘s breakout nuclear capability points to an increased 
likelihood of a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia, made possible by the regional security 
dilemma, lack of cooperative security architecture, and deep-seated distrust between regional 
players.  A regional nuclear cascade may look something like this: Japan, as a threshold 
nuclear power, develops a nuclear weapons program in response to what it sees as the 
existential danger posed by North Korea‘s nuclear capability.  In turn, South Korea, still 
distrustful of Tokyo in light of unresolved wounds stemming from Japan‘s imperial past 
could harness its own extensive indigenous nuclear expertise to develop a nuclear weapons 
program.  If the cascade continues unaddressed by the international community, Taiwan may 
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choose to develop a nuclear deterrent of its own as a counterforce to the threat from mainland 
China.  This may prompt China to increase its own arsenal, which would place further 
proliferation pressure on Japan, as well as China‘s nuclear rivals—India and Pakistan—in 
South Asia.
1
   
 
Japan and to a lesser extent South Korea are both threshold nuclear powers.  In particular, the 
Japanese have a well-developed civilian nuclear energy program that incorporates the entire 
nuclear fuel cycle.  Both countries have the technological capacity, expertise and materials to 
develop a nuclear weapons capability in a very short timeframe, perhaps even in a matter of 
months.
2
  The North Korea threat has prompted regular debates in Japan about the feasibility 
and desirability of acquiring nuclear weapons.  The nuclear crisis of 1994 triggered an 
internal review within the Japanese government the following year on whether to develop a 
nuclear deterrent.  Foreign Minister Kabun Muto had made the argument in 1993, as the 
crisis with North Korea was brewing, that a nuclear weapons capability would be valuable for 
Japan if it faced a severe threat.
3
  The idea was rejected as not in the national interest, given 
that such a move could exacerbate the regional security dilemma, leading to the cascade 
scenario described above, the weakening the American security guarantee and even lead to 
abandonment by Washington.
4
  For South Korea, the fear of US abandonment has some 
traction because American military drawdown has been underway for some time.  Nuclear 
                                                 
1 HUGHES, C. 2007. North Korea‘s Nuclear Weapons: Implications for the Nuclear Ambitions of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Asia 
Policy, 3, p. 77; CHANLETT-AVERY, E. & SQUASSONI, S. 2006. North Korea’s Nuclear Test: Motivations, Implications, and U.S. 
Options. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33709.pdf. p . 9. 
2 SNYDER, S. 2007. Responses to North Korea‘s Nuclear Test: Capitulation or Collective Action? The Washington Quarterly, 30, pp. 39-40. 
3 SHUJA, S. 2004. Japan‘s Changing Security Posture and its Implications. Contemporary Review, 285, p. 209. 
4 REY, S. 2009. World powerless to stop North Korea . Hong Kong: Asia Times Online, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KE27Dg01.html [Accessed 30 May 2009]. 
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development may begin to look more appealing in light of North Korea‘s newfound 
belligerency, especially in the context of the reconfiguration of American forces in Korea.
5
 
 
Yet despite the perennial danger posed by the regional security dilemma, it is not obvious that 
current events are likely to cascade into a nuclear arms race.  Christopher Hughes suggests 
that the traditional principal drivers of nuclear proliferation are not yet strong enough to push 
Japan or South Korea down the path of nuclear weapons development.
6
  In the realm of 
national security, conventional deterrence and multilateral dialogue should suffice to prevent 
regional security dynamics from overheating.  Contrary to North Korea, neither Japan nor 
South Korea has an important vested economic interest in nuclear proliferation.  For Tokyo 
and Seoul, the fear of US alliance abandonment is a nagging theme in their strategic 
calculations.  However, while the US security guarantee remains in place it is unlikely that 
either country will contemplate nuclear weapons acquisition. 
 
Cooperation: Institutionalised Multilateral Security 
Where the nuclear arms race scenario seems overly pessimistic, a Northeast Asian future 
characterised by cooperation may be overly utopian.  Many analysts viewed the Six Party 
Talks as the embryonic phase of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia, 
believing a successful multilateral resolution of the Korean nuclear crisis could be the first 
step toward regional institutionalised security cooperation and the possibility of regional 
responses to all strategic disputes.
7
  The Six Party Talks were the first forum in which all 
regional states have worked together to address a specific security issue.  Francis Fukuyama 
                                                 
5 HUGHES, C. 2007. North Korea‘s Nuclear Weapons: Implications for the Nuclear Ambitions of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Asia 
Policy, 3, p. 96. 
6 Ibid. pp. 76, 101-2. 
7 Gilbert Rozman, in the preface to:ARMSTRONG, C., ROZMAN, G., KIM, S. & KOTKIN, S. (eds.) 2006. Korea at the Center: Dynamics 
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sees an institutionalised multilateral forum as a sensible vehicle for addressing not only the 
Korean nuclear issue but also the implications of China‘s military modernisation, Japan‘s 
normalisation and rearmament, the ramifications of a united Korea, and territorial disputes 
such as the South Korea-Japan dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima and the Sino-Japanese quarrel 
over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.
8
  Fukuyama‘s model excludes North Korea on the grounds that 
Pyongyang has been an impediment to a negotiated settlement in the Six Party Talks and thus 
would likely hinder consensual decision-making in an expanded multilateral organisation.
9
  
Peter Van Ness has put forward a similar proposal in which the four major powers of 
Northeast Asia—China, Japan, Russia, and the United States—commit to jointly 
guaranteeing regional security, using the peaceful reconciliation of the Koreas as a 
springboard.
10
  By keeping the two Koreas on the periphery, the four great powers could 
maximise the chances of mutually beneficial consensus emerging from regular security 
dialogue. 
 
There is a catch: these proposals will not gain momentum unless the Six Party Talks succeed 
in arriving at a fully executed negotiated settlement to the North Korean nuclear issue.  
Without success, it has no legitimate basis as a model for expanded security cooperation, 
which highlights the problem of using the Six Party Talks as a model for multilateral 
cooperation.   Very little of lasting substance has come out of the six party process since its 
inception in 2003.  The parties have signed off on agreements in great triumph, only to see 
each deal reinterpreted, dishonored or discarded almost immediately.   As preceding chapters 
have shown, strategic competition remains the norm for Northeast Asian international 
                                                 
8 FUKUYAMA, F. 2005. Re-Envisioning Asia. Foreign Affairs, 84, pp. 82-84. 
9 Ibid. p. 85. 
10 VAN NESS, P. 2003. The North Korean nuclear crisis: four-plus-two - an idea whose time has come . Research School of Pacific and 
Asian Studies - The Australian National University, http://rspas.anu.edu.au/ir/keynotes/documents/Keynotes-4.pdf [Accessed 01/05/2006]. p. 
5. 
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relations.  Regional states do not share enough common interests, nor do they harbour a 
common appraisal of the North Korean threat to reach agreement on a multilateral 
institutional response.  Multilateral cooperation is unlikely to evolve in the context of bipolar 
Sino-American competition and cross cutting hedging strategies between regional states.  
With the failure of the talks in 2009, the raison d’être of regional security cooperation may 
have evaporated, leaving the underlying patchwork of crosscutting interests and rivalries of 
the security dilemma as the foundation for regional interaction.   
 
 
Competition: The Pragmatic Options 
The terrain between Hobbesian conflict and utopian regionalism appears to be the most fertile 
ground for pragmatic policy choices available to regional states, reflecting the reality of 
regional strategic competition.  Clearly, North Korea‘s nuclear weapons program is of some 
concern to all regional states, though not to the same extent for all.  Nonproliferation goals 
are relative, not absolute, because a nuclear-armed neighbour does not pose an inherent 
existential threat.
11
  Other variables shape the threat matrix within which we locate a nuclear 
weapons state, an observation that rings true for North Korea as it does in other contexts.  
Nuclear weapons states can be managed or accommodated in some form or another and 
North Korea is no exception. 
 
These pragmatic choices suggested here are for the United States and Japan (and to a lesser 
extent South Korea).  The need for a dramatic shift in policy is not so pressing for China and 
Russia, because their relationships with North Korea are not adversarial in the same way that 
Pyongyang‘s relations are with the US bloc.  Because of their historic ties to North Korea, 
China and Russia are more adept at dealing with Pyongyang in a nuanced and calibrated 
                                                 
11 MAZARR, M. 1997. North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation, London, Macmillan Press. p. 7. 
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fashion.  Similarly, they are accepted more readily (though not completely) by the Kim 
regime as constructive interlocutors.  The US and Japan, in particular, have some way to go 
before they can engage with North Korea as honest brokers. 
 
Deterrence 
Deterrence will continue to be the foundation of all responses to North Korea's nuclear 
weapons program by the US and its allies, regardless of the strategy they ultimately choose.  
To normalise relations with North Korea as a nuclear power, regional states must be 
comfortable that the regime can be deterred from using its nuclear weapons inventory or 
engaging in other aggressive behaviour.  Clearly, this is possible; the United States has 
successfully deterred North Korea from attacking the South since 1953 and has deterred 
larger nuclear powers for decades with its vast nuclear arsenal.  The idea that the US and its 
allies are incapable of deterring a fledgling nuclear state such as North Korea is one that does 
not bear serious consideration.
12
  China and Russia have less reason to fear direct attack from 
North Korea‘s nuclear arsenal and thus have no strategic motivation to deter Pyongyang.  
Their concerns over the nuclear program relate to its impact on the strategic posture of the US 
bloc and the consequent flow-on effect for Beijing and Moscow‘s strategic calculations. 
 
The argument that North Korea is now undeterrable boils down to an assumption about the 
rationality of the DPRK leadership.  The concentration of power in the hands of Kim Jong-il, 
even if he were inherently irrational in his decision-making, does not translate into increased 
danger of nuclear attack.  It takes more than one person to prosecute a nuclear order to strike 
and the prospect of lethal retaliation from the US, and therefore certain death, is likely to 
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Change, Peace and Security, 21. pp. 377-387. 
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forestall the attack order by at least one individual in the chain of command.
13
  This is a 
worst-case scenario; all the evidence presented in this thesis points toward regime 
perpetuation as the primary goal of the North Korean leadership.  Launching a suicidal first 
strike against targets in South Korea, Japan or even the United States does not fit into this 
narrative. 
 
While mutually assured destruction does not predominate in Northeast Asia, a relatively 
stable system of mutual deterrence is likely to hold.  For the United States and its allies, the 
cost of war on the Korean peninsula remains obstructively high while for North Korea, the 
cost of conflict would be even higher.  On the North Korean side, the decision to launch a 
nuclear attack would be met with overwhelming, regime-ending retaliation from the US.  
Over time, the potential of danger of nuclear conflict could breed caution amongst all 
regional players and reduce the odds of a provocation spiralling beyond control into a nuclear 
exchange.
14
  This may breed conservatism in Pyongyang‘s strategic decision-making and 
could be the very factor that encourages North Korea to become a responsible nuclear power.   
 
Successful deterrence still leaves room for Pyongyang to engage in provocative behaviour.  
Ted Galen Carpenter points to North Korea‘s proliferation links with Pakistan and Syria as 
evidence that living with a nuclear North Korea would still be ―a nerve-wracking 
experience.‖15  Indeed, successful deterrence will do nothing to alter the status quo and will 
not preclude a continuation of the provocative pinpricks that Pyongyang has employed 
through its coercive bargaining strategy.  The security environment will remain prone to 
                                                 
13 BROWN, H. 2007-08. New Nuclear Realities. The Washington Quarterly, 31, p. 13. 
14 PARK, J. S. & LEE, D.-S. 2008. North Korea: Existential Deterrence and Diplomatic Leverage. In: ALAGAPPA, M. (ed.) The Long 
Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press. p. 283. 
15 GALEN CARPENTER, T. 2009. A Bold Plan B for North Korea . Washington DC: Cato Institute, 
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periodic escalations, with Pyongyang continuing to rely on external inputs extracted through 
coercive bargaining tactics in which the North escalates tensions to extract concessions from 
the international community.  In the absence of confidence-building measures, the status quo 
is unsatisfactory in terms of regional stability, therefore it is likely that the US and its allies 
could couple deterrence with some other pragmatic initiative to address the situation. 
 
Nuclear Constrainment 
The Six Party Talks lack a raison d’être now that North Korea has become a nuclear power.  
Regional states have invested a great deal of effort in the multilateral forum since 2003 and 
will be loathe to completely abandon the process altogether.  For US officials, the option of 
clinging to the Six Party Talks may be the default strategy in lieu of other choices that could 
be interpreted as failure or defeat.  This unwillingness to abandon the process is manifesting 
itself now in a search for a new raison d’être for the multilateral forum.  Some analysts 
favour continuing the Six Party Talks with the more limited goal of constraining North 
Korea‘s nuclear program, to limit its future nuclear development rather than seek full 
verification of past activities.  According to Shen Dingli, the United States now has only one 
bottom line: the DPRK should become a responsible nuclear power and must not continue to 
proliferate nuclear weapons.
16
  This strategy would not be without precedent, as the 
international community has already adopted a similar approach with other determined 
proliferators such as Israel, India and Pakistan.
17
  Gary Samore believes negotiations might 
be an appropriate way to contain Pyongyang‘s nuclear weapon stockpile, placing a cap on the 
North‘s nuclear development until future circumstances present an opportunity for full 
                                                 
16 SHEN, D. 2006. North Korea‘s Strategic Significance to China. China Security, Autumn 2006, p. 27. 
17 HAASS, R. 2005. Regime Change and its Limits. Foreign Affairs, 84, p. 76. 
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denuclearisation.
18
  This slowing of the proliferation tempo may have bought regional states 
some time until more favourable circumstances arise in which denuclearisation may become 
more feasible.
19
 
 
Selig Harrison has proposed an approach coupling recognition with arms limitation 
negotiations.  In Harrison‘s framework, the Six Party Talks would continue with the goal of 
limiting North Korea‘s nuclear weapons cache to the four or five warheads so far declared.20  
Though full relinquishment of the North‘s nuclear deterrent would be jettisoned as an 
objective, dismantlement of the Yongbyon complex and other nuclear sites would remain on 
the table.  Pyongyang is also likely to outline much tougher terms for continued compliance.  
This would of course require the fulfilment of commitments made in previous agreements to 
keep the process alive.  Delivery of the remaining 200,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to North 
Korea that was promised in return for disabling the Yongbyon reactor would have to be fast-
tracked.  Harrison has stated, however, after a January 2009 visit to Pyongyang, that North 
Korea‘s terms for the dismantlement of Yongbyon have hardened from those outlined in 
previous negotiations.  Their demands include completion of the two light-water reactors 
promised in the Agreed Framework, as well as internationally verified inspections of US 
military bases in South Korea to determine that the US has removed its nuclear weapons as 
announced by President George HW Bush in 1991, in parallel with those conducted at North 
Korean nuclear installations.
21
  In light of revelations from Sigfried Hecker in November 
2010 regarding the advanced status of Pyongyang‘s highly enriched uranium program, 
                                                 
18 Samore, G, quoted in GALEN CARPENTER, T. 2009. A Bold Plan B for North Korea . Washington DC: Cato Institute, 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10124 [Accessed 01 May 2009]. 
19 LYON, R. & MOLOMBY, K. 2009. North Korea: Sliding Towards the Abyss. Strategic Insights No. 46. Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute, http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=201&pubtype=6 p. 12. 
20 HARRISON, S. 2009. Living With A Nuclear North Korea . Washington DC: The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/02/16/AR2009021601101.html?sub=AR [Accessed 18 February 2009].  
21 Ibid.  [Accessed].  
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constrainment will also need to encompass negotiations to bring its enrichment facilities 
under international safeguards. 
 
In May 2010 the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability released a plan for a 
Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (KJNWFZ).  Features of the KJNWFZ proposal 
include standard features of other nuclear free zone treaties, including nuclear weapon 
prohibition, verification and compliance mechanisms, and non-aggression commitments, 
along with Northeast Asia-specific clauses related to North Korea‘s entry as a nuclear or non-
nuclear weapons state.  The proposal also includes mechanisms for addressing corollary 
issues like the status and composition of US nuclear deterrence posture in East Asia, China‘s 
security relationships with KJNWFZ parties, and the different philosophies adhered to in 
South Korea and Japan regarding extended nuclear deterrence.
22
  According to Peter Hayes, 
North Korea could join the KJNWFZ either at its inception, under a waiver from some of the 
requirements of the treaty until it feels secure enough to commence dismantling its nuclear 
weapons program, or at some point in the future when the benefits of KJNWFZ membership 
begin to outweigh the costs of outlaw proliferation.  Should North Korea collapse in the 
meantime, the zone would cover a unified Korea.  For Hayes, having North Korea as a 
founding member of the nuclear freeze zone is the preferable option, as a positive affirmation 
of its intention to denuclearise.
23
 
 
Currently however, the Six Party Talks provide the only avenue through which Washington 
can credibly engage Pyongyang without admitting failure or defeat, which is the key to 
understanding why the US remains committed to multilateral diplomacy.  Gary Samore has 
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insisted that the United States is ―not going to recognise North Korea as a nuclear weapon 
state,‖ which means that the US could not sign a peace treaty or normalise relations until 
North Korea is completely denuclearised.
24
  To admit failure would represent a loss of 
prestige for the United States and starkly illustrate the fragility of the global nonproliferation 
regime.  North Korea‘s nuclear activities set a legal and symbolic precedent that could 
undermine the NPT.
25
  Pyongyang‘s success in avoiding meaningful repercussions for NPT 
withdrawal and subsequent nuclear proliferation sets a precedent for other nuclear aspirants 
and is likely to erode future arms control compliance.   
 
The Six Party Talks have been unsuccessful because North Korea discerns greater benefits in 
nuclear weapons possession over any offer made to date by regional states.  As an extension 
of failed multilateral diplomacy, constrainment does little to address the security concerns, 
domestic economic and political imperatives and diplomatic considerations that drive the 
North‘s preference for nuclear weapons.  Constrainment could thus be construed as a 
desperate last-gasp effort to preserve the Six Party Talks.  For the United States in particular 
it is a sign of desperation, groping for a redefinition of a familiar strategy in lieu of the 
absence of a more appropriate replacement.  US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton implied as 
much in a statement made on 7 May 2009: ―We may have to show some patience before that 
[a return to negotiations] is achieved, but we agree on the goal that we're aiming for.‖26  Yet 
it is hard to escape the conclusion that North Korea‘s withdrawal from the six party forum 
has an air of finality about it and may represent the beginning of a new phase in which 
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Pyongyang moves away from nuclear development toward perfecting the technology for 
miniaturisation and delivery systems.
27
   
 
Accept North Korea as a Nuclear Power 
Given that denuclearisation is highly unlikely, recognition of the DPRK‘s nuclear status may 
become necessary.  This could be achieved in two ways: first, through de jure acceptance, or 
official recognition of North Korea‘s nuclear status.  It may be in the best interests of regional 
states to accept North Korea into the nuclear club and encourage it to become a responsible 
nuclear power, in much the same way as non-NPT states such as India, Pakistan and Israel 
have been accepted as nuclear powers.
28
   On the down side, as Part II of the thesis illustrates, 
the Kim regime is committed to brandishing the nuclear card because of its many domestic 
benefits, the antithesis of a responsible nuclear power in the eyes of the international 
community.  In addition, de jure acceptance in the North Korean case would undermine the 
NPT regime by sending the message to would-be proliferators that it is possible to reap 
benefits from cheating on the treaty, as North Korea, a former NPT signatory, has done. 
 
Second, regional states could settle for de facto acceptance, in which they accept the reality 
of a nuclear North Korea but continue to press for denuclearisation regardless.  The symbolic 
message of this position to those states that would flout the NPT regime is that while it may 
be possible to cheat the nonproliferation regime, any state that chooses this path will be 
isolated in the international community.  While this appears to be the default strategy in the 
short run, in the longer term it seems untenable.  As shown in chapter seven, North Korea is 
                                                 
27 2009k. North Korea’s Missile Launch: The Risks of Overreaction. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 
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not completely isolated because it is strategically important for China.  This negates the 
symbolic message that the de facto position is intended to convey to other would-be nuclear 
states.  The blowback of de facto acceptance may be a DPRK further isolated and 
increasingly paranoid, with poor intelligence assets and nuclear forces on hair-trigger alert, 
all the while tempted to generate hard currency through sale of nuclear materials.
29
   
 
It is possible that acknowledgement will lead to a decrease in nuclear tensions in Northeast 
Asia.  The combination of the perceived threat of the North‘s nuclear program and doubts 
about its level of technical development amongst the international community have 
accelerated Pyongyang‘s proliferation tempo, pushing it to advance the technological 
development of the nuclear program at a rate faster than it otherwise would have.  If regional 
states were to acknowledge the North as a bona fide nuclear power, Pyongyang might be 
satisfied with the deterrent it already has and level off its proliferation efforts.
30
  Of course, 
this view does not take into account the existential security concerns of Japan, whose officials 
see North Korea‘s nuclear and ballistic missile programs as a grave threat to Japan‘s national 
security. 
 
Apart from the United States and Japan, the other regional parties appear to have adjusted and 
begun to accommodate North Korea.
31
  This would accord with the differing priority regional 
states place on the danger posed by the North‘s nuclear deterrent.  For China and Russia, 
Pyongyang‘s nuclear deterrent is strategically advantageous because it plays a useful role in 
constraining US freedom of action in Northeast Asia, providing that the Kim regime does not 
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brandish its nuclear capability provocatively.  South Korea‘s long-term goal of increasing 
economic inter-dependence across the DMZ is not dramatically affected by the North‘s 
nuclear capability.  For the United States, on the other hand, its failure to overcome the 
nuclear threat from a small regional state has badly damaged its regional leadership, as 
evidenced by Washington‘s request for China to play a pivotal role in the multilateral 
process, which Peter Hayes interprets as an abdication of its hegemonic role.
32
  Given the 
circumstances however, it is not clear what other options were available. 
 
Diplomatic & Political Normalisation 
Neither constrainment nor nuclear acknowledgement will alone be sufficient to preserve 
stability in Northeast Asia in the face of North Korea‘s nuclear ascension.  The US and its 
regional allies Japan and South Korea may therefore pursue political and economic 
normalisation of relations with the DPRK, which is a step beyond nuclear acceptance.  In 
doing so, they could remove the sources of North Korea‘s leverage while simultaneously 
addressing some of the North‘s key security and economic concerns.  This may be a stretch, 
given that the Kim regime appears to require the United States as an enemy for domestic 
propaganda. 
 
Assuming that Pyongyang‘s propaganda requirements can be overcome, political 
normalisation would entail the establishment of full diplomatic relations after an official 
peace treaty is signed to end the Korean War.
33
  In conjunction with political entente, 
normalisation could begin in the economic sphere.  This does not mean that regional states 
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should offer incentives to the North.  Rather, it would allow the regime to integrate into 
global trade at its own pace.  After all, experience has proven that economic incentives are 
not an enticing carrot given the regime‘s consciousness of the potential for ideological 
pollution that comes with economic engagement.  As noted in chapter four, the existence of 
parallel economies shows that structural change is already taking place and regional states 
may do well to allow this process to run its course organically rather than attempt 
interventions that risk destabilising the North‘s fragile economic equilibrium. 
 
The practicalities of normalisation may require some experimentation.  Several analysts have 
argued that the terms of reference of the Six Party Talks could be expanded to encompass 
political and economic normalisation.
34
  The linkages created would act as confidence-
building measures, gestures of goodwill, which with patience and time could lead Pyongyang 
to make concessions on divesting itself of nuclear weapons.  Doing so would not be a reward 
for bad behaviour but would instead open channels for dialogue with a regime that is 
undergoing a substantial and uncertain internal transformation.
35
  This position has much in 
common with the grand bargain strategy, in making an offer that Pyongyang cannot refuse as 
a carrot for nuclear relinquishment.  The key difference is that instead of offering a small 
concession for simultaneous in-kind actions, the US would initially put denuclearisation on 
hold to first improve economic and political relations to establish an environment more 
congenial to cooperation, as a precursor to denuclearisation negotiations.  If successful, this 
confidence-building measure could deepen North Korea‘s commitment to nuclear 
disarmament by removing Pyongyang‘s greatest external threat: the United States.36  This 
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shares with the Sunshine Policy the assumption that a significant unilateral gesture of 
goodwill can buy reciprocal concessions.  Beijing and Moscow could support this course of 
action because US-DPRK normalisation would correspond with their strategic goal of 
maintaining regional stability.
37
 
 
The problem however, has been made clear repeatedly through this thesis: there is little 
evidence that North Korea is willing to consider denuclearisation at any time.  North Korea‘s 
strategic calculus is anchored within the world-view of an extreme Hobbesian form of 
realism, in which the Kim regime sees itself surrounded by external and internal threats to its 
survival.  Its foreign policy choices are thus based on this narrow and fearful assessment of 
its security environment.
38
  The continued emphasis by regional states on denuclearisation 
feeds into Pyongyang‘s threat perception and provides further justification for the regime to 
consolidate its nuclear program.  For Roehrig, the goal should not be to coerce the regime 
into compliance with an extensive list of demands but rather to draw it out of its isolation.
39
  
While this will not lead Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program, the existence of 
rudimentary political trust between North Korea and its neighbours could lay the foundation 
for a regional security environment in which regional states can accommodate the North‘s 
nuclear deterrent without sliding into a destabilising arms race.  Similarly, the real economic 
benefits of unrestricted economic contact with the global economy should dampen the 
financial temptation to sell nuclear technology, lessen the incentive (though probably not the 
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will) to engage in criminal activities or leverage the nuclear threat in exchange for 
international largesse.
40
   
 
For several reasons, unconditional normalisation may not be a panacea for instability on the 
Korean peninsula.  While normalisation is the most desirable path forward in terms of 
regional stability, it is also the most utopian of the pragmatic adjustments and, like 
multilateral institutionalism, is unlikely due to the multiple crosscutting cleavages that have 
plagued relations between regional states.  Because any regional state considering bilateral 
normalisation with the DPRK would have to consider the impact on its alliance relationships, 
as well as regional competitors, normalisation can be discounted as a possibility 
 
Other obstacles to normalisation also exist: first, political normalisation with the United 
States would pose problems for the regime‘s internal social mobilisation.  Since the Korean 
War, the Kim regime has blamed the United States and South Korea for many of the 
country‘s problems.  Indeed, as changes to the domestic economy and social relations have 
discredited the ideological paradigms of the Kim Il-sung era, anti-imperialism—read ―anti-
Americanism‖—has become the primary mobilisational device of regime propaganda.  North 
Korea‘s national image has been nurtured for over fifty years in relation to the American 
enemy.
41
  The subordination of the North Korean state in favour of the military under Songun 
politics requires an external enemy to make it viable.  Without the United States as the 
national adversary, the raison d’être of Kim regime‘s ideational paradigms would become 
irrelevant.  Consequently, the North Korean leadership may favour the status quo in order to 
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maintain the edifice of the Songun system rather than risk institutional failure in pursuit of 
political accommodation with Washington. 
 
Japan and South Korea may baulk at diplomatic normalisation with North Korea.  The 
abduction issue and North Korea‘s missile threat provide ammunition to right-wing elements 
in Japan whose militarist agendas are bolstered by widespread public anger directed at the 
Kim regime.  It seems unlikely that rapprochement can take place in the context of such 
emotionally charged anti-North Korean public sentiment in Japan.
42
  In South Korea, the 
insistence on reciprocal action taken by the Lee administration has resulted in a rapid 
deterioration of relations with Pyongyang to their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold War, 
in the context of which normalisation of North-South relations appears inconceivable.  The 
US would find it problematic to normalise relations with the North without freezing South 
Korea out of the process, thus playing on the long-standing frustrations harboured by South 
Koreans over their sidelining from negotiations with Pyongyang.  The challenge for 
Washington, should they go ahead with the normalisation process, would be to pursue 
strategic redefinition without violating its solidarity with South Korea and Japan.
43
  Leaders 
in both countries would no doubt raise questions about what any US-DPRK rapprochement 
would mean for the credibility of American security guarantee.
44
  
 
There is also likely to be substantial opposition to normalisation within Washington itself.
45
  
Since the Agreed Framework was signed in 1994, wide divisions have opened up over the 
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appropriate line to take on North Korea, cutting across Party lines and dividing 
administrations.  Obstruction from Congress played a large part in the Clinton 
administration‘s failure to fully implement the terms of the Agreed Framework.  During the 
George W Bush presidency, particularly during its first term, factional wrangling within the 
administration and even within agencies produced schizophrenic strategies with conflicting 
objectives that were ultimately self-defeating.  This played into the Kim regime‘s hands, 
allowing it to play the coercive bargaining game against an American adversary whose 
position was weakened by internal bickering.  How the Obama team or any subsequent 
administration handles the firestorm of internal criticism will be a key factor in the success or 
failure of any normalisation strategy.  
 
Wildcard Scenarios 
Two decades of ultimately fruitless denuclearisation efforts have come to a head with North 
Korea attaining nuclear weapons status at a time when the country is undergoing an extensive 
internal transformation, which is being held in check in various ways by the nuclear program 
itself.  This occurs, however, when critical internal and external developments—wildcard 
scenarios—are coming into play which have the potential to drastically alter this unsteady 
equilibrium.  Internally, the next leadership transition represents a threshold event for North 
Korea‘s political system, the outcome of which may completely alter the strategic 
environment on the Korean peninsula.  Externally, three trends—the global financial crisis, 
the peaking of global oil production, and abrupt climate change—are increasingly influencing 
all countries around the world, including the DPRK state.  Wildcard scenarios involve 
phenomena that are likely to create outcomes beyond the bounds of expected variability.  
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Traditionally, wildcard events are considered less plausible than other futures.
46
  In this case, 
each of the trends identified is going to impact on North Korea in the short to medium term, 
yet because they have the capacity to be threshold transformational events, their likely 
consequences have the potential to be disproportionately dire.  The present historical moment 
is one in which several phenomena of global scale— the global financial crisis, peak of 
global oil production, and abrupt climate change—are manifesting in the international 
system, affecting all states to varying degrees.  Despite its relative isolation, North Korea will 
not be immune to the consequences of these trends, which are also likely to alter regional 
power dynamics and shift the strategic calculations of regional states.  They are therefore of 
sufficient importance and gravity that they require detailed consideration as possible futures 
for North Korea. 
 
Leadership Transition 
Speculation about the declining health of Kim Jong-il has grown in recent years.  Kim is 
suspected to suffer from diabetes, high blood pressure and heart disease, and is thought to 
have undergone heart surgery in 2007 and 2008.
47
  Reports surfaced in August 2008 that he 
had suffered a stroke, sparking conjecture amongst foreign analysts about an impending 
leadership transition in North Korea.  The inscription of Kim Jong-il‘s political obituary may 
have been premature however, as Kim demonstrated seemingly full physical and mental 
capacity in a meeting with Chinese Communist Party figure Wang Jiarui in January 2009, 
five days before the CFR report was released.
48
  While speculation about Kim‘s poor health 
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may have been exaggerated, it nonetheless highlights a complicated obstacle to regime 
perpetuation post-Kim Jong-il. 
 
In countries where personalised leadership has grown around a single dictatorial figure, 
augmented by a personality cult that blurs the distinction between the ruling regime and the 
state, the leader actively seeks to grow beyond a mere custodian of the state to become 
synonymous with the state itself.
49
 North Korea under Kim Il-sung matched this description 
well, featuring patrimonial ties to key state organisations, the frequent purging of rivals and 
dissenters and a personalised hands-on approach to wielding power, all draped underneath an 
elaborate personality cult based around the Great Leader.
50
  As Kim Il-sung‘s son, Kim Jong-
il derived his legitimacy as rightful heir from the distinctly Confucian emphasis on the filial 
link to the dynastic founder.
51
 The strong Confucian social hierarchy allowed Kim Jong-il to 
command a higher level of authority than would have otherwise been possible for a new 
leader elsewhere.  Such personalised regimes tend to collapse when the dictator dies or is 
removed from power because state institutions cease to function without the leader‘s direct 
input. North Korea‘s previous leadership change was unique among totalitarian states in that 
Kim Jong-il was able to assume control of the system without a messy succession struggle.  
This is not to say that Kim‘s transition to power was seamless, with reports suggesting that 
opposition to his succession existed at high levels within the internal security establishment.  
Kim dealt with this opposition through a series of purges of senior KPA and KWP officials in 
the mid-1990s.
52
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During a typical totalitarian leadership transition it is common for a new leader‘s power and 
influence to be limited by his under-developed patronage network, while state ideology tends 
to weaken and the apparatus of terror and coercion ceases to be all-pervasive.
53
  Despite such 
obstacles, as chapter five notes, Kim Jong-il‘s ultimate success in assuming power was made 
possible by over two decades of grooming and preparation.  During this period he developed 
his own power base and patronage network within the institutions of state, independent of 
those of his father, which ultimately found expression in the Songun politics doctrine.
54
  In 
1969 he became deputy director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department within the 
KWP after his involvement in a power struggle within the Party earlier in 1967.  By 
September 1973 he had become the Party secretary in charge of organisation affairs, in 
conjunction with his role in propaganda and agitation, elevating him to the chief position 
within the Party apparatus under Kim Il-sung.
55
  The younger Kim became the chief 
interpreter and theoretician of Juche, through which he strengthened the role of Party cadres 
in local administrative units and enhanced the role of self-criticism rituals in workplace 
teams.  In so doing he promoted a large cohort of junior cadres who later became his power 
base, beholden to him for their career advancement.  Though nepotism clearly played a role, 
Kim was able to place himself at the critical node of power during the period when the 
process of power transition was underway.  As Kim Sung-chull argues, Kim Jong-il obtained 
his father‘s blessing as designated successor as through his own efforts as much as through 
inheritance.
56
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The Designated Successor and Potential Rivals 
Kim Jong-il has many offspring among whom to choose a successor, including at least three 
sons and two daughters.
57
  Kim Jong-il‘s youngest son, Kim Jong-un, was thought to have 
been designated heir to the DPRK leadership in June 2009.  Reports from North Korea cited 
by Yonhap News Agency in early June 2009 stated that Kim Jong-il issued orders to regime 
officials and diplomats abroad to pledge loyalty to Jong-un as heir, with Kim‘s brother-in-law 
Jang Song-taek to act as regent.
58
  He was officially unveiled as the likely successor at the 
Workers‘ Party of Korea conference in September 2010, the first such congress held since 
1980.  Kim Jong-un was promoted to the rank of General and named Vice-Chairman of the 
Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party and was appointed to its central 
committee.
59
   
 
In 2003 Kim Jong-il‘s former chef, writing under the pseudonym Kenji Fujimoto, published a 
memoir in which he claimed that Kim Jong-il greatly favoured Jong-un as successor to the 
family dynasty.
60
  Jong-un is said to closely resemble his father in many ways in his 
personality and physical appearance, which on a superficial level gives his some appeal as a 
succession candidate.  However, he did not hold any important positions in the government 
until his promotion to the National Defence Commission at the First Session of the 12
th
 SPA 
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in April 2009.
61
  The transition may be unstable if Kim Jong-un‘s patronage networks are 
under-developed.
62
  Potential succession candidates need to establish their own institutional 
attachments and personal loyalties as the foundation of their claims to future leadership.  For 
a smooth transition to take place, Kim Jong-un needs to be acceptable to a sizeable majority 
of the high-level elites, particularly in the KPA.
63
   
 
Kim Jong-il has two other sons who at various times had been mentioned by foreign analysts 
as possible successors: Kim Jong-nam and Kim Jong-chul.  Kim Jong-nam is the eldest son 
but was widely discredited as a potential successor after being arrested in Japan en route to 
Tokyo Disneyland in May 2001 for traveling on a fake Dominican passport.
64
  Some reports 
indicated that Jong-nam was being rehabilitated with appointments to senior government 
positions, even identifying him as a potential figurehead leader for a pro-regime military 
junta, though later sightings have him pinned down living a privileged lifestyle in Macau.
65
  
Given his seeming disinterest in the affairs of state, his ascension to the apex of power seems 
rather unlikely. 
 
Kim Jong-il‘s middle son, Kim Jong-chul, had a much stronger claim.  He is presently 
working as a member of the KWP Central Committee Leadership Division as deputy director 
of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, the same role held by his father in 1969.
66
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Reports indicate that special departments have been established since 2004 in the National 
Defence Commission and the KWP to prepare the way for Jong-chul‘s succession.  He may 
have even been promoted to higher positions under the pseudonym Pak Se-bong, following a 
precedent set by his father in the early-1970s.  If these reports are true, this level of support 
from key institutions in the state bureaucracy indicates that he may have established the 
necessary support base in the Party and the military to consolidate his claim.
67
  In 2002, 
propaganda messages began to glorify Jong-chul‘s mother, Koh Young-hee, with themes 
such as ―respected mother‖ and ―most loyal companion‖ of Kim Jong-il, evocative of slogans 
used to reify the late wife of Kim Il-sung.  This firmly incorporates Jong-chul‘s mother and 
by extension Jong-chul himself into the mythology of the Kimist personality cult.
68
  Yet 
Jong-chul has not been designated as heir, despite strong evidence pointing to him as a likely 
successor.  There are three primary explanations for this: first, the evidence stated above is 
circumstantial and may not reflect the true preferences of the National Defence Commission, 
which is sure to play a lead role in the leadership transition.  Second, it has been reported that 
Kim Jong-il has chastised Jong-chul for being too effeminate to wield the reins of power.
69
  
Finally, Jong-chul‘s mother was a mistress of Kim Jong-il, making Jong-chul an illegitimate 
son and therefore not an heir to the Confucian family lineage.
70
  
 
Kim‘s brother-in-law Jang Song-taek has previously been mentioned as a possible successor.  
Jang was purged in 2004 for an alleged bid to enhance his own power, but was reinstated in 
2005 to become Kim Jong-il‘s right-hand man, having responsibilities for oversight of 
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domestic intelligence, police and judicial institutions.
71
  He also enjoys close family 
connections to the military through an older brother who is a corps commander of the 
Pyongyang Military District.
72
  He recently assumed a caretaker role for domestic affairs 
while Kim Jong-il was unwell, after which he was promoted to a key role within the NDC at 
the First Session of the 12
th
 SPA in April 2009.
73
  Of the contenders mentioned so far, Jang is 
the only individual in a realistic position to assume the reins of power in the event of a rapid 
transition.
74
  This would explain the reasoning behind his recent designation as future regent 
for Kim Jong-un. 
 
Kim Jong-il has insulated his leadership from hostile takeover by dividing power between the 
Party, the military and his own extended family.  Individual power within this hierarchy is 
delineated according to proximity to Kim Jong-il, while the roles of government offices are 
circumscribed to prevent any one person from accruing enough power to challenge for the 
leadership.  This means that no one person will be in a position to take complete control of 
the country in the event of a rapid leadership transition.
75
  Instead, a leadership collective 
similar to Burma‘s military dictatorship may seize power, probably under the aegis of the 
National Defence Commission.  One of Kim Jong-il‘s sons—most likely Kim Jong-un in 
light of developments at the party congress in September 2010—may be positioned as a 
figurehead leader to provide some continuity with the mythology of the Kim dynasty, though 
                                                 
71 STARES, P. & WIT, J. 2009. Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea. Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/North_Korea_CSR42.pdf. p . 11. 
72 LYON, R. & MOLOMBY, K. 2009. North Korea: Sliding Towards the Abyss. Strategic Insights No. 46. Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute, http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=201&pubtype=6. p. 6; BECK, P. 2008a. After Kim Jong-il 
. Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/08076Beck.html [Accessed 12 
December 2008]. 
73 HWANG, D.-H. 2009. N. Korea to return to negotiations with anointment of Kim's successor: official  . Seoul: Yonhap News Agency, 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2009/06/03/52/0301000000AEN20090603000400315F.HTML [Accessed 03 June 2009]. 
74 HARRISON, S. 2009. Living With A Nuclear North Korea . Washington DC: The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/02/16/AR2009021601101.html?sub=AR [Accessed 18 February 2009]; BECK, P. Interview with the author. 22 
July 2008. Seoul, South Korea. 
75 HAGGARD, S. & NOLAND, M. 2009. North Korea in 2008: Twilight of the God? Asian Survey, 49, p. 105; LYON, R. & MOLOMBY, 
K. 2009. North Korea: Sliding Towards the Abyss. Strategic Insights No. 46. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 
http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=201&pubtype=6. p. 7. 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
 362 
ultimate power would reside with the senior members of the NDC.
76
  That the military would 
come to dominate a collective leadership seems to be a natural result of Songun politics and 
the current supremacy of the NDC as the paramount institution in the DPRK state.   
 
A collective leadership may represent a positive development for the relations of regional 
states with North Korea.  Such systems coalesce not through revolution but through the need 
to manage a system already in place.  They derive legitimacy from their extensive client 
networks of neo-feudal relationships, rather than from the extreme forms of overt coercion 
through which their predecessors ruled.
77
  Being competent administrators as opposed to 
ideologues, a military junta may be more amenable to constructive relations with regional 
states.
78
  This does not mean however that a military junta will be predisposed to radical 
economic and political reform.  Given that approximately 1,300 of 1,400 generals in the 
officer corps were promoted by Kim Jong-il and given that the ruling elite in the Party and 
military, from which a ruling junta would derive, are provided with great incentives for their 
continued backing of the system, great incentives exist for upper echelon figures to maintain 
the system under which they prosper.
79
    
 
A collective leadership is also the most likely framework in which divergent personal and 
institutional interests of the elite could be accommodated.  A smooth transition is less likely if 
individual claimants attempt to assume power.  As Paul Stares and Joel Wit note, the 
outcome is likely to hinge on the personal client networks, leadership abilities, and sources of 
                                                 
76 BECK, P. 2008a. After Kim Jong-il . Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, 
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/08076Beck.html [Accessed 12 December 2008]. 
77 For a description of the tendencies of collective leaderships in communist states, see: MYER, A. 1983. Communism and Leadership. 
Studies in Comparative Communism, 16, p. 167. 
78 MYERS, B. Interview with the author. 27 July 2008. Seoul, South Korea. 
79 STARES, P. & WIT, J. 2009. Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea. Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/North_Korea_CSR42.pdf. p. 12. 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
 363 
funding of competing claimants.
80
  Ultimately, the succession struggle may fail to yield a 
governing regime that enjoys widespread support and legitimacy, which may see the North 
Korean state disaggregate into a series of warring fiefdoms.  Given that regional states are 
unwilling to countenance the collapse of the DPRK for a host of economic, strategic and 
humanitarian reasons, it is possible that they will intervene in the succession struggle as 
shadow backers of particular claimants to prevent this outcome and ensure a friendly regime 
comes to power.
81
  Other reports suggest that Beijing has a plan to insert Chinese troops 
across North Korea in the event of rapid regime disintegration.
82
  With South Korean and 
American forces poised to enter a collapsed North Korea from the south, the greatest danger 
of ensnaring regional states as adversaries in conflict lies in this scenario.   
 
Global Financial Crisis and the Collapse of Dollar Hegemony 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) began as rising default levels amongst sub-prime 
borrowers burst a speculative bubble in the US housing market beginning in 2006, leaving 
American banks exposed to unsustainably large levels of unrepayable debts as a result of 
their over-zealous extension of credit to the high-risk sub-prime demographic.
83
  The crisis 
spread from its epicentre in the United States into a fully global financial contagion because 
these debts had been repackaged into complex financial instruments and traded as assets on 
global financial markets.
84
  Consequently, the bad debt accrued in the US sub-prime sector, 
combined with over-extensions of credit in other industrialised economies combined to push 
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the economies of North America, Europe and East Asia into recession.  Declining demand in 
the industrialised countries depressed commodity prices and international trade flows, which 
along with the tightening of credit availability has led to the depreciation of currencies and 
economic contraction in resource-exporting developing states.
85
   
 
The GFC has even begun to impact on isolationist North Korea, a country whose export 
income is largely derived from the resources sector.  The North‘s exposure to the crisis flows 
from its economic interactions with China and South Korea.  As noted earlier, North Korea‘s 
exports are dominated by resources from the mining sector, sent principally to China.  The 
financial crisis has dramatically slashed economic growth in China and thus decreased 
demand for natural resources from supplier countries like North Korea, resulting in falling 
prices for primary products.  The prices North Korea has fetched for its mineral exports have 
been almost halved since the onset of the GFC, causing the North‘s trade deficit with China 
to increase.
86
  Ordinarily, an increasing trade deficit tends to depress the value of a country‘s 
currency.
87
  However, in the North Korean case, Pyongyang has refused to alter the value of 
the Won, forcing prices of Chinese goods in North Korean markets to rise sharply, in many 
cases beyond the means of the regular clientele.  For this reason, many Chinese traders have 
had to stop selling goods in North Korea.
88
  The price inflation is damaging the livelihoods of  
the North Korean market traders who sell Chinese-made goods in North Korea‘s jangmadang 
(private market places), including many of North Korea‘s nouveau riche who derive their 
livelihoods from private enterprise in the entrepreneurial economy.  While this sector proved 
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most resilient during the famine, it is the most exposed to the GFC.  North Koreans are used 
to privation, but the political consequences of the decimation of a social group that has made 
itself comparatively well-off outside of the official economy is beyond the experience of 
North Korean politics under the Kim dynasty. 
 
The joint venture industrial facility at Kaesong has also been affected by the GFC.  The 
contracting South Korean economy has inevitably affected companies investing in the 
Kaesong precinct.  Domestic consumption in the South has fallen, along with demand South 
Korean exports (including goods produced in Kaesong), forcing companies operating at 
Kaesong to scale back production.
89
  Even if North Korea had not chosen to wind down 
support for the project, the planned expansion of the facility would have to be delayed until 
economic conditions pick up, as the massive investment capital necessary for expansion is 
not available in the current economic climate.
90
  Either way, the regime will collect declining 
revenue from its cut taken from the wages of North Korean employees working in the zone. 
 
As a rule, foreign aid from developed to developing countries tends to decrease during 
economic crises.
91
  This is problematic for North Korea, a country for which international aid 
is an important economic input.  Donor fatigue in South Korea is setting in, with the 
government finding it difficult to muster the funds or the enthusiasm to maintain aid to 
Pyongyang.
92
  Aid and economic cooperation have served as the backbone of inter-Korean 
trust and dialogue, but the strain of the GFC and Lee Myung-bak‘s tougher line on inter-
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Korean cooperation is starting to show on the level of aid entering the DPRK.  Furthermore, 
donor fatigue from other regional states, including the US and Japan, is likely to further 
reduce the level of aid to North Korea reducing the inputs destined for the military and 
further on-sale onto the private market.
93
  The KPA‘s dominance of aid distribution is an 
important source of its power in the Songun system.  If aid declines over an extended period, 
so too will the power of the military and thus the regime itself. 
 
The GFC is having wider geopolitical consequences that are affecting the relative balance of 
power in Northeast Asia between China and the United States.  In a version of hegemonic 
stability theory, Robert Gilpin has contended that hegemonic transitions develop from the 
natural operation of the international market economy.  For Gilpin, international trade, capital 
exports and technological diffusion provide rising powers with the economic and technical 
means to extract themselves from a dependency relationship with the incumbent hegemon.  
As this process occurs, the situation usually leads to conflict between the incumbent power, 
which seeks to maintain its dominant position in the international system, and the rising 
challenger, which seeks to increase its own status.
94
  As discussed in Chapter 7, some within 
the American foreign policy establishment would see this as an apt description of the current 
dynamic between China and the United States, in which Sino-American engagement has 
facilitated China‘s increasing regional power at a relative cost to the United States.95  If this is 
indeed the case, the GFC will have been a disaster for American power in East Asia. 
 
                                                 
93 NANTO, D. 2009. The Global Financial Crisis: Foreign and Trade Policy Effects. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 
http://opencrs.com/document/R40496/. p. 28. 
94 GILPIN, R. 1992. The Economic Dimension of International Security. In: BIENEN, H. (ed.) Power, Economics and Security: The United 
States and Japan in Focus. Boulder. p. 53. 
95 CHRISTENSEN, T. 2006. Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and US Policy toward East Asia. International 
Security, 31, p. 82. 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
 367 
The root of this phenomenon lies in the role of the American dollar as the global reserve 
currency.  The United States has been accumulating growing levels of foreign debt since the 
early 1980s.  Over this period, capital from East Asia has increasingly underwritten the value 
of the US dollar.  Asian countries have been earning US dollars for their export goods, which 
their governments have used to by US Treasury bonds, the debt financing instruments for the 
American government.
96
  This cycle has allowed the US government to accumulate massive 
foreign debts—estimated at US$1.84 trillion for fiscal year 200997—without concomitant 
currency depreciation, a trend that is clearly not sustainable.  A point may be reached when 
foreign creditors will cease buying US Treasury bonds because they have lost confidence that 
the US government has the capacity to honour its debt obligations.
98
  At this moment, foreign 
creditors will offload their dollar denominated assets leading to a precipitous decline in the 
value of the US dollar, affecting the US government‘s ability to finance its extensive global 
security commitments, as well as other activities such as foreign aid.
99
 
 
This point may have arrived with the advent of the global financial crisis.  In March 2009, 
Governor of the People‘s Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan, proposed that the international 
monetary system based on the US dollar as reserve currency is too unstable and should be 
abandoned in favour of an international reserve currency.
100
  This reflects a trend in which 
countries such as China, Russia, India and Brazil have assumed a greater role in coordinating 
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a global response to the financial crisis.  Many experts, including Australian strategic analyst 
Paul Dibb, believe the GFC will hasten the relative decline of the United States, improve 
China‘s status and embolden China as a global power.101  The crisis has presented the 
opportunity for rising powers such as China to adjust the global balance of power away from 
the United States.   
 
This will have substantial repercussions for North Korea and the security environment in 
Northeast Asia.  In the short term, American military threats have become even less credible.  
To risk war in a region that is the engine room of the world economy during the GFC would 
be suicidal for the American economy, which, as has been shown above, exists in inter-
dependence with the Chinese economy and to a lesser extent those of Japan and South Korea.  
This credibility gap between American threats and action appears to be encouraging greater 
bellicosity from North Korea, which may be a function of this growing credibility gap and is 
surely a sign of the regime‘s confidence in the face of growing American weakness.  There is 
an observable difference between the caution shown by Pyongyang in pronouncements of its 
2006 missile and nuclear tests, and the more strident rhetoric surrounding the rocket launch 
and the second nuclear test in April and May 2009 respectively, which may be attributable in 
part to perceptions in Pyongyang of a weakened US foreign policy position.
102
  The flow-on 
effects are predictable: North Korean bellicosity on the one hand further undermines the 
position of liberal in South Korea, the supporters of the Sunshine Policy and biggest 
constituency for engagement with the North.  On the other, Pyongyang‘s recent actions have 
enhanced the position of right wing factions in Japan, giving further weight to their calls for 
the full remilitarization of the Japanese state. 
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The longer-term outcomes are less certain, but may derive from a creeping American 
retrenchment from the region.  The global financial crisis is highlighting the fact that the 
United States is losing its economic capacity to maintain a worldwide military presence.  As 
this capacity decreases, US forces abroad are likely to be rationed to priority postings in vital 
energy source regions in the Middle East and Central Asia.  A diminishing American 
presence in Northeast Asia will erode its future capacity to act as a balancing power, 
aggravating the regional security dilemma due to the absence of institutionalized cooperative 
security mechanisms.  This would create a de facto multipolar system in which Japan would 
assume greater weight in the regional balance of power.
103
  Specifically, this could lead to 
maritime competition between China and Japan, in what was formerly the exclusive domain 
of the US Pacific Fleet, a vortex into which both North and South Korea will be drawn.  
 
Global Oil Supply Constraints 
Petroleum geologist M. King Hubbert first postulated his theory of peak oil production in 
1956, when he proposed that the rate of discovery in individual oil fields followed a bell 
curve, at the halfway point of which rates of discovery would begin to decline.  As a 
consequence of this, at some point in the future the rate of production from a given field 
would also follow a bell curve congruent with the discovery curve.  The peak of the 
production curve represented the point at which all the cheap and easily accessible oil from 
the field had been produced, with the remaining half consisting of oil of decreasing quality 
that would be increasingly expensive to extract.  Hubbert used his theory to predict that oil 
production from all fields in the United States would peak in 1970, which proved correct to 
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within a year.  He later extrapolated the peak theory to incorporate all known global oil 
resources, from which he predicted a global oil peak occurring around 2000.
104
  As demand 
for oil increases beyond the available supply as the peak is passed, the price of oil is likely to 
trend upwards, punctuated by periods of extreme price volatility.  The impact of the peak on 
oil-dependent modern industrial societies has been predicted to be severe, resulting in 
disruption to agriculture and transportation, slowing down the wider economy.
105
  While the 
concept of peak oil is not a matter of debate in the academic literature, predictions for the 
timing of the global peak range from 2005 to 2030.
106
 
 
This has major relevance for Northeast Asia, which is dependent on oil imported from the 
Middle East for over half its energy demand.  China, Japan and South Korea all have 
advanced industrial economies that are heavily dependent on oil as an energy source and as 
demand increases, so too will their reliance on imports from other regions.
107
  The 
geopolitical ramifications for Northeast Asia of declining global oil production rates in a 
post-peak era are immense.  Pessimists such as Liao Xuanli and Kent Calder predict that the 
region‘s inherent energy insecurity will spawn increasing rivalry between regional states and 
confrontation over scarce resources and energy corridors in vulnerable sea-lanes.
108
  More 
optimistic analysts believe that energy insecurity will spur multilateral cooperation where 
regional states choose energy interdependence through institutionalised cooperative projects 
in areas such as joint oil stockpiling, energy efficiency, offshore exploration, pipeline 
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construction, and anti-piracy measures to protect sea-lanes.
109
  Choi Hyun-jin sees great 
potential for transforming the Six Party Talks into an institutionalised political body to 
manage regional energy security issues, once the nuclear question has been resolved 
[emphasis added].
110
  
 
The problem with this proposal lies in the current viability of the Six Party Talks.  Having 
failed in its goal of denuclearising North Korea and with Pyongyang‘s withdrawal from 
participation altogether in April 2009, the prospects for institutionalising the six party forum 
do not appear bright.  Regional energy security cooperation could provide a new raison 
d’être to breathe new life into the Six Party Talks if denuclearisation was abandoned from the 
agenda and Pyongyang agreed to resume participation.  In the probable event that this does 
not occur, energy security relations between regional states are likely to reflect the 
predictions of the pessimists who see a future of heightened competition reinforced by the 
regional security dilemma.  For North Korea, such an environment would only augment 
Pyongyang‘s view of a DPRK surrounded by hostile powers, vindicating its choice to 
maintain a nuclear deterrent.  In such an environment, with sharpened cleavages of 
competition, regional states are unlikely to favour the type of unconditional normalisation 
with North Korea proposed in the scenario above. 
 
Declining oil production rates and tightening competition for access to oil supplies is also 
likely to impact on North Korea‘s political economy.  As noted earlier, North Korea is 
completely reliant on external supplies of oil, chiefly from China with occasional shipments 
from other regional states as a component of aid agreements.  This raises two pertinent issues: 
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(1) as the oil supply crunch increases, China may become unwilling to sell oil to North Korea 
at any price, let alone subsidised friendship rates; and (2) other regional states may be 
disinclined to ship oil to North Korea if global supply constraints push industrial countries to 
favour oil stockpiling.  The precipitous decline in energy imports from the collapsed Soviet 
Union was the principal trigger event leading to the famine and the collapse of the North 
Korean economy after 1991.  Since that period, external inputs of energy aid and subsidised 
imports have stalled the complete decay of the Kim regime‘s totalitarian system.  A decline in 
this energy inflow is likely to accelerate the deterioration of the eroded totalitarian system 
until the economy settles on a new equilibrium in balance with the reduced level of energy 
inputs, supporting a political order of reduced organisational complexity.   
 
Maintaining structures of this scale requires an enormous resource base, which if diminished 
with force the complexity of the system to be reduced.  In practice, reduction of 
organisational complexity will require the state and its huge centralised institutions to 
disaggregate into smaller units.  This could occur in one of three ways: (1) disaggregation of 
the state into smaller discrete political units, such as occurred in the ―Balkanisation‖ of the 
former Yugoslavia, and the collapse of Soviet Union; (2) via social triage, where sections of 
the population are cut off from the resource pool so that system can be maintained.  This 
regime survival strategy was maintained during the famine period, as it continues to be in 
light of the revived Chollima campaign; and (3) through systemic reform, where the state 
consciously alters its political system to a mode of organisation that is more efficient.  In the 
case of North Korea, this would include official marketisation of economy, greater political 
and social freedoms requiring less policing, and fewer, more streamlined government 
institutions. 
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Climate Change 
Climate change represents another direct threat to the political economy of the DPRK.  
Traditionally, environmental impacts tended to be localised or manifest as cumulative 
problems over distant time horizons, neither of which posed a threat to the core interests of 
states.  With the advent of climate change, however, it is no longer tenable to separate 
environmental variables from other political, economic and security considerations.  Climate 
change is distinctive amongst environmental problems in that it is a global phenomenon, 
creating for the first time in modern history a convergence between the geopolitical and 
environmental realms at the global level.  Climate change hazards are affecting human 
systems now and are worsening as the cumulative effects manifest over time.
111
 
 
Several analysts have established the link between climate change and security concerns at 
the domestic level.  Climate change is likely to create problems at the sub-state level by 
reducing the carrying capacity—through declining availability of food, water and energy, sea 
level rise, migration, and extreme weather events—of states, acting as stress multipliers for 
countries already at risk from internal instability and economic weakness.
112
  Climate hazards 
will cause the greatest harm in combination with existing problems such as over-population, 
demographic imbalance, poor governance, endemic poverty and lack of infrastructure.  Weak 
                                                 
111 HULTMAN, N. & BOZMOSKI, A. 2006. The Changing Face of Normal Disaster: Risk, Resilience and Natural Security in a Changing 
Climate. Journal of International Affairs, 59, p. 26.  A climate hazard is a process or event that has the potential to create loss in human 
social, economic and political systems through its transformative effect on the biosphere.  The Earth is committed to at least a 2oC rise in 
global mean temperature from pre-industrial levels.  At +0.8oC, the planet is already on the precipice of feedback mechanisms that will 
trigger rapid and catastrophic climate change.  See: HANSEN, J., SATO, M., KHARECHA, P., BEERLING, D., BERNER, R., MASSON-
DELMOTTE, V., PAGANI, M., RAYMO, M., ROYER, D. & ZACHOS, J. 2008. Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim? : 
arXiv:0804.1126v2 [physics.ao-ph], http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/2008/TargetCO2_20080407.pdf; SPRATT, D. & SUTTON, P. 2008. 
Climate Code Red: The Case for Emergency Action, Melbourne, Scribe. 
112 DUPONT, A. 2008. The Strategic Implications of Climate Change. Survival, 50, 29-54; BARNETT, J. 2003. Security and Climate 
Change. Global Environmental Change, 13, pp. 7-17; SCHWARTZ, P. & RANDALL, D. 2003. An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its 
Implications for United States National Security. Pasadena CA: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, http://www.kelber.de/medien/doks/Pentagon-
Studie%20Klimawandel.pdf 
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countries like North Korea, where such problems are endemic, will be the least able to 
cope.
113
   
 
The main dangers to the DPRK state from climate change do not lie in developments at the 
international level, but rather will derive from the erosion of the state itself, chiefly as a 
function of increasing food insecurity.
114
  Food insecurity exists when access to sufficient 
amounts of safe and nutritious food for normal sustenance and development cannot be 
guaranteed.  It can be caused by inadequate access due to specific political arrangements for 
distribution, as well as insufficient and uncertain supplies.  The North Korean famine was a 
result of both of these drivers acting in combination.  Armatya Sen observed that populations 
rarely experience shortages evenly, because access to food during a food shock is a function 
of ―entitlement.‖115  Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland demonstrated the validity of Sen‘s 
thesis in the context of North Korean famine, showing that government decisions not to 
purchase food on the international market contributed to the severity of the famine.
116
  The 
underlying factor at play here is that the North Korean population had outstripped the 
carrying capacity of the land base, meaning that the regime had more mouths to feed than 
domestic food production could satisfy.
117
  Under these circumstances, political decisions 
about food procurement and distribution can be decisive in limiting or perpetuating mass 
starvation. 
 
                                                 
113 CAMPBELL, K. & PARTHEMORE, C. 2008. National Security and Climate Change in Perspective. In: CAMPBELL, K. (ed.) Climatic 
Cataclysm: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Climate Change. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. p. 14. 
114 The author has conducted extensive investigations into this area.  See: HABIB, B. 2010. Climate Change and Regime Perpetuation in 
North Korea. Asian Survey, 50, pp. 378–401; HABIB, B. 2009. The Implications of Climate Vulnerability for North Korean Regime 
Stability. The International Journal of Climate Change: Impacts and Responses, 1, pp. 83-104. 
115 SEN, A. 1981. Poverty and Famine: An essay on entitlement and deprivation, Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
116 HAGGARD, S. & NOLAND, M. 2007a. Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform, New York, Columbia University Press. p. 9. 
117 NATSIOS, A. 2001. The Great North Korean Famine, Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace Press. p. 12. 
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North Korea has always had to cover its domestic food shortfall from foreign sources.  Prior 
to 1991, it procured food at subsidised prices from the communist bloc.  After the Soviet 
Union collapsed, the North propped up domestic production with international food aid.  
While the famine could have been minimised if the regime had acquired food on the 
international market, the question does arise, in light of climate change, about what would 
happen if global food production were to decline such that the amount of food available on 
the international market was to significantly decrease.  Crop yields are bounded by the 
inherent limits of photosynthetic efficiency, which places a ceiling on the Earth‘s biological 
productivity.  Convincing evidence exists that global food production may be declining after 
reaching a peak in the 1990s, a trend exacerbated by the influence of climate change.
118
  
According to Lester Brown, a dangerous new politics of international food scarcity has 
already begun.  Brown reports that in 2007, wheat-exporting countries including Russia and 
Argentina limited exports in an attempt to counter domestic food price rises, while Vietnam 
banned exports of rice for similar reasons.
119
  In a future dominated by growing global food 
scarcity, even if the regime wanted to buy food in the global marketplace, it would be at a 
severe disadvantage relative to prosperous states, which could pay a higher price for food 
commodities.   
 
Large segments of the North Korean population are already at-risk because the regime 
continues the misguided pursuit of agricultural self-sufficiency.  This policy has forced these 
people to develop coping mechanisms to secure subsistence or face malnutrition and death.  
As it has in the past, migration will be the best available adaptation option when governing 
institutions prove unresponsive to climate-induced crises and household capital endowments 
                                                 
118 The Food and Agriculture Organisation reports that global grain stocks are at their lowest level in over three decades.  See: 2008f. The 
State of Food Insecurity in the World 2008: High food prices and food security – threats and opportunities . Rome: Food and Agriculture 
Organisation. Available: ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/i0291e/i0291e00.pdf. pp. 9-10. 
119 BROWN, L. 2009. The Geopolitics of Food Scarcity . Spiegel Online, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,druck-
606937,00.html [Accessed 14 February 2009]. 
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preclude other adaptation measures.
120
  For many North Koreans during the famine— people 
with minimal access to foreign currency and limited access to the black market and the 
victims of social triage—this was indeed their only option for survival and is likely to remain 
so in the future.  During the famine, the proliferation of internally displaced persons 
destabilised the strict system of travel restrictions that kept people rooted in one place, 
weakening domestic surveillance.  Intensification of food shortages will place tremendous 
pressure on the regime to again tolerate unrestricted travel, leading to the further 
delegitimisation of social controls and additional growth in official corruption.
121
  Once 
systematic corruption becomes the norm it is exceedingly difficult for reformist leaders to 
dismantle.  In the DPRK, money and self-enrichment have replaced career advancement and 
fear of the coercive apparatus as behavioural motivators, clear evidence that the totalitarian 
order is eroding and the complexity of the institutional system is decreasing.  Exposure to 
climate change hazards is likely to accelerate this process, both weakening institutions and 
rendering them more vulnerable to future climate impacts. 
 
Faced with climate-induced systemic breakdown that social triage is unable to stem, the 
regime may be forced into a corner where reform is unavoidable.  The de facto marketisation 
of the North Korean economy during the famine provides a glimpse of inescapable systemic 
change.  In 2002, state-owned enterprises began paying market prices for goods through their 
supply chains while the price of merchandise in state-owned stores was adjusted to reflect the 
price of goods in the farmers‘ markets.122  Private farmers‘ markets weakened the primacy of 
the command economy, demonstrating the inefficiency of central planning and the PDS as 
mechanisms for distributing food.  People stopped looking to the state to provide for them 
                                                 
120 MCLEMAN, R. & SMIT, B. 2006. Migration as an Adaptation to Climate Change. Climatic Change, 76, p. 41. 
121 2006i. A Matter of Survival: The North Korean Government‘s Control of Food and the Risk of Hunger. Human Rights Watch, 18, p. 29. 
122 WOO, M. J.-E. 2005. North Korea in 2005: Maximising Profit to Save Socialism. Asian Survey, 46, p. 54. 
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and instead learnt to take care of themselves, shattering the propaganda image of the state as 
paternal provider.  Again, this is a sign that the system cannot be maintained at the level of 
complexity required for totalitarian control.  Marketisation requires minimal state 
intervention to function efficiently, in stark contrast to the level of intervention necessary for 
the proper function of the command economy.   
 
Members of the elite live in a cloistered bubble of privilege, safely sequestered from the 
pervasive malnourishment afflicting the lower social strata.  Kim Jong-il may confront a 
scenario in which the agricultural and industrial capacity servicing the military and Party elite 
is further undermined by climate hazards or by international donor fatigue. It is not clear what 
minimum level of resource procurement is necessary to sustain the elite and at what point of 
erosion a backlash against the leadership may occur.
123
  The tipping point may come when 
mid and high-ranking officials are confronted with severely reduced access to food, 
prompting key figures to see support for the status quo as a losing gambit.  This will be the 
coup de grace for the totalitarian order, because social triage is not possible if the protected 
portion of the population begins to crumble from within.  This will be the point at which 
political disaggregation will begin to take place. 
 
The regime has positioned itself strongly having adopted Songun politics as its legitimising 
paradigm.  The military remains strong, having co-opted approximately three quarters of the 
total North Korean economy.  This portion operates largely on market principles and provides 
the KPA with a generous revenue stream through the on-sale of diverted goods on the black 
market.
124
  Decreases in the food available locally will affect this revenue stream, but to 
                                                 
123 Reports in 2008 suggested that high-ranking residents of Pyongyang had their ration substantially reduced.  See: 2008d. N. Korea's food 
situation hopelessly bad: aid group . The Hankyoreh, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/279706.html [Accessed 03 
April 2008]. 
124 PARK, I.-H. Interview with the author. 28 July 2008. Seoul, South Korea. 
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constitute chronic revenue impairment, food shortages would have to coincide with donor 
fatigue from international sources such that overall food inputs decrease.  Foreign nationals 
representing international donor organisations are a possible conduit for information about 
the outside world, increasing the chance of ideological pollution and the leakage of dangerous 
information.  Social discord could result if the flagging monopoly on information is totally 
shattered and the North Korean public are able to make a genuine comparison between the 
outrageous excesses of official propaganda and the harsh reality of their everyday lives.  
Totalitarian ideology loses its credibility when political complexity decreases.  If total control 
does not exist, totalitarian ideology is an empty shell, an idea without a purpose.  Barry 
Buzan states that the ideas and the institutions of the state are inseparably intertwined: the 
ideational pillars are useless without the institutions to put them into practice, just as the 
institutions are pointless and even impossible without these ideas to give them definition and 
purpose.
125
  Without Juche, Songun politics or the revived Chollima spirit as a practical 
guide, the institutions of the North Korean state will lose their raison d’etre, destroying the 
motivation of state officials to carry out their duties and the incentive for the citizenry to 
comply with government directives.  Again, climate change exacerbates the risk that pre-
existing problems will degenerate into system-threatening movements. 
 
Conclusion 
It is clear from the analysis above that while Pyongyang has achieved nuclear status on its 
own terms, the fate of the North Korean state and of the Northeast Asian security 
environment is still a matter of conjecture.  In a region where strategic competition is the 
norm for interstate relations, the scenarios of pragmatic accommodation are more likely to 
                                                 
125 BUZAN, B. 1991. People, States and Fear: An Agenda For International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Boulder, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers. p. 86. 
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play out than those of conflict or cooperation.  That is not to say that either a nuclear arms 
race or multilateral security institutionalism are out of the question, but merely to 
acknowledge that the balance of probabilities favour more ad hoc arrangements reflecting the 
divergent strategic interests of regional states. 
 
The wildcard scenarios described above have the potential to change the underpinning 
dynamics of the entire nuclear crisis.  At some stage in the next two decades, and assuming 
the state remains intact, North Korea will undergo a leadership transition after Kim Jong-il 
passes away.  It is unclear at this stage whether the designated heir, Kim Jong-un, has 
assembled the necessary backing from important members of the regime elite to assume 
power uncontested.  External developments at the global level are also relevant to the Korean 
peninsula.  North Korea has been unable to escape the effects of the global financial crisis, 
which is diminishing its revenue from raw materials exports and increasing its trade deficit 
with China.  Going forward, the global financial crisis may also constrain the ability and 
willingness of regional states to provide aid to the North, leaving the military and 
entrepreneurial economies exposed.  The peaking of global oil production may lead to a 
similar problem, where growing competition for imported energy supplies leads regional 
states to husband oil for themselves rather than forward oil to North Korea as part of aid 
assistance packages.  Climate change poses a comparable problem for the North‘s 
procurement of international food aid.  In a global environment of contracting food 
production, a problem exacerbated by climate change, less food may be available for North 
Korea either as food aid or for sale on the international market, which in turn will place 
greater pressure on the regime to leverage its nuclear weapons capability to obtain 
international largesse. 
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The famine period in the 1990s saw a decrease in the level of economic and institutional 
complexity in North Korea.  The totalitarian system was able to accommodate this reduced 
complexity through strategic retreat in certain sectors of the system, creating a new 
equilibrium where a weakened totalitarian architecture survived at a lower level of 
complexity.  International largesse has been an important factor in maintaining the 
institutions of the totalitarian order, stalling the slide of the DPRK state toward a post-
totalitarian system.  There is a danger in each of the wildcard scenarios that international aid 
may be curtailed, which will exacerbate existing stresses and necessitate further strategic 
retreat and systemic reorganisation.  This could result in Pyongyang placing increasing 
emphasis on nuclear sabre-rattling as the cure-all solution for its domestic economic and 
political woes.  Without doubt, this would be an undesirable development for regional states.  
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10. Conclusion 
 
Given the underlying structural features of North Korea‘s political economy and the 
international relations of Northeast Asia, there would appear to be little that regional states 
can do to compel North Korea to relinquish its nuclear program.  It has become clear that 
Pyongyang has been insincere about the denuclearisation process, ultimately proving that 
almost two decades of diplomatic effort on the part of regional states has been fruitless.  
North Korea‘s hedging behaviour—engaging in nonproliferation negotiations while 
simultaneously developing a nuclear capability—is a sign that the nuclear program fulfilled 
objectives for the Kim regime above and beyond national security.  This thesis has clearly 
demonstrated that the nuclear program is embedded in the political economy of the DPRK 
state and is integral to the perpetuation of the Kim regime.  In this light, the rationality of 
Pyongyang‘s persistence with nuclear development and ultimate abandonment of the 
negotiation process is understandable.  Regional states were unable to halt the North‘s march 
to nuclear power status because they lacked the military, economic and political leverage 
necessary to force Pyongyang to make concessions. 
 
The Political Economy of Nuclear Proliferation 
The first research question posed at the beginning of this dissertation concerned the 
likelihood that North Korea would willingly relinquish its nuclear weapons program.  The 
conclusion reached in Part II of the thesis is an unequivocal ―no‖, based on proliferation 
motivations deeply rooted in the political economy of the Kim regime.  Institutional failure in 
the mid-1990s very nearly brought about the complete failure of the DPRK state.  This crisis 
resulted from macro-level long-term trends, intermediate level problems of institutional 
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viability and micro-level trigger events.  At the macro-level, North Korea‘s inability to access 
international capital and costly military competition with South Korea and the United States 
stressed its economy and exacerbated intermediate level pressures such as agricultural 
inefficiency related to collectivisation and intensive industrial farming practices, bottlenecks 
associated with the command economy, and growing official corruption.  These intermediate-
level trends were the product of declining marginal returns on investment, which weakened 
the North Korean economy and agricultural sector such that they were incapable of surviving 
systemic shocks.  The micro-level shock events of the Soviet collapse in 1991 and natural 
disasters of 1995-97 degraded North Korea‘s institutions and capital stock to the point where 
maintenance costs of vulnerable sectors could not be serviced.  In short, the old institutional 
structure that had existed prior to 1991 had disaggregated in a system that was less complex 
and more congruent with the available resource inputs. 
 
This new institutional structure was made more stable through Kim Jong-il‘s reconfiguration 
of the institutional power structure of the state around the military.  Under Songun politics, 
the KPA was given priority access to the state‘s resources and production facilities.  In the 
decade since its institution, Songun politics has facilitated the incorporation of approximately 
three-quarters of economic activity in North Korea within a parallel military economy.  
Perpetuation of the Kim regime was the primary objective of Songun politics.  It was 
achieved in two ways: first, by generating an economic recovery from the famine period by 
creating a self-sustaining defence sector in which military activities generate more resources 
and economic goods than they consume.  Second, the Songun system solidified Kim‘s 
support base by privileging the one institution that could threaten his control over the state. 
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The North Korean nuclear program has to be analysed in the context of Songun politics.  The 
security-related drivers of the North‘s nuclear development are reasonably clear-cut: the 
nuclear capability deters attack by American and South Korean forces and acts as strategic 
equaliser against the substantial technological superiority of those enemy forces.  Nuclear 
weapons may also constitute an important component of the North‘s offensive war plan, 
which features a blitzkrieg strategy based its specific strengths in asymmetric capabilities, 
artillery firepower, WMD, and military manpower.  Together, these offensive and defensive 
nuclear doctrines raise the risk premium of war on the Korean peninsula and create doubt in 
the minds of enemy planners about the wisdom of attacking North Korea, which safeguards 
the Kim regime from being deposed by external military intervention. 
 
The nuclear program has provided North Korea with a means to obtain scarce strategic 
commodities such as food and energy supplies from international donors, which are funnelled 
directly to the KPA to help subsidise its systemic maintenance costs.  The regime has been 
able to obtain this international largesse through the use of coercive bargaining tactics in 
denuclearisation negotiations, leveraging nuclear-related provocations for external inputs.  
The KPA enriches itself as the primary distributor for surplus goods from aid shipments that 
are not consumed by the military itself.  By providing an avenue to low and middle-level 
officials for advancement and enrichment, this arrangement prevents widespread public 
defection from the Songun system by offering incentives for participation as well as 
punishment for those who transgress.  Without an effective framework of carrots and sticks, 
the Songun system would not be viable. 
 
The nuclear program helps the regime to maintain the bureaucratic support base necessary to 
perpetuate its rule.  By placing control of the nuclear program in the hands of the NDC, Kim 
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Jong-il has bestowed prestige upon key high-ranking figures and demonstrated that the 
interests of the regime leadership and the military are closely aligned.  This congruence of 
interests is enough to ensure that regime elites have a strong vested interest in supporting the 
status quo.  The program also provides employment for highly educated technicians and 
scientists who may otherwise consider defection en masse, which would deplete the country‘s 
intellectual stock and damage its economic development.  The regime leadership and the 
KPA have reached a quid pro quo under Songun politics, solidified by institutional 
momentum (sunk costs in infrastructure and employment) and strong shared interests.
1
 
 
Finally, the nuclear program solidifies the ideological legitimacy of the Songun system as a 
powerful positive example to the North Korean people of their nation as a ―strong and 
prosperous country.‖  It helps to legitimise the military as the paramount institution of the 
state and thus Kim Jong-il as its leader, and encourages the citizenry to accept the 
deprivations created by the diversion of resources to the military.  North Korean propaganda 
has long positioned the Kim regime as the defender of the nation against imperial enemies.  
The nuclear program provides the regime with a practical illustration of a powerful KPA 
defending the nation against these external enemies, as well as an example of the supremacy 
of the regime‘s diplomacy.  Without these propaganda images the Songun system would lack 
clarity and purpose. 
 
The Songun system would be much more unstable than it is today in the absence of the 
nuclear program.  Regime sympathiser Kim Myong-chol has written that Pyongyang 
                                                 
1 The nuclear test in 2009 may have been orchestrated by Kim Jong-il to demonstrate that he and his supporting elite remain firmly in power.  
It may be no coincidence that the rocket launch on April 4 occurred only four days prior to the First Session of the 12th SPA, during which 
Kim Jong-il was confirmed as Chairman of the National Defence Commission.  Interestingly, his youngest son Kim Jong-un was given a role 
in the NDC, giving him an opportunity to develop his own client patronage network in the military as the designated heir.  See: 
NAKAYAMA, L. & SIN, S. 2009. Contributing Factors to North Korea’s Different Treatment of 2006 and 2009 Taepo Dong-2 Missile 
Launches. USFK Joint Operations Centre Korea, http://www.scribd.com/doc/15245116/Contributing-Factors-to-North-Koreas-Different-
Treatment-of-2006-and-2009-Missile-Launches. pp. 6-7; NOERPER, S. 2009a. North Korea's Nuclear Test of International Resolve . 
Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/09042Noerper.html [Accessed 02 June 
2009]. 
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envisages going it alone as a nuclear armed state, using Songun politics as a vehicle for 
growing into a prosperous and powerful country.  Kim suggests that the regime‘s 
announcement to withdraw from the Six Party Talks, restart operations at Yongbyon and 
conduct further nuclear and missile tests is a clear signal of the regime‘s change of course.  It 
also implies the regime believes the US is powerless to respond, burdened as it is by the 
global financial crisis and costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
2
  Lance Nakayama and Steve 
Sin concur, noting that Pyongyang‘s perception of American weakness would have formed a 
large basis for the decision to proceed with the April rocket launch.
3
  These developments 
confirm the proposition that regional states hold little leverage over North Korea, an 
advantage of which the regime leadership is undoubtedly aware. 
 
Regional States Lack the Leverage to Compel 
The second research question addressed by the thesis related to the capacity of regional states 
to compel North Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons program.  Again, the thesis comes to 
a negative conclusion: regional states lack the leverage to force North Korea to denuclearise.  
As illustrated in Part III, this arises because regional states have divergent strategic 
objectives.  Northeast Asia is a complex strategic environment characterised by historic 
animosity and contemporary competition.  The region is a bipolar system dominated by the 
United States and China, in which Chinese control of the continental mainland is matched by 
American dominance of the East Asian maritime environment.  Regional states align their 
positions more or less behind these two poles of power in denuclearisation negotiations, 
allowing Pyongyang to successfully cultivate the divergence of positions to its own 
                                                 
2 KIM, M.-C. 2009b. Kim Jong-il shifts to plan B . Hong Kong: Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KE21Dg02.html 
[Accessed 22 May 2009]. 
3 NAKAYAMA, L. & SIN, S. 2009. Contributing Factors to North Korea’s Different Treatment of 2006 and 2009 Taepo Dong-2 Missile 
Launches. USFK Joint Operations Centre Korea, http://www.scribd.com/doc/15245116/Contributing-Factors-to-North-Koreas-Different-
Treatment-of-2006-and-2009-Missile-Launches. p. 6. 
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advantage.  Each regional state harbours its own specific set of core strategic goals that often 
conflict with those of their neighbours.  The strategic significance of the Korean peninsula 
varies for each of the regional players, creating divergences in attitudes to North Korea‘s 
nuclear capability that are evident in the commitment of each player to US nonproliferation 
initiatives.  The lack of regional consensus that derives from these differing perspectives has 
been a critical aspect of the failure of strategies employed to compel North Korea to 
denuclearise.  Regional states were left with little choice but to pursue the diplomatic track 
because military options are unviable in the absence of a catalysing event such as a North 
Korean attack over the DMZ.  The risks associated with military action, such as North 
Korea‘s deterrent posture and the estimated cost of war on the peninsula, are simply too high 
to be seriously considered. 
 
Efforts to extract concessions from Pyongyang by strangling the North Korean economy have 
not fared much better, owing to the disunity of purpose among regional states described 
above.  China and to a lesser extent South Korea have been unwilling to rigidly enforce the 
sanctions and interdiction regime erected by Washington to pressure North Korea, freeing 
Pyongyang from the vice that US officials had hoped would squeeze the North into making 
concessions on its nuclear program.   North Korea‘s growing trade with China has allowed it 
to avoid making denuclearisation concessions to the United States to access international 
markets because it is already plugged into the global economy via its relationship with China. 
 
The most constructive progress has been made through the multilateral engagement process.  
Unfortunately, however, the diplomatic track became a dead letter after the North‘s 
successful nuclear test in 2009.  One of the key motivations of Pyongyang‘s participation in 
the Six Party Talks was a desire to extract concessions from regional states, a strategy that 
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worked reasonably well.  Yet by September 2008, negotiations had reached a point where the 
North was being asked to take significant steps toward nuclear dismantlement, steps that 
would degrade its operational nuclear capability.  Clearly, Pyongyang has no taste for this 
outcome, as its provocations throughout 2009 have amply demonstrated.  If the nuclear 
program was indeed a tool for extracting external inputs from the international community 
then by mid-2009, the Six Party Talks had reached the end of its usefulness for this purpose. 
 
Regional States Must Adapt to a Nuclear North Korea 
The final research question addressed by the thesis concerns the future of the North Korean 
nuclear issue.  The thesis concludes in Part IV that the Korean peninsula is a microcosm for 
the wider region, where strategic competition is the norm.  The most likely policy choices on 
offer reflect the limitations of a region in which countries have divergent strategic goals and 
varying commitments to nonproliferation on the Korean peninsula.  Regional states are most 
likely to adopt pragmatic policy positions as they navigate between these boundaries, 
avoiding pessimistic arms race scenarios but falling well short of the regional institutional 
cooperation hoped for by many.  One way or another, regional states will adapt to a nuclear-
armed North Korea. 
 
North Korea has joined the nuclear club within a region in which interstate relations are 
shaped by a security dilemma and a lack of cooperative security mechanisms with which to 
manage it.  Northeast Asia is potentially unstable because there is no institutionalised 
cooperative security architecture to regulate relations between regional states, as exists in 
Europe.  The Six Party Talks were regarded as the great hope for an embryonic multilateral 
security institution in the making, but with North Korea‘s nuclear ascension and the collapse 
of negotiations there appears to be little chance of it evolving into a more substantial regional 
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security organisation.  Because of the unviability of armed coercion and the failure of 
economic pressure as strategies for preventing and unwinding North Korea‘s nuclear 
proliferation, the collapse of denuclearisation negotiations may push regional states to adapt 
to the reality of a nuclear North Korea.  How they do so will shape the relative stability of the 
Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia over the coming decade. 
 
Abandoning denuclearisation negotiations will be a bitter pill to swallow.  For American 
officials, clinging to the Six Party Talks in some form or another is preferable to other 
choices that could be interpreted as failure or defeat, leading many officials and analysts to 
champion nuclear constrainment as a new raison d’être for the multilateral forum.  Although 
the battle to prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear power has been lost, they believe 
that an effort to limit the size of Pyongyang‘s future nuclear arsenal is still worthwhile.  After 
all, containing the North‘s weapon stockpile to a small number of weapons is preferable to 
allowing Pyongyang to rapidly expand its nuclear arsenal.  The problem is constrainment has 
virtually no chance of even getting off the ground while Pyongyang continues to indulge in 
diplomatic provocation, rocket launches and nuclear tests.  There is no evidence that the 
regime is inclined to participate in multilateral negotiations to cap its nuclear arsenal, nor are 
there incentives available that could entice it to do so.  The problem of leverage that plagued 
regional states in denuclearisation negotiations remains relevant in the context of nuclear 
constrainment. 
 
Regional states may come to realise the futility of constrainment and come to accept North 
Korea as a member of the nuclear club, either officially or implicitly.  There are three ways in 
which regional states can adapt to the new reality: first, regional states can balance against the 
North Korean threat within the framework of pre-existing alliance relationships.  Japan and 
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South Korea are protected under the American nuclear umbrella, while China shares a long-
standing alliance with the North.  Second, regional states could respond by developing their 
own nuclear deterrent, in the belief that alliance relationships will be insufficient to address 
the threat posed by Pyongyang.  Japan is the key player here; it feels the most acute 
existential threat from North Korea‘s nuclear and missile capabilities and is the non-nuclear 
state most likely to respond by pursuing its own nuclear deterrent.  If Japan goes down this 
road, leaders in South Korea will come under tremendous pressure to establish their own 
nuclear deterrent.  Finally, regional states may choose to develop confidence-building 
measures with Pyongyang and encourage it to become a responsible nuclear power, an 
outcome that proffers the best chance of enhancing regional stability. 
 
The most positive confidence-building tactic for regional states may be political and 
economic normalisation with the DPRK.  Political normalisation would entail the 
establishment of full diplomatic relations, including a peace treaty to end the Korean War, in 
conjunction with economic normalisation to encourage the North to integrate into the global 
trade system at its own pace.  The existence of rudimentary political trust between North 
Korea and its neighbours could prevent the crystallisation of conditions in which the North‘s 
nuclear deterrent stimulates pressure toward a destabilising arms race.  Similarly, the real 
economic benefits of careful economic contact with the global economy could dampen the 
financial temptation for Pyongyang to sell nuclear technology, lessen the incentive for it to 
engage in criminal activities and reduce the need for it to leverage threats in exchange for 
international largesse.  While normalisation is the most desirable path forward in terms of 
regional stability, it is also the least likely due to the multiple crosscutting cleavages that have 
plagued relations between regional states, discounting normalisation within a multilateral 
framework as a possibility.  Any one regional state considering bilateral normalisation with 
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the DPRK will have to consider the impact on its alliance relationships before moving 
forward. 
 
Coexistence, Not Disarmament 
The continued stability of Northeast Asia is largely dependent on how regional states respond 
to the North Korean nuclear threat.  The logic of denuclearisation and nonproliferation is no 
longer relevant.  Regional states need to develop new strategies that will allow them to 
coexist peacefully with North Korea, because the wildcard trends emerging at the global level 
may render cooperation all the more difficult if a modus vivendi cannot be reached.  
Whatever course of action regional states choose, it should be borne in mind that a nuclear 
North Korea can be deterred.  The motivations for Pyongyang‘s nuclear proliferation all trace 
back to a fundamental desire within the Kim regime to perpetuate its rule.  The very factors 
that have driven North Korea‘s quest for nuclear weapons are those that suggest it is unlikely 
to behave irresponsibly as a nuclear power.   
 
This thesis also highlights the narrow, blinkered perspective of the Western-centric field of 
nonproliferation, which tends only to consider the security prerogatives of the established 
nuclear powers.  That the leadership of a state may actually improve its external security and 
internal power through nuclear weapons acquisition is beyond the comprehension of the 
nonproliferation paradigm, which is why its proponents have such difficulty interpreting the 
decision-making calculus of proliferant states.  By examining nuclear proliferation through 
the lens of political economy, as this thesis has done, as well as that of security, academics 
may be able to lay the intellectual foundation upon which policy makers can ground a more 
realistic response to states who seek nuclear weapons.  This method of analysis is an addition 
to the nonproliferation literature that is sorely needed and could be applied fruitfully to the 
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case of Iran, Syria or any other would-be proliferators.  The intellectual challenge posed by 
this thesis is to recognise that the goal of denuclearisation, toward which regional states have 
expended great effort, is no longer a viable goal in the North Korean context.  This is 
uncharted terrain, a journey into which is the price to be paid for two decades of failed 
attempts to denuclearise the DPRK. 
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Epilogue 
 
In the period since mid-2009, there have been some intriguing developments in Korean 
peninsula affairs.  During the opening months of 2010, it appeared that North Korea might be 
willing to return to the Six Party Talks.  An article describing Kim Jong-il‘s visit to China, 
published by KCNA on March 8
th, showed some willingness on Kim‘s part to re-engage in 
the Six Party Talks: 
Kim Jong-il expressed the DPRK's willingness to provide favorable conditions for the 
resumption of the six-Party talks together with other parties to the talks, declaring that 
the DPRK remains unchanged in its basic stand to preserve the aim of denuclearizing 
the Korean Peninsula, implement the joint statement adopted at the six-Party talks and 
pursue a peaceful solution through dialogue.
1
 
Pyongyang‘s participation was conditional on the lifting of economic sanctions against it as 
well as negotiations for an official peace treaty to replace the 1953 Korean War armistice 
agreement.
2
  However, just prior to the publication of this thesis, tensions have again 
escalated on the Korean peninsula because of a North Korean provocation.   
 
On 26 March 2010, a South Korean navy corvette named the ROKS Cheonan sank in the 
Yellow Sea after an explosion pierced its hull, killing 46 seamen.  The Cheonan was 
patrolling the southern side of the disputed Northern Limit Line (NLL) maritime boundary 
between North and South Korea near Baengnyeong Island.
3
  The South Korean Ministry of 
Defense subsequently commissioned the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group (JIG), 
comprised of experts from South Korea as well as the US, Australia, Great Britain and 
Sweden, to conduct an investigation into the sinking.  The JIG report found that the explosion 
                                                 
1 KAROTKIN, J. 2010. All Eyes on China in Wake of Cheonan Sinking. Jamestown Foundation China Brief, X, pp. 4-8. 
2 CHA, V. 2010. The Sinking of the Cheonan . Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
http://csis.org/publication/sinking-cheonan [Accessed 3 May 2010].; JUNG-WOOK, K. & JEE-HO, Y. 2010. Nuclear sessions could be at 
hand: North seems ready to return to table . Seoul: JoongAng Ilbo, http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2917211 [Accessed 
30 May 2010]. 
3 CHA, V. 2010. The Sinking of the Cheonan . Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
http://csis.org/publication/sinking-cheonan [Accessed 3 May 2010]. 
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was caused by a shockwave caused by the detonation of a torpedo and was unequivocal in its 
conclusion that the torpedo was fired from a North Korean mini-submarine.  Remnants of a 
torpedo bearing the Hangul script ―1번‖ (translated as ―No. 1‖ in English) were dredged up 
from the seabed near the wreckage of the ship.  These markings matched those found on a 
known model of North Korean torpedo, suggesting that the recovered device was 
manufactured in North Korea.  Furthermore, it cited evidence that a small squad of North 
Korean mini-submarines left a North Korean naval base, accompanied by a mother ship, 
approximately 2-3 days before the Cheonan attack and returned to the base 2-3 days after the 
incident.  There were no other submarines from neighbouring countries in the vicinity at the 
time of the attack.
4
   
 
The Cheonan incident has highlighted a number of themes that have arisen through this 
thesis.  The response of South Korea, the US and other regional state has demonstrated how 
little capacity they have to influence North Korean behaviour through punishment.  A 
provocation of this magnitude is a clear violation of the Armistice Agreement and tantamount 
to an act of war.  Yet the South Korean response has been a measured one, reflecting Seoul‘s 
desire to avoid an escalation into broader military conflict, for reasons described in chapter 
seven.  The South Korean government‘s weak response reflects its compromised position as a 
hostage to a North Korean artillery and rocket assault.
5
  The weak response of regional states 
reflects their leverage deficit vis-à-vis North Korea, as discussed in chapters seven and eight.  
In reply to South Korea‘s response to the Cheonan incident, Pyongyang stated an intention to 
sever all relations with South Korea during the remainder of Lee Myung-bak‘s presidency 
                                                 
4 NK threatens to cut all relations with South . 2010. Seoul: Korea Times, 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/05/113_66513.html [Accessed 30 May 2010]. 
5 These measures include a prohibition on North Korean vessels in South Korean waters, a suspension of North-South trade, further 
restrictions on the visiting rights of South Koreans to the North, a freeze on new investment in North Korea, and a suspension in 
humanitarian aid to the North.  See: 2010. Announcement of Measures against North Korea. Seoul: ROK Ministry of Unification, 
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/2010MOU.pdf [Accessed 27 May 2010]. 
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and threatened ―tough measures‖ and ―all-out war‖ in response to any further punitive 
measures by the ROK and its US ally.
6
 
 
Rhetoric aside, the question remains as to why a North Korean submarine would attack the 
Cheonan.  One hypothesis suggests the torpedo attack could have been a retaliation for an 
incident in November 2009 in which two North Korean naval seamen were killed.  A North 
Korean naval patrol boat crossed the NLL, prompting warning fire from a South Korean 
vessel.  The North Korean patrol returned fire and was met with a crippling volley from the 
South Korean vessel, which disabled the North Korean boat.  The attack on the Cheonan may 
have been a reprisal for this incident.
7
   
 
A second possibility posits that the Cheonan attack could be a sign of instability within the 
regime leadership, where an external crisis has been engineered to bolster the domestic 
credentials of Kim Jong-il and his succession plan, which was described in chapter nine.
8
  
Kim Jong-il may deem such bold provocations necessary to secure institutional support for 
his son and anointed successor, Kim Jong-un, in the absence of a long grooming period in 
which Kim Jong-un could build his support within the military and the Party.  The Cheonan 
incident preceded Kim Jong-il‘s visit to China in early May, reportedly accompanied by his 
son.
9
  Kim Jong-un‘s inclusion in official state delegations and insertion into important 
institutional posts may be part of an accelerated grooming program, given urgency by Kim 
Jong-il‘s questionable health.  
                                                 
6 NK threatens to cut all relations with South . 2010. Seoul: Korea Times, 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/05/113_66513.html [Accessed 30 May 2010]; Investigation Result on the Sinking of 
ROKS "Cheonan"—The Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group . 2010. Seoul: ROK Ministry of Defense, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/20_05_10jigreport.pdf [Accessed 30 May 2010]. 
7 SIGAL, L. 2010. To Calm Korean Waters . Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, 
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10031Sigal.html [Accessed 30 May 2010]. 
8 CHA, V. 2010. The Sinking of the Cheonan . Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
http://csis.org/publication/sinking-cheonan [Accessed 3 May 2010]. 
9 SIGAL, L. 2010. To Calm Korean Waters . Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, 
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10031Sigal.html [Accessed 30 May 2010]. 
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A third theory suggests the attack was another provocation designed to constructed a coercive 
bargaining dynamic, with the intention of forcing Lee Myung-bak‘s government into 
negotiations to calm tensions through which Pyongyang could extract aid and inputs for its 
economy.
10
  This scenario is entirely consistent with past North Korean negotiating 
behaviour, outlined in chapter four, in which Pyongyang has shown a willingness to 
participate in negotiations while simultaneously engaging in provocations to increase its 
bargaining advantage.  If this suggestion is correct, it may represent a dangerous new phase 
of the coercive bargaining game in which Pyongyang has decided to engage in more extreme 
provocations to extract aid from the international community, confident that its nuclear 
weapons capability will deter military retaliation from South Korea and the United States.  In 
spite of some muscular rhetoric, the muted practical response of Seoul and Washington has 
done little to dissuade Pyongyang from this view.  
 
 
 
                                                 
10 KAROTKIN, J. 2010. All Eyes on China in Wake of Cheonan Sinking. Jamestown Foundation China Brief, X, p. 5. 
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